MEN OF MEXICO

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MEN OF MEXICO


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

Moctezuma II



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Men of Mexico

JAMES A. MAGNER

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In Memory
of My
Father and Mother

7-47- Herbert - History

Preface

If the writing of history and of men's deeds requires calm and impartial judgment, this is nowhere more true than in chronicling the men of Mexico — who are an integral part of the nation and rise, as it were, from its very soil. Mexico is a country of paradoxes. To the extravagant contrasts of mountains, deserts, and jungles, must be added the complications of its culture, ranging from high intellectual groups to the most primitive and elementary tribes. More distracting still have been the clashes of its ideas and philosophies, flowing over into the fields of emotion and bathing its history in blood. To a large extent, its social problems are still in the temperamental order, arising from the natural instability of a mixed, evolving race. The inquiring mind that wishes to have the answer to the Mexican problem put "in one word" is certain to be discouraged and even exasperated.

Mexico has been and still remains an Indian nation. But it is a nation that has been formed in Spanish molds, and indeed in terms of the glory of the Spanish Renaissance. Before the Spaniards arrived, it was hardly more than a geographic expanse. Only a small area could be called civilized; and this civilization was itself tottering on the brink of a cannibal collapse. Within a short time after the penetration of the sixteenth-century Spaniards, who were supermen if ever there were such, this expanse had become a worthy rival of the best in European organization and culture.

To understand the enormous driving power of the Spanish conquerors, it must be remembered that Spain itself had just emerged from a long period of military and religious crusade that recovered the Iberian Peninsula from the Moor. Granada was delivered in 1492, the same year that Columbus set foot in America. As a worthy representative of a stalwart race, Cortés brought to Mexico the full vigor of militant and mystic Spanish Catholicism.

From the encounter, there was erected a new nation. Feudal forms of society were established, dictated in part from the patterns of European law and society, in part by the necessities of the situation, and in part by the greed of adventuresome colonists and by the needs of Charles V and of the Spanish treasury. All these factors were moderated by Christian influences, which in turn became identified with the nation and its people. Thus arose the greatness of the sixteenth century, in art and in general appreciation as well as in expansion and material wealth. From the beginning, this New Spain expressed its thought in grandiose terms.

Nevertheless, Spain failed to make a complete penetration and to create a homogeneous race. This was because of limited immigration from the homeland as well as because of profound cultural and racial distinctions within the conquered Indian tribes. Hence there remained a division, not only between European Spaniards and Creoles, or their white descendants born in Mexico, but also between Creoles, mixed bloods, and pure-blooded Indians. And darker blood has a way of reasserting itself.

Further and more unfortunate confusion has arisen from the struggles of Catholicism to maintain itself against the crusading reformers of nineteenth-century rationalist liberalism. This fight was frequently confused and intensified by the battles of political centralism and federalism. Then there was and still remains the silent antagonism of Spanish forms of thought, or more concretely what is called *Hispanidad,* and Northern or "Anglo-Saxon" ideas. Today the problem, interwoven with many elements, is complicated by the advance of militant Marxism.

Failure to make necessary human compromises has been responsible for much of the conflict and much of the violence of civil war that devastated the country, almost from the beginning of independence. To this failure must be added the fatal trinity of passionate destruction, selfish exploitation, and cynicism that have made the most of national instability and weakness. As a result, the finest elements of Mexico have often been ignored or trampled underfoot, while raucous and disorderly elements have been glorified and made to appear decisive.

To retrace the pattern of Mexican evolution is therefore no easy task; and in the end, one may find himself engaged in advancing his own philosophy rather than in presenting facts and analyzing mentalities. But if history is the record of men's deeds, and the forms taken by society are the shadows cast by men, then it is perhaps to the personal element that we must turn if we are to have a sympathetic understanding of the nation, and to its leading men if we are to read its destinies. Mexico is a nation of tremendous vitality. What it and its own men have to say in their own behalf deserves the most complete understanding and respect. It is to this task that we turn in this book.

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MEN OF MEXICO

CHAPTER I

Moctezuma II

EMPEROR OF THE AZTECS

i

In 1325, a tribe of brave but hunted men, without home or country, arrived at a miserable island in a lake on the high central plateau of Mexico and founded a settlement which they called Tenochtitlán, after their religious leader Tenoch. Two centuries later that village had grown into a resplendent city, with towers and temples, and moats and causeways dominating a federation of peoples. Its tribute gatherers ranged the entire country to exact taxes where its armies led in conquest. Now, in the year 1502, began to rule its sixth monarch, the noble Moctezuma II. His was a triple office: emperor, supreme commander of the army, and high priest. He had come to the throne with an enviable record as a warrior and enjoyed the universal love and respect of the Aztec nation. Reserved in manner, cultured, and religious, he enjoyed a prestige as great as monarch might reasonably hope for.

When the Spaniards arrived in Mexico, Moctezuma was about forty years old, "of good height," as Bernal Díaz relates in his famous memoirs, "and well proportioned, slender and spare of flesh, not very swarthy, but of the natural color and shade of an Indian. He did not wear his hair long, but just so as to cover his ears. His scanty black beard was well shaped and thin. His face was somewhat long, but cheerful, and he had good eyes and showed in his appearance and manner both tenderness and, when necessary, gravity."[1]

Following his election by the elders, he immediately undertook the traditional war to obtain victims for the sacrifices of the coronation service, and amid the bloody rites began the disastrous reign that was to bring the Aztec Empire to its doom.

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[1] Bernal Díaz, *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico;* cf. A. P. Maudslay's translation (George Routledge & Sons, London, 1933), p. 289.

The origin of his Aztec ancestors is fairly shrouded in fable, although their emergence from seven caves is chronicled, together with their passage down the western coast from the north in company with other tribes, their trek through the region of Michoacán, and their settling at Chapultepec about the beginning of the thirteenth century. At the latter place they were whipped in battle by the Tecpanecs and Chalcans. Their leader Huitzilhuitl was taken prisoner and killed. After further wanderings they asked the ruler of Colhuacan for land and received Tizapan, a barren, rattlesnake-infested region. There they lived on friendly terms with their benefactors and intermarried with them.

Imposed upon, however, by the stronger tribe, they decided to move again. At this moment, according to the story, the deity appeared by night to one of the priests and advised the foundation of a city on the spot where an eagle would appear perched upon a cactus with a serpent in its claws. The spot was found on an island, with the eagle according to prophecy; and a temple was at once reared to the terrible god of war, Huitzilopochtli. This event has been permanently memorialized in the Mexican national seal of the eagle perched upon the cactus and grasping a viper in its talons. The word Tenochtitlán actually means "the place of the cactus growing from a rock."[2]

The supremacy of the Aztec during the succeeding centuries was but an incident in the development of the Indian tribes of the American Continent, and even in the territory which is known today as Mexico. Human remains discovered with the bones of extinct animals such as the giant sloth, bison, and mastodon, in both North and South America give evidence of man's arrival in the New World as far back as twenty thousand years ago. It is now commonly agreed that the basic stock of the

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[2] Without questioning this explanation, one may note that the symbols of the rock and the cactus made up the word picture or ideograph of the chief Tenoch. It is not improbable that the eagle, as the symbol of greatness in war, was added later, and this was completed by the glyph of the vanquished serpent.

American Indian is Mongoloid, akin to the Chinese. It seems clear that successive migrations from Asia took place across the Behring Straits and thence down through the continent. There may have been some arrivals also from the Polynesian Islands and possibly some strains from Africa.

The most ancient of recorded cultures within Mexican territory are those which are roughly called Mayan. These extended from the coastal regions near Vera Cruz, down through Yucatán, and on through Guatemala and Honduras. The Zapotecan culture flourished with its magnificent mountaintop temples in the state of Oaxaca. From the ninth to the twelfth centuries, the Toltecs dominated the great central plateau, constructing their religious and cultural capital at Teotihuacán near Mexico City, where their grandiose pyramids and altars may still be seen.[3]

To the Toltecs is due the legend of Quetzalcoatl, said to have been a white-skinned, bearded prophet, the last of their leaders, who mysteriously disappeared, with the promise of one day returning to the country and taking up his rule again. When Cortés invaded the country, he was immediately assumed by the natives to be the fulfillment of this prophecy, a fact which played an important part in the Spanish Conquest. The Toltecs seem to have established a federation of communities. Culturally, they were profoundly influenced by the Mayans, to their south; and in turn they imposed their rule and bloody religion upon these peoples.[4] Invaders from the North speaking the Nahua tongue, a derivative still spoken by Indian groups as far north as Montana and Oregon, later succeeded in destroying this federation, and establishing or inhabiting the city states of Azcapatzalco, Colhuacan, Texcoco, and Tlacopán.[5] Upon this scene later arrived the Aztecs, also speaking Nahua and humbly applying to the ruler of the Colhuacans for a spot of ground to settle upon.

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[3] Cf. George C. Vaillant, *Artists and Craftsmen in Ancient Central America* (New York, 1935).

[4] Cf. Diego de Landa, *Relación de las Cosas de Yucatán* (Mexico, 1938).

[5] According to Dr. Nicolás León there are still 17 indigenous language groups in Mexico, comprising 35 idioms and more than 130 dialects. Besides these, more than 60 languages have been entirely lost. All, however, can be grouped in three divisions: the Nahua, the Otomi, and the Maya.

The rise of the Aztec nation was due principally to a series of clever alliances against its enemies and a maneuvering into the position of leadership within these alliances. In 1375 the Aztecs united with the Colhuacans by electing as their chief ruler Acamapichtli, whose mother was a daughter of the Colhuacan chieftain. Then they joined hands with the Chalcans and Azcapotzalcans, to whom they had paid tribute, in a war against Xochimilco and Texcoco. Later they united with Texcoco to crush both of these allies and formed a federation with the Texcocans and Tlacapáns which lasted, even to distributing the spoils of war, until the Spanish Conquest. Under Itzcoatl, the Aztecs assumed leadership of this federation and thus gained the leading position in the country. The weakness of this arrangement, however, lay in the fact that its power depended on force. The other tribes which paid tribute to it never gave more than a grudging servitude, while retaining their own identities. Many of them, notably the Tlaxcalans, kept up a bitter feudal grudge which played into the hands of the Spaniards under Cortés and gave to the Conquest the character of civil war.

In 1440, Moctezuma I, the son of Huitzilhuitl and nephew of Itzcoatl, was elected to rule his people, and began the program of aggressive warfare that carried beyond the valley of Mexico. He succeeded in subduing Cuernavaca and penetrated as far as the Zapotec country of Oaxaca, the hot Totonac territory of Vera Cruz, and the southern part of what is today the state of Guerrero. He was succeeded by Axayácatl, who seems to have been his son. This warrior went as far as Guatusco, a town on the Pacific coast near the frontier of Guatemala. The next ruler, Tizoc, concentrated his energies on building pyramids and enlarging the temple of Huitzilopochtli, the god of war. His people, however, regarded him as a coward, and he was poisoned. In 1486 his brother Ahuitzol assumed command, strengthened the federation of tribes even so far as definitely subduing the Zapotecs, and completed the temple in the capital. The dedication of this structure, it is alleged, was celebrated by the sacrifice of 20,000 human victims. The Tarascans of Michoacán and the Tlaxcalans alone remained independent. To Moctezuma II, Axayácatl's son, fell the ungrateful fate of becoming the prisoner of Cortés, of witnessing the revolt of many of his subject tribes, and finally of being stoned by his own people.

ii

There is considerable difference of opinion on the amount of power that descended to Moctezuma II. Following the ancient procedure, he was elected to his seat by an assembly of the clan chiefs, ancients, and leading priests. The vote of this group had to be unanimous, and their choice was limited to a single line, usually a younger brother of the deceased monarch or a son if the brother did not meet requirements. This assembly also had the power of deposition, which it actually exercised when it removed Moctezuma from office because of his inability to rule effectively or independently after his imprisonment by the Spaniards.

According to Prescott and the early Spanish writers, Moctezuma was an emperor of unlimited powers. Bandelier maintains, however, that as an elected executive, he enjoyed a limited personal authority. A more current opinion regards him as having been the federation chief with as much power as he could wrest from the Executive Council.

Apparently Moctezuma II made the most of his opportunities. Upon his elevation to the throne he removed from office all who had served during the reign of his uncle Ahuitzol and, by putting in young nobles, established an aristocracy. He was accorded high honors befitting a demigod. When Cortés first met him and made as though he was going to embrace him, the nobles who accompanied Moctezuma held back the Spaniard by the arm, since they considered this beneath the dignity of their monarch. He was carried in a litter, and carpets were spread before him so that his feet never touched ground. No one could enter the royal palace without removing his shoes, and even the nobles were compelled to put off their adornments and appear before him in inferior dress. Subjects wishing to do business made three profound bows, saying reverently "*Tlatoani* (Lord), *Notlatoani* (my Lord), *Hueitlatoani* (great Lord)." They spoke without raising their eyes and had to back out under pain of death.

The executive council was made up of one representative from each of the twenty *calpullis* or geographic clans, which formed a ward of Mexico City. Each *calpulli* had its own military and civil leaders and council, its own patronal god and communal house. Each also held title to land which was partly worked communally for tribute and religious offerings and partly distributed to families or communities, which worked it without holding a transferable title to it. These latter communities and holdings survived as *ejidos* during colonial times, protected by the civil government and Church against the encroachment of large landowners, but largely crumbled after the inauguration of the so-called liberal policies and reforms of Juárez in 1857.[6]

This social and executive arrangement was supplemented by another, more ritualistic in character, consisting of four quarters and embracing groups of five *calpullis,* each with its own temple, war chieftain, armory, and boys' college. The judicial courts were similarly based on clan divisions, with a single court of appeal for the people, located in the emperor's palace, and another for the nobility, presided over by an official known as the "Snake Woman." Besides these courts, there were special tribunals for the military.

As with most primitive peoples, military service and pageantry loomed large in the social fabric of the Aztecs, closely identified with religious ritual. After the four days of coronation festivities, Moctezuma II with regal pride launched a series of military expeditions, not all of which, however, were of equal success. He first went to Atlixco and declared war on Malinal, the chief of Tlachquiauhco in Mixteca, because the latter refused to give him a certain flowering tree. Malinal was captured and put to death. In 1504, to end an ancient feud, he undertook a campaign against the Tlaxcalans, placing his army under the command of his brother Tlacahuepan. The Tlaxcalans, however, surprised the invaders and killed their general, and successive avenging expeditions were similarly dispersed. The following year the Aztecs suffered a scarcity of seed grain, but military expeditions against various provinces remedied this defect.

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[6] Besides the communal properties, there were large estates held by the nobility or warriors. These passed from father to son, like the *ejidos,* but their title resided, not in the *calpulli* or community, but in the Aztec ruler. It was these estates that the Spaniards confiscated, commanding the services of the peasants who had formerly aided in the harvests, and reducing their overlords to the condition of servile managers, when they remained tractable.

Meanwhile, Moctezuma II rebuilt the acqueduct of Chapultepec and erected a pantheon to all the gods of the earth, calling it Coateocalli. He then undertook a third campaign against Tlaxcala and took as prisoner the famous Tlalhuicole, a warrior of herculean strength and valor. His treatment of this captive is typical. Tlalhuicole was taken back to Mexico City and shown every consideration, even being sent as a general in an indecisive war against the king of Michoacán. He was finally granted the trial of a gladiatorial combat, the only honorable way a prisoner could hope for liberation. But, although he killed 6 adversaries and wounded 20 others, he was finally delivered to the sacrificial altar of Huitzilopochtli.[7]

iii

The outstanding act of the Aztec ritual was human sacrifice, so that wars assumed the double character of subduing other tribes and capturing victims alive. In many instances, as before the coronation of Moctezuma, military expeditions were sent out with no other thought in mind than to obtain material for the sacrifices. The Spaniards dreaded capture more than death, for they knew what it would mean. Bernal Díaz gives a thrilling account of the sacrifice of some of his comrades who had been captured by the Aztecs during the siege of Mexico City.

"Again there was sounded the dismal drum of Huichilobos," he writes, "and many other shells and horns and things like trumpets, and the sound of them all was terrifying, and we looked towards the lofty Cue where they were being sounded, and saw that our comrades whom they had captured when they defeated Cortés were being carried by force up the steps, and they were taking them to be sacrificed. When they got them up to a small square in front of the oratory, where their accursed idols are kept, we saw them place plumes on the heads of many of them, and with things like fans in their hands they forced them to dance before Huichilobos, and after they had danced, they immediately placed them on their backs on some rather narrow stones which had been prepared as places for sacrifice, and with stone knives they sawed open their chests and drew out their palpitating hearts and offered them to the idols that were there, and they kicked the bodies down the steps, and the Indian butchers who were waiting below cut off the arms and feet and flayed the skin off the faces, and prepared it afterwards like glove leather with the beards on, and kept those for the festivals when they celebrated drunken orgies, and the flesh they ate in *chilmole*. In the same way they sacrificed all the others and ate the legs and arms and offered the hearts and blood to their idols, as I have said, and the bodies, that is their entrails and feet, they threw to the tigers and lions which they kept in the house of the carnivores which I have spoken about in an earlier chapter.

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[7] Huichilobos or Huitzilopochtli, the war god of the Aztecs, was the special patron of Moctezuma, who constantly ordered prayers and human sacrifices to him to learn the will of heaven. His shrine with that of Tezcatlipoca, the god of Hell and the future life, said to be the brother of the war god, was situated on the top of the great temple in Mexico City. Díaz describes their statues and adds, "The walls were so clotted with blood and the soil so bathed with it that in the slaughterhouses of Spain there is not such another stench." A. P. Maudslay suggests that among the probable causes which led to the disappearance of the earlier races in Mexico and the abandonment of the cities of Central America must be included the triumph of the bloody war god Huitzilopochtli over the peaceful, civilizing cult of Quetzalcoatl, or Kukulcan as he is known in the Mayan country.

"When we saw these cruelties all of us in our camp said the one to the other: 'Thank God that they are not carrying me off today to be sacrificed.' "[8]

According to Díaz, it was rumored that Moctezuma himself was accustomed to eat a dish made of the flesh of young boys, but, he adds, "I know for certain that after our Captain censured the sacrifice of human beings, and the eating of their flesh, he ordered that such food should not be prepared for him thenceforth." In spite of repeated demands by Cortés, however, Moctezuma refused to give up the practice of human sacrifice.[9]

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[8] Maudslay's translation, *op. cit.,* pp. 568–569.

[9] Orozco y Berra estimates the number of victims annually sacrificed throughout the empire at 20,000, although he admits that during years of special occasion, like that of the dedication of the great temple of Mexico,

Human sacrifice had become regarded as an absolute necessity to keep the gods propitiated and to insure good crops. The sacrificial victims were assured of a direct entrance into Paradise. There was a sacrifice in honor of the sun every 260 days. Large numbers of children were annually sacrificed to the rain god, or Tlaloc. Often the captives were forced to fight with mock weapons before the sacrifice. The heart of the victim was usually cut out, as Díaz describes, the body was rolled down the pyramid, and the blood was drawn off and sprinkled on the walls of the shrine or worked into the hair of the priests. Describing the priests at Tlaxcala, Díaz writes, "Their hair was very long and tangled so that it could not be parted unless it were cut, and it was clotted with blood which oozed from their ears, which on that day they had cut by way of sacrifice."

Fundamentally all the religious practices of the Aztecs, like those of primitive peoples everywhere, were based upon the cult of divinity in nature. The Mexican civilization was based upon agriculture, in particular upon the cultivation of maize, so that the whole pantheon of gods in some way was rooted in the idea of crops and fertility. When Cortés suggested to Moctezuma that a cross and an image be set up to confound the Aztec gods on the great temple tower, the Emperor replied: "Señor Malinche, if I had known that you would have said such defamatory things, I would not have shown you my gods. We consider them to be very good, for they give us health and rains and good seed times and seasons and as many victories as we desire, and we are obliged to worship them and to make sacrifices, and I pray you not to say another word in their dishonor."

According to the chronicler Fray Torquemada, more than 5000 persons were employed in one capacity or the other for the service of the temple of Huitzilopochtli in Mexico City. At the head of this cult there was a high priest known as Quetzalcoatl Totec, who shared a religious supremacy under Moctezuma with the chief priest of the cult of Tlaloc. Moreover, every important god had its own hierarchy.[10]

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the number would be much greater. Cf. also William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico*, Bk. I, Chap. 3, "Human Sacrifices."

[10] Cf. Bernardino de Sahagún, *Historia General de las Cosas de Nueva España* (Mexico, 1938), tomo I, lib. 3 and *passim*.

The cult of Tlaloc, or of the innumerable deities that shared this name, was perhaps the one most dear to the people. Together with the supreme Tlaloc, there were three others who combined to form a kind of high council to rule the four world directions. The Tlalocs were mountain gods, who controlled the rains, snows, hail, storms, rivers, and wells, and all the elements which mean life to the farmer. Of the sky gods, the most important were Tonatiuh, god of the sun and source of all life, and Metzli, of the moon. In the underworld, Mictlantecutli and his wife Mictecaciuatl, ruled over Mictlan, or the abode of the dead who could not as warriors enter the abode of the sun or, by burial, enter Tlalocan. A tendency toward monotheism could be seen in the cult of Tezcatlipoca, or "Smoking Mirror," who was regarded as an all-powerful, ubiquitous deity, who beheld everything in the world. He was represented also as the great enemy of Quetzalcoatl.

From the standpoint of the final destinies of the Aztec empire, the latter god was to play a part of paramount importance. Quetzalcoatl, or "Quetzal-snake," becomes a figure of particularly intriguing interest because he has become confused with the famous white leader of the Toltecs.[11] The tradition of such a personage was so widespread and constant among the various tribes of Mexico that his reality can hardly be denied. While some commentators have attempted to identify him with St. Thomas the Apostle or with St. Thomas de Meliapor, it is more probable that he was a shipwrecked adventurer or missionary. It is supposed that he introduced the cross to the Anahuac tribes, and that this symbol, which is found in different parts of Mexico is due to him, with the exception of such as the cross of Palenque, which appears to be older than Christianity. Being of European origin, he could easily predict that he would be followed by other men from the Continent.

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[11] The word *Quetzal* is the name of a rare and beautiful bird of southern Mexico, valuable in feather mosaics for its tail feathers. This had led some observers to think that the cult came up from the South. Queztalcoatl came to be worshiped under the figure of a feathered serpent, which serves as the principal ceremonial motive of the pyramids throughout Mexico. Cuevas points out that according to the annals of Cuahutitlán, Quetzalcoatl was born in A.D. 895, arrived at Tulancingo in 922, became priest-king of Tollan in 925, and died in 935. Rejecting the idea of Orozco y Berra that this more or less probable personage was a Scandinavian from Greenland, the same author declares that the crosses referred to are a symbol of rain and states as his belief that Christianity was not introduced into Mexico prior to the coming of the Spaniards. Cf. Mariano Cuevas, *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, Tex., 1928), tomo I, pp. 94, 95.

His superior culture and personal leadership might easily have led to his deification after his death. According to the legend, he came from the east, wore crosses on his clothing, and after his death was converted into the planet Venus, under the calendar name of 1 Acatl. He is said to have predicted his return in a year corresponding to the year 1 Acatl, and this coincidence actually led Moctezuma II to believe that Cortés represented the fulfillment of the prophecy.

Quetzalcoatl became known as the wind god, also the god of agriculture and fertility. He was known to be opposed to human sacrifice. The center of his cult was Cholula, where the remains of his great pyramid may still be seen, now crowned by a Catholic church.[12]

iv

The energies of the Aztecs were by no means consumed in religious ceremonial. A frugal and industrious people, they made excellent use of the bounties that nature placed at their disposal. At the time of Moctezuma II, the population of the Mexico dominated by the Aztecs was certainly not less than 16,000,000. This figure was later reduced by the wars of the Spanish Conquest, the burdens placed upon the Indians in the Spanish mines, the flight of many natives to the mountain recesses to maintain their freedom, and epidemics of smallpox, which took more than 2,000,000 persons.

From the standpoint of natural resources, climate, and scenic beauty, Mexico is ideally placed. The great central plateau, rising between 6000 and 9000 feet above sea level, enjoys a moderate climate the year round, while the rapid descent to the sea on either side provides every variation including the most tropical conditions. Maize, beans, cocoa, chile, tomatoes, vanilla, and a great variety of fruits formed staples of cultivation, while cotton was extensively raised and used for making garments. Crops such as wheat and oats were later introduced by the Spaniards.

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[12] J. Eric Thompson, *Mexico Before Cortez* (New York, 1933), pp. 157–161.

Although bloody and warlike in their religion, the Aztecs were otherwise a people of moderate habits. Drunkenness was disapproved, except for certain ceremonials.[13] Matrimony was held in great favor, and polygamy was prohibited, although the kings and nobles had many wives and concubines.[14] Moctezuma II had many mistresses, daughters of chieftains, besides two great queens as his legitimate wives. Slaves were sold in the market, 20 cotton mantles being the average price. Bernal Díaz, describing his visit to the market place of Tlatelolco, says: "Then there were other wares consisting of Indian slaves, both men and women; and I say that they bring as many of them to that great market for sale as the Portuguese bring Negroes from Guinea; and they brought them along tied to long poles, with collars round their necks so that they could not escape, and others they left free." A slave might own property in the communal way and possess other slaves. The children of slaves were free, but the children of destitute families were often sold as slaves.

The Aztecs were particularly successful in marketing. The great market, or Tianquixtli, was held at the end of the five-day week and set up in the great plaza accommodating nearly 60,000 persons. Each product or ware was given a special section, and the entire affair was carefully governed by magistrates and inspectors. "We were astounded at the number of people and the quantity of merchandise that it contained," says Díaz, "and at the good order and control that was maintained, for we had never seen such a thing before."

In the sciences, the medicinal qualities of herbs were widely classified, and the use of anesthesia was known. The Aztecs were good astronomers and were able to measure time even more accurately than their European contemporaries.

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[13] Sahagún, *op. cit.*, tomo I, lib. 2, pp. 199, 214; lib. 3, p. 293.

[14] There is considerable difference of opinion on this matter. Cf. William H. Prescott, *op. cit.*, Bk. I, Chap. 5, "Domestic Manners."

Records of events were kept in hieroglyphic codices. Phonetic writing was unknown, but the Mexicans were faithful artists, quick at catching the essential idea and reproducing it in their drawings. When news of Cortés' arrival on the coast reached Moctezuma, he immediately dispatched artists to make a record of what they saw, and so faithful was the report of horses and men that the Spaniards themselves were amazed. The portrait of Cortés was so cleverly done that Moctezuma and his chiefs immediately recognized the striking resemblance of one of the Aztec lords, a certain Quintalbor, whom they dispatched as an emissary to the Spaniard.

It is probable that only a small number of persons were capable of interpreting the more involved codices. These were a combination of hieroglyphic and pictographic writings painted on both sides of a single long sheet about 6 inches wide and as long as 34 feet. The codices, which folded like a screen, were made of amatl paper, a product of the maguey cactus, or of hide, covered with a thin coating of lime. A few of them recorded the lives of individuals; some dealt with religious matters; others listed tributes, and preserved matters of history and instruction.[15]

Although the Aztecs, in common with the other American Indians, were ignorant of the wheel and of the arch in architecture, they constructed pyramids, temples, and dwellings that were the admiration of the Spaniards. The city of Tenochtitlán, with a population of over 300,000 inhabitants at the time of Moctezuma II, must have presented an unforgettable sight. It was built on the waters on Lake Texcoco. Passage from house to house was effected, as in Venice, by boats, and the entire city was protected by drawbridges over three causeways. The Spanish soldiers had received good accounts of what to expect, from Indian chieftains along the way, and in particular from one Olintecle. "But," says Díaz, "in reality Mexico was much stronger and had better munitions and defences than anything he told us about, for it is one thing to have seen the place itself and its strength, and quite another to describe it as I do."

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[15] Relatively high literary culture was attained in the writings of the poet-king of Texcoco, Nezahualcoyotl. Cf. W. H. Prescott, *op. cit.*, Bk. I, Chap. 6; also Sahagún, *op. cit.*, tomo V.

Perhaps the best bird's-eye view of the city is that afforded by Díaz himself. "Then Moctezuma took Cortés by the hand," he writes in describing the ascent to the great pyramid of Huitzilopochtli, "and told him to look at his great city and all the other cities that were standing in the water, and the many other towns on the land round the lake, and that if he had not seen the great market place well, that from where they were they could see it better. So we stood looking about us, for that huge and cursed temple stood so high that from it one could see over everything very well, and we saw the three causeways which led into Mexico, that is the causeway of Iztapalapán by which we had entered four days before, and that of Tacuba, and that of Tepeaquilla (Guadalupe), and we saw the fresh water that comes from Chapultepec which supplies the city, and we saw the bridges on the three causeways which were built at certain distances apart through which the water of the lake flowed in and out from one side to the other, and we beheld on that great lake a multitude of canoes, some coming with supplies of food and others returning loaded with cargoes of merchandise; and we saw that from every house of that great city and of all the other cities that were built in the water it was impossible to pass from house to house, except by drawbridges which were made of wood or in canoes; and we saw in those cities Cues and oratories like towers and fortresses and all gleaming white, and it was a wonderful thing to behold; then the houses with flat roofs, and on the causeways other small towers and oratories which were like fortresses."[16]

Many of the finer homes were those of the feudal lords of the empire, for Moctezuma demanded that his vassals, no matter how distant they might be, should establish a house in the capital for their sons to remain there as a proof of fidelity. His own palace, sumptuous with barbaric splendor, was built of stone and adorned with marble and alabaster. Its façade was sculptured with his coat of arms, made up of an eagle, with a tiger in its talons. More than 100 parlors, and as many other baths with gardens were included in the structure, all adorned with gold and silver, cotton tapestries, mosaics of feathers in which the Aztec artists excelled, skins of animals, flowers, and perfumes. His personal service embraced some 3000 servants.

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[16] Maudslay's translation, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–303.

He bathed daily, and changed his garments four times, using them only once and then distributing them among his vassals. He dined at noon and in the evening on a great table spread with white cloth. More than 100 kinds of food were placed before him, each in a brazier to keep it warm. During the meal he sometimes spoke with his consultors and sometimes was entertained by jesters and dancers, for as Díaz remarks, he "was fond of pleasure and song." At the end of the meal he smoked a little tobacco and then slept.

Besides his private palace, he maintained also recreational palaces in Chapultepec for himself, his ally kings, and guests. The Spanish invaders were much impressed also with his zoo which he had installed in a large building with a beautiful court and four sections, one for ferocious quadrupeds like wildcats and mountain lions, one for birds of prey, one for serpents and reptiles, and one equipped with tanks for amphibians of all kinds. There was also a birdhouse maintained at great expense. His gardens were planted with every kind of Mexican plant including the most rare specimens. In addition to these wonders, he kept a house of deformed men and hunchbacks.

The cost of maintaining these establishments was undoubtedly one of the causes for dissention in the empire, for the taxgatherers of Moctezuma II were everywhere at work.[17] Cortés, on his way to the capital, everywhere received complaints of this. At Cempoalla, for example, the chief complaints that every year many of their sons and daughters were required by Moctezuma II for sacrifice and others for service in the royal houses and plantations. The taxgatherers carried off their wives and daughters, if they were beautiful, and ravished them. Their entrance into a town was marked by a ceremonious arrogance. "Their cloaks and loin cloths," Díaz says, "were embroidered richly, and their shining hair was gathered up as though tied on their heads, and each one was smelling the roses that he carried, and each had a crooked staff in his hand. Their Indian servants carried fly-whisks and they were accompanied by many of the chief men of other towns, who until they had shown them to their lodgings and brought them food of the best, never left them." When Cortés dared to seize these taxgatherers and ordered the local chieftains to pay no more tribute or obedience to Moctezuma, it was immediately assumed that the white men were gods, since no human being would have the courage to do such things.

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[17] Cf. William H. Prescott, *op. cit.*, Bk. II, Chap. 6.

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In spite of his barbaric grandeur and the power which he wielded over his tributaries, Moctezuma II was inherently a man of indecision and fear, both traits undoubtedly proceeding from his superstitions. From the beginning of the Spaniards' entrance into his realms, he alternated between gestures of great generosity and schemes of secret treachery. The priests of Moctezuma II, who were sent to interview the Spaniards at Cholula, acknowledged that their master changed his mind several times every day and could not come to any decision regarding the invaders. Sometimes he would send orders to pay them every respect and guide them on their way to the city. At other times he would reverse the order and declare it was not his wish that they should come to the capital but that they should be killed in Cholula or be sent, bound, to Mexico City.

When he was no longer able to prevent them from coming to the capital, he hoped under pretense of hospitality to lure them into a trap and slay them. On the one hand, he feared and even acknowledged that Cortés was the reincarnation of Quetzalcoatl and as such should take over the reign of his people. But at the same time he realized that the invaders were only flesh and blood like himself. "You must be tired, Señor Malinche," he said to Cortés, as he led him up the great pyramid. Whereupon the crafty Spaniard replied that he and his companions were never tired by anything.

During the last years of his reign a number of omens had appeared to prepare him for the worst. He had witnessed two eclipses of the sun. Comets appeared in 1516 and 1518. In 1510 a great light appeared consecutively on several nights from the east. Alarmed by this phenomenon, he called for his counselor, Nezahualpilli, the king of Texcoco, who interpreted the event as a sign that in a short time foreigners would come to take away his sovereignty. Nezahualpilli was so convinced of his augury that he offered to stake his crown in a game of pelota to demonstrate its truth; and although he had previously been beaten regularly, this time he won the contest. As a matter of fact, Alonso de Ojeda had already set foot on Darien in 1509. There had been some fighting between the Spaniards and the natives, so that rumors must have already come to the ears of the prophet.

From then on, every unusual event was taken as an omen of coming disaster. Among the most remarkable things recounted is that of the resurrection of the Princess Papantzin, the sister of Moctezuma, who had been buried after a pompous funeral in 1509 in a grotto of the palace garden. Upon her return to life, the Princess narrated a vision she had beheld, in which an angel, marked with a cross, announced the coming of white men, who would preach the true god, and declared that she would be the first to be baptized. It is possible that details of this story may have crept in after the Conquest; but, as a matter of history, the Princess was the first to be baptized in Tlatelolco, receiving the name of María. Similar events and interpretations appeared to corroborate the ancient prophecies of Quetzalcoatl, so that Moctezuma II believed it useless to resist what the gods had decreed.

So far as the Spaniards were concerned, the first great mistake he made was to dispatch a load of rich gifts to the invaders with the promise of more if they would only stay out of his territory. "The first article presented," writes Bernal Díaz, "was a wheel like a sun, as big as a cart-wheel, with many sorts of pictures on it, the whole of fine gold, and a wonderful thing to behold, which those who afterwards weighed it said was worth more than ten thousand dollars. Then another wheel was presented of greater size made of silver of great brilliancy in imitation of the moon with other figures shown on it, and this was of great value as it was very heavy — and the chief brought back the helmet full of fine grains of gold, just as they are got out of the mines, and this was worth three thousand dollars. This gold in the helmet," he adds significantly, "was worth more to us than if it had contained twenty thousand dollars, because it showed us that there were good mines there. . . . And then over thirty loads of beautiful cotton cloth were brought worked with many patterns and decorated with many colored feathers, and so many other things were there that it is useless my trying to describe them for I know not how to do it."

Cortés returned the compliments with some glass beads, a cup of Florentine ware, and three holland shirts and declared that, since he had come across the sea to interview the great Moctezuma, nothing could deter him.

When the monarch heard of the Spaniards' victory over his old enemies, the Tlaxcalans, he reinforced these gifts substantially and offered to become a vassal of the Spanish Emperor, paying any stipulated tribute, providing the invaders would stop their onward march. The terrain, he said, was very bad around the capital, and he did not wish to see them undergoing such hardships as this would involve. "Malinche," declared the ambassadors from the Aztec Emperor, "Our Lord the Great Moctezuma begs as a favor, that you will not advance any farther but return whence you have come, and he promises to send you to the port a great quantity of gold and silver and rich stones for that King of yours, and, as for you, he will give you four loads of gold and for each of your brothers one load, but as for going on to Mexico your entrance into it is forbidden, for all his vassals have risen in arms to prevent your entry, and besides this there is no road thither, only a very narrow one, and there is no food for you to eat."[18]

Stimulated by these evidences of great wealth, the Spaniards let no obstacles stand in their way to capture the goose that laid these golden eggs. Nor were they disappointed in their first view of the vacillating monarch when he came out with a brilliant equipage to welcome the Spaniards on their arrival at the capital. He had secretly put every obstacle in their way, and when force of arms had failed, he resorted to cajolery. Now he came out to the causeway, supported by his great chiefs beneath a rich canopy of green feathers which was embroidered with gold and silver, pearls and other precious stones.

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[18] The Aztecs referred to Cortés as Marina's captain or Malinche, although this name is now used for Doña Marina, his faithful interpreter.

Once they were installed as his guests in the royal palaces, the Spaniards were again weighted down with gifts; but not satisfied with what they received, they made their way, secretly as they thought, to the treasury of the Emperor. At this time they decided to take nothing of what they saw, but to wall up the stones as they found them. "When it was first opened," says Díaz, "Cortés and some of his captains went in first, and they saw such a number of jewels and slabs and plates of gold and chalchihuites and other great riches, that they were quite carried away and did not know what to say about such wealth. . . . I took it for certain that there could not be another such store of wealth in the whole world."

Moctezuma II now had the difficult task of reducing the illusions of the Spaniards and, in a way, of calling their bluff in claiming divinity. "Malinche, I know very well," said he to Cortés, "that these people of Tlaxcala with whom you are such good friends have told you that I am a sort of god or Teule, and that everything in my houses is made of gold and silver and precious stones. I know well enough that you are wise and did not believe it but took it as a joke. Behold now, Señor Malinche, my body is flesh and bone like yours; my houses and palaces are of stone and wood and lime; that I am a great king and inherit the riches of my ancestors is true, but not all the nonsense and lies that they have told you about me, although, of course, you treated it as a joke, as I did your thunder and lightning."

Beneath his fatalism and fear of ancient traditions about the return of Quetzalcoatl, there was undoubtedly a good deal of common sense and skepticism in Moctezuma about the Spaniards, and he was determined to put them to the test and forestall fate, if possible. "Regarding the creation of the world," he remarked to the Spanish leader, "we have held the same belief for ages past, and for this reason we take it for certain that you are those whom our ancestors predicted would come from the direction of the sunrise. As for your great King, I feel that I am indebted to him, and I will give him of what I possess, for as I have already said, two years ago I heard of the Captains who came in ships from the direction in which you came, and they said they were the servants of this your great King, and I wish to know if you are all one and the same."

When the moment came for him to show his mettle, however, he found himself in a distinctly embarrassing position, which grew increasingly awkward as time went on. Whether, behind his show of generosity and affability, he was actually scheming to get rid of the Spaniards by force is not entirely clear. A native uprising against the invaders at Tuxpan near the coast furnished at least some material for apprehension among the Spanish captains at the capital, and Cortés was persuaded that the time had come for a decisive blow. Accordingly the Captain with a select group of his officers presented themselves at Moctezuma's private chambers and began to complain about what had happened. "I do not wish to begin a war on this account," Cortés declared, "nor to destroy this city. I am willing to forgive it all, if silently and without raising any disturbance you will come with us to our quarters, where you will be as well served and attended to as though you were in your own house, but if you cry out or make any disturbance, you will immediately be killed by these my captains, whom I brought solely for this purpose."

Moctezuma's first reaction was that of terror and dumbfounded surprise. He indignantly denied the accusation and offered to summon the responsible parties before him for punishment. Moreover, such an order, he affirmed, was not to be given to him, and he would not go. Something of an argument followed between himself and Cortés during which the pros and cons of the matter were threshed out, until one of the Spaniards, Juan Velázquez, roared out, "What is the good of your making so many words. Let us either take him prisoner or stab him. Tell him once more that if he cries out or makes an uproar we will kill him, for it is better at once to save our lives or to lose them."

The bewildered monarch turned to Cortés' interpreter, the Doña Marina, for an explanation of this, and the clever lady replied, "Señor Moctezuma, what I counsel you is to go at once to their quarters without any disturbance at all, for I know that they will pay you much honor as a great Prince such as you are. Otherwise you will remain here a dead man, but in their quarters you will learn the truth."

"Señor Malinche," exclaimed Moctezuma, "if this is what you desire, I have a son and two legitimate daughters. Take them as hostages and do not put this affront on me. What will my chieftains say if they see me taken off as a prisoner?"

The upshot of the argument was that there was no other alternative. When he began to see the light and agreed to go with them, the Spaniards, who understood his great personal vanity and love of luxury, bestowed more than their usual caresses upon him, called for his rich litter, and had him removed to their own quarters, where he was installed, under guard, with every comfort. When the principal Mexican chieftains and his nephews called to learn the reason for his seizure, he replied with all the calm logic that the Spaniards had put into his mouth. He was delighted, it appeared, to be in his new abode. He had come of his own free will, not by force, with the sanction and advice of the god Huichilobos, for certain priests who had spoken with the idol had so directed him. There he continued to hold a puppet court and to indulge in the pleasures he loved.

In the meantime, he ordered the chieftains who had attacked the Spaniards at Tuxpan to be turned over to Cortés. In their confessions, they declared that they had acted under orders from Moctezuma. For their pains, they were sentenced by Cortés to be burned in front of Moctezuma's palace; and the monarch, roaring with rage and fright, was placed in chains during their execution. Cortés made it clear that it was only by special favor and love that his own life was spared, and finished by declaring that he was now free to go back to his own palace if he wished.

vi

By this time the Aztec was fully aware that he had lost prestige with his own people and that in reality, quite independently of the insincerity of Cortés' offer, the safest place for him was in the hands of his captors. His nephews and relations, as he confided to the Spaniard, were already on the point of starting a rebellion and indeed of setting up another prince in his place. For himself he preferred peace and was quite content with the freedom which the Spaniards gave him, to hunt, to sail in their boats, and to offer sacrifices to his favorite idol Huichilobos. He was accompanied on all these excursions by guards and was warned that to raise any disturbance was more than his life was worth. Cortés also gave orders that he was not to indulge in human sacrifice in connection with his worship. This command alone he violated. For the rest he showed himself completely tractable. "As we saw him so frank and kind," writes Díaz, who shared in his generosity, "we treated him with the respect in which the kings of these countries are held, and he behaved in the same manner to us. If I were to relate the traits and qualities that he showed as a great Prince, and the reverence and service that all the Lords of New Spain paid to him, I should never come to an end. There was not a thing that he ordered to be brought that was not immediately there."

It was inevitable that the bewilderment of the Aztec chieftains at this complacency in their Emperor should stir from impatience to an open planning for revolt, so that Moctezuma soon found himself torn between the remnants of desire for freedom and his indignation with those of his lords who were beginning to impeach his own sovereignty. This was an unpleasant dilemma, to be sure, but in view of his own dalliance and cowardice, he can be accused of hardly less than treachery to his own people in turning the leaders of the revolt over to the Spaniards.

The rumblings of rebellion had begun to center around one of his nephews, Cacamatzin, lord of the city of Texcoco, which was the largest and most important city in the realm after the capital itself. Dissention among the conspirators, over who could succeed to the throne, soon appeared; and news of the affair was delivered to Moctezuma by one of the rivals of the young rebel. When Moctezuma detailed the story to Cortés, the latter actually suggested that Mexican troops be placed under Spanish command and the city of Texcoco be captured or destroyed. This idea not meeting with approval, Cortés sent an embassy to Cacamatzin, warning him of the folly of an uprising and suggesting he would like to have him as a friend. When these overtures met with rebuffs, and Cacamatzin sent back word of his disgust for so chickenhearted an uncle, Moctezuma secretly arranged for the seizure of the insolent nephew and turned him over with his confederates to be held as a prisoner by the Spaniards. In his place, the brother of the captive was set up as king of Texcoco, with the name of Don Carlos; and when three other nephews protested, they also were delivered into irons. Thus the monarch actually succeeded in bringing into captivity with himself, not only the rightful head of Texcoco but also the chiefs of Coyoacán, Iztapalapán, and Tacuba.

He now began to call upon the other chieftains to give their fealty to the King of Spain. He admitted that the gods no longer answered him as they had used to do, but in a statement reported by his page declared: "As for the present it does not imply anything, and as in time to come we shall see whether we receive another and better reply from our gods, so we will act according to the time. For the present what I order and beg you all to do with good will is to give and contribute some sign of vassalage, and I will soon tell you what is most suitable, and as just now I am importuned about it by Malinche, I beg that no one will refuse it. During the eighteen years that I have been your Prince, you have always been very loyal to me, and I have enriched you and have broadened your lands, and have given you power and wealth, and if at this present time, our gods permit me to be he held captive here, it would not have happened, unless, as I have told you many times, my great Huichilobos had commanded it."

Tribute gatherers were sent to all the provinces, and those chieftains who refused to contribute were seized and fastened by Moctezuma's command to the great chain with the other imprisoned nobles. Then, lest all this be inadequate, the whole of the treasure which Moctezuma had received from his father, he now turned over to the Spaniards. It took three days to take the ornaments apart, and after the weight of the gold was taken by the officers of the King, there was more than six hundred thousand pesos worth, without counting the silver and jewels. After the royal fifth had been deducted, Cortés proceeded to gobble up the rest for himself; and thus came to an end the fabulous treasury of the Aztecs. To cap the climax, Moctezuma decided to offer his daughter to the Spaniard in marriage.

All this was borne with comparative patience, until the invaders arranged to set up a chapel on the top of the great temple pyramid and to have Mass said. Then, apparently, the Aztec gods began to speak again in no uncertain terms, according to the Aztec priests; and some of his former craft and self-confidence began to return to the royal prisoner. "Oh! Señor Malinche and Captains," he exclaimed, "how distressed I am at the reply and command which our Teules have given to our priests and to me and all my captains, which is that we should make war on you and kill you, and drive you back across the sea. I have thought it over, and what seems to me best is that you should at once leave this city before you are attacked, and that not one of you should remain here. This, Señor Malinche, I say that you should not fail to do, for it is to your interest; if not, you will be killed. Remember, it is a question of your lives." This speech apparently broke the spell, although the Spaniards assured him that he would have to accompany them before the Spanish Emperor.

At that moment, word was brought of the arrival of another fleet of Spaniards on the coast, and Cortés shortly found himself obliged to face a hostile band of his own countrymen under the leadership of Narváez. At first Moctezuma saw in this an easy way of getting rid of his bailiffs, for he believed that they could depart on these ships without the delay of constructing new ones. The agitation of the men around Cortés and news of trouble from the coast, however, soon gave him to understand that all was not well. "I have noticed," he remarked to the Spanish leader, "that all your captains and soldiers are agitated, and I have observed that you only come to see me now and then, and Orteguilla the page tells me that you intend to go against those, your brothers, who have come in the ships, and to leave Tonatio here to guard me; do me the favor to tell me if there is anything I can do to assist you, for I will do it with the greatest will."

Cortés was able to subdue the expedition of Narváez and to win over the followers of his rival, but when he returned to the capital, he found the city up in arms against his brash lieutenant Alvarado. It was not long before the palace had been turned into a fortress and the Spaniards found themselves in a state of siege against the howling thousands of natives who were bent on their extermination. There was nothing to do, but sue for peace, and Moctezuma was called upon to mount the roof and announce that the Spaniards had decided to leave the city.

vii

When this request was brought to him, the Aztec replied with grief: "What more does Malinche want from me? I neither wish to live nor to listen to him, to such a pass has my fate brought me because of him." To Padre de Olmedo he now declared: "I believe that I shall not obtain any result towards ending this war, for they have already raised up another lord and have made up their minds not to let you leave this place alive. Therefore, I believe that all of you shall have to die."

The broken Emperor was right, so far as the intentions of the Aztec nation were concerned. When he appeared before them, mingled feelings ran through the mob, and the leaders bade them be silent and desist from discharging their stones and darts. "Oh! Señor, and our great Lord," exclaimed a spokesman, "how all your misfortune and injury and that of your children and relations afflicts us. We make known to you that we have already raised one of your kinsmen to be our Lord."[19] At the same time they made it clear that, in spite of his pleadings for peace, they had determined to push the war until the Spaniards were completely driven out or exterminated. He was assured that they were praying to their gods to keep him safe in the meantime, and that, if all turned out as they planned, he would be restored to his throne with even higher honors in the end.

Hardly had these declarations been ended, when the mob let loose with a shower of stones and darts, catching the Spanish guards unawares. Three of the stones struck the Emperor, one on the head, another on the arm, and another on the leg. The Spaniards begged him to have the wounds dressed and take food, but he refused; and before anyone had time to realize the gravity of his condition, word was brought to Cortés that he was dead.

Whatever may have been the final verdict on Moctezuma by his own subjects, it is certain that he had endeared himself to his

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[19] Cuitláhuac, the Lord of Iztapalapán.

Spanish captors. "Cortés wept for him," writes Díaz, "and all of us captains and soldiers, and there was no man among us who knew him and was intimate with him, who did not bemoan him as though he were our father, and it is not to be wondered at, considering how good he was. It was stated that he had reigned seventeen years and that he was the best King there ever had been in Mexico."

Moctezuma had agreed that the daughter whom he had offered to Cortés should become a Christian, but apparently he himself was never baptized. The Spanish soldiers were considerably disappointed at this, and even upbraided the chaplain Padre Bartolomé de Olmedo that he had not persuaded him to this effect. After his death, an embassy consisting of a priest and one of the captive chieftains was sent out to arrange for his funeral and to beg the people to reject the king they had elected, in favor of the cousin of Moctezuma still in the custody of the Spaniards or one of his sons. They were also to negotiate a peace so that the invaders could leave Mexico. The body of the dead Emperor was then sent out with six of the noble prisoners and the priests who had been captured by the Spaniards and was handed over for burial to the Aztec captains, with orders to remember what Moctezuma had commanded or rather pleaded for at his death.

When the populace beheld the corpse, they were simply confirmed in their desire for vengeance, and cried out through their spokesmen: "Now for certain you will pay for the death of our King and Lord, and the dishonor to our idols; and as for the peace you sent to beg for, come out here and we will settle how and in what way it is to be made." From then on, it was clear that the spirit of Moctezuma dead was more of a problem for the terrified Spaniards than that of the Moctezuma living, and they began desperately to find a way out of the trap in which they had been caught.

For one last time, Aztec ferocity flamed up to purge away, as it were, the weakness and compromises of the slain Emperor, before its own final pacification under Spanish institutions. Commenting on his later siege of the city, Cortés remarked, "They often pretended to allow us to enter, saying: 'Come in, come in and enjoy yourselves.' At other times they would say: 'Do you think that there is a Moctezuma reigning over us now, so that you can do whatever you like?' "[20]

"In this state of things," writes Prescott, "it was beneficently ordered by Providence that the land should be delivered over to another race, who would rescue it from the brutish superstitions that daily extended wider and wider, with extent of empire. The debasing institutions of the Aztecs furnish the best apology for their conquest. It is true the conquerors brought along with them the Inquisition. But they also brought Christianity, whose benign radiance would still survive, when the fierce flames of fanaticism should be extinguished; dispelling those dark forms of horror which had so long brooded over the fair regions of Anahuac."[21]

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[20] Hernando Cortés, *Five Letters,* trans. by J. B. Morris (George Routledge & Sons, London, 1928), p. 152.

[21] *Loc. cit.*, Bk. I, Chap. 3, "Human Sacrifices."

CHAPTER II

Hernando Cortés

CONQUEROR OF MEXICO

i

"He was of good stature and body," says Bernal Díaz, the great biographer of Hernando Cortés, "well proportioned and robust. His complexion was somewhat ashen and his look was not very gay. If his face had been larger, it would have looked better. His eyes were affectionate and at times grave. His beard was rather short, scant, and thin; and his hair at that time was of the same quality as the beard. He was deep-chested, erect, slender, and of moderate waste-line, somewhat bow-legged, with strong limbs and thighs. He was a good rider, skilled in the use of all weapons, on foot as well as on horseback, and above all a good heart and spirit, which is most to the point! In everything about his appearance, in his presence and activity, as well as in talk and conversation, eating and in dress, he gave unmistakable evidence of being a great gentleman."[1]

The Conqueror of Mexico was born in 1485 at Medellín, the principal city of Estremadura, in the present province of Badajoz, Spain. His parents were poor but of noble stock, and his father, Martín, had been commander of a company of infantry in the army. Through his mother, Doña Catalina Pizarro Altamirano, he was related to the Pizarros who conquered Peru. As a child he was weak and sickly. At the age of fourteen, Hernando went to Salamanca to attend the university and study Latin and law. After two years of this, he came to the conclusion that his was to be a military career, and with small taste for books, he returned to Medellín, "rowdy, overbearing, restless, and in love with the profession of arms." He considered first to go to Naples with the army of the great Captain Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, and later to the Indies with his cousin Nicolás de Ovando, who was going to be governor of Santo Domingo.

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[1] Quoted from Lucas Alamán, *Disertaciones Históricas* (Mexico, 1844), V, tomo II, pp. 44–45.

He chose the second course. But in the meantime, as an early chronicler declares, "clambering one night over some roofs close by his lodgings, on his way to a young woman with whom he had relations, he fell from a wall in ill-repair, which broke under his weight." The bruises and a resultant fever held him back so that he was unable to realize his ambition until 1504.

Arriving at the Port of Santo Domingo, at the age of nineteen, Cortés soon distinguished himself in a military way, under the command of Diego Velázquez, by helping to put down a revolt of the Indians. As a reward, he received a grant of lands and Indian serfs from the governor, and spent the next few years as a prosperous gentleman colonist.

When Velázquez was called to the task of subduing the island of Cuba in 1511, he again enlisted the help of Cortés. Success pursued this venture, and Don Hernando was given new grants of property. His great attraction for the fair sex was destined at this point to cause some shift in his fortunes. He had proceeded to court the daughter of Juan Xuárez, a fellow colonist, and at the last moment changed his mind. The matter was brought to the attention of the governor, who insisted that he fulfill his word, and, on his refusal, had him imprisoned.

After daring escapes and recaptures, he finally became reconciled with all concerned and went through with the marriage. Everything seems to have been forgiven, for he shortly became the *alcalde* or mayor and chief justice of Santiago, where he had settled down.

About this time reports came back from exploring parties under Francisco Hernández de Córdoba and Juan de Grijalva. The Mexican coast had been traced and Yucatán had been discovered. Considerable gold and other booty had been secured, and reports of rich treasure and possible slaves urged the governor to fit out a fleet and take full advantage of the new opportunities. Cortés was the man suggested for the command.

On the twenty-third of October, 1518, he received orders from

Velázquez, to explore the coasts and regions discovered by Hernández de Córdoba; to rescue the Spaniards who had been captured by the Indians; to get what gold and silver he could, and to inquire about the location of Grijalva and his companions; to learn about the religion and the customs of the natives; and to colonize, if this seemed advisable. He immediately began preparations, pledging his entire fortune and borrowing heavily from his friends for the enterprise. A banner was designed bearing the royal coat of arms and a large cross with the motto: *Amigos, sigamos la cruz con verdadera fe, que con ella venceremos*—"Friends, let us follow the cross with true faith, with which we will conquer." Three hundred soldiers were promptly enlisted at Santiago.

Velázquez, who had seen the beginning of the enterprise with enthusiasm, soon began to doubt the loyalty of Cortés and to express some vacillation about his original commission. This change of heart was made known by Andrés Duero, secretary of the governor; and Cortés, taking with him all the meat which had been destined for the city and paying for it with a gold chain which he wore about his neck, promptly embarked with all his soldiers, on the night of November 18, 1518. As soon as Velázquez learned what had happened, he hurried to the wharves, but Cortés gave as an excuse the urgency of the situation; and, since there were no other boats to stop him, he set sail in the face of the governor's countermand.

From Santiago de Cuba, he went to Macaca and Trinidad for provisions, troops, ammunitions, and more ships. The *alcalde mayor*, Francisco Verdugo, meanwhile, received letters from Velázquez, his brother-in-law, to lay hands on Cortés and prevent the departure of his ships. Verdugo, however, was awed by the army and personal qualities of Cortés as well as by the representations of the gentry of the region, and failed to put his orders into effect. Cortés replied to the governor, justifying his conduct and declaring his loyalty, and set forth with his fleet for Havana. Orders for his arrest were awaiting him also in that port, but the strength of his forces was sufficient to render opposition futile. He secured what he needed, taking by force what was refused, and set out for Yucatán, February 10, 1519.

An imposing armada it was, composed of 11 boats, 508 soldiers, 13 musketeers, 32 archers, 16 horses, 10 pieces of bronze artillery, and 4 small cannon. Antón de Alaminos went ahead as pilot, with Pedro de Alvarado the captain general, and Alonso Hernández Puertocarrero, Diego de Ordaz, Juan Velázquez de Léon, Alonso de Ávila, Francisco de Morla, Juan de Escalante, Francisco de Montejo, Cristóbal de Olid, and Francisco de Salcedo as captains of the respective ships. Francisco de Orozco was placed in charge of the artillery.

From San Antón, the expedition passed to the island of Cozumel, where Pedro de Alvarado had arrived three days in advance of the party, because of the fact that his pilot Camacho had disobeyed orders and gone ahead. Alvarado immediately seized a temple and struck terror into the natives with his plundering and cruelty, to such an extent that Cortés, on his arrival, arrested the pilot and reprimanded his captain. He immediately set about regaining the confidence of the Indians and learned that there were Spanish captives in the neighborhood of Catoche. One of these, Gerónimo de Aguilar, a deacon, made his way to the Spanish ships, and served afterward in the useful capacity of interpreter of the Mayan language. Another, Gonzalo Guerrero, refused to be rescued, inasmuch as he had married a native and been tatooed. More than this, he led the Indians in an attack against the Spaniards.

On the fourth of March, Cortés left an image of the Blessed Virgin in the temple at Cozumel and set out for Tabasco. A hostile reception on the part of the natives there was aggravated by the desertion of an Indian interpreter Melchor, who stirred up the tribes with information of the small forces of the invaders. Courageous action with the aid of the cavalry, and later magnanimous treatment of the prisoners on the part of Cortés, however, succeeded in bringing peace and gifts for the Spaniards, who remained in Tabasco until the eighteenth of April, when they departed for San Juan de Ulúa. Of all the gifts received by Cortés in the course of his conquest, none exceeded in value that of the famous Doña Marina, who was presented on this occasion with 19 other women to the Spaniards by the principal chief.

Born of a noble Aztec family, she was secretly given to some merchants of Xicalanco by her widowed mother, who married a second time and wished to have a clear title of succession for the son born in her second marriage. The Spaniards called her Marina or Malinche. Her services as an interpreter became extremely valuable when the expedition reached the coast of Vera Cruz, for although she did not know Spanish, she spoke both the Mayan and the Nahua languages and was able through Aguilar to communicate between the Spaniards and the natives.

From San Juan de Ulúa, the expedition passed to the coast, where they traded beads, mirrors, and other baubles for the gold ornaments which the Mexicans brought in large quantities. After a few days in this region, Cortés determined to found the Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz.[2] This was largely to avoid the imputation of a rebellion against Velázquez and to legalize his own authority. He set up a city council which immediately declared null the power and orders of Velázquez and nominated Cortés captain of the armada and chief justice, recommending his good services to the king. With this he assumed control of the expedition in his own name.

As a result of this action, some of the soldiers who were partial to Velázquez began a rebellion. When the arrest of a few of the conspirators failed to settle the matter, he used more energetic measures, executed Pedro Escudero and Diego Cermeño, cut off a foot of the pilot Gonzalo de Umbría and gave 200 lashes to each of the others involved in the plot. Then, lest this should fail to prevent further outbreaks, he resolved to send a ship, directed by Antón de Alaminos, Alonso Puertocarrero, and Francisco Montejo as procurators, to Charles V in Spain. The other ships, with the exception of a few fishing boats, he put out of service or sank after removing sails, anchors, and cordage. He was supported in this by the advice of his own loyal troops who were thus willing to cut off the possibility of a retreat and to conquer the country or die in the attempt.

ii

Moctezuma, who had been informed of the previous expeditions of Hernández de Córdoba and Grijalva, now sent various jewels and objects of gold and silver to the Spaniards through his ambassador Cuitlalpitoc, with orders to observe them closely and beg them not to come to the capital. Needless to say, these gifts had the opposite effect and aroused the Spaniards to the desire of reaching and dominating the center of civilization from which such evidences of wealth originated. Cortés took particular pains to increase the superstitious beliefs of the natives, deploying his cavalry before their eyes and firing off his cannon. Neither of these wonders had been seen in Mexico before the arrival of the white man.

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[2] Translated: The Rich City of the True Cross.

At this moment, messengers from the chief of Cempoalla arrived, to welcome Cortés and enlist his aid against Moctezuma, whom they denounced as the tyrant who had subjugated them and bled them for tribute. Encouraged by the promises of the Spaniards, they proceeded to arrest the Aztec officials who had come to collect the tax, and would have sacrificed them had not Cortés secretly intervened. Liberating the prisoners at night, he sent them off with gifts for Moctezuma, declaring his friendship in the name of the powerful king whom he represented.

At the same time, he consolidated his position with the tribe of Cempoalla, destroyed their idols, and had Christianity preached to them. Then leaving a guard of 100 soldiers under Juan de Escalante at Vera Cruz and others at Cempoalla, he set out on the arduous climb toward the Aztec capital, on the sixteenth of August. The army for the expedition numbered 400 infantry, 15 cavalry, 6 cannons, 1300 Totonac Indians and 200 other natives to carry the equipment. When he arrived at Xocolta, he received details of the power and wealth of Moctezuma from the friendly chief there, and sent an embassy to Tlaxcala to secure the alliance of that tribe and permission to pass through their country to Tenochtitlán.

The Tlaxcalans were divided in their reactions toward the strange invaders. Finally they decided to simulate signs of peace and, with the aid of the Otomis, their allies, to ambush the Spaniards. If victorious, they could claim the glory. If not, they could lay the blame for the treachery upon their allies as a barbarous tribe which had betrayed their orders. Before he received a reply from the Tlaxcalans, Cortés decided to invade their territory, August 31, for peace or war, whichever it might be. It was war. Four times the Tlaxcalans threw themselves with great numbers and bravery, under the leadership of Xicotencatl the younger, against the Spaniards; but the superior military discipline and tactics of the latter, combined with their firearms, their use of Greek fire, and the terror which their horses struck into the hearts of the natives, made it an unequal fight.

Under the impression that the Spaniards were the offspring of the sun god and therefore invincible by day, the Indians decided to attack them by night. They were again defeated. Marveling at the prowess of the invaders, the Tlaxcalans now joined themselves as eager confederates of the Spaniards in the march against their ancient enemies, the Aztecs. Their aid soon became indispensable to the plans of Cortés, and the Conquest of Mexico assumed the nature of a civil war of tribe against tribe.

Cortés entered the city of Tlaxcala amid the acclaim of the people, September 22. It was his intention to convert them to Christianity. After various vain attempts, he decided to repeat the tactics he used at Cempoalla, namely destroying the pagan idols and altars. He was dissuaded from this by Father Olmedo, who realized that violent action would have succeeded only in arousing a permanent enmity and in jeopardizing the entire expedition.[3]

About to set out in the final stages of his journey, with the aid of his Tlaxcalan and Totonac allies, he received an embassy from the prince Ixtlilxochitl, the disgruntled king of a section of Texcoco, who offered his alliance and further aid. He now had an army of 6000 allies besides his regular troops and with these reinforcements began his march to Cholula, on October 13. More than 20,000 people met him with the greatest solemnity upon his arrival at this famous religious center of the Aztecs. The only request of the Cholulans was that his allies, their ancient enemies, be not permitted to enter the city. But, after this initial display of hospitality, a notable change came over the conduct of the natives of the city. Food supplies, which were at first given in great abundance, suddenly fell off. The suspicious Tlaxcalans feared that a conspiracy was on foot. Doña Marina said she had been secretly warned that the city had prepared an ambush of more than 20,000 warriors; and the chief priests of the city, who had been seized, confessed to the same fact.

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[3] Lucas Alamán, *Disertaciones cit.*, II, tomo I, pp. 94–95.

Cortés resolved to chastise the rebels before they should have a chance to show their hand. He announced his departure for the morrow and called for a liberal supply of native porters, which were brought without delay. Then with a signal of a gunshot, he ordered his troops and their allies to fall upon the Cholulans, with such force that they were unable to offer the least resistance. The Tlaxcalans took advantage of the situation to sack the place and wreak vengeance upon their ancient enemies. This went on for two days of bloodshed and pillage. With more than 6000 dead, Cortés was moved to pity and put a stop to the carnage. This massacre has remained as one of the blackest spots on his escutcheon, comparable with the later slaughter of the Aztecs by Pedro Alvarado in the temple area of the capital and even with the disastrous siege of Tenochtitlán itself.

Cortés remained in Cholula, reorganizing the cowed city, until November 1, and then set out for Mexico on the route between the two volcanoes.[4] At Cuauhtecatl he was met by another embassy, with gifts from Moctezuma. The latter had become thoroughly frightened after the affair at Cholula and sent a nobleman disguised as himself in the hope of satisfying the white man's desire of seeing him. The native allies of Cortés, however, at once recognized the trick. In spite of repeated supplications not to enter the city he pushed on, with the new vengeful allies enlisted along the way, and arrived at its gates, November 8, 1519.

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At the outskirts of the city, accompanied by his nobles in luxurious state, Moctezuma hastened to meet the dauntless young Spaniard. Cortés would have embraced him, had the

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[4] Popocatépetl, or "Smoking Mirror," and Ixtaccíhuatl, or "Sleeping Woman."

Aztec nobles not turned this gesture aside as unfitting for their monarch. The Emperor then ushered him to the palace of Axayácatl, where the Spaniards were given every comfort, and later appeared in person to pledge them his obedience in fulfillment of the ancient prophecies of Quetzalcoatl.

The Spaniards lost no time in making a survey of the city, even penetrating the secret treasure vaults. Then to consolidate their position, which was obviously precarious, they decided to lay hands on the Emperor himself and hold him in a kind of benevolent imprisonment as hostage against possible uprisings of the natives. As justification for this action, Cortés pointed out that the tribute gatherers had fallen upon the tribe of Cempoalla and that in defending their allies the Spaniards had suffered considerable loss, including the death of Juan de Escalante, whom he had left in charge of the garrison at Vera Cruz. Moctezuma disclaimed any responsibility for this affair when Cortés, accompanied by Alvarado, Sandoval, and Velázquez de León, presented himself at his court; but, when they made a show of impatience, he weakly consented to accompany them to their camp. The sixteen leaders of the incident of Cempoalla, including the son of Moctezuma, were placed at the disposition of Cortés and burned alive. Moctezuma himself was soon to fall, as the victim of his own weakness.

After this initial show of force, Cortés decided for the next five months to follow a policy of peace and conciliation, while keeping the Emperor in his power. Meanwhile, he continued to study the psychology of the people, their customs and resources. His own increasing boldness and the cowardice of Moctezuma, however, produced an unfavorable reaction in the minds of the people. Cacamatzin, proud King of Texcoco, and Totoquihuatzin, his confederate, withdrew from the capital, only to be recalled forcibly on orders through the Emperor. They were placed in irons, and in their stead Cuicuicatzin was named ruler. Then, on orders from Cortés, the Aztec monarch summoned his nobles and announced the submission of the entire federation to the King of Spain. Tribute was immediately offered or seized. It is estimated that in this way more than 3,500,000 pesos of gold, besides precious stones and other objects of value, were collected by the Spaniards.[5]

The alleged purpose of the Conqueror, who was now only thirty-four years of age, was to secure the submission of the Aztec nation to the Spanish crown. This was completed. But as the people gave signs of increasing irritation, Moctezuma urged Cortés to withdraw from the country while there was still time to do so in safety. The Spanish leader explained that his boats had been burned and that new ones would have to be constructed. The Emperor immediately proposed to supply him with wood for the project.

At this moment, came news of the arrival of another Spanish fleet at Vera Cruz. Cortés joyfully believed that he was receiving reinforcements from Montejo and Puertocarrero; but he soon learned from Gonzalo de Sandoval, who had succeeded Juan de Escalante in command of the fort, that the expedition was really a mission from Diego Velázquez, under the direction of Pánfilo de Narváez, with orders for his immediate return to Cuba. The newcomers arrived on 18 vessels, with a formidable array of 800 Spanish soldiers, including 80 cavalry, as many musketeers, and 150 archers, besides 1000 Cuban Indians and 18 cannons.

Cortés received a group of the emissaries at the capital with the greatest kindness and vividly described the situation, and promptly converted them to his side. He then decided to meet the rest of the punitive expedition at the port. Leaving Pedro de Alvarado with 80 Spaniards in Mexico, he began the descent to Vera Cruz with the troops immediately available. At Cholula he picked up the troops of Velázquez de León. With the aid of the Padres Olmedo and Guevara and the secretary Andrés de Duero, he succeeded in learning the plans of Narváez.

The latter had become so confident of success that he posted only two sentinels on the fort of Cempoalla. Cortés took advantage of a heavy rain in the night and completely surprised the garrison. Narváez fell, wounded in the eye, and was handed over as a prisoner. His army, although four times the size of that of Cortés, passed, without further ado, to the command of his adversary, who hastened to secure their loyalty through promises of wealth and conquest.

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[5] Luis Pérez Verdía, *Historia de Mexico* (Mexico, 1911), p. 147.

Velázquez de León with 200 Spaniards and 2 ships, was now sent to explore the province of Pánuco. Diego de Ordaz proceeded on an expedition to Coatzacoalco. Rodrigo Rangel was left in Vera Cruz as lieutenant governor for Sandoval. Cortés himself returned with 600 Spanish soldiers up the mountain slopes, to Tenochtitlán.

Thus far, the fortunes of the Conqueror had proceeded with scarcely a halt. But now occurred an incident that was bound to unleash the inevitable showdown. Left in the capital after Cortés had gone down to the coast to meet the forces of Narváez, Pedro de Alvarado ratified Cortés' permission for a religious festival among the Indians. On May 20, 1520, more than 600 Mexican nobles assembled in the courtyard of the principal *teocalli* or temple area and began their sacred dances before a crowd of over 3000 spectators. Alvarado had meanwhile been thrown into a panic by reported plans of insurrection. Suddenly deciding to cast terror into the natives, he fell upon the assembly with his troops and artillery and slaughtered indiscriminately. The general reaction of the people, as soon as they collected themselves, was one of wild indignation. Alvarado found himself faced by an overwhelming mob, and, wounded during the fray, he was forced back into his barracks. There was nothing left for him to do but beseech and threaten the terror-stricken Moctezuma to pacify his vassals.

The city was still in an uproar when Cortés returned. He was enraged at Alvarado's impetuous conduct, and as a gesture of good will to the people, liberated Cuitláhuac, the brother of the Emperor and heir apparent, with instructions to resume the festival and restore order to the city. Cuitláhuac took advantage of his liberty to fan the insurrection still further. The following day, June 25, he appeared with an imposing army to cut off the city from communication with Vera Cruz and other exterior points. Cortés sent out Diego de Ordaz with 400 Spaniards to obstruct the movements of the Aztec army, but such was the vigor of the natives that his soldiers barely escaped with their lives and were obliged again to retreat to their barracks.

The Spaniards now found themselves in a state of veritable siege. In spite of sallies beyond the walls of the barracks, Cortés' men were repeatedly driven back by the native forces. In desperation, he finally resorted to the extremity of asking Moctezuma to show himself to the populace and ask for peace. The people by this time had lost most of their respect for the monarch. Cuauhtémoc publicly denounced him for his cowardice and let fly a shower of arrows. At that signal, as described in the previous chapter, the Indians threw their stones at the embassy. Moctezuma was fatally injured; and thus deprived of their royal hostage, the Spaniards were left to shift for themselves.

"Startled by the crime they had committed," says Bancroft, "awe fell upon the multitude as the stricken monarch was led away. . . . But the evident desire of the besieged for peace only served to encourage the Indians, and the assault was renewed with an increased ardor that taxed the defenders to the utmost."[6]

iv

Hemmed about by the howling populace and confined in the center of the city with no communication outside, Cortés realized that his position was dangerous in the extreme. His only hope was in escape. It was resolved that the most favorable time would be night. A portable bridge was constructed so that his men might cross the canals in silence. Then separating his own portion of the treasure from that of the King of Spain, he allowed the soldiers to divide the rest among themselves. The entire company set forth secretly, on the night of June 20, and reached the canal of Tecpantzingo, where they laid the bridge.

Hardly had the vanguard crossed over, when they were discovered by the Aztec sentinels. An alarm was shouted. Immediately, the great war drum was sounded in the temple. The canals were shortly filled with warrior canoes, and the streets were crowded with Aztec soldiers. Far from facilitating the flight of the Spaniards, the obscurity of night now offered them the greatest confusion. They were unable to use the cavalry or guns or even to distinguish their enemies. Complete panic resulted.

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[6] Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1883), Vol. I, pp. 442–443.

Under the sudden weight of the terrified fugitives, the portable bridge itself sank into the moat. Some tried to cross on their horses. Others attempted to swim. But borne down by the weight of the gold and other treasure which they were carrying, they were sent to the bottom of the canal or fell an easy prey to the Indians. A partial causeway was formed on the corpses and the equipment, and some of the troops succeeded in passing over. The rear guard was obliged to return to the fort, where it perished in the siege after three days.

Once beyond the range of the Aztec fury, Cortés in dismay reckoned his loss at 450 Spaniards, 4000 Indian allies, 46 horses, all his cannon, the greater part of his firearms, and nearly all the coveted treasure. Juan Velázquez de León, Francisco de Morla, and Francisco de Salcedo were dead. Many of the survivors were desperately wounded. Such was the toll of the famous *Noche Triste* or Sad Night.[7] That not all the Spaniards were exterminated is probably due only to the fact that Cuitláhuac turned his attention to those who had retreated back to the fort in the capital.

Cortés' new problem was that of facing his old allies, the Tlaxcalans. With his prowess and prestige reduced to the dust, he had every reason to fear the worst. Accordingly, he went about the lake of Zumpango and, on July 7, arrived on the heights overlooking the valley of Otumba. Here his troops were attacked by an army of over 100,000 warriors. In spite of valiant resistance, his now small band would have certainly come to an end had he not succeeded in capturing the banner of the enemy. This stroke of good fortune was enough to demoralize the forces of the barbarians. More than 20,000 natives were killed in their flight, while the Spaniards escaped with an insignificant number of casualties. Cortés rested in Hueyotlipán for three days and, with renewed confidence, proceeded to Tlaxcala. News of his most recent exploit had gone before him. His expulsion from

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[7] The tree under which Cortés sat to ponder his tragedy is still pointed out at Popotla, in the suburbs of Mexico City.

Tenochtitlán simply whetted the Tlaxcalans' desire for revenge upon the Aztecs; and he was received with enthusiastic welcome.

A variety of circumstances contributed to demoralize the reorganization of the Aztecs. The efforts of Cuitláhuac to effect an alliance with the tribes of Tlaxcala, Michoacán, and Cholula proved fruitless. Moreover, the smallpox, introduced into the country by a Negro in the expedition of Narváez, had spread from Cempoalla to Yucatán, then throughout the entire country, and taken frightful toll in the native forces.

Good fortune, on the contrary, played into the hands of Cortés. A small force of soldiers and cavalry had disembarked at Vera Cruz with aid for Narváez. This party was captured by the men of Cortés, and its supplies were seized. Later a colonizing expedition of 150 men sent out by Francisco Garay was shipwrecked at Vera Cruz. Through kind treatment and large promises Cortés succeeded in recruiting these men for his cause. Finally, another boat coming from the Canary Islands landed on the coast, with a cargo of guns and ammunition, all of which Cortés bought to such good effect that the members of this crew also joined his forces. With these reinforcements and 150,000 native allies, Don Hernando, like the perennial phoenix bird, set out for his second and final conquest of the Aztec capital. This time, there was to be no dissembling or turning back. He realized that his life depended on victory. As for his Indian allies, they were determined to end the Aztec tyranny once and for all.

After a few preliminary encounters, from which he emerged victorious, in the early part of September, Cortés established a fortified camp and base of supplies at a strategic point which he called Segura de la Frontera. Tepeaca, Quecholac, and other objectives were taken successively. At Huacachula, a native leader offered to surrender his division of 30,000 men to Cortés; but the Aztecs under him, preferring death to surrender, fought until they were completely exterminated. The same fate befell other settlements which refused to submit, notably that of Itzocan, where all the inhabitants were reduced to slavery. One hundred *teocalli* were burned, and the city was completely sacked.

Cortés returned to Tlaxcala at the beginning of December, to reunite his troops and to construct a number of barges which he intended to use in the siege of Mexico City. In the military review held December 26, 1520, he counted 520 Spanish infantry, with 80 crossbows and guns, 40 cavalry, and 9 guns. On the twenty-eighth, he set forth for Texcoco, accompanied by 150,000 allies from the provinces of Tlaxcala, Cempoalla, Cholula, and Huejotzinco.

The epidemic of smallpox was now raging through the country. Maxixcatzin, King of Tlaxcala, had fallen along with thousands of his subjects, to the dread disease. The Aztecs were likewise afflicted, and their Emperor Cuitláhuac, who had succeeded Moctezuma, was the next to go. This left the throne open to Cuauhtémoc, eleventh and last Emperor in the Aztec line. A youth of only twenty-three years, Cuauhtémoc had an indomitable will, in strong contrast with the unfortunate Moctezuma. His first move was to renew the overtures and gifts which Cuitláhuac had made to the Indian tribes allied with Cortés. When this failed, he resolved to oppose the invader to the death.

Three days after his departure from Tlaxcala, Cortés and his allies arrived at Texcoco, in spite of many obstacles put in the way. The lord of this city had assured him of friendship. Nevertheless, it had been deserted. Turning the place over to be sacked by his troops, he set up camp there and secured the submission of several neighboring tribes.

The barges which he had ordered built for the siege of the capital were completed in the early part of February, 1521. When they had passed inspection successfully in the Zahuapán River, Cortés ordered them to be brought to the waters of the lake surrounding Tenochtitlán. An imposing convoy it was. Eight thousand Indians, accompanied by a guard of 20,000 Tlaxcalan warriors, 200 Spanish infantry, and 15 cavalry, carried the parts of the thirteen great barges to be later assembled. The eighteen leagues between Tlaxcala and Texcoco were covered in less than four days. A canal was opened through one of the spillways of the lake, and the barges were assembled for the siege.

In early March, Cortés set out with his army and allies to obtain an interview with the Emperor Cuauhtémoc. At Xaltocan he was severely attacked by the Aztecs and would have been defeated had not a deserter from the Aztec forces shown him a passable road on which to escape. After a number of sallies, he returned again to Texcoco, to consolidate a coalition with his allies. On April 5 he set out to dislodge the Aztecs from Chalco and clear the way for the siege of the capital. In one of these encounters, also, he barely escaped with his life.

As if the stern resistance of the Aztecs were not sufficient obstacle, Cortés now found himself faced with dissension in his own ranks. A number of the Spanish officers had become tired and disgusted with the dangers of the campaign. Much easier, they thought, to assassinate the leader and his loyal captains, seize the booty, and return to Cuba. The conspiracy was discovered in time. Its leader, Antonio de Villafranca, was put to death; and the others, too numerous to deal with safely, were pardoned.

Meanwhile, final preparations for the siege went on apace; and, on May 20, the army was divided for the attack. The first division, under Pedro de Alvarado, established its barracks in Tlacopán. The second, under Cristóbal de Olid, made its headquarters at Coyoacán. The third fixed itself at Iztapalapán, under the leadership of Gonzalo de Sandoval. Cortés placed the fleet, consisting of a large number of canoes in addition to the barges, under his personal command.

To cut off the capital's supply of drinking water, the aqueduct from Chapultepec was destroyed. Then, with the combined forces of land and lake, Cortés proceeded to take the vital points of connection between the city and its defenses. Xoloc was seized and held, against the desperate action of Cuauhtémoc; likewise Tepeyacac (the present Guadalupe), through which the city received supplies from the exterior. The city itself was penetrated as far as the principal plaza; but the Spaniards were compelled to withdraw, before the Aztecs should prevent their retreat by cutting the causeways. Xochimilco, Mixquic, Colhuacán, Mexicaltzingo, and Churubusco, all suburbs of the city, soon capitulated, and all attention was concentrated on the capital itself.

For more than twenty days the action consisted of hardly more than a destruction of the city, the Spaniards filling up the trenches and destroying the houses and parapets by day, the defenders reopening the canals and rebuilding their strongholds by night. On the twenty-eighth of June, urged on by his soldiers, Cortés decided to make a general attack upon the interior of the city. He had given commands to Alderete to fill up the causeways for the contingency of a retreat; Alderete failed to take this precaution; and, led into ambush, the Spaniards were thrown into a panic. Cortés himself fell into the hands of the Aztecs and would certainly have been sacrificed without delay, were it not for the daring action and prompt rescue by a few of his captains.

It now became obvious that halfway measures would never take the city. While other tribes were daily submitting to Cortés' leadership, the Aztecs within Tenochtitlán simply increased their determination to resist. All attempts at truce and parley with the proud Cuauhtémoc failed. With retreat cut off by practical considerations, Cortés decided that the only alternative was to destroy the city systematically. His own position had become notably stronger with the arrival of men and supplies at Vera Cruz, under the favorable command of Ponce de León.[8] His Indian allies were willing to go the limit. The plan, therefore, was to advance gradually, filling in the ditches and canals with the material from the ruined houses. More than 100,000 Indian troops were to engage the besieged Aztec warriors while the work of destruction was going on. By the beginning of August, the great Tenochtitlán was reduced to ruins. Its people had nothing left to eat, and the streets were covered with pestilential corpses. Finally driven to one single section of the city, that of Tenatitech in the extreme northwest, the survivors held out, without roof, water, or food beyond some few morsels.

On August 11, Cortés again sought a parley with Cuauhtémoc. The young Emperor replied by sending five of his captains to refuse any overtures of peace. He later promised to meet the Spaniard in the principal square, but again changed his mind and failed to keep his appointment.

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[8] Later the discoverer of Florida.

The final phase of the siege was marked by the combined action of the barges, under Sandoval and of the land forces, under Alvarado and Cortés. This was the bloodiest part of the entire conquest. Thousands of natives perished in the successive assaults, until the memorable end came, August 13, 1521. Cuauhtémoc, attempting to escape in a canoe, was recognized and captured before he could harm himself. As soon as rank and file learned of their leader's apprehension, they ended all resistance.

Cortés received the royal captive with all his customary courtesy. "Senor Malinche," declared the Aztec proudly, "I have done that which I ought in the defense of my city and people, and have not been able to do more. Since I came by force into your presence and power, do to me what you wish." Then placing his hand on a dagger in Cortés' belt, he added, "Take this dagger and kill me." The Spaniard tried to give him every consolation, praised his courage, and sent for his wife and followers.

The loss of the Aztecs had been estimated at 140,000 men, of whom some 50,000 perished through disease. Some 30,000 of the Indian allies of the Spaniards lost their lives. The siege had lasted seventy-five days, and the city was reduced to scarcely more than a heap of ashes.

A great disappointment, however, was in store for the Spaniards when they began their search for treasure. Little remained even in comparison with that which had been lost during the flight of the Spaniards on the *Noche Triste*. The Aztecs replied that the Tlatelolcoans had taken it. The Spanish soldiers, recalling certain fraudulent deals of Cortés in the past, began to murmur their suspicion that he had hidden the treasure for himself. To disprove this charge and to wring the truth from Cuauhtémoc, he finally agreed to torture the captive Emperor. The hands and feet of Cuauhtémoc, as well as of the King of Tlacopán, were placed over fire, but to no avail. Neither of the chieftains would reveal anything. Cortés was forced through shame to call a halt to the cruel proceedings.

Promise of rich booty had been a principal cause moving the victors to danger and sacrifice. Enraged over this supreme disappointment, Cortés' soldiers began to threaten him with advances of every sort. A man of lesser parts never would have emerged to tell the story. But Cortés was master of diplomacy as well as of war. To relieve the tension and to distract his men with new hopes, he decided to organize new expeditions. Gonzalo de Sandoval was sent with a considerable force to subdue the provinces of Tontepec, Huatuxco, and Aulicapán. Cristóbal de Olid was dispatched to Michoacán. Francisco de Orozco set out for Oaxaca. Others followed. And thus, instead of contentment in the possession of the gold and silver plate, which they never recovered, the Spaniards speeded their discovery of Mexican territories, building new cities, colonizing, civilizing, and founding the Mexican nation upon the ashes of Tenochtitlán.

v

Meanwhile, Diego Velázquez still smarted with resentment and envy over the success of Don Hernando, who had sailed away from Cuba, against his orders, to the conquest of Mexico, or New Spain, as it came to be known. There was a fear, moreover, at the Spanish Court, lest the conquerors should feel too keenly the opportunities of their power and perhaps display an independence of action that would deprive the King of Spain of his just dues. It was consequently easy for Velázquez to get revenge by suggesting to Bishop Fonseca of Burgos, then in charge of affairs in the Indies, to have Cristóbal de Tapia named governor of the territory which Cortés had acquired for the Crown.

Cortés naturally felt that his triumph entitled him to first consideration. Nevertheless, he swallowed his pride; and, when the governor arrived in December, 1521, he called his men together to declare obedience to the wishes of the King. An examination of the credentials of Tapia, however, revealed that he had come, not from the King, but from the Bishop of Burgos. Cortés therefore appealed from these papers and, after buying some of the supplies and slaves which Tapia had brought, put the new dignitary back on the ship.

To press his own cause, he now dispatched Alonso de Ávila and Antonio Quiñones with rich presents to the King. When these gifts fell into the hands of French corsairs, they were replaced with other objects of great value entrusted to Diego de Soto.

Cortés had already begun to systematize the taxes and labor in the mines, to found cities, and in all ways to act as the logical and *de facto* head of the government. The Duke de Béjar and other friends at court reinforced this record with an able defense against the accusations of Narváez and Tapia. As a result, he finally received the coveted appointment of governor and captain general of New Spain in a royal document signed at Valladolid, October 15, 1522. Velázquez and the Bishop of Burgos were warned to keep their hands off.

Under this franchise, he set about rebuilding the ruined capital on a scale far greater than before. The center of the city was assigned to the Spaniards. Lands were distributed under the title of *encomiendas* to his principal officers.[9] Spaniards living in the Antilles, he encouraged to immigrate with their families to Mexico. Every class of domestic animals, cereals, and other useful plants were introduced into the country. Government was organized on an efficient basis, and provisions were made for a humane treatment of the Indians.[10]

The following year, he decided to send Cristóbal de Olid with five ships and 400 soldiers on an expedition to assume title to the provinces known as the Hibueras. Once out of range, De Olid joined forces with Velázquez, revolted against Cortés and took command of the expedition on his own account. Cortés then sent Francisco de las Casas to pursue the rebel. News of success not immediately forthcoming, he determined to punish De Olid personally. After appointing Alonso de Estrada, Zuazo, and Rodrigo de Albornoz to take the reins of the government in his absence, he left Mexico City, on October 12, 1524, with a large army of Spaniards and Indian allies.

In point of historic importance, this punitive expedition cannot compare with the Conquest of Tenochtitlán, but in point of difficulty and danger, it was hardly less fantastic and arduous. The route proceeded by way of Coatzacoalco to Tabasco, thence to Itztapán, and finally to Honduras. Perils of swamps, matted jungles, mountains, stupendous contrasts of tropical lowlands and frigid altitudes, insects, pestilence, wild life, and hostile savage tribes plagued every foot of the way. To add to his responsibilities, Cortés included Cuauhtémoc among the Indian chieftains in his train. At Izancanac, allegations of unrest and conspiracy were brought against this sector; and, on February 25, 1525, the unhappy Cuauhtémoc was put to death together with other native nobles.

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[9] Cortés provided large grants of land also to Indian nobles, including the family of Moctezuma. The Tlaxcalans, for their services, were exempted from feudal servitude.

[10] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *Disertaciones cit.*, VI, tomo II, pp. 63–126.

The expedition penetrated as far as the river Naco without meeting Las Casas or having received any news of him. Just as Cortés was about to abandon his enterprise, word came of Olid's capture and death and the submission of his forces. He therefore returned to Vera Cruz, after a year and one half on the march, so worn out by fatigue and suffering that his friends had difficulty in recognizing him.

His reverses, however, had only begun. Hardly had he left Mexico City in 1524, when the governors whom he had appointed began to quarrel among themselves. When he failed to return or send news within a stipulated time, he was declared dead. He was accused of having robbed the Treasury. His majordomo, De Paz, was put to the torture of Cuauhtémoc to discover the treasures under his care, and a suit was entered to collect 60,000 pesos from his estate. With the country in this state of turmoil, Cortés returned to the capital, June 20, 1526. A tremendous ovation was given him by the people, Spaniards and Indians alike, who hoped under his rule to have a return of peace and justice.

This hope, unfortunately, was not to be realized. His enemies had already dispatched to the Court of Spain a long list of grievances against him. It was asserted that he had concealed the treasure of Moctezuma, had given a false accounting of the lands recently conquered, and even had attempted to set himself up as independent ruler of the country, repudiating his fealty to the Emperor Charles V. The immediate effect of these charges was the suspension of his powers as governor. Luis Ponce de León was named by the Crown to act as resident judge upon the case and meantime to assume the office relinquished by the accused. The new governor arrived in Mexico

City, July 2, 1526, and was received with full submission by Cortés. He had hardly begun to administer his office, however, when he was taken seriously ill with a fever, and died within three weeks, transmitting his authority to Marcos de Aguilar.

Suspicions, although unsubstantiated, were promptly raised against Cortés. A controversy arose also over the validity of Aguilar's claims, which Cortés and his followers at first refused to recognize. Aguilar was finally accepted, without further action, but death cut short his administration in February, 1527. Next in office came Alonso de Estrada, whose appointment was confirmed later by the Crown. If Cortés and his friends had reason to feel badly over the treatment they had already received, their subsequent experiences were infinitely more irritating. The administration of Estrada was so vindictive, that, in desperation, the Conqueror finally resolved to return to Spain and present his claims before Charles V himself. He could easily have stirred up rebellion; but this he refused to do.

On the eve of his departure he learned that the Emperor had decided to change the form of government in Mexico from that of military rule to an *Audiencia* or executive court. To this body would likewise fall the duty of continuing an appraisal of the old charges brought against his administration. At once the hue and cry were renewed. He was accused of defrauding the Emperor of the royal fifth, of disobeying the royal orders, of trying to set himself up as king, and even of strangling his wife.

Nevertheless, Cortés was received with great cordiality at the court. Among other favors, the Emperor conferred upon him the title of Marqués del Valle de Oaxaca together with large estates and possessions. In addition, he was confirmed in the title of captain general of New Spain. But, contrary to his ardent desire, he was not restored to the governorship of New Spain. Instead, as a partial consolation, he received a rather vague commission as governor of the islands and lands of the Southern Sea with one-twelfth part of all that he should discover. The court was willing to stimulate his passion for discovery and conquest, but not to trust his ambition for power.

At this time he secured from Rome the perpetual patronage of the Hospital of the Most Pure Conception, which he had founded immediately after the Conquest of Tenochtitlán, also the legitimation of his natural sons.[11] A widower since the death of his wife in Coyoacán, he now entered marriage with Juana de Zuñiga, daughter of the Count de Aguilar and niece of the Duke de Béjar, thus allying himself with the higher Spanish nobility. It is said that at this time he presented to his wife five magnificent emeralds, valued over 5000 ducats, incurring the lasting displeasure of the Empress, who desired the gems for herself.

After two years in Spain, he returned to Mexico, on July 15, 1530. With him this time came wife and mother and an imposing train of followers. The new Marqués del Valle proceeded in state to Tlaxcala and thence to Texcoco. On express orders of the Empress, who feared the clash of rival officials, he stayed out of Mexico City.

The First *Audiencia,* under the domination of the infamous Nuño de Guzmán, had played havoc with his property and claims as well as those of his vassals and had the entire province in a turmoil. His return, consequently, was viewed with the greatest alarm by this faction, which realized the real power he was capable of exercising over the natives. Cortés, however, withdrew to his estate in Cuernavaca and obediently occupied himself with his new projects in the Southern Sea. From these new headquarters he began to launch plans for the discovery and conquest of the Spice Islands and spoke even of a grandiose scheme to secure the submission of China to the Spanish Crown.[12]

The Second *Audiencia,* which was appointed to right the wrongs of the first, arrived shortly after his return to the country. Its members were inclined to lend a more sympathetic ear to his claims, but they were not disposed to regard his powers as in any way superior, or indeed equal, to their own. Whether, therefore, from an irritated sense of limitation or from the urge of temperamental restlessness, he soon decided to push off in the spirit of Tennyson's Ulysses and carve out a new jurisdiction for himself in territories as yet undiscovered. Among the practical exploits of this period must be mentioned his exploration of the coast of Jalisco and his discovery of the peninsula of California, which was named, according to some, after *calida fornax,* or "hot furnace," because of its excessive heat.

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[11] Cf. Alamán, *Disertaciones cit.*, tomo II, apénd. 2.

[12] Cf. *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1853), tomo II, p. 580.

These hopes, however, were soon dashed by the decision of the Spanish monarch to elevate New Spain to a viceroyalty. The first viceroy, Antonio Mendoza, arrived late in 1535, armed with almost plenary powers which reduced still further the remnants of the Conqueror's authority. Unwilling to allow Cortés to build up a rival province, and perhaps instructed in Spain to this effect, the Viceroy determined to explore the new regions which were opened up and to bring them under his control. Cortés assumed that they belonged to his jurisdiction in virtue of the grants which he had received in Spain. When remonstrances failed, he decided to return again to Spain to press his contentions. In the thought that his stay would be brief, he took with him only his eight-year-old son, Martín.

This time he was met with coldness and indifference, a faintly pathetic figure who had outlived his age and usefulness. From one official, he was referred to another, and from one city to another, to secure a hearing from the court. As a final gesture to recover royal attention, he joined the Emperor in an expedition against Argel. This was brought to near disaster in shipwreck. The famous emeralds, which he always carried with him, were lost; and he and his son barely escaped with their lives. Further disappointment came with the news that the proposed marriage of his daughter with the son and heir of the Marqués de Astorga had been called off. Six years of this kind of fortune persuaded him that the best thing to do was to return to the land of his conquest and settle down with his family on the estates that were left to him.

Broken in spirit, he began to make preparations for the voyage. But even these had to be abandoned. Mental anguish had sharpened into physical infirmity. When he realized that the end was near, he retired to Castilleja de la Cuesta near Seville, to spend his last days in spiritual considerations. From Valladolid, he had written his last letter to the Emperor, dated February 3, 1544. "I am no longer of an age to spend my time traveling from inn to inn," he declared, with a pathos strangely contrasting with the indomitable temperament of the early Conqueror, "but must rather settle down and make up my account with God. It is a long one, and I have but a short time to balance it, but it is better to lose my fortune than my soul. . . ."

He now drew up his last will, a truly great document, received the final sacraments and awaited the end, which came, on December 2, 1547, in his sixty-third year.[13]

The same restlessness of spirit that characterized the man during his life seemed to pursue even his ashes. He was buried first in the church of San Isidro del Campo at Seville. In 1566, the remains were sent to Mexico and placed in the church of St. Francis of Texcoco, whence they were removed in 1629 to the church of St. Francis in Mexico City. In 1794 they were transferred to the church of Jesus where they remained until 1823. Then from fear of the excesses of the people in their devotion to the cause of Independence, they were changed to the church of Jesus the Nazarene. Their present location is in doubt, inasmuch as his descendants, the Dukes de Monteleone, maintain that they were removed to Palermo.

vi

If Cortés' later years were filled with disappointments and reverses, his reputation has fared hardly better at the hands of scores of historians who have subsequently followed his career. He has been accused of a complete lack of conscience, concealing his avarice and passion for gold under the banner of religion. His biographer and sincere admirer, Bernal Díaz, has charged him with injustice in the distribution of the spoils of war. Much is made also of his personal licentiousness; even the accusation of having murdered his first wife, Catalina Xuáres, was brought against him.[14] Of his cruelty toward the Indians, particularly in the massacre at Cholula and the treatment of Cuauhtémoc, enough has been said to condemn him forever.

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[13] *Diccionario cit.*, tomo II, pp. 582–592.

[14] From his second marriage, Cortés left one son, Martín, and three daughters; in addition he left five natural children, including a son of the celebrated Doña Marina, or Malinche, all named in his will.

A true appraisal of the man, however, can hardly be made except in terms of the times in which he lived and of the perilous circumstances into which he deliberately placed himself. Some value, too, must be given to his own accounts of the bloody business into which he plunged. Whatever may be said of his personal ambitions, there can be no doubt that all his hopes were pinned primarily on increasing the domains and prestige of his monarch. Thus in his fourth letter to Charles V, he declared, "I am strongly persuaded that, if it please God, Your Majesty will be made ruler of more kingdoms and dominions than all those of which our nation yet has knowledge. May it please Him to direct us that He may be served and Your Majesty so prosper, when I think there will be nothing wanting to make Your Majesty the monarch of all the world."[15]

This did not mean, of course, that he was oblivious to his own interests. "I desire above all things," he stated in his fifth letter, "and not without cause that Your Majesty should be truly informed of my services and faults; for I hold it certain (and not without reason) that knowing them Your Majesty will grant me great and extensive favors, considering, not how little my slight capacity may be capable of receiving, but how much Your Majesty is obliged to bestow on one who has served him as well and faithfully as I have done."[16]

Perhaps the best exposition of his philosophy in justification for the conquest of Mexico is that contained in his address to his troops in the grand review at Tlaxcala. "You are aware," he said, "that in order to do service to his Majesty the Emperor we came to settle in this land, the inhabitants of which declared themselves vassals of his Majesty, and so remained for some time receiving good works from us, as we from them. But without cause the people of Culua, who are those dwelling in the great city of Tenochtitlán and all other provinces subject to them, not only rebelled against his Majesty but also slew many of our company, our kinsmen and our friends, and drove us forcibly from their land. Remember what trials and toils we have passed through, and consider how fitting it is to the service of God and His Catholic Majesty to turn and recover that which is lost, for which we have on our side just cause and reason; first, we are fighting to spread the faith against a barbarous people; second, we are serving his Majesty; third, we have to secure our very existence; fourth, many of the natives are joining us as allies, all of which are potent causes to cheer our spirits."[17]

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[15] Cf. Hernando Cortés, *Five Letters*, trans. by J. B. Morris (London, 1928), p. 270.

[16] *Letters, loc. cit.*, p. 373.

In spite of his much-publicized cruelty, Cortés was sincere in his desire of spreading Christianity in Mexico. "All that was done for the introduction of the Catholic religion during the Conquest," declared Lucas Alamán, "can be seen better as a proof of the zeal, sometimes imprudent, which animated Cortés than as a systematized force directed to the great object of changing the established religion."[18] His destruction of the idols at Cozumel and Cempoalla, and their substitution with the figures of the Redemption, did not, it is true, have the logical effect of converting the natives. Nevertheless, while waging a constant crusade against the terrible Aztec practice of human sacrifice, he realized the necessity of a systematic Christianization of the people, as "the great object of the Conquest."

"In no letter that I have written to Your Majesty," he declared to the Spanish monarch, "have I failed to point out the opportunity that exists to convert certain of the natives in these parts to our holy Catholic Faith, and I have begged Your Majesty to dispatch religious persons of saintly life and character for that purpose."[19] For himself, he never ceased to take counsel with the Almighty. Thus, referring to a grievous dilemma during his expedition to Nicaragua, he said, "I bethought me that nothing can be well done or directed unless by the hand of the Mover and Doer of all things, and accordingly ordered Masses to be said and processions and sacrifices to be made, beseeching God to guide me in that path most pleasing to Him."[20] These could not have been the words of a bad man.

These same considerations led the way to his vision of the future of the country. He was aware of the ruinous attitude of many of the white settlers. "For all or the greater number of them," he wrote with bitterness, "have notions of using towards these lands as they used towards the Islands before them, that is to say, impoverishing them, destroying them, and then abandoning them." "It behooves me," he added "to seek every means possible for the settling of these lands, that both Spaniards and natives may maintain themselves and multiply, and our holy Catholic Faith take root, our Lord God being pleased to make me the instrument by which He should be made known."[21]

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[17] *Letters, loc. cit.*, pp. 137–138.

[18] *Disertacion* VII, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, pp. 130, 127.

[19] *Letters, loc. cit.*, p. 280.

[20] *Letters, loc. cit.*, p. 361.

At the same time, he saw himself forced to accede to some extent to the demands of his colleagues. "On account of the many importunities of Your Majesty's officials and all my men, which there was no means of resisting," he explained, "I found myself practically forced to hand over the rulers and natives of these parts to the Spaniards so that until Your Majesty shall make some fresh arrangement or confirm this one, the aforesaid rulers and natives will serve and provide the Spaniards, to whom they were respectively allotted, with whatever they may need to sustain themselves. All this was done with the approval of persons who have great knowledge and experience of the country. No better course could have been taken, nor one which contributes more both to the proper maintenance of the Spaniards, and the conservation and good treatment of the Indians."[22]

Much has been written in allegation of the insensate cruelty of the Spaniards toward the Indians and their general policy of enslavement. In this respect, Cortés' instructions to the captain in charge of the expedition against the Chichimecas, a savage tribe northwest of Michoacán, is illuminating. "If he find any aptitude or capacity in them to live as the other native inhabitants, accept the Catholic Faith, and acknowledge the service they owe to his Majesty, he is to pacify them and bring them under his Majesty's yoke, establishing a settlement there in whatever part seem to him best; but if he find no such signs, but rather that they are unwilling to be obedient, he is to make war on them and take them as slaves, that there may be no useless tribes in the land nor such as do not recognize and serve his Majesty, and by enslaving these tribes, who are indeed almost savages, his Majesty will be served and the Spaniards profited not a little, for they can dig gold from the mines, and it may be that merely by coming into contact with us some of them will become civilized."[23] In a word, he was not concerned with the finer points of humanity. As the rough and ready opener of a continent, he looked at facts as he found them and thought only in terms of large results.

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[21] *Letters, loc. cit.*, pp. 284, 285.

[22] *Letters, loc. cit.*, pp. 240–241.

The initial policy of Cortés, in spite of his double dealing, was one of peaceful agreements. Indeed, the Indians continued to regard him as their sole protector against the rapacity and cruelty of the Spaniards, after the siege and reorganization of Mexico City. It is not improbable that, if the impetuous Alvarado had restrained himself during Cortés' sally against Narváez, the country could have been reorganized in comparative peace. Cortés' determination to fight it out to the bitter end, once the situation reached a desperate pass, is expressed in the motives of self-preservation and pride which he himself alleged. "I told them," he declared, "that in no wise would I abandon this land for I considered that to do so would not only be shameful to my person and full of danger for us all, but also disloyal in the highest degree to Your Majesty. I was therefore determined to turn upon the enemy wherever I could, and attack him by whatever means were possible."[24]

To attempt an appraisal of the Conquest in terms of its morality and justification, or the contrary, is not within the scope of this work. It is a generally recognized Christian principle that conquest, if based upon nothing except the "right of force," is unjustifiable. Many maintain that the so-called right of conquest is nothing else than the application of force, and that the superior civilization of an invading people is no justification for such action. The eminent theologian and jurist, Father Francisco de Vitoria, contemporary with the Mexican Conquest, pointed out that since the Indians possessed their territory under a ruler, the

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[23] *Letters, loc. cit.,* p. 379.

[24] *Letters, loc. cit.,* p. 128.

Spaniards had no right to acquire it by occupation. So far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the Bull of Alexander VI had no further effect in right than that of conferring upon the Spanish people the privilege of preaching Christianity to the people in the newly discovered lands.[25]

Cortés himself was assailed by conscientious considerations after the heat of the Conquest was over. The ferocity of the siege gave way to a sincere desire on his part to prevent the abuse of the natives, with which he had long been familiar. He set himself at once to the work of rebuilding a new Mexico from the ashes of the old, reconstructing the ruined city, enacting beneficent laws for the masses, and establishing a new unity throughout the country. In drawing up his will, he made generous allowance for institutions of charity and education. On the matter of slavery, he directed his son Martín "and those who shall afterwards succeed him in my estate to use all diligence in verifying this matter to the peace of my conscience and their own."[26] Unlike the Anglo-Saxon colonizers of North America, he never believed that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian," and it seems clear that he never contemplated slavery as a permanent solution for pacifying even the most primitive and savage tribes.

"In all these provisions," writes Zamacois, of the ordinances drawn up by Cortés, "there is to be found the spirit of organization, of order, of observation, and of care in all matters. Howsoever insignificant they may appear, they form the sequence, the union, and harmony of the social order. In these regulations, recommending the embellishment, the sanitation, and the convenience of cities and the fulfillment of religious duties in all acts relative to public worship, are to be seen the wise provisions which govern the decorum and conduct that should be observed by those who occupy any important office in the public administration." The fundamental thought of the Conqueror was unmistakably "that the Indian race should be preserved, that the country should grow, and that the Spaniards should remain in it forever."[27] The talents of Cortés the administrator and organizer were certainly comparable with his military genius.

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[25] Cf. Juan de Solorzano, *Politica Indiana* (Antwerp, 1703), lib. I, cap. 10.

[26] *Diccionario cit.*, tomo II, p. 589.

On the other hand, for most of the tribes under the Aztec domination the Conquest represented an opportunity for liberation from the hateful impositions of tyranny and human sacrifice. If the Aztecs had been destined to spread and increase their power, it is doubtful whether the result could have been other than the extinction of the native populations.

Thus, after discussing the glories of the Texcocan culture under Nezahualcoyotl, Prescott turns to more realistic considerations. "What was the actual amount of the Texcocan civilization," he admits, "it is not easy to determine, with the imperfect light afforded us. It was certainly far below anything, which the word conveys, measured by a European standard. In some of the arts, and in any walk of science, they could only have made, as it were, a beginning. But they had begun in the right way, and already showed a refinement in sentiment and manners, a capacity for receiving instruction, which, under good auspices, might have led them on to indefinite improvement. Unhappily, they were fast falling under the dominion of the warlike Aztecs. And that people repaid the benefits received from their more polished neighbors by imparting to them their own ferocious superstition, which, falling like a mildew on the land, would soon have blighted its rich blossoms of promise, and turned even its fruits to dust and ashes."[28]

Whatever may be the final verdict of history and humanity upon the Conquest, there can be no doubt that Mexico can never erase the memory of one of the greatest of its figures — Hernando Cortés. To his energy and initiative can be credited the foundation of modern Mexico as a nation, quite as truly as the establishment of the United States of America can be ascribed to the British of the original thirteen colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. It was he who envisioned a great and expanding domain, brought under a single rule, taught the civilizing principles of Christianity, and united in a large economic plan. Even more than this, it was his purpose to work with the human material at hand, the natives of the New World, not merely to set up a white man's refuge rimmed round with forts, as was the case to a large extent in the American colonies of England. If the glory of his undaunted courage may be dimmed by considerations of greater humanity for the Aztecs who opposed his advance into their territory, it may well be answered that the cause of Spanish expansion which he represented was certainly no more reprehensible than the cause and the manner of the expansion of the American federation from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Moreover, Cortés began a tradition of civilization, not of extinction, for the Mexican Indians, including those whose very existence was threatened by the Aztec program of human sacrifice and extortion.[29] And to this fact has been due the conservation and the mingling of the Spanish and native bloods of Mexico. To forget these facts or to bemoan them is to turn with indignation or contempt upon the very conception of Mexican nationality and statehood itself.

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[27] Niceto de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1877), tomo IV, pp. 212–215.

[28] W. H. Prescott, *The Conquest of Mexico,* Bk. I, Chap. VI, "Tezcucan Civilization."

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[29] Cortés, *Letters, loc. cit.*, pp. 91–92; 294–295.

CHAPTER III

Bartolomé De Las Casas

PROTECTOR OF THE INDIANS

BISHOP OF CHIAPAS

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Of the great figures of colonial Mexico, none has aroused more controversy than that of Bartolomé de las Casas. Such men, Manuel José Quintana writes in his introduction to the "History of the Indies" by Las Casas, "give to the opinions and affairs into which they enter the electrical character of their spirit, so that it seems impossible to consider them, even many centuries after their death, without taking part in the movement and the passions which they aroused."[1] Whatever view one may hold of the man and of his policies, it is certain that his vigor and idealism have been an inspiration for every reformer of any rank that has arisen during the turbulent history of Mexico.

Las Casas was born in Seville, in 1474, of a French family named Casaus, which had settled there from the time of the Re-Conquest of Spain and been given an estate there by St. Ferdinand for its part in the wars against the Moors. Bartolomé used the French form for his name, although he preferred that of Casas, which he finally determined upon. His studies were made at the University of Salamanca, first in grammar, philosophy, and theology, and later in law, in which he received his licentiate.

His father, Francisco de Casaus, had accompanied Columbus on two voyages to America, and brought back a young Indian slave to serve as a valet for his son. Queen Isabella, however, was angered at the discoverer's unauthorized distribution of Indians among the Spaniards and gave orders under penalty of death that they should be liberated and returned to their country at the expense of their masters. As a result, the valet was shipped back from Seville to the New World.

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[1] Bartolomé de las Casas, *Historia de las Indias* (Mexico, 1877), tomo I, p. 3.

The narration of his father's experiences and the general excitement over the new discoveries inspired the student to see the world for himself. Consequently, at the age of twenty-four, on March 30, 1498, Bartolomé set out as Columbus' secretary, not returning to the port of Cádiz until three years later. He again joined the Admiral, on May 9, 1502, in company with Ovando, who was being sent to straighten out a rather bad situation on the island of Hispaniola, or Santo Domingo. Apparently his heart was touched by the plight of the natives, which grew steadily worse after the death of Isabella in 1504; and he resolved to dedicate his life in their cause. He returned again to Spain, preparing himself for the priesthood and was ordained, probably in 1510. In that year he celebrated his first Mass, sung in the New World, at La Vega, Santo Domingo.

His activity on the island gave evidence of his virtue and ability, for the following year, Diego Velázquez, who was appointed governor of Cuba, took Las Casas with him as counselor. When the governor was obliged to absent himself from headquarters, he gave orders that nothing should be done without first consulting Don Bartolomé; and when Pánfilo de Narváez found himself in a difficult situation with the Indians of the province of Bayamo, it was Las Casas again who was called to negotiate peace.

The apostolic career of the priest did not begin until he was appointed to the second expedition of Narváez, which set out with 100 men and 1000 Indians to visit friendly provinces, pacify Camaguey, and explore still farther as circumstances presented themselves. His own duties embraced preaching to the Indians, baptizing the children, and preventing excesses on the part of the soldiers. To remain on good terms with the friendly tribes, he arranged that the Spaniards should establish their quarters in a section apart from those of the natives and not disturb the latter, under heavy penalties. In spite of every precaution, however, the Spanish troops lost their good judgment, once they entered the province of Camaguey, and fell relentlessly on the assembled natives whom they suspected of treachery. The memory of this horrible affair remained with Las Casas to the end of his life, as he related in his *History*. Again it was only his compassion and good repute with the Indians that saved the Spaniards from becoming the victims of their inhuman audacity and brought the Indians back to a state of confidence and peace.

As a reward for his services on this expedition, he received from Velázquez an estate in the neighborhood of the newly founded city of La Trinidad. Las Casas made the most of this property, and utilized the Indians that were assigned to him for work in the mines and in the fields. Apparently this caused him no qualms of conscience at the time, for he later wrote of himself: "In this matter at that time the good Father was as blind as the lay members of his flock."[2]

Called upon to preach on Pentecost Sunday at Baracoa, he began to meditate on the thirty-fourth chapter of Ecclesiasticus: "He that taketh away the bread gotten by sweat is like him that killeth his neighbor. He that sheddeth blood and he that defraudeth the laborer of his hire are brothers." The text produced so profound an effect upon him, that he resolved to turn the Indians and lands which he had received back to the government immediately, so as to be able to preach the same truths without hypocrisy.

The incredulous Velázquez offered to give him more time to consider the matter, but Las Casas insisted on the immediate surrender of his property, taking care that his partner, Pedro de Rentería, should not suffer because of his decision. At once he began to preach in no uncertain terms the iniquity of the *repartimientos,* so long as the oppression of the Indian workers continued. Because of his own example, the Spaniards were unable to accuse him of insincerity, but beyond that little change took place. Las Casas himself, in his *History,* admits that for them "saying that they could not have Indians in their service was the same as saying that they could not make use of beasts of burden."

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[2] Las Casas, *loc. cit.,* lib. 3, cap. 31.

When Rentería, who had been in Jamaica, learned what Las Casas had done, he returned with the rather singular revelation that he had been entertaining the same impressions of the situation, and had resolved not only to abandon this traffic, but even make representations to Spain in favor of the Indians. It was then decided that Las Casas was better fitted for this mission. Rentería therefore turned over the profits of his Jamaica venture to the expenses of the journey, and Las Casas set out for Santo Domingo and Spain.

ii

The island of Santo Domingo, from the time of Columbus, was the primitive center of the Spanish domination in America. From there the new soldiers of fortune spread out to Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, and thence to Mexico. Already in 1495 Columbus had imposed a tribute of gold and cotton upon the natives, who proceeded to flee into the interior to avoid this domination. Later he found himself obliged to give in to the demands of his companions and apportion Indian workers to serve in the mines and fields of the colonists. This arrangement by no means satisfied the Spanish court; but while theologians and jurists were discussing the merits of the case, the Indians were brought increasingly under the yoke, each village being obliged to offer its quota. This was the beginning of the *repartimientos* or *encomiendas.* The Indians who refused to work were punished, and those that tried to escape were made slaves.[3]

In the islands, where the natives were hardly better than savages, their treatment was such that within a comparatively short time they were all killed off, or bred in with imported Negro slaves. In Mexico, where they had already attained a relative degree of culture, more pause was given to the situation; and means were taken to preserve them, if not from reasons of humanity, at least for the sake of utility. Cortés had seen the practical effects of the system in Cuba, and although he was moved largely by desire of personal gain, he realized that some moderation was going to be necessary to prevent the extermination of the natives of Mexico. The insistent demands of his companions in arms, however, compelled him to make the same divisions of property with the same allotment of Indian labor.

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[3] Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley, 1929), p. 20.

In theory, the system which had been forced on Columbus from 1499 was a most humane one. The title under which the Holy See had granted dominion to Spain over the Indians was their conversion to Christianity.[4] It was under this idealistic title, therefore, that the conquerors received not only land claims but also groups of Indians under the direction of their traditional *caciques* or chiefs, who were to be clothed, fed, taught Christianity, and placed in the service of the land. Later this was extended by Bobadilla to secure service in the mines. The Indians were to be treated well, given a reasonable wage, and considered as free persons, vassals of the king of Spain much the same as Spanish subjects.

Queen Isabella had been particularly solicitous in this matter and had given orders that "the Indians should be well treated, and with gifts and good works attracted to the faith, while Spaniards who maltreated them were to be severely punished." In her instructions to Ovando, the successor of Bobadilla, she expressly ordered that "all the Indians of the Spaniards were to be free from slavery, unmolested by anyone, and should live as free vassals, governed and preserved in justice, like the vassals of the crowns of Castile."[5] These orders she repeated again in her last will and testament. Unfortunately her death cut short this determination, and the greed of the colonists made short shrift of considerations of humanity or religion.

With the idea of improving the royal revenues, the King now sent, as treasurer-general, Miguel de Pasamonte. Such was the insolence and greed of this man that within six years from the time he arrived in 1508, the Indian population of Santo Domingo fell from 60,000 to 14,000. The Dominican Fathers, who had been sent to safeguard the spiritual welfare of the natives, were unable to view the situation without some protest; and in 1511

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[4] Cf. *Ordenanzas* of Cortés, in N. de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1877), tomo IV, p. 758.

[5] *Cedula of Isabella to Ovando*, Dec. 20, 1503, cf. Simpson, *loc. cit.*, p. 31.

Fray Antonio Montesinos delivered a passionate address in the presence of the high officials denouncing the whole procedure. Attempts by the latter to silence him resulted only in the repetition of his accusations and in his decision to carry the matter to the King personally.

He returned to Spain and forced his way into the royal presence, with the effect that a commission was formed by Ferdinand to study the matter. Nothing came of this, except a confirmation of the *encomenderos* in their holdings, certain moderating ordinances, and an encouragement to the missionary fathers to work for the salvation of souls by good example and sound doctrine.

If the question of *encomiendas* had remained strictly under the management of the government, where it belonged, a good many of the abuses might have been avoided. Unfortunately, it fell into the hands of corrupt individuals who proceeded to play favorites and wreck the fortunes of some of the colonists for the benefit of others. Thus in 1514 Rodrigo de Alburquerque secured the commission to redistribute the *encomiendas,* and assigned the Indian workers to those who were able to make him the most handsome offerings. Diego Columbus, son of the discoverer, was governor at the time, and complained to Spain of this abuse. As a result, Ibarra, a judge from Seville, was appointed to dispatch justice. In spite of his repeated injunctions, the situation remained very bad.

When Las Casas arrived at Santo Domingo, he found the island divided into two hostile camps, one that of the old colonists under the protection of the governor, the other, of the royal officials with Pasamonte at their head, and all in an uproar over the results of Alburquerque's work. He put himself to the task of championing the rights of the Indians amid the turmoil, by public and private conference, but succeeded only in offending the plantation owners in both parties. Aware of the futility of further argument here, he set out, as already stated, for Spain, and arrived in Seville at the end of 1515.

Pasamonte's letters, calculated to nullify his representations at court, had already reached the King; but Las Casas possessed besides his own eloquence two powerful aids, the archbishop of

Seville and the King's chaplain Matienzo, both Dominicans. In his first interview with the monarch at Plasencia, the King showed himself favorably disposed and promised a second audience at Seville. His second approach, however, was blocked by Bishop Fonseca, who was near the King, had served on Pasamonte's board in Santo Domingo and was himself a rich *encomendero* with 800 Indians on his plantations. The death of King Ferdinand, on January 23, 1516, obliged Las Casas to formulate a new plan of approach.

He now decided to present himself before the new King in Flanders, but first lay his proposals before Cardinal Cisneros, the most important figure in Madrid. Cisneros heard him with the greatest interest and declared the trip to Flanders unnecessary. A commission was immediately appointed. Las Casas explained in detail the object of his mission, and a plan of amelioration was drawn up for the mutual benefit of the Indians and the colonists. The next problem was to select a group of men to carry out these recommendations with the least possible partiality or prejudice. The matter had already become a source of dispute even among the religious orders on the scene, the Dominicans embracing the views of Las Casas, and the Franciscans declaring themselves in opposition. Cisneros therefore turned to the Jeronymite Fathers, as neutral, and named for the governing of the Indies three of their members, Friars Luis de Figueroa, Bernardino Manzanedo, and Alonso de Santo Domingo.

Las Casas then proposed that a man of knowledge and conscience should be appointed to office explicitly for the constant protection of the interests of the Indians. He urged, moreover, that laborers should be encouraged, with certain privileges, to immigrate to the Indies. Cisneros agreed to both ideas. The latter idea was not given immediate effect; but the office of Protector of the Indians was created, and Las Casas received the appointment.[6]

He was eager in this capacity to accompany the three commissioners on the voyage, to give more authority to his position;

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[6] Cf. Simpson, *loc. cit.*, apend. II.

but they declined the suggestion, inasmuch as they had no desire of arriving under the suspicion of being influenced one way or the other. Las Casas found himself obliged to take another boat, and arrived at Santo Domingo, in the early part of 1517, a few days after the three friars.

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Idealist that he was, he had hoped that the first act of the new body would be to suspend the whole system of the *repartimientos*. But he failed to take into account that, however glaring its defects, the system had become ingrained into the social and economic fabric of the colony and could not be eliminated so easily, without practical anarchy. Cisneros had shown himself in sympathy with the ideas of Las Casas, it is true; but he did not intend to be governed blindly by them. The commissioners whom he sent were instructed to study both sides of the question. If the Indians were capable of being assimilated into society as Las Casas declared, then his plans were to be followed. Otherwise the ordinances drawn up at the behest of Father Montesinos in 1512 were to be enforced with certain features in greater favor of the Indians.[7]

The commission worked cautiously, removing the *encomiendas* from the government counselors and absentee landlords and penalizing the oppression of the natives, but failed to see the full picture as Las Casas had painted it. The latter became considerably annoyed at what he regarded as a criminal delay of radical reform and set himself to condemn, not only the immediate offenders, but public officials and the commission as well. The commissioners endured his fulminations with patience; but other elements became so aroused that several attempts were made upon his life.

By 1508 the native population of Santo Domingo had so diminished that it became necessary to find some way to replenish the number of laborers. Queen Isabella had forbidden the seizure of Indians from other islands, but upon her death permission for this was granted by the King. By false promises and later by force, various expeditions of the Spaniards enslaved, in four or five years, about 40,000 persons.

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[7] Cf. Simpson, *loc. cit.*, apend. I.

The incriminations of Las Casas finally reached the point where the government ordered him to leave the Island. He resolved to return to Spain, in 1517, before the order of his expulsion could take effect, and went, immediately upon his return, to Aranda, where the court had been set up. Cisneros, by this time, had been somewhat prejudiced against him by reports of his imprudent zeal and was, moreover, afflicted with a mortal illness. Las Casas, therefore, awaited the return of Charles V and his ministers. Apparently he made an excellent impression on the latter, and urged an immediate acceptance of his plans.

One of the commissioners, Friar Bernardino Manzanedo, had followed him to Spain with the intention of defending himself against the charges of Las Casas, but he received scant attention from the court and retired to his convent. The adversaries of the Protector were not content to let the matter rest there. Instead, they stormed the ministers with accounts of Las Casas' poor judgment, relating the absolute inability of the Indians to live in liberty, and the evils that would result from the inauguration of his policies.

Pressed by the chancellor for a practical solution of the problem, Las Casas made two proposals. The first, he had made before, namely the immigration of Spanish workers to the colonies. The second, which hardly accorded with his own humane policies, was that the Spaniards should be given leave to send Negro slaves to work in the sugar mills and in the mines, where labor was too arduous for the Indians. It may be said, in extenuation of this inconsistency, that his intention was in accord with a general opinion of the times that Negro slaves in Spain might profitably be transferred to the Indies. He later recognized his error, as he declared, in "not considering the injustice with which the Portuguese take and make them (the Negroes) slaves"; and he added "the case was the same for them as for the Indians."[8]

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[8] It is to be noted, however, that Negro slaves had been introduced into the Indies at least fourteen years before this. Cf. William Robertson, *The History of America*, 2nd ed. (London, 1778), I, p. 286.

The government immediately approved both measures, but without the desired results. The slave trade quickly became a corrupt monopoly. Las Casas himself undertook the organizing of emigrant labor groups throughout Spain. In this he was assisted by a certain Berrio, who sent off a shipload of men, without his knowledge or permission, and without accompanying them, as directed, or making arrangements for their arrival. They were therefore obliged to disperse on landing at Santo Domingo; and Las Casas became disgusted with the whole plan.

He now conceived a new ambition, to secure 100 leagues of territory on the coast, where the Dominican Fathers might preach to the natives without disturbance from Spanish civilian or military elements. This scheme meeting with little sympathy from the government, he proposed another which would be more profitable for the King's coffers. This was to secure 1000 leagues of coastal property at Cumaná, Venezuela, and set up an entirely new regime. The Indians of the region who had been enslaved and removed were to be returned to it, accompanied by others whom he would select in Santo Domingo. Laborers were to be imported from Spain together with a good number of Dominicans and Franciscans. The Indians would serve as mediators and interpreters, the laborers as farm hands and colonists, the religious as preachers and propagators of the faith. He conceived the idea also of forming a company or order of 50 men as founders, who would dress in white with red crosses, like the order of Calatrava, to impress the natives with the idea that they were a different type of man than had come before. They were to be granted coats of arms and made knights of the Golden Spur.

The King's ministers considered the plan favorably and instructed Las Casas to submit it to the Council of the Indies. This was in 1519. Las Casas immediately balked at this idea, inasmuch as the Council was composed of practically the same men as he had confronted before, with his enemy Fonseca at their head; and he convinced eight of the King's preachers that they should form a committee to examine the project. In spite of the repeated attacks of his adversaries and ridicule over his uniformed company, he bearded all opposition and wrung permission from the King to carry out his enterprise.

An example of his courage in the service of his convictions appears at this time in his statement to the Bishop of Darien, who was called into the sessions. "First," said he to the prelate, "you have sinned a thousand times and another thousand much more in not having devoted your soul to your flock to free them from those tyrants which have destroyed them. Secondly, you eat the flesh and drink the blood of your flock. Thirdly, if you do not restore all that you have taken from them, up to the last particle, you stand no better chance of salvation than Judas." Then turning to the King, in answer to the charge that the Indians were naturally made for menial service, he declared, "They are most capable of the Christian faith and amenable to every virtue and all good habits that can be taught by reason and dogma. By nature they are free and have their own kings and native leaders who govern their policies."[9] In this view he was ably seconded by Diego Columbus. The bishop agreed with his conclusion.

The concession for the scheme was finally granted on May 19, 1520, at Coruña, but under a modified form, granting only 260 leagues instead of the 1000. Las Casas went at once to Seville where he enlisted 200 workers, and in spite of opposition from the Bishop of Burgos, set sail with goodly supplies. The district assigned to him was known as the Pearl Coast, one of the first and most important discoveries of Columbus. There the Dominicans and the Franciscans had established monasteries, seven leagues apart; and due to the industry and good example of the friars, the Indians had become thoroughly peaceful.

Unfortunately for the whole cause, an adventurer named Ojeda happened to be exploring this coast in search of slaves, against the law. Taking advantage of the good will and lack of suspicion on the part of the natives, he suddenly surprised a large number of them while they were loading his ship, putting them in chains and slaying those that resisted. Immediately the whole district was in an uproar. Ojeda himself was later surprised and killed by the natives, as were the innocent monks whom they believed to be in on the conspiracy. All the improvements which the Spaniards introduced were wrecked. Then the government, instead of assigning the blame where it belonged, sent out a punitive expedition against the Indians. Such was the state of affairs when Las Casas arrived at Puerto Rico with his expedition.

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[9] Cf. Quintana, *loc. cit.*, p. 35.

In spite of the dismay which this news brought, he resolved to go ahead with his plans, and awaited the arrival of the punitive fleet under the command of his friend Ocampo. He at once made known his authorization from the King to the effect that he had been commissioned to settle the regions to which Ocampo was proceeding in warlike fashion, and therefore bade that commander to turn back. Ocampo insisted that he had orders from the government of the island, and, being in a festive mood, ridiculed Las Casas on his whole expedition, including the white habits and the red crosses. As a result, the latter got nowhere in his representation and was obliged to remain in Puerto Rico, while the armada proceeded to do vengeance in his territory.

Ocampo was successful in this venture, capturing the Indian leader, named Gil González, together with many slaves, killing many others, and establishing a new town one-half league from the mouth of the Cumaná river, which he called Nuevo Toledo. With the rift between the whites and the natives thus widening immeasurably, Las Casas proceeded to Santo Domingo to secure the fulfillment of his orders. The members of his expedition were left in charge of various farmers who offered to care for them. At Santo Domingo he found the same divisions as before with regard to his projects; but he succeeded in having the terms and privileges of his settlement posted in public, and after considerable delay secured official assistance.

It was finally decided that the profits of the undertaking should be divided into 24 parts, 6 for the royal treasury, 6 for Las Casas and his 50 knights, 3 for the governor, 4 for the judges, 3 for the royal officials, and 2 for the scribes of the *Audiencia*. Each of these parties was to contribute proportionately to the expenses. Ocampo was appointed to provide the convoy. And thus Las Casas found himself tied up in the same enterprise with Pasamonte and the appellate judges whom he had so bitterly denounced on both sides of the Atlantic.

He started, in July, 1521, to gather together his workers whom he had left in Puerto Rico, only to learn that they had been terrified by reports of the situation at Cumaná and had dispersed in all directions. Arriving at Cumaná, he discovered all the sad truth. The expedition of Ocampo had completed the destruction Ojeda began. The Indians had abandoned the region; and the settlers of Nuevo Toledo, unable to make any contacts or secure help, leaped at the opportunity of returning with Ocampo. Even the members of Las Casas' party became overwhelmed with the hopelessness of the situation, and he was left alone with a few servants and faithful followers.

The Franciscan monastery, which had survived the vengeance of the Indians after Ojeda's crime, seemed to offer the most favorable nucleus for the settlers. Las Casas entered into an agreement with the Fathers, to build an arsenal and storehouse adjoining their garden. He proposed also to erect a fortress at the mouth of the river as a safeguard both against attacks by the Indians and maraudings by the Spaniards of the neighboring island of Cubagua. At the same time he sent emissaries with presents to the local tribes to gain their friendship. The erection of the fort, however, was blocked by representations of the Cubaguan Spaniards, who continued to invade the territory, plying the natives with drink and keeping up a slave trade, to the complete distraction of Las Casas. Repeated complaints to the authorities at Cubagua failed to bring any results, and he determined to place the matter before the governing board or *Audiencia* at Santo Domingo.

With this proposal, he set out after leaving one Francisco de Soto in charge of the colony with orders to maintain two vessels for escape in case of an attack by the Indians. Hardly had he left, when De Soto dispatched the two boats on an expedition to gather slaves, pearls, and gold. The Indians immediately sized up the situation and began preparations to attack. Although the Spaniards heard of the movement, they were in no condition to resist. As a result, they were soon surrounded and their stockades were burned. A number managed to escape to the boats which were on the salt beds at Arraya. For the rest, the settlements and its buildings fell prey to the savage rage of the

Indians. Cubagua itself was threatened by the increasing horde, so that this settlement also had to be abandoned by the colonists, who escaped to Santo Domingo.

To add to misfortunes, the ship carrying Las Casas lost its way and put up at the port of Yaquimo, some 80 leagues below Santo Domingo. There it remained two months because of contrary currents, when the luckless reformer decided to set out overland by himself. By this time the news of the disaster had spread over the entire island; and as he had not appeared in the meantime, he was given up for dead. His final arrival at Santo Domingo brought him knowledge of all that had happened. Complete loss and failure on his part, and the triumph of his enemies, left nothing for him to fall back on. He took refuge in the Dominican convent, and decided to put an end to his enterprises by leaving the world and entering the order. He was received as a member in 1522 and made his solemn profession the following year.

iv

For seven years Las Casas remained in the complete retirement of the cloister, engaged in the spiritual exercises and studies of his order. At this time he conceived the idea of writing his "General History of the Indies," which he actually began in 1527 and finished only shortly before his death. At the end of this period he was sent to Nicaragua, where a diocese was being founded, to aid the bishop, Diego Álvarez Osorio, in preaching and converting the Indians. He remained there for a short time as a founder of the Dominican monastery of León, and returned to Santo Domingo, where he engaged in 1531 in writing an extensive letter to the Council of the Indies on the plight of the natives. His mission carried him repeatedly between Nicaragua and Santo Domingo at this time.

In 1536 he resisted the determination of Rodrigo Contreras, governor of Nicaragua, to engage in a military expedition to the interior of the country, even preaching to the soldiers to refuse obedience to these orders. As a result he was threatened with trial as the instigator of sedition and revolt, and escaped only by intercession of the bishop. Consequently, adverse pressure obliged him to abandon the convent of Nicaragua and leave with his friars for Guatemala.

Here he was received cordially by the bishop-elect, Francisco Marroquín, who invited him to take part in the evangelization of the province. The band of missionaries was able to establish residence in a Dominican house which had been founded in the city of Santiago de Guatemala some years before.

Las Casas now issued his Latin treatise *de unico vocationis modo* in which he set forth two principal ideas. The first was that the only way established by divine providence for teaching men the true religion was that of reason and peaceful persuasion, no matter what their state might be. The second principle was that so long as infidels do not disturb or injure a Christian state, there can be no justification of a war of conquest against them under the title of facilitating their instruction. The conquerors of the epoch looked upon this type of reasoning as totally impracticable and challenged him to try to put his theories into practice. He was not long in accepting the challenge.

The wild and mountainous region of Tuzulutlán offered an ideal theater for the experiment. Three military expeditions had been directed against the natives, and all had failed. Las Casas therefore offered to bring the provinces under the obedience of the King and to establish the Gospel without force of arms, under the condition that the Indians of the region would never be given to a Spanish *encomienda* but would remain free vassals, subject only to a reasonable tribute. He also stipulated that no Spaniard should put foot in the territory within the period of five years. Alonso Maldonado, governor of the province at the time, accepted the conditions and gave his authorization, on May 2, 1537.

The Fathers went about their task carefully. Inasmuch as they were fairly well acquainted with the Indian tongue, they began to translate the principal doctrines of Christianity into easy verse and set these to music. Las Casas then selected a number of baptized Indians who were acquainted with the region and had served as messengers, and taught them to sing these compositions. They were instructed to entertain the native chief in this way and deliver him various gifts. The messengers did as they were told, remaining eight days among the natives. Such was the curiosity they aroused, that the chief and his people demanded to know the source of their education. From this it was but a step to introduce the Fathers themselves, and Friar Luis Cancer was commissioned to enter the territory.

His arrival at the headquarters of the chief was greeted with great festivity. He explained his mission and the terms of the evangelization of the region, and conducted a Christian service at which the chief and his counselors were present. After a period of catechizing, the chief decided to become a Christian, ordered his idols burned, and encouraged his subjects to do the same. The missionary was then authorized to visit the various settlements under the chief's control, where he found the same favorable dispositions.

Returning to Guatemala, Cancer reported his success to Las Casas, who determined to visit the region personally, accompanied by Friar Pedro de Angulo, and push the work of evangelization on to the more remote interior. He was met with the same friendly reception, although some antagonism had been shown to the religious innovations of the first missionary by some of the Indians. The friendly chief, now baptized as Juan, agreed to assemble the Indians under his control into villages, to promote the work of conversion, and develop civil life. This plan met with the greatest opposition among the families scattered throughout the mountains and forests, and it was only after much labor and persuasion that the settlement of Rubinal was begun, in 1538. This consisted of about 100 houses with a church. Gradually, the advantages of clothing, cleanliness, and community life dawned on the other natives, as they came in contact with life in this city.

Las Casas now believed it wise to return to Guatemala to secure a confirmation of previous agreements with the Governor Maldonado, and he brought Don Juan and a small number of Indians with him. Juan was presented both to Marroquín and Maldonado, who took a day to accompany the chief through the city. He was offered various gifts of merchandise by the shop owners, but curiously enough showed a desire only for an image of the Blessed Virgin, which the bishop ordered to be given him. Well content with this visit, the chief returned to his country, still accompanied by Las Casas. The latter was subsequently recalled to Guatemala by the bishop and left the continuation of the work to his successors.

Under the bishop's orders, accompanied by Friars Rodrigo de Ladrada and Cancer, he now set out for Spain to solicit more missionaries. He arrived in 1540, and immediately set himself to the task of confirming in the King's name the privileges he had secured for missionary expansion and of securing Franciscans and Dominican Fathers for the regions of Guatemala. He was ready to return with these men the following year, when he received orders from Cardinal Loaysa, president of the Council of the Indies, to postpone his own trip in favor of certain affairs under consideration by that body. Accordingly he divided the expedition into two sections, the first group consisting of Franciscans, under the leadership of Father Cancer, the second made up of Dominicans whom he would accompany as soon as his business was finished. The result of his representations to the Council at this time was no other than the formulation of the famous "New Laws," which threatened to revolutionize the entire economic structure of the Spanish colonies.[10]

Whatever may have been the abuses in the colonies, there can be no doubt that the Spanish crown had constantly striven to enact laws for the protection of the Indians. The ideal repeated over and over again was the conversion of the Indians and their civil development.[11] Las Casas now addressed a long statement to the King complaining of the inefficacy of these provisions and suggesting 16 remedies. The principal ideas he summoned up as follows: "Let Your Majesty ordain, command, and constitute with the aforesaid majesty and solemnity in solemn court, by decrees, sanctions, and royal laws, that all the Indians in the Indies, whether subjects now or in the future, be placed, reduced, and incorporated in the royal crown of Castile and León under the head of Your Majesty as the subjects and free vassals that they are. Let none of them be given in *encomiendas* to Christian Spaniards. Let it be of inviolable constitution and royal law that neither now nor at any time henceforth they be taken or alienated from the royal crown, or given to anyone as vassals, or placed under *encomenderos* or in trusteeship, or in any other title, manner, or method of alienation. Let them not be seized from the said royal crown for services which anyone may claim, under any title, necessity, cause, or color which may be offered or pretended."[12]

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[10] Cf. Simpson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 151–153.

[11] Cf. Solorzano, *loc. cit.*, I, cap. I.

In practical affect, the "New Laws" aimed to free the Indians from the plantation system and to constitute them as free men, just as Isabella had contemplated. Las Casas envisioned a state of society which the Indians, even under the aboriginal rule, had not known. Under the Spanish organization of Mexico, the Indians, with their leaders as bosses, passed into a plantation system. Their ultimate emancipation was contemplated, and provisions were made to the effect that within ten years an Indian would be capable of assuming complete freedom with vassalage only to the Spanish Crown. Unfortunately, the immediate inauguration of this policy was not suited to Indian capabilities and would have ruined the Spanish planters and thrown the country into practical anarchy. When the Spanish Visitor, Francisco Tello Sandoval, arrived in Mexico City with orders to enforce the "New Laws," he found his position extremely difficult. He soon became persuaded of the impracticability of the proposals, and as a result was forced to suspend their application.

At this time also, Las Casas wrote his "Destruction of the Indies," undoubtedly the most poorly advised act of his career. The bitterness of its tone, its false generalizations, and the horror of its denunciations against the Spanish explorers and settlers naturally aroused the most bitter antagonism against him on the part of his countrymen. On the other hand, it served the enemies of Spain to blacken the Spanish people and to glorify Las Casas as an almost solitary figure in the cause of justice, a martyr against the Spanish inhumanity. "The Destruction of the Indies" was soon translated into English and other languages and given great publicity throughout Europe.[13]

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[12] Quoted in Quintana, *loc. cit.*, p. 51.

v

The "New Laws" were signed by the Emperor at Barcelona, November 20, 1542. The next year Charles V decided to offer Las Casas the bishopric of Cuzco, Peru. Against the Emperor's insistence, he refused the post. Shortly thereafter, the diocese of Chiapas in Mexico became vacant with the death of Juan de Arteaga, its first bishop; and in spite of his remonstrances, Las Casas was compelled to accept this place. He now urged that an *Audiencia* be erected to govern the provinces of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Yucatán, later known as the *Audiencia de los Confines.* On his recommendation also, Maldonado was named its president.

As soon as he had accepted the miter, Las Casas made application for a sufficient number of religious for the provinces of Chiapas and Guatemala. Accompanied by his missionaries, he was consecrated bishop in Seville on Passion Sunday, 1544, and on the tenth of July set sail.

Hardly had he landed in Santo Domingo, when the storm provoked by the "New Laws" fell on his shoulders. No one cared to give him a welcome, and all cursed him as the moving cause of their financial ruin. Even the ordinary offerings made to the Dominican convent at Santo Domingo were suspended because he was staying there. Far from being intimidated, the bishop raised his voice against the *Audiencia* itself for delaying by appeals and injunctions the enforcement of the laws.

On December 14, 1544, he again set sail, for Yucatán, with the idea of reaching Chiapas by way of the Tabasco River. After a stormy passage he arrived at Campeche on the sixth of January. Here he was received more cordially, but his outspoken denunciation of the Spanish landlords and his insistence upon the immediate freedom of slaves and application of the "New

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[13] "Thus when Spain was at the apogee of her political power and all good Protestants were shuddering at the thought of the dungeons of the Inquisition, the *Brief Relation* came as a veritable godsend to those most interested in believing it." — Simpson, *loc. cit.,* p. 2.

Laws" soon aroused the sentiment of the city against him. He was refused obedience as bishop, and his tithes were cut off, so that he found himself in the most embarrassing circumstances.

He had hoped to leave from here to Tabasco by sea, when news came of the wreck of one of his boats which he had sent ahead with part of his equipment and some of his missionaries. The entire personnel, including 9 religious and 23 other Spaniards, was lost. It was with the greatest difficulty that he finally persuaded the remainder of his companions to enter the second boat. Then after an overland journey, he reached Ciudad Real de Chiapas, his capital, February, 1545.

He was welcomed with the same initial cordiality as at Campeche. The missionaries were led to believe that this first exchange of friendship was but the beginning of a permanent harmony, while the Spaniards hoped that through gifts and favors they could soften the reforming zeal of the new prelate. Las Casas, however, was not to be reached in this manner, and the local *encomenderos* were no more inclined than those of other regions to revolutionize their economic status or free their Indians. In the words of one of them, "We say here that the sins of this country must be very great, when God chastises it with a scourge so great as to send us this anti-Christ for a bishop."

When private warnings and public sermons failed to bring about any improvement, Las Casas resorted to spiritual weapons and denied the sacraments to all who refused to give up their traffic in slaves. The local dean and the Mercedarian Fathers were now approached as mediators; and these threatened to appeal against his orders to the Archbishop of Mexico, to the King, and the Pope. The dean proceeded to give confessional absolution as before and Las Casas found his own life threatened when he tried to silence him. Only the departure of the disobedient cleric and the composure of the bishop saved the situation from tragedy.

Counseled by some of his friends to go away, the courageous man replied, "If the cause were mine, I should gladly leave, to put an end to these fears and pacify all. But it is a question of my sheep, these miserable Indians, oppressed and worn out with an unjust servitude and insupportable taxes which other sheep of mine have imposed upon them. Here I wish to stay. This is my church, and I am not going to abandon it." As a result of their adhesion to the bishop, the Dominicans were forced to leave their house in Ciudad Real.

The Dominican Fathers divided themselves into three groups, one band going to Chiapas, where they were cordially received by an *encomendero* who professed so great a satisfaction with the "New Laws," that Las Casas himself decided to accept an invitation to live with him. The magnificence of his reception and the eagerness of the Indians to accept the Christian faith convinced him that here at last was a model establishment. Gradual knowledge of the true situation and the complaints of natives ranging from kidnaping to land seizure, however, soon changed his mind, and he decided to lay his grievances before the *Audiencia de los Confines* in the city of Gracias-á-Dios. His route carried him through the regions where he had inaugurated his earlier experiment in pacifying the natives. In this territory at least he had the comfort of seeing his dreams realized. He arrived at Coban in June, 1545, where the religious had established their convent and witnessed the definite civilization of Indians in orderly communities from their former barbarism and isolation.

At Gracias-á-Dios he found the bishops of Nicaragua and Guatemala. They had come to the city to consecrate a new bishop, but they intended also to present to the *Audiencia* grievances similar to his own. They had hoped to receive a favorable hearing inasmuch as that body with Maldonado at its head had been created for this purpose largely at the suggestion of Las Casas. Maldonado had served as a member of the illustrious Second *Audiencia* of Mexico and had distinguished himself for his justice and humanity as governor of Guatemala. In the meantime, he had married the daughter of Montejo, conqueror of Yucatán, whom Las Casas had upbraided for his iniquitous dealings with the natives; and he had come into the management of large estates because of this connection. At any event, the venerable prelate was treated with the greatest insolence by the *Audiencia* and was practically ejected after being insulted by the same Maldonado. Nevertheless the *Audiencia* finally decided to make an investigation in Chiapas; and Las Casas, now over seventy years of age, set out on foot for Ciudad Real.

Hearing of this move, the officials of Ciudad Real began to stir up every kind of charge against him, stating in particular that he had never presented his authorization from the Pope or the King, and therefore was not to be obeyed. Orders were placed at various roads leading to the city to prevent his entrance. At Copanabastla, an Indian village, the members of his own order advised against his proceeding any farther. The Indians who were instructed to stop his advance did not have the heart to carry out their orders, and allowed themselves to be bound as prisoners and followed him into the city. In this formation, the group marched all night. In the morning Las Casas entered Ciudad Real and proceeded directly to his church without arousing anyone. He then sent notice to the officials that he was ready to receive them.

Practically the whole city turned out to the affair. It is probable that the conciliatory attitude of the bishop would have brought about a peaceful solution, were it not for a few hotbloods, including one of his own friars. The principal demand was, as usual, for suspension of the "New Laws" and the appointment of confessors who would not press the question of slaves as a matter of conscience. Las Casas declared himself willing to appoint certain confessors whom he deemed prudent, when one of his companions, thinking he was merely temporizing, shouted, "Your Lordship, do not do this; it would be better to die first."

Repairing to the house of the Mercedarian Fathers, he found himself menaced by a disorderly group of armed men who had broken into the monastery, and he thought his time had come. The disturbance turned out to be an organized complaint against the bishop for having brought the Indian sentries back as prisoners, and he was accused of thus maltreating them as he had complained about others. After listening patiently for some time to this tumult, and seeing his servants abused by the mob, he ordered his men to put the intruders out by force. All this took place before nine o'clock in the morning. By noon, the entire city had settled back to a peaceful attitude; and the situation was dominated by the moderate element of the populace. Committees were sent to the bishop to apologize for the untoward events of the morning, and he was brought in triumph to his own house.

In spite of this apparent truce, Las Casas began to realize that his was almost a hopeless task in view of the fundamental differences of principle and policy that existed between himself and the chief members of his flock. Moreover, he was constantly distressed by the communications he received from the viceroy and the visitor, and from various bishops and scholars who vehemently denounced his policy of denying the sacraments under circumstances which practically condemned the more moderate action of all the other prelates in Mexico. His biographer, Remesal, states that, so general was the disgust for his methods in the country, his name could hardly be mentioned without a thousand execrations.[14]

When Juan Rogel arrived from the *Audiencia de los Confines* to carry out the investigation demanded by Las Casas, he found it practically impossible to make any headway so long as the people had the impression that he was acting under the direction of the bishop; and he finally told him so. One of the principal sources of feeling against the "New Laws" was precisely that Las Casas had so much to do with their framing. The Spanish conquerors felt that his zeal was due not so much to love for the Indians as to hate for them. Rogel therefore advised him to hasten preparations for the meeting of the bishops soon to be held in Mexico City, inasmuch as he could do nothing so long as Las Casas remained on the scene. The bishop saw the point of this suggestion, put his affairs in order, and set out from the city in 1546. At Chiapas he was joined by Friars Ladrada, Vincente Ferrer, Cancer, and Juan de Perera.

When news of his proximity reached Mexico City, the viceroy and Sandoval, fearing a disturbance, wrote to him to delay his actual entry until further orders. Nevertheless, he proceeded to enter the city and established himself at the Dominican convent. When the Viceroy Mendoza and the judges of the *Audiencia* presented their courtesies, he immediately indicated that he wished to have nothing to do with them inasmuch as he considered them excommunicated for having ordered the corporal punishment of a cleric in Antequera.

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[14] Antonio de Remesal, *Historia de Chyapa*, etc. (Madrid, 1619), lib. 7, caps. 15, 16.

The meeting began with six bishops, several theologians, jurists, and lawyers. Las Casas immediately began to dominate the discussions. Although in the field of practical affairs, when dealing with men of the world, he usually succeeded in arousing only animosity, he was invincible in the order of controversy. As a result eight points were adopted unanimously, reflecting his own mind and serving as a basis for further judgment. The right of infidels, no matter what their sect or religion or sins, to own property was confirmed. It was affirmed, moreover, that the only and final cause why the Apostolic See conceded the supremacy over the Indies to the kings of Castile and León was the preaching of the Gospel and the spread of the Christian faith, and not their personal enrichment. In further explanation of this, the assembly pointed out that the Holy See, in granting this supremacy, did not intend to deprive the native kings and rulers of their states, jurisdictions, or dignities, or to give to Spain any grant which would impede the spiritual mission.

Las Casas remained unsatisfied because the assembly had not settled the matter of slavery with the fullness he desired. He complained to Mendoza and presented his point so vigorously in a sermon before the viceroy, that the latter gave him permission to discuss this and related matters as he saw fit in meetings and public conferences at the Dominican convent.

Accordingly he reconvened the members of the former assembly, with the exception of the bishops, and discussed for several days the slavery of the Indians and their personal services. In particular, the formula used by punitive and slave-hunting expeditions to seize the Indians in the name "of God, the Pope, and the King of Castile" was roundly condemned.[15] The whole slave traffic, as well as the system which held Indians to render personal services to the conquerors, was also denounced.

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[15] Cf. Robertson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 444–446.

Las Casas had his say, even though he must have known that these principles were not going to be generally accepted. In view of the wide dissatisfaction and hostility which his presence had constantly provoked, he now decided to resign his bishopric and return to Spain. Naming Juan de Perera his vicar-general in the administration of his diocese, he sailed from Vera Cruz in the early part of 1547.

vi

Although he was no longer to serve in the actual missionary scene, the spirit of Las Casas remained very much with the Indians, whose cause he continued to serve until his death. As soon as he arrived in Spain, he secured the issuance of a number of laws and regulations to this effect. These prohibited local Spanish authorities from alienating the territories and dignities of Indian chieftains and demanded that restitution be made where such had been done. The *encomenderos* were likewise warned against interfering with the free preaching of the Gospel both on their own plantations and in the Indian villages.

He also engaged in debate with the celebrated scholar Doctor Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, who had issued a book *Democrates segundo* justifying the subjugation of the Indians. Sepulveda maintained that "there is nothing unjust in subjugating those who by their character and condition necessarily have to obey others." Hence, he concluded, "Since the Indians are naturally servants, barbarians, uncultured and cruel, if they refused, as they generally did, to obey other more perfect men, it was just to subject them by force and war, in the same way as matter is subjected to form, the body to the soul, the appetite to reason, the worse to the better." If Sepulveda had intended to give a blanket endorsement by this to the Spanish Conquest, he found himself taken back by official reaction. The universities of Spain and various scholars rejected his doctrine and the Council of the Indies refused permission for its publication. He succeeded, however, in having the book printed, at Rome, in Latin with a summary in Spanish. As soon as it appeared, Las Casas leaped into the fray.

In a long written statement, he declared that the principles

Sepulveda had advanced were precisely the cause of the death of unnumbered Indians and the destruction of their settlements by the Spanish conquerors and settlers. When the death of his former companion, Friar Cancer, at the hands of the Indians in Florida was thrown up as an evidence of Indian barbarism, he replied that the natives, unaware of the sacred character of the man, had simply waged a war of just defense against the ravaging expeditions of the Spanish explorers.

In view of the importance and public character of the debate, the government decided to form a committee of the outstanding theologians and jurists of the time to examine the matter, but only as a theoretical question, since the seizure of the Indies and the reduction of their inhabitants was an accomplished fact. After hearing Sepulveda, the body turned its ear to Las Casas, whose written report took five consecutive days. The eminent theologian Domingo de Soto was then commissioned to sift the evidence and the rebuttals of the principals; but, in the end, he wisely refrained from giving a decision.

During the course of the debate, Las Casas found himself confronted with some rather bald statements from his own writings, particularly in the *Confesonario,* in which he practically denied any just title of the Spanish kings to the Indies. Among those who stood out against him at this time was Gil Quintana, the rebellious dean of Cuidad Real, whom he had, as a matter of fact, later pardoned and restored to his faculties. Las Casas was called before the Council of the Indies to answer these allegations, and presented a list of 30 propositions, including an acknowledgment of Spanish sovereignty over the Indians, which he later developed in his treatise *Tratado Comprobatorio.* The government declared itself satisfied with his rather involved explanations, and the whole matter rested there.

One of the most violent attacks launched against the bishop of Chiapas was that of the Franciscan Friar Toribio de Benavente, otherwise known to the Indians as *Motolinía.* He had gone to Mexico with other members of his order at the request of Cortés, and arrived shortly after the taking of the capital. His popular name had been given him because of his great poverty; and he had distinguished himself both as a student of Indian antiquities and as a zealous missionary and friend of the natives. Nevertheless, in the controversy that raged over the respective rights and claims of the Spanish invaders and the Indian social system, he threw himself unhesitatingly on the side of the Spaniards. It has been said that his judgment was colored by the rivalry between the Franciscan and Dominican Orders and the favors which his brethren received from Cortés. Be this as it may, his general point of view in the matter was sustained by a large number of churchmen including the venerable bishop of Mexico City, Juan de Zumárraga. After the writings of Las Casas reached America, Motolinia lost no time in directing a letter to the King, in the early part of 1555, defending the conquerors, local governors, *encomenderos*, and Indian traders, and lashing furiously at the bishop of Chiapas.[16]

The sweeping condemnations of Las Casas, he maintained, were an insult not only to the Spanish settlers but to the King himself in whose name the new territory was governed and taxes were collected. Quoting the accusation of Las Casas that "All the conquerors have been robbers, despoilers, and the most of them confirmed in evil and unparalleled cruelty, as is manifest to all the world," he marveled that the King and his counselors "have been able to suffer for so long a man so offensive, restless, importune, turbulent, and disputatious in the garb of a religious, so uneasy, uncivil, abusive, prejudiced, and unstable." So far as Christianity in Mexico was concerned he declared, "I have heard religious, servants of God, and good Christian Spaniards say they find here more Christianity, more faith, more frequenting of the holy sacraments, more charity, and more assistance of every kind to the poor than in Old Spain." He admitted that there were instances of injustice but asserted that Las Casas' exaggerations and misstatements had given a totally false impression. "Your Majesty," he said, "ought to order him confined to a monastery so that he may not be the cause of still greater evils."

Las Casas resigned his bishopric early in 1550 and nominated as his successor his friend and fellow Dominican, Tomás Casillas, who had gone out with him on his last journey to the Indies. He then retired with his faithful companion Rodrigo de Ladrada to the monastery of San Gregorio at Valladolid. Here he gave his time to religious exercises, while acting as consultant on affairs in the New World and finishing the histories he had begun many years before. His end came at the convent of Atocha in the latter part of July, 1566. His span had run ninety-two years.

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[16] Cf. Simpson, *loc. cit.*, apend. VI.

vii

Final judgment on this tireless and venerable missionary must inevitably be qualified by the point of view that one takes of his theories and of his strictures. That he was widely and sincerely appreciated by his contemporaries is evident in the influence which he constantly exerted in the Council of the Indies and in the judgments which he wrung from the Spanish courts in favor of the Indians. Even in his final retirement, his voice was powerful in legislation affecting the New World. When, in 1556, the government decided to sell its *encomiendas* to raise immediate cash, he succeeded in representing the consequent evils of the measure so effectively that it was blocked. Similarly his action was effective in preventing the transfer of the *Audiencia de los Confines* from Guatemala to Panama. Respect for his opinions in Spain by no means ceased with his death, and various works later written against him were forbidden publication on the grounds that "this pious writer should not be contradicted, but commented upon and defended." Historians and commentators like the Franciscan Torquemada, Herrera, and Nicolás Antonio have made clear their high estimate of the man.

On the other hand, there were other missionaries and men of unselfish zeal for the Indians, like Zumárraga and Mendoza, for whom his theories and activities were a source of constant embarrassment. The truth is that Las Casas' theory of the inalienable rights of the Indians was incontrovertible. His insistence upon the conversion of the Indians to Christianity, as the basis of the Spanish hegemony, was beyond debate. He actually demonstrated that the conquest of the Indians by peaceful evangelization and gradual social evolution was feasible. But he failed to take in account that the rank and file of adventurous men were unwilling to hazard everything merely for the conversion of the Indians and the salvation of their individual and collective souls. He was unable to make the equation between humanitarian laws as they issued from the Council of the Indies and the demands of the royal treasury upon the new territory. And in his disgust for the duplicity and stupid cruelty of the white race toward the more primitive red man, he allowed himself to vent his rage in a personal manner that nullified whatever faint hope there might have been in his demands for an immediate abandonment of the *encomienda* system and a cessation of all slave traffic.

One of the most formidable obstacles to the reforms proposed by Las Casas was, as the Visitor Juan Rogel pointed out to him, Las Casas himself. His high sense of principle, and his refusal to "go along" even for one moment in a situation which he deemed bad, made him hopelessly ineffectual in anything like gradual reform or in friendly approach toward those whose personal interests precluded their seeing eye to eye with him. In the long run, Las Casas' ideals must win out; and the men of Mexico will continue to issue manifestos and stage revolutions until they think they have achieved them. Yet, from a practical standpoint, the approach of Quiroga toward the social problems of Mexico was probably far more realistic and capable of fruitful results, as we shall see in a later chapter.

The strictures of Las Casas against the Spanish rule in Mexico have undoubtedly served to make him a martyr to truth in the eyes of the historical enemies of Spain. His attitude of protest and fearless denunciation have elevated him to a position that has sometimes been used to dim the glory of others who worked more quietly and perhaps more in the spirit of compromise with facts as they found them. But when the full social history of Mexico or any nation is looked at impartially, both types of men, Quiroga and Las Casas, must be given due credit; and Las Casas, the peaceful evangelizer of Guatemala, will ultimately have a more grateful place in the hearts of the Mexican people than Las Casas, the author of the "Destruction of the Indies."

CHAPTER IV

Juan De Zumárraga

FIRST BISHOP AND ARCHBISHOP OF MEXICO

i

"AMONG the victims of ignorance and of a partisan spirit," writes the eminent historian Joaquín García Icazbalceta, "there stands out Juan de Zumárraga, first bishop and archbishop of Mexico. Due in large part to the declarations of popular writers — those who write without reading or read so that they may lie more effectively — the worthy and beneficent prelate has come to be, in the concept of many persons, a type of ignorant and fanatical *friar*. . . . But, far from having been an ignorant *friar*, a bloody and blind destroyer of the monuments of the Mexican civilization, Zumárraga was an apostolic figure, poor, humble, wise, zealous, prudent, enlightened, charitable, the mortal enemy of all superstition and tyranny, the indefatigable propagator of the true doctrine of Jesus Christ, the refuge of his helpless flock, the benefactor of the people in the material order, and eminently practical in all his plans and counsels. If at times he made mistakes, let us be indulgent with him who did so much well, remembering that he was a man and of his century."[1]

Zumárraga was born in the city of Durango, in the Basque country, probably of poor parents, sometime before 1468. Practically nothing is known of his life until the time of his entrance into the Franciscan Order. His worth was soon recognized there, however, for he held the posts of guardian in several monasteries and even of provincial in his own province of Concepción.

While he was guardian of the monastery of Arojo in 1527, his community gained the admiration of Charles V, who happened to be at Valladolid and insisted on delivering a rather large offering into his hands. When Zumárraga finally accepted, he distributed the entire sum among the poor, without reserving anything for the community. The Emperor was evidently impressed with the sincerity and spiritual character of the man, for he shortly thereafter appointed him to investigate reports of demonism in Pamplona — a mission which he discharged with good sense and justice. On December 12, 1527, the good friar found himself presented by Charles for the bishopric of Mexico.

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[1] Joaquín García Icazbalceta, *Biografía de D. Fr. Juan de Zumárraga* (Madrid, 1929), pp. 10–12.

Up to this time, the only diocese in New Spain was that of Carolina or Santa María de los Remedios of Yucatán, which had been erected in 1519 with only the vaguest boundaries. The first bishop, a Dominican, Julián Garcés by name, began to build his cathedral at Tlaxcala in 1526 and later changed it to Puebla. The rapid extension of the Conquest and the importance of Mexico City now made imperative the erection of an episcopal See in the capital. At the same time, the First *Audiencia,* under Nuño de Guzmán, was appointed to investigate charges of mismanagement that were being brought against Cortés.

Zumárraga was not eager for the post, and it finally took a positive command from his religious superior, on the insistence of the monarch, to overcome his scruples in accepting the dignity. Moreover, the prospects were not particularly inviting. The reports against Cortés which were brought back by his enemies had created an extremely bad impression of the situation. Unfortunately, the man selected to examine the state of affairs, Nuño de Guzmán, was a mortal enemy of the Conqueror and carried with him an enormous authority.

Once he had accepted, Zumárraga believed the necessity of his departure urgent. Not waiting to receive the papal bulls or to be consecrated bishop, he joined Guzmán and his colleagues for the perilous journey. The delay of the bulls was probably due to the broken relations between the Pope and Charles V because of the sack of Rome. In the days to come, however, his failure to get episcopal consecration proved to be a decided handicap face to face with men of the type he had to deal with in the civil order. The group left Seville, toward the end of August, 1528, and arrived in Mexico on the sixth of December. Thirteen days after their arrival, two of Guzmán's colleagues, Parada and Maldonado, died of appendicitis, leaving only two other and younger men, Matienzo and Delgadillo, to carry on. The following year, Zumárraga felt himself constrained to write to the court, "I am very certain that so far as well-being and tranquillity are concerned in the land, it was a very great pity that God permitted the death of the first two and spared the life of the others."

When the *Audiencia,* together with the new bishop, arrived in Mexico, Cortés had already departed for Spain to answer his accusers directly in the court. Guzmán was therefore unable to carry through his plans against the person of Cortés; but he did, with the assistance of one Gonzalo de Salazar, wreak considerable vengeance against his property. Very shortly, the partisans of the *Audiencia* began to style themselves "Those who follow the voice of the King" and to call the others "Partisans of Don Hernando." The persecution extended itself to all who had been loyal to Cortés, particularly Pedro de Alvarado, who was stripped of everything including his saddle mule.

Then through the lieutenancy of a certain García del Pilar, a savage program of extortion and enslavement was launched against the Indians, both directly and through a corrupt imposition upon the *encomenderos.* As former governor of Pánuco, Guzmán had left that province practically a desert. It now appeared that he had the same plan for Mexico. Zumárraga relates as typical what happened to the chief in Tacuba when he failed to deliver to Delgadillo all the free workers he demanded. "He seized him by the hair," wrote the bishop, "and gave him so many blows that he crushed his chest and caused him to throw up blood and water through his mouth. I took him in a hammock to the monastery nearest Coyoacán . . . and although I took every means for his recovery, the man died."

Not even the houses of refuge were spared. One such institution in Texcoco, established by the monks for young girls and widows and placed under the direction of a Spanish matron, was broken into at night, by order of the same Delgadillo, and two of the girls were handed over to a brother of the auditor. Indians were enslaved; and, faced with the inevitable prospect of being taken out of their native regions, many of them committed suicide. In Michoacán and Nueva Galicia, the Tarascan Indians, who had peacefully pledged themselves in fealty to Cortés and the King, were now brutally set upon, and their King, Caltzontzin, was put to death.

Zumárraga was powerless to render any official aid to the Spanish victims of the *Audiencia,* but as Protector of the Indians, he found himself in constant conflict with the tyranny of this body. Unfortunately the good intentions of the Spanish Court in establishing his office had failed to formulate a clear-cut definition of its duties. As a result, his representations in favor of the natives were frequently regarded as an infringement on the civil order; and since he had only spiritual weapons to sanction his judgments, there was nothing to prevent a countermand on the part of Guzmán and his auditors. Moreover, it was constantly thrown up to him that he was only an elected or presented bishop, and no more than a simple friar. To this was added an unfortunate conflict between the Dominican and Franciscan Orders. The former put themselves to support some of the policies of the *Audiencia,* although they had followed Las Casas, while it appears that the Franciscans, who had arrived in the country first, were inclined to regard the activities of their contemporaries in the missionary field with some misgivings.[2]

The real hub of the difficulty was that there was no superior body to whom an appeal might be made in case of dispute between the *Audiencia* and the Protector. Zumárraga decided that the only way he could carry out his office was to appoint inspectors and judges to study the complaints of the Indians and penalize their oppressors, with right of appeal, not to the *Audiencia,* but to him. The *Audiencia* regarded this as an unjustifiable extension of powers, and inasmuch as its head and associates were not inclined to take an humane view of the problem, the situation was bound to increase in bitterness until some radical change would be made. This came later with the arrival of the Second *Audiencia,* which was better prepared to administer justice.[3] In the meantime, a large number of the complaints made to Zumárraga were lodged directly or indirectly against the *Audiencia* itself.

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[2] Domingo de Betanzos, founder of the Dominican province, however, was held in the greatest estimation by Zumárraga, who consulted him as his confessor. A report of the Second *Audiencia,* March 30, 1531, declared that because of his friendship for the Franciscans, de Betanzos was later transferred to Guatemala. Cf. Icazbalceta, *loc. cit.,* pp. 48, 49.

To face this situation required the utmost courage, but the bishop was equal to it. The *Audiencia* warned him that he might teach religion to the Indians, but nothing more. When he suggested a joint study of the provisions of his commission from the King, he was told to desist from exercising his office, under pain of banishment, loss of his income, and even personal attack. The Spaniards were then forbidden to consult the Protector on their affairs with the Indians. The Indians who consulted him were threatened with death. There was nothing left for the bishop to do, inasmuch as all efforts at reconciliation were thwarted, but to refer to the situation in his sermons.

The members of the *Audiencia* retaliated by refusing to attend the divine services, and began to circulate the most abominable accusations against him and the friars. "These were so horrible," wrote Zumárraga, "that I do not repeat them for fear of offending the pious ears of Your Majesty and because religious language does not dare to mention them by reason of decency." The monks resolved to vindicate themselves from the slander, and chose the Feast of Pentecost, when Mass would be solemnized by the bishop of Tlaxcala. One of the brethren, Fray Antonio Ortiz, was selected to give the sermon. He referred to the libelous report and declared that none of the charges made could be proved. Guzmán, who was in the congregation, arose at this moment and roared out for the preacher to turn his discourse to other matters or get out of the pulpit. The friar replied that he was only fulfilling his obligation, whereupon Delgadillo gave orders that he should immediately be pulled down from his place.

The whole affair caused a ferocious scandal and resulted in the excommunication of those responsible for the violence. In the end, the libelous statement was destroyed and its authors were let off with the light penance of reciting the psalm *Mise-*

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[3] The iniquity of the Guzmán era, unfortunately, has remained to darken the general picture of Spanish rule.

rere. The general abuses of the *Audiencia* and the woes of the Indians, however, went on apace.

Guzmán was particularly disturbed by reports of the favors bestowed upon Cortés in Spain and organized a commission to represent affairs in such a light that his old enemy would not be permitted to return to Mexico in any capacity. He proposed also that the Indians belonging to Cortés should be divided among the conquerors, that the president and *oidores* or associate judicial members of the *Audiencia* should have a perpetual *repartimiento* or estate, that the defense of the Indians should be entrusted exclusively to the *Audiencia,* and that no Indians should be given to the perpetual trust of bishops or churches, "since this would make them the most powerful forces against the royal jurisdiction, as they show themselves at present without this possession."

On the other hand, the *Audiencia* did everything in its power to prevent unfavorable reports of its own activities from reaching Spain. Letters were opened at the port, against the explicit orders of the King, and Zumárraga found it practically impossible to send his reports through this censorship. Repeatedly his letters were opened and used against him. Finally he resolved, with the sailing of Guzmán's commission, to go down to Vera Cruz himself and see that his dispatches went on board untampered. When the agents there refused to allow anything to go through until it had been censored, he persuaded one of the sailors to secure their delivery to the Empress. The seaman hid them in a piece of wax which he threw into a barrel of oil, and succeeded in bringing them to their destination.

When word finally came of Cortés' return to Mexico, Guzmán knew that his end had come. It is possible also that he sensed something of the content of Zumárraga's letter to the Crown, and preferred to be out of the way when a reckoning would have to be made. Through fear or discretion, he decided to force the enlistment of the Conqueror's old captains and set off on a new expedition of his own. He gathered together about 500 Spaniards and over 10,000 Indians, and persuaded his willing *oidores* to give him ten thousand pesos from the public treasury to complete arrangements for his departure.

ii

In his letter, the bishop outlined in detail what had been happening in New Spain and proposed a number of urgent remedies.[4] First of all, he asked for a new *Audiencia,* under the presidency of "a friend of God and a man of every virtue." He demanded that the members of the First *Audiencia* be given a trial and punished. The *repartimientos* or grants of lands with their Indians, he maintained, should be perpetual; the powers of the Protector of the Indians should be enlarged and always confided to the charge of the Religious, among whom he recommended in particular Friar Martín de Valencia and Friar Domingo de Betanzos; ordinances should be drawn up for the good treatment of the Indians, and limitations assigned in the taking and bartering of slaves. He added that what he had written was not from resentment over the fact that he had been deprived of his tithes, "since with the pastoral office I should be honored and esteemed, and with my knapsack I should be able to seek my living," but for the honor of God, the service of the King, and the obligation of his conscience.

Matienzo and Delgadillo, however, were quite capable of carrying on their old traditions, even in the absence of Guzmán, riding roughshod over all formalities, violating the rights of sanctuary and asylum, and even attacking the person of Zumárraga. When an ecclesiastical interdict was launched upon the city as a result of these abuses, Delgadillo did his best to ignore Zumárraga, and after seeking to have his own excommunication lifted by the guardian of the monastery of San Francisco, who had no authority in the matter, he declared, "I would sooner go to hell than ask an absolution from the Franciscan friars."

By this time, the Council of the Indies had received enough information to believe the formation of a new *Audiencia* imperative and designated Antonio de Mendoza for the presidency. Until Mendoza should arrive in Mexico, the post was to be filled by the bishop of Santo Domingo, Sebastián Ramírez de Fuenleal. The new *oidores,* including Vasco de Quiroga, set out at once to take up their difficult task.

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[4] Cf. Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley, 1929), apend. V.

Before their arrival, Cortés, as Marqués del Valle and Captain General, returned with a large following, reaching Vera Cruz, July 15, 1530. Upon his arrival, the Conqueror began to exercise jurisdiction in conformity with his office, and thousands of Indians flocked to him with complaints of what they had been suffering. His progress was soon halted, however, by a letter from the Empress, who ordered him to proceed no closer to the capital than ten leagues until the arrival of the Second *Audiencia.* Matienzo and Delgadillo, moreover, gave strict orders to the Indians against visiting him or bringing him food supplies. From Vera Cruz, he moved to Tlaxcala and thence to Texcoco, where he set up court with the eager assistance of the natives.[5] His residence there was harassed with every type of annoyance from the two *oidores* still in office; and in spite of his evident patience, civil war would have broken out, were it not for the tact and prudent offices of Zumárraga.

The members of the Second *Audiencia* reached Mexico City with the royal instructions, January 9, 1531. The numerous accusations brought against Zumárraga in the Spanish Court had met with some credence, for the new *oidores* delivered a letter from the King with certain reprimands, and Fuenleal presented him with a royal order, dated January 25, 1531, to appear immediately at the court. He answered the letter in humble terms, acknowledging that he had made mistakes and giving thanks for the arrival of the new tribunal; but it was with some misgiving and sadness of spirit that he now prepared to leave the scene of so many labors and sacrifices. No longer a young man, and not yet consecrated in the bishopric to which he was appointed, he could look back only upon a scene of heroic struggle without definite fruit or recompense.

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[5] The Second *Audiencia* was not inclined to look with great favor upon Cortés' title of Captain General and sought to curb his authority. Still, the country was in such turmoil that Cortés seemed the only man capable of restoring order and confidence. "So great was the opinion and authority that he enjoyed among the Indians," according to Herrera, "that they would accept no effective punishment except from his hands." Cf. Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia General* (Madrid, 1601), Dec. IV, lib. IX, cap. 4.

He had faced a complex task, charged with the ecclesiastical organization of Mexico as bishop-elect and with the administration of civil justice as Protector of the Indians. The establishment of a church for two distinct races, the conversion and protection of the natives with necessary discipline in the social order of the times, the maintenance of peace between two rival monastic orders, and the creation of a diocesan clergy with sparse elements against the great privileges of the religious orders — these were tasks to try the strength of a Hercules. Zumárraga did them well, in spite of all the restrictions and indignities that a malevolent and tyrannical *Audiencia* could offer. Had he not maintained his courage to the end and brought his Christian spirit to bear constantly throughout these trying times, it is difficult to say how Mexico could have emerged from the era of Guzmán and his associates. Zumárraga sailed for Spain in the spring of 1532.

Arriving in the court, he found himself once more faced by the charges of Delgadillo, who appeared in person against him. He was accused of having attempted to block the justice of the *Audiencia* in various ways, liberating its prisoners, preaching against it, excommunicating its members, taking sides with Cortés, and putting burdens on the Indians. Apparently he had small difficulty in freeing himself from these assertions of Delgadillo, who had already been deposed and convicted, or in exonerating the friars and pleading the cause of the Indians. On April 27, 1533, after some technical delays, he was duly consecrated bishop in the principal chapel of the monastery of San Francisco at Valladolid by the bishop of Segovia; and his legates were dispatched to Mexico to take possession of the diocese in his name.

In his sermon after the episcopal consecration, he declared: "If in just wars, brave soldiers defy manifest danger of death and despise it to gain fame with posthumous glory, how much more reason have we to advance, in combat for the name and glory of Jesus Christ, to gain for certain, not a brief and passing fame, but eternal rest and life without end!" That year he spent in Spain, arranging his affairs and recruiting vocations for the missionary field. He left Spain in June, 1534, arriving in Mexico the following October, accompanied by a large number of artisans with their wives and children and six women to teach the Indian girls.

Fuenleal, who had been governing the Second *Audiencia,* now petitioned the Emperor to allow him to retire and to send the man originally appointed to the post, Don Antonio de Mendoza. His resignation was accepted, but because of the change of the general situation, Mendoza was commissioned with the title of viceroy. The latter arrived in Mexico, November 14, 1535. In view of the favorable and impartial justice dealt to the natives by the Second *Audiencia,* the office of Protector of the Indians was now suppressed, and Zumárraga found himself free to devote all his attention to the spiritual obligations of his office.

iii

In many ways, despite the obstacles placed by some of the Spanish rulers and the scandalous behavior of many of the conquerors and colonists, Christianity was singularly favored in New Spain from the very beginning. The conversion of the natives simplified the problem of cultural unity for the Spaniards; from a material standpoint, the Indians had nothing to lose by abandoning their old gods. Moreover, the Aztec religion was so bloody in its demands and so dolorous in its outlook on the future life that Christianity meant, at least for the masses of the people, a genuine deliverance. Morally the transfer of faith imposed no intolerable burdens, for, with the exception of the chieftains and rulers, monogamy and purity of life was the rule among the Indians. The ruling class and the Aztec priests, however, did offer a considerable resistance, the former because they were accustomed to many wives and resented the idea of a spiritual democracy; the priests because of attachment to their ancient offices and of jealousy for the Christian missionaries.

If the Indians were in constant admiration at the bravery and military success of the Spaniards, and above all of Cortés, the Church was fortunate in providing missionaries and prelates of the first order of zeal and sanctity. Garcés as bishop of Tlaxcala, Marroquín in Guatemala, Zárate in Oaxaca, Quiroga in Michoacán, Maraver in Guadalajara, Toral in Yucatán, and Zumárraga in Mexico — these are names for which New Spain must forever be grateful. Francisco Marroquín was consecrated bishop by Zumárraga in 1537. Shortly thereafter Zumárraga consecrated Zárate, and the following year, Quiroga.

The presence of the three bishops, Zumárraga, Marroquín, and Zárate, in the capital offered an opportunity for discussion and a resolution of ecclesiastical problems, as the King had recommended. This took place in the latter part of November, 1537; and on the last day of the month the committee directed a letter to the monarch outlining the course of their discussion and asking for certain faculties and concessions.

Above all they asked for worthy priests who would not be exempt from their own jurisdiction. The necessity of members of the religious orders was also stressed for "they are so necessary and useful that neither conversion nor good manners can be effected in the natives both in the spiritual and the temporal order without them"; but they complained that the great privileges which had been accorded to the religious orders offered a decided handicap to ecclesiastical organization and discipline, even to the point of competition with the bishops and opposition to diocesan clergy.

These privileges appear to date from a bull of Pope Adrian VI to Emperor Charles V, the *Exponi nobis fecisti,* of May 9, 1522, otherwise known as the *Omnimoda* because it transferred to the Franciscans and the other religious orders, notably the Dominicans and the Augustinians, his own Apostolic power in all that they judged necessary for the conversion of the Indians, except that for which episcopal consecration is required. The bishops were content that the religious orders should continue to exercise these faculties in the missionary field but objected to these same privileges and exemptions in the establishment of parishes. The orders were loath, on their part, to give up these faculties. Hence their conflict with the bishops and their opposition to the introduction of the secular clergy in the curacies. "If the religious of New Spain," remarks Icazbalceta, "had ceded in good time and of their own will certain privileges no longer necessary, their glory would be more splendid; they would have avoided unhappy conflicts and at least held back the decadence of the orders."[6]

In a meeting of the bishops of Mexico, Oaxaca, and Michoacán, two years later, the question of a native clergy was considered. The Franciscans had experimented in this field with unfortunate results and had determined not to receive any Indian or *mestizo* into the order or even to take creoles, that is, Spaniards born in Mexico, except by joint agreement of the provincial and counselors of the order. The bishops, however, recommended the ordaining of worthy *mestizos* and Indians for the four minor orders of the Church, to act as assistants to the pastors. Moreno, in his life of Quiroga, declares that Bishop Morales of Michoacán, who governed that diocese from 1566 to 1573, ordained to the priesthood Don Pablo, the King of that region, "the first Indian clergyman of whom there is mention."[7] By the end of the century there were a considerable number of creole and *mestizo* priests.

Another request of the bishops was for the establishment of a college in Tlatelolco for the natives and a convent for the education of Indian girls who might become teachers. From the beginning of his career in Mexico, Zumárraga had worked to provide educational facilities for the natives. In eight or nine towns of his diocese he maintained centers for the teaching of Christian doctrine to the daughters of the chieftains and leading men. At his request Cortés had brought six women as teachers, and Zumárraga himself brought another six on his return from Spain in 1534. Inasmuch, however, as they had not taken the vows of religion, they could not be held to the school when better opportunities were offered to them. Besides, the Indians were loath to send their daughters to a school that was not cloistered; and in spite of all Zumárraga's efforts, this arrangement lasted only ten years. For this reason he applied to the King for the establishment of a large convent school in the Indian section of the city. This not being granted, he set about to establish various centers and asylums for both the Indian and *mestizo* girls.

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[6] *Loc. cit.*, p. 145.

[7] Juan José Moreno, *Vida de D. Vasco de Quiroga* (Mexico, 1766), p. 53.

More facilities were available for the Indian boys, for they could be taken into the monasteries. The bishops in their second meeting made provisions to the effect that these boys should be given not less than six years' instruction nor more than another six, so that at the age of thirteen or fourteen they might go out to work or teach. To supplement these schools with a more advanced college, Zumárraga, who had noted the success of the classes held in the monastery of San Francisco, now received with great satisfaction a favorable reply on his project for Tlatelolco. The new college, authorized on September 3, 1536, by royal decree, was to be known as Santa Cruz.[8]

In a letter addressed on the subject to the bishop, the monarch declared: "I have been very pleased by what you say, namely that after examining the intelligence of the native boys who are taught grammar in the monasteries, you have found many to be of great aptitude, lively ability, and good memory. What you say strikes me favorably, and since you have certified that they have the qualifications and the desire for the study of grammar and other subjects, I have reported on this to our president and *oidores*. You are therefore empowered to erect a college for the Indians in the parish of Santiago, as the most suitable location, and to select up to 60 students from the monasteries, to enter said college on the Feast of the Epiphany."

The character of the school is amply described in the faculty that took charge of it. Friar García de Cisneros, one of the first missionaries, was made the first dean. Friar Arnaldo de Basacio, a Frenchman who had taught under Pedro de Gante in the chapel of San José, succeeded him. Later came Friar Bernardino de Sahagún. All were men of the highest attainments, products of the European universities, masters of several languages, and profound students of the antiquities of Mexico. Such was the success of the enterprise and the zeal of the bishop for education, that he wrote to the Emperor: "The thing which most occupies my thought and moves my will to stir up my feeble powers is that in this city and in every diocese there should be a college for the Indian boys, where they may learn at least grammar, and a large convent where a good number of girls can be taken care of." Zumárraga himself never learned the Indian tongues, a fact that caused him deep regret.

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[8] Santa Cruz is rated as the second college in the New World, the first, San Francisco, having been founded in Texcoco by Pedro de Gante in 1523. Of course, there were some who were violently opposed to the higher education of the Indians. Thus the scribe Jerónimo López wrote to the Emperor, after marveling at the work of the schools: "Good doctrine is what they ought to know, but for them to read and write is as harmful as the devil." Zumárraga was interested in good doctrine, and urged that the Bible be translated into all the Indian tongues and given wide distribution.

In spite of every effort to place the college on a permanent basis, however, its decadence was only a matter of time. The direction of the school was placed in the hands of the alumni, and remained so for about twenty years, constantly going down, until the friars again took charge. Then came the great epidemic of 1576, when the college was decimated. By this time the profound distinction of the races had diminished considerably, so that when Mendoza asked for the creation of the university, he indicated that it should serve for both the natives and the Spaniards. The later career of Santa Cruz was varied. It became a primary school, and later lapsed. In spite of attempts to revive it, the institution had completely disappeared by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Coincidental with the establishment of secondary education in Mexico, must be recalled the first printing press in the country. The credit for this is also due to Zumárraga, who conferred with Mendoza, and arranged to have the famous Sevillian printer Juan Cromberger send the necessary equipment in charge of Juan Pablos, "to print books of Christian doctrine and all the sciences." This arrived in 1537. From that date until the completion of Mexican independence, nearly 12,000 scientific and literary works were turned out from the Mexican press.[9]

Another matter of importance remained for the bishops to submit for the counsel of the Emperor. This concerned the manner of extirpating the idolatry which still existed to a considerable extent among the Indians. The practice of human sacrifice had been largely eliminated, but idols were still retained by many natives and secretly worshiped. The bishops saw no other way of uprooting this practice than by destroying the temples and burning the idols, for which they now asked permission. This was given by the Emperor in a letter dated December 23, 1538, with instructions to use the stones from the old pagan edifices to build Christian churches.

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[9] José R. Benítez, *Historia Gráphica de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1929), pp. 137–146. This was the first printing press set up in America. It is interesting to note that the Press of Mexico had a century of notable productivity before the "New England Primer" was issued by the Harvard Press.

Because of this procedure, Zumárraga has been subjected by later writers to every abuse and been made responsible for a fanatical destruction of most of the Aztec manuscripts. Thus Prescott writes: "The first archbishop of Mexico, D. Juan de Zumárraga — a name that should be as immortal as that of Omar — collected these paintings from every quarter especially from Texcoco, the most cultivated capital of Anáhuac, and the great depository of the national archives. He then caused them to be piled up in a 'mountain-heap' — as it is called by the Spanish writers themselves – in the market-place of Tlatelolco and reduced them all to ashes! . . . The unlettered soldiers were not slow in imitating the example of their prelate. Every chart and volume which fell into their hands was wantonly destroyed, so that when the scholars of a later and more enlightened age anxiously sought to recover some of these memorials of civilization, nearly all had perished, and the few surviving were jealously hidden by the natives."[10]

That Zumárraga, his missionary companions, converts, and Spanish soldiers destroyed a great number of Aztec temples and idols, both of stone and wood as well as those painted on paper, is certain. It is difficult to see how idolatry could otherwise have been stamped out. The missionaries were not always interested precisely in the antiquarian character of these images; and in their destruction they had ample precedent in the Holy Scriptures. It is probable that in this process many manuscripts of value were lost. But the scholarly character of Zumárraga as well as that of most of his confréres hardly lent itself to the systematic destruction of hieroglyphic manuscripts of cultural value. Indeed it is to these men that the preservation of Aztec history and our knowledge of the Aztec civilization are due.[11]

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[10] W. H. Prescott, *The Conquest of Mexico,* Bk. I, Chap. 4.

A great number of the pyramids and temples had been destroyed before the arrival of Zumárraga, inasmuch as they served not only for bloody sacrifices but also as fortresses. So far as the existence of the famous archives mentioned by Prescott is concerned, the source of authority is the Aztec writer Ixlilxochitl, who accused Zumárraga of their burning. But the same Aztec affirmed, with small consistency, that when the Tlaxcalan allies of Cortés entered the city, they put fire "to the principal palaces of the King Nezahuilpilli, so that they burned all the royal archives of all New Spain, and the memory of its antiquities perished from this time." This happened in 1520, eight years before the arrival of Zumárraga in New Spain.

Zumárraga himself never referred to the alleged burning described by Prescott, and while he mentioned that "more than 1,000,000 persons have been baptized, 500 temples thrown down, and more than 20,000 figures of the demons which they adored have been broken and burned," there is ample evidence to show that these men knew the difference between archives and demoniacal figures and paintings. The man who sent an appreciation of the antiquities of Mexico to the Council of Trent and entrusted various manuscripts to Fuenleal to be sent to Spain was hardly a fanatical destroyer of knowledge.

The loss of the archives must be attributed to a series of events over which the bishop of Mexico had no control. Sahagún relates that in the time of King Itzcoatl, pictures were burned to keep them out of the hands of the vulgar. Then came the burning of Texcoco by the Tlaxcalans, already mentioned. Six eighths of the city was destroyed during the siege of Mexico by Cortés, and this must have included many manuscripts. Others were hidden and lost by private individuals during the course of the wars. In spite of all this, a considerable number have been saved.

Of greater importance than the destruction of pagan memorials, in the elimination of idolatry and the spread of Catholic worship, was the incident since known as the revelation of Our Lady of Guadalupe, which occurred during the lifetime of Bishop Zumárraga. On December 9, 1531, an Indian of lowly birth, Quauhtatohua by name and baptized as Juan Diego, was passing through the rugged and barren country on his way to Tlatelolco, near Mexico City, to hear Mass and receive instruction at the school there. While crossing a sterile hill known as Tepeyacac, he suddenly heard the strains of sweet music and turned to behold a beautiful woman within an arc of light. When he drew near the apparition, she assured him that she was the Virgin Mary and expressed the wish to have a shrine built on the spot where she was standing.

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[11] Cf. works of Sahagún.

According to the instructions which she gave him, Juan Diego made his way to Bishop Zumárraga and told him what had transpired. The latter remained unconvinced by the Indian's story, and Juan returned to the spot, which has since been called Guadalupe,[12] where he beheld the same vision and received the same instructions as before. This time Zumárraga insisted that he bring some proof or sign of the divine command, and he ordered two persons to follow the native secretly and observe what happened. According to the story, the Indian suddenly disappeared as soon as he crossed the small stream near the hill. Two days later, while on his way to Tlatelolco to obtain the services of a priest for his dying uncle Bernardino, yet hoping to avoid the apparition which had already caused him so much embarrassment, he was again confronted as before. The Virgin then assured him that his uncle was already cured and ordered him to climb the hill and bring back to her in his mantle the roses which he would find there.

Doing as he was commanded, he was amazed to find the garden of roses to which he had been directed. He brought them back to the Virgin, who took them in her arms and then returned them with directions to bear them at once to the bishop. When Juan opened his mantle at the feet of Zumárraga, both were astonished to see painted on it the figure of the apparition as it appeared. Zumárraga took the sacred image and placed it in his chapel. The next day he proceeded with his household to the scene of the vision and visited Bernardino, who had indeed recovered according to the Virgin's assurance and at the same hour had beheld the same vision and heard the same injunction relative to the building of the shrine.

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[12] This name may be a corruption of Quautlalapan, or a derivation either from the Arabic *guada* (river) and *lub* (fountain) or from *guada* and *lupus* (wolf).

News of this miraculous event spread rapidly, and the bishop was obliged to place the picture on the altar of the cathedral for public veneration, until the following year, when it was solemnly transferred to the hill of Tepeyacac and placed in the newly constructed shrine. Popular devotion soon grew to national proportions. The little shrine gave way to a more imposing structure, and this in turn was succeeded by the magnificent church, which was begun in 1695 and completed in 1709. Since that time, the devotion to our Lady of Guadalupe has become traditional with the Mexican people, so deeply inrooted that even the sternest measures of anticlerical governments have failed to shake the faith and devotion of this Catholic nation.

The image itself may still be viewed by all who make the trip to the shrine, which is today in one of the suburbs of Mexico City. Numerous attempts have been made to disprove the authenticity of the picture and of the story surrounding it, but the miraculous events which are recounted as having taken place there have reinforced popular belief in the supernatural character of the painting, while scholarly research has massed together an impressive body of evidence from testimony and facts contemporary with the original incident which prove at least the authenticity of the mantle itself and general acceptance of the miracle by those present, including Bishop Zumárraga.[13]

iv

One of the most complicated and difficult problems which Zumárraga had to consider was identified with the social fabric of the country itself, namely the position of the Indians in the economic reorganization of the country. The Indians of Mexico represented a wide diversity of tribes and languages and cultural advancement; but they had this in common, that whenever the Spaniards came in contact with them, they became a conquered people. During the conquest of the country and its economic exploitation they came to bear the burdens of the invaders, and under the tyranny of the First *Audiencia* the situation became very bad. Cortés had made many of them slaves, although, as he declared, this burdened his conscience. It was largely through the offices of the religious orders that the condition of the natives was alleviated. Zumárraga had interceded with the King for their freedom.

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[13] Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), I, pp. 272–291; also *Album Historico Guadalupano del IV Centenario* (Mexico, 1930).

In the meantime, he labored to put limitations on the branding of those held or taken in slavery, but with so little success that the Spanish Emperor finally decided that the only way to handle the situation was to put an end to the whole practice of slavery. Thus in a mandate of August 2, 1530, the Crown ordered that from then on "no one should take in or out of war any Indian for a slave, or to hold Indians as such with the title of having taken them in a just war, or by barter, or purchase, or ransom, or any other title, even though they be Indians which the natives themselves of the islands or mainland took or take as slaves for themselves. For the first offense against this, the penalty will be complete confiscation of the offender's goods." Slaves already possessed had to be registered. This decree did not, however, put an end to the traffic.

Zumárraga also secured ordinances against the maltreatment of Indians by the *encomenderos,* the moderation of Indian tributes, and their exemption from forced labor on Spanish buildings. One of the great problems of the time was that of the *tamemes,* or Indian porters, that were used, for the lack of beasts of burden, to carry cargoes of various kinds from place to place. Complaints of the many abuses in this connection brought an absolute prohibition of this kind of labor, but with more idealism than practical vision. The solution of this problem lay rather in the introduction of burros as beasts of burden, recommended by Zumárraga. Even today the Indians are accustomed to carry heavy burdens on their shoulders.

The fact is that, with the exception of the tyrannies of the

First *Audiencia* and of certain *encomenderos*, the social and economic condition of the Indians, including that of slavery and the payment of tribute, remained about the same after the Conquest as it was before under the Aztec masters. Charles V and his successors repeatedly insisted that the Indians were free and equal to his other subjects, and decreed that they should be given instruction and good treatment. In spite of this, large numbers of the natives perished after the Conquest. The blame for this has been assigned to the hard work they were given in the mines and on the plantations. The largest losses, however, were due, not to this labor, but to the epidemics that repeatedly swept the country after the Conquest. Besides this, must be added the process of racial mixture that took place by intermarriage of the Spaniards particularly with the higher caste Indians.

The mass of the Indians, disunited and warring among themselves, had not yet emerged beyond the most elemental stages of culture. If they were not to be exterminated, as in the British colonies, special protective laws had to be made for them. It became the business of the state to formulate laws for this purpose. The Church put itself pre-eminently to the same task, providing hospitals, giving instruction in the arts and sciences, and teaching the Christian vision of life.

It was only under the title of the conversion of the Indians that Pope Alexander VI had acceded to the Spanish Conquest; in compensation for the expenses of the new organization of the country, he turned over to the Spanish monarch the right of collecting tithes, with the obligation of seeing that the Church was provided for. This, together with the Patronage, by which the kings had the right of presenting bishops and religious superiors for office, meant that the free activity of the Church was profoundly limited.[14] Despite these difficulties and its poverty, before the pious endowments of later generations, the Church in the hands of men like Zumárraga did wonders for the country. "Without the charitable zeal," as one Mexican writes with justice, "of these heroes of Christianity and of civilization, who sacrificed everything for its propagation, including advancement, favors, comfort, and even life itself, it is practically certain that the fruits of the Conquest would have been ruined in the hands of greedy and hard adventurers, and that Spain would have acquired in a short time only deserts which it would be necessary to re-populate to make them of any use."[15]

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[14] Papal Bull of November 16, 1501. The Bull, *Universalis Ecclesiae* of Pope Julius II (July 28, 1508), gave the Spanish monarchs the right of the Patronage in the Indies.

Only the inevitable end could terminate the labors of this servant of God. The month of April, 1548, saw him, now in his eighties, still active in his pastoral duties, and confirming in forty days more than 400,000 persons. In the secret Consistory of February 11, 1546, Pope Paul III declared Mexico to be a Metropolitan See, with the suffragan dioceses of Oaxaca, Michoacán, Tlaxcala, Guatemala, and Ciudad Real de Chiapas. Notice that he had been named archbishop of the capital was not sent to Zumárraga, however, until July 8, 1548. He did not live to receive the bull of official notification.

When the first intimation of the impending honor reached him, Zumárraga hastened to Mexico from Ocuituco where he had been confirming, to seek counsel from his advisers on the matter. From there, he set out to the Convent of Tepetlaoztoc to consult his faithful confessor Friar Domingo de Betanzos; but in the ardors of the journey his strength failed him, and he was brought back with his confessor to Mexico. "I die very poor, but very happy," he wrote to the Emperor. Having put his affairs in order, he received the last sacraments; and with the words, "Into Thy hands, O Lord, I commend my spirit," he breathed his last, June 3, 1548.

When the figures of Zumárraga and Las Casas are drawn together for comparison, a profound difference may appear between the two men, with Las Casas emerging as the protagonist of human rights against the force of invaders and Zumárraga more as the churchman fitting in with the schemes of imperialism, or rather innocently unaware of their implications, while preaching the spiritual salvation of Christianity. Zumárraga feared Las Casas and resented the violent outcries of the bishop of Chiapas. He himself held Indians in personal service and believed in the necessity of the *encomienda* as a means of national organization and of protection of the Indians, although Las Casas denounced this system in unqualified terms.

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[15] *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1853), III, p. 520.

Nonetheless, Zumárraga was the friend of the Indians as he found them, even risking his life in their behalf. His way of education and benevolence, of gradual assimilation, was at least as constructive as that of Las Casas, and if carried through logically, would have eventuated more surely in placing the Indian in a position of enjoying and safeguarding the rights which Las Casas so loudly proclaimed. It has been argued that the protective laws suggested by Zumárraga and others had the unfortunate effect of making the Indians more or less the wards of a paternalistic state, absorbed in their communities and freed from the struggle for individual assertion which seems requisite for progress. As a matter of fact, the analysis of Indian character and of the social capabilities of the native made by men like Zumárraga and Quiroga has increasingly proved its truth in the light of Mexican history and modern research.

If, in the course of the last century, less noise and violence had been made in the name of liberalism and individual freedom and more constant and constructive work were done for the Indian in the spirit and methods of these great churchmen, the inheritance of the country would have remained far richer, and the descendants of guilty generations would not be reduced to the expedient of defending themselves by denying or denouncing the great work done before their time.

CHAPTER V

Don Vasco De Quiroga

MEMBER OF THE SECOND AUDIENCIA

FIRST BISHOP OF MICHOACAN

i

THE name of Quiroga is an ancient one in Spain. According to Padre Felipe de la Gandara, general chronicler of the Kings of León and Galicia, it arose in the fifth century from the union in marriage of Recario, the Suevian, with the daughter of the Goth monarch Theodoric. In the course of time the Quirogas gave an imposing list of eminent men to both Church and State.

Don Vasco, or Blasco, de Quiroga was born, in 1470, in the city of Madrigal de las Altas Torres, not far from Ávila of Old Castile, although his descendancy was from one of the most distinguished families of Galicia. The day of his birth as well as the names of his parents is unknown. Nothing has been recorded of his youth, but it is clear that he must have been devoted to study since he obtained the degree of Licentiate in Law. By 1530 he was engaged in the Royal Chancellory of Valladolid, where his qualities came under the notice of the judges of that body and its president, then the bishop of Badajoz.

"Physically, he was of corpulent proportions," wrote his biographer Juan José Moreno, "but morally he was of gigantic eminence."[1] His remains show him to have been a large man. Contemporary portraits represent him as of kindly but ascetic face, of swarthy complexion, partly bald, with white hair over the temples. Of his early qualifications, little more can be said than that, when Charles V ordered the bishop of Badajoz to cast an eye on the judicial timber of Spain for magistrates to set the affairs of Mexico in order after the regime of Nuño de Guzmán, Don Vasco was selected as member and first assistant to the president of the Second *Audiencia.*

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[1] *Vida del D. Vasco de Quiroga* (Mexico, 1776), introduction by Gutierrez Coronel.

The bad record of Guzmán as president of the First *Audiencia* and of his associates Matienzo and Delgadillo, as related at court by Zumárraga and numerous others, made it clear to the Council of the Indies that only a complete change of personnel could remedy the situation. The Empress, into whose charge Charles V had placed the matter, was determined to make a viceroyalty of New Spain and secured the promise of Antonio de Mendoza to accept the new post. In the meantime, the situation brooked no delay, and until Mendoza could put his own affairs in order, the presidency of the new or Second *Audiencia* was confided to Sebastian Ramírez de Fuenleal, bishop and president of the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo, and former inquisitor of Seville. Besides Quiroga, the bishop of Badajoz named as *oidores,* or members of the board, Juan de Salmerón, formerly the *alcalde mayor* of Castilla del Oro, Alonso Maldonado, and Francisco Ceynos, one time *fiscal* to the Council of the Indies.

According to their instructions, of July 12, 1530, the new *oidores* were to proceed to Santo Domingo, where they would join Fuenleal before entering Mexico. They were to advise the old board of their arrival as soon as they reached the country and enter the capital with the royal seal and fitting ceremony. The First *Audiencia* and its president were to be reprehended publicly, and immediate steps were to be taken for the *residencia* or trial of this body as well as for completing that of the Marqués del Valle, Hernando Cortés. Finally, they were to proclaim solemnly the royal sovereignty of the Queen Juana, the Emperor Charles, and the Prince Philip. At Mexico City, their residence was to be the palace of Cortés, which they were to secure for a reasonable price.

The duties and limitations of the new board were outlined with great detail. Each member was assigned a salary of 600,000 maravedis and an additional 150,000 for expenses.[2] As a condition of this generous allowance, they were not to employ any natives without pay. Their predecessors, who had flagrantly violated this rule, were to be compelled to make recompense, and, if any of their laborers thus defrauded had died, the money was to be given to the hospital fund. Extorted lands were to be returned, and *encomiendas* were to be distributed, with first preference to the conquerors. Laws against extravagance, gambling, and concubinage were to be enforced, and the Church was to be encouraged in its work of conversion and education of the natives. Slavery was to be brought under greater control. The branding of slaves was to cease; and illegally enslaved natives were to be freed. Indians as well as Spaniards were to be encouraged in the arts of cultivation and handicraft, but the former were not to be entrusted with firearms or allowed to ride horses or mules. A strict accounting was to be given of the royal revenues. The estates of Cortés and his friends were to be restored, and friendly relations were to be maintained with him.

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[2] The maravedi was a copper coin worth nominally about ⅜ cent.

The latter, with his new wife, Doña Juana de Zuñiga, and his recently acquired titles of Marqués del Valle and captain general, had already set out from Spain, before the departure of Quiroga and his associates, to claim the vast grants of land and labor with which the Crown enriched him. He had secured letters of recommendation from the King to the *Audiencia* but preferred to wait and travel in the company of the new *oidores.* The expenses of maintaining his large retinue, however, compelled him to change his plans, and he left without them, arriving at Vera Cruz, July 15, 1530.

Matienzo and Delgadillo, who remained in Mexico City after the departure of their chief, Nuño de Guzmán, on his expedition to Nueva Galicia, were under the impression that the new appointments would include only a new president to the *Audiencia* and two *oidores,* so that they would be left on the board. Accordingly, they put every possible obstacle in the way of Cortés, whose honors left him without definite authority. In spite of an order from the Empress not to proceed closer than ten leagues from the capital, the Marqués felt obliged to leave the pestiferous region of the coast, and, followed by an enormous throng of Indians who sought his protection, he moved, first to Tlaxcala and later to Texcoco. Here, as already described, he set up a court which attracted more persons than that of Mexico City itself.

The new *oidores* sailed from Seville, August 25, 1530. Stormy weather prevented their stopping at Santo Domingo to join Bishop Fuenleal, and they proceeded directly to Vera Cruz. For some unknown reason Ceynos and Salmerón went ahead of their colleagues and reached port about the tenth of December. Without assuming authority immediately, they proceeded to Tlaxcala and from there, toward the end of the month, entered Mexico City. They were joined by Maldonado and Quiroga on January 9, and all four took solemn possession of office on the twelfth. Fuenleal, who had been awaiting their arrival at Santo Domingo, did not reach the capital until September 23, 1531. His delay caused some anxiety among the new magistrates, particularly Quiroga, who wrote the Council of the Indies, on August 14, urging that, as a man of culture, conscience, and experience, Fuenleal was the logical choice for the presidency.

Imposing the oath of allegiance to the Spanish monarchs, as they had been instructed, the magistrates proceeded at once to the *residencia* or survey of their predecessors and placed an embargo on their properties. Inasmuch as Guzmán could not be reached, the trial began with Matienzo and Delgadillo. The latter proved so recalcitrant that he was confined for a time to prison and afterward was placed under guard in his own house. Matienzo was ordered not to leave the city, but he was later commissioned to investigate the slave trade in Pánuco. Charges, 125 in all, were brought against them from all parts of the country. Cortés alone brought suits amounting to 200,000 gold pesos and gained 100 verdicts in his favor, without being entirely satisfied. On April 9, 1532, the *Audiencia* condemned the two *oidores* on 25 major charges and ordered the payment of 40,000 pesos in fines besides later imposts by the Court. In addition, the *encomiendas* which they had illegally given to their friends were restored to the rightful owners or confiscated for the Crown. In the character of prisoners, together with the records of their trials, the two were sent back to Spain in the autumn of the same year, to face an end of poverty and disgrace.

Guzmán, meanwhile, paid no attention to the summons of the

Audiencia, and continued to call himself the president and governor of New Spain, in the hope that his conquest of Nueva Galicia might consolidate his position with the Crown. Even his opponents, like Zumárraga, while deploring the injustices of his campaign, recognized that a concerted effort to stop him would result in greater evils. Cortés, as captain general of New Spain, began to view the successes of his defiant rival with increasing alarm and commissioned Luis de Castilla with a hundred men to advance into Guzmán's territory and place him under arrest. Through a ruse, the latter captured his bailiff and ordered him back to Mexico City under threat of death.

Matienzo and Delgadillo to exonerate themselves, were eager to throw as much as possible of the guilt of the indicted regime upon their former chief, and indeed the *Audiencia* had no difficulty in finding ample evidence to justify the confiscation of Guzmán's properties. When he heard how affairs were proceeding, he cried out, "What justice is this that permits such measures without a hearing? Is this my reward for having served Your Majesty with so much labor, faithfulness, and honesty?"

In May, 1533, Guzmán received orders from Spain to make all reports regarding the territory he had conquered to the Second *Audiencia.* Already deprived of his title of governor of Pánuco, disappointed in his discoveries, and deserted by his men, he turned back to the capital, where he was placed under arrest by a special agent of the King, Diego Pérez de la Torre, who was appointed to give him trial and succeed him as governor of Nueva Galicia. From there he was sent back to Spain, in 1538, after a year and one half of confinement, and ended his days in the ignominy he so largely deserved.

ii

From the beginning of its career, the Second *Audiencia* in its program of justice and reform faced an endless round of demands and opposition. In an early letter to the King, Quiroga and his associates declared: "Between investigations and the execution of orders, there has been and still remains so much to be done that, besides the morning hours, we use the afternoons and a great part of the nights. It will be no small thing if this work will be finished in the present or in the entire coming year."[3] Fuenleal even recommended the appointment of two more *oidores* to remain in the capital for a period of two years and others to serve for four years, traveling in their assigned districts.

After the trial of the First *Audiencia,* the outstanding problem was the restoration of order and justice to the tenure of land and the holding of Indians. Conquerors and settlers who had profited by past disorders were opposed to anything like the limitation of their land grants or the moderation of Indian tributes and sought in every way to have their *encomiendas* confirmed in perpetuity. The difficulty was that, in 1529, Spain had determined that the *encomienda* system should give way to that of the *corregimientos,* or districts in charge of the magistrates known as *corregidores.* The latter, as already described, were to act as royal representatives governing the Indians as tributary vassals of the King, with practically the same rights as the Spaniards. Like the *encomenderos,* they were to aid in the progress of conversion and civilization of their subjects and to protect them from abuse. In the discharge of their duties, they were to be aided by a priest and a petty officer known as an *alguacil.*

The conquerors who had certain claims to land were given special consideration in the appointment of *corregidores,* and by March, 1531, about ninety dispossessed *encomenderos* had been rewarded with positions under the new system. The *Audiencia,* meanwhile, gave out the general impression that all this was but a temporary measure until a new distribution of land grants should be made. When the full effect of the royal orders began to dawn on the colonists, a storm of opposition broke loose. To meet the difficulties involved, particularly in the withdrawal of *encomiendas,* a special council consisting of Zumárraga, Cortés, several friars, officials, and residents was called, in the early part of 1532, to aid the *Audiencia.*

In truth, small enthusiasm was shown for the change even by the *Audiencia.* Both Quiroga and Salmerón believed that the *encomienda* system, if properly administered, was more equitable and better adapted to the welfare of the Indians. While the *corregidores* and their assistants complained of the small pay allotted by the government, Ceynos pointed out that the royal revenues would be seriously imperiled both by the requirements of maintaining the large staff of officers under the proposed change and by the smaller income to the state. The majority of the friars and churchmen, including Zumárraga, likewise opposed the change, which had been so strongly advocated by Las Casas. Later, the Viceroy Mendoza stood out against the publication of the "New Laws." Thus the two systems continued, side by side, for a number of generations, until the final suppression of *encomienda* grants by Charles III.

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[3] Cf. Nicolás León, *El Ilmo. Señor Don Vasco de Quiroga* (Mexico), p. 10.

At the same time as Quiroga was taking a leading part in these negotiations of justice, he made every possible effort of charity to improve the condition of the Indians. His first impressions of the deplorable state to which the Indians had been reduced and of the pitiful life of the more primitive tribes remained with him to the end of his life. Even in his last will and testament, he recorded "the misery and great want, seldom seen or heard of, which the Indians — poor orphans and miserable persons — have to suffer. Many of the adults sell themselves and permit themselves to be sold, while children and orphans are stolen from their parents and guardians and sold as slaves. Others go about naked through the market places looking for something to eat from what is left by the swine."[4]

Quiroga saw the Indians, according to Moreno, at a time and in circumstances "when our nation commonly regarded them with such contempt that the only idea was to make them slaves, to treat them inhumanely, and to make them serve in tasks in which brutes were commonly employed. He loved them as his neighbor, when many persons even denied their rationality."[5] It has been asserted that the papal bull, *Sublimis Deus,* issued by Pope Paul III, put an end to disputes on whether the Indians had souls, by declaring their rationality. The Church, at least, never had any doubts on the matter.[6] In the words of Alfonso

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[4] León, *loc. cit.,* p. 10.

[5] *Loc. cit.,* p. 159.

[6] Cf. Francisco Lorenzana, *Concilios Provinciales de Mexico* (Mexico, 1769), pp. 33, 34.

Junco, what the bull really declared was "the liberty and capacity of the Indians, their dignity as human beings, their right to property, and the obligation to attract them to the faith by persuasion and good example."

A decree forbidding the further enslavement of Indians, for any cause, was issued, as noted, in 1530, and holders of slaves at the time were required to register them before the royal officials. Shortly afterward, the children born of Indian slaves were liberated, and in the course of time only Negroes were held in legal slavery.

Quiroga's viewpoint was not simply the product of sentiment. Where strong measures were required to establish order, he was ready to use them. During the absence of Cortés in Spain, with the Spaniards in discord under the regime of Guzmán, various tribes had attempted insurrection, and more than 200 Spaniards were slain on the roads by Indian marauders. The Second *Audiencia* was not inclined to favor the title of captain general which Cortés brought back from Spain or to grant him much authority, but when alarming reports began to mount, the *oidores* were happy to call upon the Conqueror as the one man capable of inspiring both fear and affection in the natives and of restoring the safety of the community. Quiroga, as well as Salmerón, suggested that Indians guilty of rebellion, social crimes, and idolatry should be condemned to the mines.

What he perceived was the necessity of a realistic outlook on the plight of the Indians and special consideration for their problem as such. "There are so many Indians," he wrote to the Council of the Indies, on August 14, 1531, "that they are like the stars of the sky and drops of water in the sea, without number. Their manner of living is chaos and confusion, and there is no way of putting them in order or promoting good Christian life, eliminating drunkenness, idolatry, and other evils, unless they can be placed together in well-ordered communities. They now live scattered around without the direction or cooperation of civic life. Each one has his own little plot of maize near his hut in the country, where without being observed he can practice idolatry, drink to excess, and do as he pleases. If the children who have been reared in the monasteries should now have to return to this nauseating confusion and danger, all the good work done by the religious will have been lost."[7]

The plan which Quiroga proposed was that "new Indian communities should be created apart from the old ones, on public lands not used by other groups but capable by cultivation of sustaining the communities. "This," he maintained, "is without doubt a great thing, very useful, and necessary, for from it will proceed the following benefits: the common and unused lands will, under cultivation, be made fruitful and profitable; and in these new centers, the Indians from childhood will be brought up and taught with all the diligence and labor of the monks there, and upon coming to the age of matrimony will be joined in marriage and thus avoid other dangers and sins."

Toward the close of 1531 or at the beginning of the following year, he began to put his ideas into practical effect by erecting at his own expense a hospital or community center named Santa Fe, west of Mexico City. To this place, in increasing number flocked not only the sick and disabled, but also those who wished to be taught Christian doctrine and be given training in the crafts and trades. Converted natives, who had been given elementary instruction in the monasteries, were here given further training by the friars. Half-breed children deserted by their fathers were brought in and provided for. Within a short time more than 30,000 Indians had settled around the institution, so that municipal authorities at Mexico City complained to the King that this enterprise was dividing the forces which ought to be concentrated in the capital.

The *Audiencia*, however, sustained the noble work of its associate, and Quiroga proceeded to enlarge its possibilities. The merits of this philanthropy were not long in reaching the knowledge of the King. As a result, it was placed under royal patronage and allowed various privileges and grants. This success convinced Quiroga that the natives of the country were responsive to kindness, as he had already declared. "If God guides this work," he wrote in the letter already mentioned, "as I hope He must, since it is so great an enterprise that it cannot, in my opinion, be explained in words, and if Your Majesty and the members of the Council of the Indies favor it in an effective manner, I pledge myself with God's help, to build up a true body of Christians as my first concern and to fulfill everything that may be done conformable with His will. The true conversion of the natives should be the principal intent of those in charge here, since this people is obedient in everything that is required, and so docile that with a reasonable effort they can be taught Christian doctrine with certainty and truth."

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[7] Cf. Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), I, pp. 311, 312.

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From the environs of Mexico City, Quiroga turned his attention to the province of Michoacán, where the situation was particularly difficult. The Tarascan Indians, natives of the region, had been traditional enemies of the Aztecs. When the latter appealed to them for aid against the Spanish invaders, they had refused. After the fall of the Aztec capital, Cortés sent emissaries into the region, with the result that the monarch, Tangaxoan II, went to Mexico City, where he was royally lodged in the palace at Coyoacan, and offered himself as vassal to the sovereign of Spain. At the same time he opened his kingdom to colonists and promised them his protection.

During Cortés' later expedition to Honduras, the region fell under the heavy hand of Salazar and Chirinos, who were commissioned to rule in his absence. Tangaxoan, or Caltzontzin, as he was otherwise known, came to Mexico City after the ejection of Salazar in 1526, to voice his complaints, and while there witnessed the good work being done by the friars. As a result, he was himself baptized, taking the name of Francisco, and asked for missionaries to work in his territory. The zealous Fray Martín de Jesús, a Franciscan, accompanied by two or three companions, answered his invitation and with later reinforcements proceeded to win the hearts of the people by patience and unselfish virtue. Within a short time institutions were established at Pátzcuaro, Acámbaro, Uruapán, Guayangareo, and Tarécuaro, under the mother house dedicated to Santa Ana in the capital city of Tzintzuntzán.[8]

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[8] The name signifies "The Place of the Humming Birds."

With the arrival of Guzmán and the first *Audiencia,* in 1528, all this changed. Tangaxoan Caltzontzin was haled into Mexico City and there held captive with demands for gold. When Guzmán fled from the city at the head of his armed expedition, in December, the following year, he took the King with him as far as Michoacán in the character of a hostage. The Spaniard immediately demanded a local conscription of several thousand natives to accompany him on his march and insisted upon knowing the whereabouts of the royal treasury. Failure to locate the desired wealth resulted in the repeated torturing of Caltzontzin and other high nobles, in the manner of Cuauhtémoc. Finally, the monarch was dragged behind a horse and then burned alive. When these facts were related later in the trial of the First *Audiencia,* Guzmán attempted to justify himself by imputing rebellious designs and relapse into idolatry to his unhappy victim.

As a result of all this infamy, the region degenerated into hardly more than a desert. Even in the darkness of heathenism, the Tarascans had been a peaceful people of some culture. But now, running from the fury of their exterminators, they quickly sank into barbarism and took refuge in the mountains. Those who had embraced Christianity abandoned the new faith for their old gods and became the victims of vice and drunkenness. In a situation of this kind, the friars, few in number and made ridiculous by the example of their countrymen, were powerless. Only a man of courage and energy with civil authority to back his judgment could effect any reform.

In 1532 the Second *Audiencia* sent Don Juan de Villaseñor as *visitador* to investigate conditions in the province and proceed in cases pertaining to public crime. He worked with great energy to win back the sympathy and confidence of the Indians. But neither his visit nor the activities of the Franciscans, including Friar Martín de Jesús, were able to restore peace. Don Vasco de Quiroga was then authorized to take the matter in hand.

He set out, in 1533, with a small group of assistants and arrived at Tzintzuntzán, where he received lodging with the Franciscans in their humble monastery of Santa Ana, outside the walls of the city. After a conference with the native governor, Don Pedro Guangua, an assembly was called of the leaders and people, and the object of his mission was explained. Then he proceeded, with characteristic zeal and good judgment, to carry out his reforms.

Marvelous and immediate results were the reward of his tireless efforts. Spaniards who had profited by an era of lawlessness were quickly brought to justice. Illegal tributes which had been imposed upon the natives were removed, and the *repartimientos* of land and labor were reorganized in conformity with the requirements of the Indians. At the same time, Quiroga made it clear that it was his intention to win the Tarascans back from idolatry and polygamy. Convinced of his sincerity and sympathy in their behalf, they delivered up great numbers of their idols, which he ordered to be burned to show that they had no power. Many adults who had previously refused to accept Christianity were now baptized with their children. Don Pedro Guangua agreed to dismiss his concubines and be married according to the law of the Church.

One of the most important achievements of Quiroga at this time was the establishment of another hospital of Santa Fe, erected about two leagues from Tzintzuntzán, similar to the one of the same name near Mexico City. With the restoration of civil order and good feeling, this center began to attract Indians who had fled to the mountains as well as natives from Pátzcuaro and Tzintzuntzán itself. The same royal favors were extended to this hospital as to the original establishment, and, as a result of cooperation between the natives and the Franciscans, five similar establishments were founded within three years.

From the experience he had derived from the earlier foundation near Mexico City, Quiroga drew up a program of ordinances, which he applied to this and to other social institutions he was subsequently to establish throughout Michoacán. "These hospital constitutions," declared the Mexican statesman and historian, Vicente Riva Palacio, "are notable, because they came as the reality of the idea of fraternity, of mutual aid, of the organization of work in common, of the equitable distribution of the fruits of labor, of economy, for the civil and religious education of the associates and their children. Moreover, they contributed to the extinction of pauperism and theft and above all to the acquisition of habits of economy in the community and in those who formed it. Thus there was realized, at least during the lifetime of Quiroga, the ideal of the primitive Church or the dream of certain modern Socialists; no one had the right to superfluous goods, but no one could lack what was necessary."[9]

The center of these communities consisted of a building for the sick and for the directors of the group and a chapel. Besides this, there were private dwellings for the members of the community. These houses were known as *familias,* since they were occupied by all the members of particular families, and were provided each with a plot of ground or garden. In the country, special shelters, known as *familias rústicas,* were erected during the sowing, cultivation, and harvesting of crops.

The central edifice was built by the members of the community, who contributed with their labor and shared in bearing the expenses of the common enterprise. The *familias* were also erected by the community without respect to ownership. Each one of these houses accommodated from eight to twelve married couples with their children. Young men who married were permitted to bring their wives to the paternal *familias.* Those who were appointed for labor in the fields had to live in the *familias rusticas* for a period of two years. At the end of this period one of their number remained to instruct the newcomers.

Labor in common was obligatory for six hours a day. The harvests were divided equally so that each one received a share sufficient to carry him through the year. Then enough was taken to cover the costs of the hospital and community expenses. The rest was set aside for the poor, but always with some provision for the possibility of a poor crop in the year to come.[10]

Regarding the education of the children, Quiroga provided that "together with the letters of the ABC and with Christian doctrine, good morals, and prudence, the boys should be taught agriculture in the following manner. After school hours twice a week, their teacher should take them out to the country or to some field near the school set aside for this purpose, and for one or two hours in the manner of fun, play, and pastime teach them the culture of the soil, even though the school hours are diminished, for this also is doctrine and good morals. Let them go out with their own *coas* or farm implements, and what they produce will be for themselves. Let all share together and divide the fruits among themselves, not as children, but judiciously so that those who work better may receive some advantage. The girls should learn the womanly arts necessary for their own and the common good, such as working in wool, linen, silk, and cotton, and weaving."

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[9] Vicente Riva Palacio, *México á través de los siglos* (Barcelona 1888–89), tomo II, pp. 224–226.

[10] *Reglas y Ordenanzas,* cf. Moreno, *loc. cit.,* apénd.

To a large extent these communities were autonomous and governed themselves. The director of the hospital was named by the bishop; the board of governors were elected by the chiefs or heads of families, generally the grandfathers. Elections were held, with the heads of families voting, annually or once every two years, without right of re-election, so that all might have an opportunity of taking part in the management of the community. If the family heads failed in their obligations of good example and management for their families, they were replaced with other guardians by the rector and his assistants.

To avoid envy through excessive display, the women were to dress in cloth the natural color of wool or cotton, without many colors or novelties in accessories. Their headdress was to be white. Married women were to keep their heads covered: unmarried women, uncovered. The garment of the men consisted of a large jacket made of wool or cotton, with wide and short plaited breeches. This attire, generally white, still serves as the ordinary, practical garment of the Mexican Indian laborer.

Quiroga can also take credit as the founder of various arts and crafts which have been handed down from generation to generation in many cities of Michoacán. Thus, to promote friendship and close alliance between the various communities and to prevent ruinous competition, he arranged that each settlement should engage in some special industry, and he provided teachers at his own expense to instruct the people. Certain villages, like Uruapán, specialized in wood carving and lacquer ware. Others, like Eronguarícuaro, became famous for their hats. Still others concentrated on utensils in iron, pottery, treating skins, and so on. To some extent, this plan has continued to survive the inroads of machine and mass production. It is easily seen that the "hospitals" of Quiroga were not merely places of refuge and cure for the infirm, but actually well-organized communities engaged in the peaceful arts and development of culture on a community basis.

As bishop of Michoacán, assisted by the religious orders, he later provided the same type of center in all the principal cities of his diocese. "In each city," as Moreno recorded, "he gave orders that there should be built a house, not far from the parish, as suitable as possible, in which various sections should be adapted for different uses, some for the lodging of the sick, others for those who were to take care of them, and others for the council chambers of the republic of the Indians. Here there were to meet each week in turn, eight or ten men with their wives to assist the sick and care for the adornment and cleanliness of a chapel next to the hospital under the title of the Immaculate Conception. . . . In a word, the hospitals were the center of religion, discipline, and humanity for the Indians."[11] During the epidemics from 1545 to 1576, these institutions were taxed to their capacity.

In all these projects, Don Vasco kept uppermost the spiritual welfare of his charges and, as he repeatedly declared, acted constantly with a supernatural motive himself. "Living in this harmony and good discipline," he declared in his ordinances, "far from want as well as from harmful idleness and excessive or disorderly cupidity, in addition to saving your souls, show yourselves grateful for the benefits received from our Divine Lord. For Him alone and His love and for your spiritual and temporal welfare, I have spent and labored in this. It has been for your salvation, your convenience, sustenance, relief, and good example for others, so that you may be freed from the disgrace of former indolence and may learn conformable with the doctrine which we have impressed upon you, as cultured and well instructed, without detriment to your obedience, simplicity, humility, and lack of greed."

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[11] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 72, 73.

That this social organization was eminently suited to the nascent society of Mexico was gratefully recognized in Quiroga's own day. Referring to the appointment of Quiroga to the bishopric of Michoacán, Zumárraga declared, on February 13, 1537, "I am certain in common with many persons that this has been one of the strokes of good judgment which Your Majesty has made here for the spiritual salvation of the Indians, which I believe Your Majesty desires more than gold and silver. For I believe that, in the deep-seated love which this good man shows them and which he has proved with the services and constant benefits he has given them so zealously and unfalteringly, he adds lustre to us prelates in this country.

"As an *oidor,* he has spent the entire salary which Your Majesty allotted him, not retaining one *real* for himself and selling his own garments to provide for the Christian congregations which he maintains in two hospitals, one in this city and the other in Michoacán. He has provided them with family dwellings at his own expense and bought them lands and flocks to sustain them. When he has become the pastor, one can believe that he will do even greater things for his sheep, although I do not know of any other who has equalled him in this land. For my own part, it is a severe rebuke, and I maintain it as a demonstrated fact that he has put us bishops, and particularly the friars, to shame."[12]

Quiroga finished his work as *visitador* of Michoacán and returned to Mexico City in the summer of 1535. A report of his work was forwarded by the *Audiencia* to the King. It is notable that, when the *Audiencia* on which Quiroga had served was itself examined the following year by Francisco de Loaysa, he was the only *oidor* against whom charges were brought and these were on the score of his treatment of the Indians. The first was that during the erection of the hospital and houses at Santa Fe near Mexico City he had forced the natives to carry adobe, stones, and wood on their shoulders from the capital, a distance of over two leagues. It was said, moreover, that he had taken advantage of his position to pay them a miserable salary. The second charge was that he had, without just title, turned over the island of Tultepec, which he had bought for this hospital, to the city of Ocoyoacac. On both points, Quiroga presented conclusive proof of his innocence and justice.[13]

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[12] Cf. Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, I, p. 309.

These imputations brought out the important fact that Don Vasco did pay wages to the Indians who worked on his projects for their own benefit. So strict was his conscience on this matter that in his last will he sought to remedy an occasion when, through the poverty of his diocese, he was unable to pay all that he thought was right, by providing "free education to all the sons of the Indians living in or around this same city of Michoacán." Such was his own poverty as a result of his philanthropies, that Moreno declared, "There was not found in all his house one *real* that was his own. The two sums of money which he mentioned in his will, he stated to belong to the college and the church, adding that for both he gave thanks to the King, since his need constantly obliged him to ask help from the latter for his own sustenance as well as for the maintenance of the hospitals and the college."

iv

Among the other matters which the Second *Audiencia* was to report upon to the Crown was that of the ecclesiastical organization of the country. The fitness of the actual bishops of Mexico and Tlaxcala was to be commented upon as well as the advisability of creating new dioceses. It must be remembered that, while the ecclesiastical and civil functions of Spanish society were distinct and the Church and State represented separate jurisdictions, the Spanish monarch exercised the right of patronage, or the appointment of bishops, and in so many ways regulated the temporal phases of the Church that, in practice, he was little short of a national vicar of the Pope.

The *Audiencia* carefully studied the problem assigned to it and made a number of important suggestions, which laid the foundation for the future ecclesiastical organization of the country. The metropolitan see of Mexico was to be definitely limited, but the bishop was to be awarded large powers in deciding disputed questions. By cedula of March 20, 1532, the diocese of Tlaxcala was given smaller boundaries. Two years later, New Spain was divided into four provinces: Mexico, Michoacán, Goazacoalco, and Miztecapan. The corresponding ecclesiastical divisions were bounded on a radius of fifteen leagues, with the cathedral town as the center, and were to be known as Mexico, Michoacán, Tlaxcala, and Oaxaca. On May 20, 1535, the diocese of Oaxaca was duly established by Rome, and June 21 the Dominican Father, Juan López de Zarate, was confirmed in his appointment as bishop.

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[13] Cf. Nicolás León, *Documentos Inéditos Referentes al Ilmo. Señor Don Vasco de Quiroga* (Mexico, 1940), pp. 40–84.

The establishment of the diocese of Michoacán, which had been contemplated since 1533, after the visit of Quiroga, became a fact by the issuance of a bull dated August 8, 1536. A Franciscan, Luis de Fuensalida, had been nominated for the bishopric, but he declined the honor on the grounds that the responsibilities of the office would interfere with his apostolate of preaching to the Indians. When knowledge of Quiroga's success in Michoacán reached the King, he decided that Don Vasco, although not a churchman, was pre-eminently qualified for the position. Accordingly he presented the name of the *oidor* to the Pope, who approved his choice. The documents arrived in Mexico in 1537; but apparently it was not until August or September the following year that he took possession of his diocese. He was given sacred orders and consecrated bishop by Zumárraga in the city of Mexico, in December, 1538.

That a layman should have been chosen for this position and elevated to the episcopacy without the usual preliminary of an extensive formal training in theology seems remarkable. Quiroga was amply prepared for his task, however, as appears from the course of his entire career. His library numbered 626 volumes — sufficient evidence of the scholarly character of a man plunged into the midst of a missionary and colonial field of endeavor. Moreover, he had already shown himself an authority in a matter of profound theological implications, namely the administration of baptism to the Indians, and was commissioned to draw up the regulations in this regard.

The early missionaries, after learning the Indian tongues and preaching the Gospel, had found themselves overwhelmed by the demand of the natives for baptism. According to Herrera, there were not over 100 members of all the religious orders combined in New Spain before 1531, and while their numbers gradually increased, only heroic activity can account for the results they achieved. The story is told of the Franciscan friar, Pedro de Castillo who learned the Mexican and Otomi dialects perfectly, and, although crippled and blind, had himself carried from town to town so that he might preach to the Indians.

The Franciscan Toribio Motolinía, in his record from 1524 to 1539, indicated that over a million children and adults were baptized in the city of Mexico and surrounding villages, an equal number in Texcoco, and in Michoacán and other provinces an additional three millions, by some sixty friars of the Franciscan order alone.[14] In their work of evangelization, the friars were aided by native converts and traders who carried the news of Christianity throughout their respective districts. To administer the sacrament to the crowds that presented themselves, an abbreviated form of the ceremonies was used. The neophytes were drawn up in order, with the children in front, and after the ritual was read for all in common, the traditional ceremonies of the salt, saliva, etc., were administered to a few. Then the children were baptized with water in the required form. Following this, the adults were briefly instructed in the principal articles of faith and similarly baptized. If the holy oils were not available, these were administered later.

So long as the Franciscans alone preached to the Indians, no difficulty was raised about this practice; but as soon as the other orders and diocesan clergy began to enter the field, contrary opinions were expressed regarding the validity of the baptisms, and the question reached the proportions of a major conflict. It is not strange, then, that a conference was called of the *Audiencia* with the bishops and heads of the religious orders. Since this body was unable to reach an agreement, the matter was submitted to Spain, where the Council of the Indies and the archbishop of Seville resolved that the Pope should be consulted. In the meantime, on November 30, 1537, the Mexican bishops met to present the entire situation before the King and urgently petitioned a decision; but, before this could be dispatched, the final solution arrived from Rome.

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[14] Toribio Motolinía, *Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España* (Barcelona, 1914), p. 105 and *passim.*

On the first of June of that year, Pope Paul III had forwarded his bull, *Altitudo divino consilii,* in which he absolved the Franciscans from blame but insisted that for the future, outside of urgent necessity, all the ceremonies prescribed by the Church should be observed in the administration of the sacrament. The bull arrived in Mexico in 1538, and in the early part of the following year the Viceroy Mendoza called a meeting of the bishops in the capital to enact regulations on this and other Church matters. Here it was decided that a multitude of native applicants for baptism did not constitute "urgent necessity," and that unless there was a necessity judged to be "urgent," the baptism of adults was to be deferred to the seasons of Easter and Pentecost.

During all this controversy, Quiroga, who was still an *oidor,* maintained the more rigorous view, against the practice of the Franciscans and the opinion of the bishops. He had, moreover, written a *Treatise* on the matter; and when the matter had finally been settled, he was commissioned by the bishops to edit the *Manual for Adults*, which appeared in 1540 from the local press of Juan Cromberger, printed in Gothic letters. His arguments, however, which were sustained by the Pope, brought small consolation to the zealous Franciscans, who were besieged as before with plaintive requests for baptism by throngs of natives from far and near. Motolinía complained bitterly against the hardships caused by these provisions and stated that, as at the convent of Quecholac where two priests baptized 14,200 supplicants in five days, the missionaries still felt constrained to take a larger view of the matter. With the increasing number of churchmen, the dimunition of adults to be baptized, and a relaxation of laws restricting adult baptism to given seasons, the question lost its practical significance.

Quiroga's legal mind, manifested in this matter, and his insistence upon exact and thorough procedure, were again brought into play over the question of diocesan boundaries, shortly after his taking office as bishop of Michoacán. A map of the region between his see and that of Zumárraga had not been completed, and as a result certain places involving the tithes of a number of borderland ranches were claimed by both bishoprics. The Viceroy Mendoza declared that these ranches belonged to the diocese of Mexico, but Don Vasco remained unconvinced and proceeded to issue letters of excommunication against the unhappy *rancheros,* who were now in the position of paying tithes to both claimants or incurring the penalties of one of the two.

In November, 1538, Quiroga proposed that the viceroy and the *Audiencia* should decide the controversy. The cathedral chapter of Mexico accepted the plan for the sake of peace, but Mendoza and the *Audiencia* replied that, since they had no jurisdiction in purely ecclesiastical matters, they could act, not as judges, but only as arbitrators. Not satisfied with this, he asked that they give a decision, "not by way of determination but of declaration," while he would reserve the right of appeal to the King in case he was ruled against. The chapter of Mexico indignantly referred the whole affair to the King, who in turn ordered the bishop of Michoacán to submit to the decision of the viceroy and the *Audiencia.* In the end, he was awarded both the tithes and the territory. Much criticism was leveled against him at the time, but Nicolás de León maintains that "a better demonstrated justification of Quiroga's intransigeance cannot be found. He laid the foundations of a new work, and for this to endure it was necessary that they should be solid and firm, so that his successors should not later have disputes or incur penalties because of something which he had not perfectly defined."

Early in 1539 he proceeded to assume actual possession of his diocese and took residence at Tzintzuntzán, where he began to construct the cathedral under the patronage of St. Francis of Assisi. Little is known of his activities at this center, but he determined at the end of a year to move his headquarters to the city of Pátzcuaro, which had been the ancient religious center of the Tarascan Indians. General opposition met this decision. The natives argued that Tzintzuntzán was the traditional capital of the Tarascan kings and that here he had assumed his miter and laid the foundations for his cathedral. The *encomenderos* felt that this transfer would diminish the importance of the city. An armed uprising was staged, of Indians as well as Spaniards. Notwithstanding all this, Quiroga stood his ground and insisted that, with the authority given by the King, he was going to move to what he considered a more suitable place.

The precise reasons for this change are not known for certain, but it is probable that the bishop felt that he could not complete the religious conquest of his territory until he had dominated its heathen citadel. Since there already was a church and convent of St. Francis of Assisi at Pátzcuaro, he changed the title of his cathedral to that of Divino Salvador (The Divine Saviour). For its location he selected the former center of pagan sacrifices, so that, as one chronicler observed, "what was the center of the city in the times of the blind paganism of this country should be the same when illumined with the light of the Holy Gospel, and where Satan had been served in insult of the Divine Majesty, the true God should be adored."

Although the pagan priests had previously resisted the most strenuous efforts of the first missionaries, Don Vasco finally succeeded in converting many of them. The famous image of the Blessed Virgin de la Salud, which is still venerated in Pátzcuaro, was made by one of these men under his direction. Leading men of the provinces and many of the natives who had remained in the mountains soon came to the new center, and within a few years the city numbered a population of over 30,000. The change of cathedral seat and title were approved by Pope Julius III in a special brief dated July 8, 1550.

News of the extent and cost of the ambitious new cathedral was spread throughout New Spain and even reached the Spanish monarch, who ordered the viceroy to halt the work until he should be better informed. An architect was named to inspect the enterprise and reported that the building was not on good foundations. The ground, due to its proximity to the lake, he maintained, was unsteady and the masons lacked the experience necessary for such an undertaking. As a result, orders were given for the suspension of work, and Quiroga set about to make use of the part which had already been put up. This consisted of one nave large enough to hold 3000 persons. Four other naves had been planned. The fears of the inspector were justified, for the walls began to crumble after a few years.

Quiroga was more fortunate in his erection of schools. By 1543 a goodly number had been established throughout the province and placed under the royal patronage. In that year, King Philip II declared that "to Our Royal Patronage belong the college of Spaniards, *Mestizos*, and Indians, so that they may study grammar, and the hospital of the sick poor of the city of Michoacán of New Spain, and we accept the charge which the founder has placed upon Our Royal Crown so that the students and the poor may be better favored and administered."

To provide for the training of priests. Don Vasco founded the Royal College of San Nicolás Obispo, about 1540, where Spanish youth were to be admitted, free of charge, to the study of Latin, Greek, moral and dogmatic theology, and canon law, besides the Tarascan language. "In the College of San Nicolás," he stated, "there are to be enrolled as many Spanish students of pure blood as can be properly accommodated. Besides purity of blood, they must have such qualities and virtue as are required for ordination to the priesthood, and for this they are to be given sufficient instruction and examination. This college is sustained by the ranch of Jaripitio which belonged to the Marqués del Valle. In the valley of Guaniqueo there are two other ranches which Your Majesty granted me. I have bought and placed cattle on them for the support of our house and college."[15]

Annexed to this college was a school where the sons of the Indians might learn reading and writing as well as Christian doctrine, and exchange languages with the Spanish students. Free education was provided for them as well as for the children of the native workers, in perpetual recompense for their labor on these public edifices. About the same time, he erected another hospital, which he dedicated to St. Martha, and established a school for girls, both Spanish and Indian, for their protection and instruction in Christian doctrine and general education. Of all his foundations, the latter alone failed to survive him. It had disappeared by 1585. The foundation of San Nicolás Obispo ceased to exist in 1810.

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[15] Cf. Nicolás León, *Don Vasco de Quiroga, loc. cit.*, p. 76.

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Up to this time the greater part of parochial administration was in the hands of the Franciscans and Augustinians, the former in the highlands and the latter in the tropical regions. The Franciscans had been in New Spain since May 13, 1524, when Padre Martín de Valencia, then in his fiftieth year, arrived with the significant number of twelve companions, ten ordained priests and two lay brothers. They had been accompanied by twelve Dominicans, who tarried at Santo Domingo for the arrival of their Vicar-general Tomás Ortiz with seven companions and arrived at Vera Cruz, twelve in number, June, 1526. When Cortés returned from Spain in 1530, he brought another twelve friars of the order of Merced, or Mercy. Seven Augustinians came in 1533, and one of them, Father Alonso de Borja, proceeded to the settlement of Santa Fe founded by Quiroga near Mexico City. Other orders followed. That of La Caridad y San Hipólito, devoted to charity, erected its first hospital in 1566. The Jesuits, who had been previously invited to Michoacán by Quiroga, arrived at Vera Cruz on September 9, 1572. The Carmelites reached the capital in 1585, and the Benedictines, in 1589.

By the end of the century all these organizations, reinforced by additional members, had established schools, hospitals, convents, and settlements throughout Mexico. "The establishment of bishoprics," as Hubert Bancroft remarked, "the organization of provincias of the regular orders, the encouragement held out to them to found convents, and the gradual but continued erection of churches were far more effective in the suppression of idolatry than had been all the labors of itinerant friars, who, howsoever many converts they baptized, left impressions of no very durable character."[16] Many settlements, nevertheless, had hardly any ministration. These were taken care of by native catechists, and the Indians, to receive the sacraments, had to go long distances.

It was partly with the idea of remedying this defect by enlisting a body of diocesan clergy, that Quiroga returned to Spain in 1548.[17] With the Spanish clergy he brought back four years later, he was able to establish his cathedral chapter and to found various curacies. By the same means he hoped to limit the jurisdiction of the monks and co-ordinate the diocese more directly under his control. At the same time he secured authorization from the King to prohibit the religious orders from founding convents which in his judgment were inadvisable and useless. As a result of his determination, the conflict between the hierarchy and the friars that had been discussed at the meeting of the bishops in 1537 was now renewed.

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[16] Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1883), II, p. 402.

In spite of the mandates of the Council of the Indies and the warnings of the bishop, the religious orders continued to multiply their monasteries. There can be no doubt that in many cases these establishments were simply an added burden for the people and an increase of work for the Indians, of small use in the administration of the Church, since there were so few clergy to manage them. Motolinía referred to these unnecessary foundations as "the seventh plague." Nevertheless, the Augustinians complained to the King when Quiroga threatened to expel them from the monasteries which they had built without his permission; and the King, by cedula of July 11, 1562, countermanding his previous authorization, ordered Quiroga to leave them in peace and possession.

Another source of contention was the matter of tithes. Don Vasco, in common with the other bishops, had asked that the Indians be assessed one fifteenth, although the Spanish King had expressly exempted the natives from this obligation. The religious orders believed in the justice of such a tax, but felt that it should go, not to the bishops, but to themselves, as the active workers in the field. The bishops were, moreover, desirous of restricting the large powers which the monks exercised in administering the sacraments; and, when resisted also in this, they became hesitant to ordain to the priesthood such men as the religious orders presented.

That considerable bad blood was developed over repeated incidents is evident from the solution given by the Franciscan Jerónimo de Mendieta so that the friars and the bishops of the Indian dioceses might live in peace. "Let the bishops hand over their income," he suggested, "confine themselves to their cathedrals among the Spaniards, and entrust the religious orders with the entire work of teaching the natives and administering to them the sacraments." Commenting on the situation, León remarked, "If Quiroga occasionally showed himself severe and unyielding with the orders, it was always with justified cause, and it was generally the friars who provoked the conflicts."

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[17] In 1543 he had set sail to attend the Council of Trent, but was turned back to Vera Cruz because of a leak in the vessel.

To meet these and related problems, Archbishop Montúfar of Mexico, the successor of Zumárraga, convoked the first synodal council, for November 17, 1555. Quiroga as well as the bishops of Tlaxcala, Chiapas, and Oaxaca and a number of other ecclesiastical and civil officials attended this historic event. Ninety-three chapters of resolutions were drawn up to regulate the administration of parochial affairs, enact disciplinary measures for the clergy, and protect the natives.[18]

A large part of these conflicts was founded on misinformation, as is clear from a statement of the Franciscan Father, Francisco de Mena, general commissioner of the Indies, who accused Quiroga, in the fifteen years under consideration, of never "ordaining, preaching, hearing confessions, baptizing, or confirming the Indians." The fact was that, to inform himself of the condition and needs of his vast diocese, Don Vasco visited every part of it himself, traveling on muleback for more than 625 leagues with only his chaplain and a page, to assist him in administering the sacraments to the multitudes of children and adults. Up to the year 1548, his field of action included, not only the realm of Michoacán, but also that of Nueva Galicia or Jalisco, a territory larger than half of Spain. Added to the natural difficulties of the terrain, he had to face a multiplicity of tongues spoken by the natives, including the Tarascan, Mexican, Cuitlatecan, Piringan, Otomitan, and Masaguan.

Wherever he went, he founded churches, curacies, hospitals, and schools. Four centers were established at Guanajuato, for the Mexican, Tarascan, Otomi, and Masaguan Indians respectively. Besides Tzintzuntzán, there were four other Spanish towns in the province, San Miguel, San Felipe, Zacatula, and Colima, and about 300 native towns and settlements. Thanks to the hospitals which he and the friars had established, the population of this territory suffered much less than elsewhere during the frightful epidemics of 1563 and 1575–76.

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[18] Cf. Lorenzana, *op. cit.*

To him also was due the settling of the barbarous and wandering tribes of the Chichemecan Indians, whom he sought to protect from the illegal, slave-hunting expeditions of Spaniards. In his letter to the Council of the Indies, February 17, 1561, he declared: "In our cathedral church of Michoacán, for more than twenty years there has been a general baptism of certain brave and savage tribes called Chichemecas which come here, and in turn bring others, attracted by the great solemnity of the celebration in the manner of the primitive church. . . . Lately they have been afraid to come, so that I am afraid this holy work will come to a stop or be seriously hampered.

"The reason for this is that they are pursued by certain Spaniards, who, with the authorization of the viceroy, have established themselves in a town called San Miguel, which is on the route taken by the Chichemecas coming to be baptized. To justify the crime, the Spaniards maintain Negroes and crafty Indians who act as highwaymen in that district and seize them as slaves for sale and for work in the mines. What is worse, even the women with their boys and girls and their babies at their breasts whom they bring to be baptized are not exempted. All this is a violation of the security which Your Majesty has promised and of the cedulas issued by which these people are allowed to settle wherever they wish in their own territory and not be molested or made to pay tribute for ten years, for they have been brought together in towns ready to live in, the principal one of which is called Epénjamo."[19]

Quiroga's indominable energy appears in the fact that he was still active in his nineties, and indeed up to the hour of his death. There was nothing which might benefit his flock that he failed to consider. As an example of his thought for the material as well as the spiritual betterment of the country, he stopped at Santo Domingo on his return from Spain, to pick up five species of bananas for cultivation by the natives of Mexico. None of these projects were for his own personal aggrandizement or profit. The King had offered him the more important dioceses of Puebla, Mexico, and Segovia, but he declined, with the reply: "To pass from one diocese to another is only to change places, not labors, for in going from one city to another, the responsibility is not lightened."

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[19] Cuevas, *op. cit.*, I, p. 314.

It seems incredible that at the age of ninety-five he should undertake a general visit of his diocese, particularly in consideration of the hardships this involved. Nevertheless, he drew up his will at Pátzcuaro, January 24, 1565, and set out for the journey. The following March, he arrived at Uruapán, where he stayed in the hospital founded by Friar Juan de San Miguel. In this place, his death came suddenly, most probably from a cerebral apoplexy, on March 14, of the same year. His remains were brought back to Pátzcuaro by members of his council and were buried in the provisional cathedral, today known as La Compañía, where they still rest.

Such has been the memory and affection of the Indians for this great man, that in spite of official neglect, the places he visited and spots he touched are still venerated. One point on the Sierra of Nahuachen is still called *Obispo Tirecua,* that is to say "the place where the Bishop ate." Vicente Riva Palacio mentions a place on the Sierra of Paracho which the natives have marked with a small altar because there Quiroga's right foot sank into the mud. Various miraculous events are also recorded, including his bringing forth potable water from a rock near his old cathedral. When the cathedral see was transferred to Valladolid, the cathedral chapter tried to remove his remains, but the Indians of Pátzcuaro prevented it.

As a man eminently of action, Don Vasco wrote little. Besides his work on the *Manual for Adults,* he printed a history of the Church in Michoacán and issued with his own notes the reprint of an explanation of Christian doctrine for the Indians. A fragment of his rules and ordinances for the hospitals was reprinted, together with other short works, in the biography by Moreno. Other works in manuscript, notably sermons preached to the Indians and a "Collection of Penitential Canons for the Use of San Nicolás College," have been lost. The most transcendental enterprise of his life, as M. O. Mendízabal has noted, was "the material redemption of the native as the solid basis for the fruitful preaching of the Gospel."[20] So well did he lay the foundations that at the end of the eighteenth century his work, although subject to the vicissitudes of time and turmoil, remained substantially the same as he had organized it. Subsequent changes have amply demonstrated that the fruitful future of Mexico depends upon the union of the material and the spiritual redemption of the Indian, as Don Vasco envisioned to such practical effect four hundred years ago.

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[20] "Don Vasco de Quiroga," in *Crisol,* June, 1931.

CHAPTER VI

Antonio De Mendoza

FIRST VICEROY OF NEW SPAIN

i

GRAVE in his manner and temperate in speech, according to Francisco de Coronado, the first viceroy of New Spain was "such a zealous Christian and was so rigorous in obeying the commands of God" that he "knew no churchman even of good reputation and life who was so conscientious."* The contemporary portraits of Antonio de Mendoza show a rather portly man of long face and dark keen eyes. A high forehead and aquiline nose lead to a firm but kindly mouth and a determined chin partly concealed under a dark beard. His entire countenance was that of an intelligent man capable of fact finding and practical judgment as well as power of execution.

The Mendoza family had long been one of the proudest and most ancient of Spain, claiming descent from the Roman patricians, the Cid, the Gothic dukes of Cantabria, and the nobility of Biscay. When Antonio was born, in 1490, near the besieged Granada, he was inevitably destined for a distinguished career. His great-grandfather, Iñigo López de Mendoza, was the celebrated Marqués de Santillana, known throughout Europe, not only as a warrior and statesman, but also as a poet and scholar. His grandfather had been twice ambassador to Rome and a brilliant soldier in the wars with the Moors. He was given the rank of Count by Henry IV and was made lord of Tendilla near Guadalajara. In the profession of arms his father had likewise served, aiding Pope Innocent VIII against King Ferdinand of Naples, and after the siege of Alhambra was made *alcalde* or mayor of the Moorish stronghold, a post which he discharged with eminent prudence.

Antonio's father married again, after the death of his first wife in 1477, so that the future viceroy was born of the second marriage. The eldest son, from the first marriage, succeeded to the post of captain general of Granada, and his younger brother, Francisco, became a cardinal after serving as ambassador to the Council of Trent. Another brother, after him, served in various diplomatic posts and has been credited with authorship of the celebrated picaresque novel *Lazarillo de Tormes.*

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* Cf. *Archivo General de Indias,* 48–1–9/31.

Brought up in the environs of Granada, Mendoza was given the regular military education of the day, and distinguished himself as a soldier of bravery and decision in helping to put down the revolt of the *Communeros.* In 1526, Emperor Charles V sent him on a diplomatic mission to Flanders. From there he was dispatched with letters of credit worth 100,000 ducats to the Emperor's brother, Ferdinand of Hungary.

In the meantime affairs in the New World had rapidly developed from mere exploration to the opening of vast new regions for colonization, and the eyes of the Emperor were directed to the possibilities of boundless wealth that lay in their proper exploitation. Up to this time, the Council of the Indies had represented the Crown as the highest authority in the government of the Spanish colonial empire; the *Audiencias* with broad judicial and executive powers had functioned in carrying out its policies. The time now seemed ripe for a more centralized control, and efforts were made to find a man whose background, training, and loyalty would qualify him to act with supreme authority as the immediate and personal representative of the King.

On November 9, 1529, Mendoza was approached on the subject, at the same time as the identical proposition was being made to the Marescal de Fromesta. The Conde de Oropeso had already turned down the offer, alleging poor health, and Fromesta stipulated terms that the government regarded as exorbitant. Mendoza, however, was immediately attracted by the idea. "I am indeed assured of the willingness which you manifest to serve His Majesty the Emperor in this regard," answered the Queen, "for it is in conformity with all that your ancestors have done in the service of the Royal Crown." Nevertheless, it was not until six years later that he was able to take the appointment. This delay was due partly to his official and personal business in Spain and in part also to the indecision of the Spanish Government itself, which did not feel quite ready to make this change in colonial organization. But the desperate situation created by Nuño de Guzmán and the First *Audiencia* required immediate attention, and the bishop of Santo Domingo, Sebastián Ramírez de Fuenleal, was ordered, on April 11, 1530, to proceed to New Spain as president of the Second *Audiencia,* until the viceroy should take office.

The actual creation of the viceroyalty and the appointment of Mendoza to the position spelled, of course, the final doom of Cortés' hopes to supremacy over the country he had conquered. From the beginning of his successes in Mexico, Cortés had been regarded with caution by the central government. His military gains were soon placed under the wing of officials appointed by Spain. Even when his position as governor and captain general of New Spain was confirmed, by the order of October 15, 1522, the financial management of his enterprise was delivered into the hands of government appointees, who arrived from Spain two years later. In 1526, Luis Ponce de León came to investigate charges against the Conqueror and to displace him as governor. An order from Alonso de Estrada, his third successor in office, suspending his authority as captain general, had sent him back to Spain to voice his indignant complaints.

Before Cortés could make his defense at court, the First *Audiencia* had been appointed, December 13, 1527, under the leadership of his enemy Nuño de Guzmán. The tragic career of this body, which has already been described, clearly called for investigation and a change; but if Cortés had ambitions in the matter, he was doomed for another disappointment. Out of a joint meeting of the Councils of the Indies, of Castile, and of Finance had come the thought of creating a viceroy and the immediate decision to supplant the First *Audiencia* with a second. The membership of the latter body, as mentioned in the chapter on Quiroga, was entrusted to the bishop of Badajoz, who completed his selection of the four *oidores* or judges by April 5, 1530. This was the board to which Fuenleal was appointed under promise of a successor in the presidency.

The Second *Audiencia* had a hard task, which it performed well; but three of its members, including Fuenleal, were advanced in years, and were anxious to be relieved. Distressed by the pretensions of Cortés, who had returned to the country with the titles of captain general and Marqués del Valle de Oaxaca, and by the defiance of Guzmán, who had set out in the conquest of Nueva Galicia, the *Audiencia* sensed a lack of royal authority for its program of reforms and felt the temporary character of its mission.

Mendoza received his royal commission as viceroy and governor of New Spain and president of the *Audiencia,* succeeding Fuenleal, in papers issued at Barcelona, April 17, 1535. His powers and duties were carefully detailed in two sets of instructions, one given with the issuance of his commission, the other, eight days later. In these, Charles V showed that he was interested in the good treatment and social advancement of the Indians, but from a material standpoint he looked upon both Spain and New Spain as reservoirs of men and funds to hold his European empire together. Mendoza accordingly found himself charged with the increase of royal revenue. Gold and silver tributes were to be enlarged, Church tithes in excess of ecclesiastical needs were to be retained by the Crown, properties were to be carefully listed for taxation, the treasures of native "devil worshipers" were to be sought and seized, and mines were to be opened and exploited by the government.

Besides the matter of revenue, he was ordered to make a thorough visitation of the country upon his arrival, for a general report. The question of slavery and of the personal services of the Indians was to be gone into, and recommendations were to be made after council with churchmen, members of the treasury department, and other officials. Adequate preparations were to be made for military defense. He was given a general, though vaguely defined, power over ecclesiastical appointments and the publication of papal bulls and briefs, and was ordered to cooperate with the Church in the conversion of the natives. In these matters, the Council of the Indies remained as a board of limitation and counsel, but the function and authority of the government rested upon the viceroy. His term of office was to be unlimited.

ii

Mendoza sailed from the port of Lucar, after being royally lodged at the King's palace in Seville, and arrived at Vera Cruz early in October, 1535. He was accompanied by his wife, Catalina de Vargos, who had been a lady in waiting to Isabella, and his son Francisco. Another son, Iñigo, remained in Spain and died in the siege of San Quentin. He was met by an official delegation of the *cabildo* or town council of Mexico City, with whom he proceeded, amid many demonstrations of welcome, to the capital. His entry into the city, about the fourteenth of the month, was signalized with great festivities — with trumpets, and colored cloaks, and kettle drums, as the record states, provided at the expense of the city. The day after this triumph and rejoicing, Mendoza settled down to business and began his routine executive meetings.

Upon the arrival of the viceroy, Fuenleal was retired with honor and returned to Spain, where he was given successively the bishoprics of Tuy, León, and Cuenca, and finally the presidency of the Council of the Indies. The other members of the *Audiencia* were gradually drawn into other lines of work. Quiroga was made bishop of Michoacán. Maldonado went to Yucatán with his wife and later served as president of the *Audiencia de los Confines*. Salmerón returned to Spain, but Ceynos remained on the board until 1546, when he also returned to the mother country. The new *Audiencia,* as it came to be formed, embraced Francisco Loaysa, Alonso de Tejada, Gómez de Santillan, and Antonio Rodríguez Quesada, who succeeded Ceynos.

At the outset of his career, Mendoza adopted, as his principle, slowness of action until study and experience should reveal the right course to be taken, "since," as he wrote in his Instruction to his successor, Luis de Velasco, "most affairs lend themselves to being handled in that way and in that way alone can one avoid being deceived."[1] The latitude of powers granted in his responsibility to the Council of the Indies thus permitted him to suspend enforcement of unfavorable laws and to frame ordinances more in line with current needs. In Mexico City, his confirmation was required for the legal effect of regulations passed by the town council. The Indian governor of Mexico City, Don Diego, who was head of the free natives in the metropolitan area, was likewise answerable to him. His position was further strengthened by his powers of patronage in making grants of lands and Indian help.

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[1] *Instrucciones que los Vireyes de Nueva España dejaron á sus Sucesores* (Mexico, 1867), p. 238.

As president of the *Audiencia,* the viceroy was authorized to appoint an *oidor* with a vote in the city council. On the other hand, his authority was modified and checked by the *Audiencia,* which was also directly responsible to the Council of the Indies. The fairness of Mendoza, however, produced a perfect harmony with these bodies, and there existed a perfect freedom of correspondence with Spain, a thing unknown in the experiences of Zumárraga under Guzmán's régime. Thus with reference to letters written to the Council of the Indies, Mendoza was able to say to Coronado, "You know very well that I never see, know about, or read what others write or what is written to them."

The *Audiencia* continued largely as a judicial body with the functions of a supreme court, although it assumed an administrative rôle during his incapacity or absence from the city. It was also the ordinary channel of orders for various civil enterprises and served the viceroy as a general advisory body. With this definition of powers, the tribunal assumed the character which it maintained throughout the viceregal era until reorganization in the eighteenth century.

For the rest, Mexico was governed regionally according to its character, stage of development, and distance from the capital. The territory over which Mendoza ruled was a vast area, including in a general way everything north of the Peru jurisdiction. By a decree of December 13, 1527, the grants of Cortés, Nuño de Guzmán, and Pánfilo de Narváez had been brought under the First *Audiencia,* thus including all provinces between Honduras and Florida. Guzmán's conquest of Nueva Galicia was placed under central jurisdiction in 1537. In 1543 the *Audiencia de los Confines,* erected largely at the suggestion of Las Casas, removed Yucatán, Cozumel, Tabasco, Chiapas, and Guatemala from Mendoza's jurisdiction, although he retained some financial and military authority over the district.[2]

Nevertheless, the movement toward centralization of power continued to meet with serious obstacles. Both Cortés and Guzmán were loath to give up their schemes for aggrandizement. The *encomenderos* fiercely resisted the attempts of the government to supplant them with *corregidores.* The idea of granting Indians equal rights as vassals of the Crown, trained in Spanish civilization, was good and humane in theory. But it proved a failure, not only because of the *encomenderos'* resistance and the bad behavior of the *corregidores,* who were supposed to guide the Indians into a position of free vassalage, but also because of the slowness of the natives and the endless lawsuits in which they engaged. The government, moreover, began to worry over the loss of revenue from the salaries that had to be paid out under the system.

Shortly after his arrival, Mendoza set out with a ruthless and efficient hand to bring his governmental agencies into discipline and to make the necessary appointments. In central Mexico, or New Spain proper, there were three principal forms of government and jurisdiction. The most important of these were the *gobiernos* under governors nominated by the viceroy and confirmed by the Council of the Indies. The Indian districts independent of rival *encomenderos* were called *corregimientos* under the direction of *corregidores. Alcaldías mayores* were governed by *alcaldes mayores,* while each district had its principal city in charge of an *alcalde,* or mayor, and a *cabildo,* or town council. Mining districts were considered separately and were placed under *alcaldes mayores de minas.*

Mendosa encouraged local Indian government with the election and confirmation of native officials, so that Indians held every type of office. Up to his time considerable confusion had come to prevail over the method of appointing officers, some being named by the missionaries, others by the local military, and so on. "When a *cacique* comes up for election," he wrote to Velasco, "I give orders that, conformable with the traditional custom which has prevailed, the Indians elect and name as *cacique* the person who seems to them most suited for the place. He must be an Indian of good life and reputation, a good Christian, free from vices, and the election must be free."[3] Native rule was successful in some instances, but Spanish control was generally necessary as the Indian *caciques* often proved to be cruel tyrants over their subjects.

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[2] For viceregal powers, cf. Juan de Solórzano, *Politica Indiana* (Antwerp, 1703), lib. V.

Frontier provinces like Yucatán, Cozumel, and Tabasco came under *adelantados*, or governors subject to the viceroy and the *Audiencia* of Mexico, until the formation of the *Audiencia de los Confines*. Nueva Galicia, which was first a province under the command of military governors, came under an *Audiencia* in 1548, with headquarters at Guadalajara, but still subject to the *Audiencia* of Mexico.

Inasmuch as one of his most important duties was that of increasing the royal revenues, Mendoza began to organize the taxation system simultaneously with his visitation of the country and the division of its government. Under the first conquerors, one fifth of the spoils of war went to the Crown. Later, tributes were paid by the Indian tribes as an evidence of vassalage. To these sources of income were added customs duties, fines and confiscations, inheritance taxes, gifts to the King, and offerings for the Bull of the Crusade. The most important source of wealth, however, soon came to be the mines, from which the King's share ranged from one fifth to one tenth of the output.

During the viceroyalty of Mendoza, the most important mines were centered around Mexico City, Taxco, Toluca, Zumpango, Tultepec, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Nueva Galicia. The opening of the famous mines at Zacatecas created a veritable "gold rush" with accompanying disorders that compelled Mendoza to bring the situation under control and place legal restrictions on claims.[4] All gold and silver bullion had to be sent to the smelting house or *casa de fundicion* at Mexico City. There the King's share was taken, and the balance was shipped from Vera Cruz to Europe.

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[3] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 234.

[4] Cf. *Ordenanças hechas por el Sr. Vissorey don Antonio de Mendoça sobre las minas de la Nueva Spaña*, Mexico, January 14, 1550 (Ayer Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago).

Laws to place this procedure on a sound basis were likewise proposed by Mendoza. Metals were officially stamped every week at a meeting of the mine proprietors and government officials, and heavy penalties, consisting of the confiscation of mines and of slaves and banishment, were imposed for evasions of the law. In spite of official preferences and large salaries paid to treasurers and accountants, a great deal of inefficiency and corruption crept into the business of collections, for which Mendoza was later held accountable by the visitor-judge Sandoval. The viceroy required account books and weekly statements, and appointed two members of the *Audiencia* to investigate and reorganize the entire accounting system. At the same time, the tribute lists of the Indian tribes were drawn up for the first time; and payment, which Mendoza reduced to thirty-two reales or four pesos, was strictly required.

From these revenues had to be paid local expenses, the salaries of royal officers, and the tithes of the Church. The balance proceeded by ship to Santo Domingo, where it was placed under convoy as a guard against corsairs and thence was dispatched to Spain.

iii

Of the greatest importance were the contributions of Mendoza to the social organization of Mexico. In a statement issued in 1537, he acknowledged a fundamental difficulty in reconciling the increase of royal revenues with the conversion and protection of the Indians. This dilemma disturbed the best minds of the sixteenth century and brought even the protectors of the Indians into conflict with the complete logic of their own humanitarian principles. The program advocated by Las Casas, if strictly enforced, would undoubtedly have brought immediate ruin to the Spaniards and the loss of the royal revenues.

It was the plan of the Spanish Government to develop a large Spanish population in the New World. Settlers were encouraged; and even churchmen, like Zumárraga and Las Casas, put their hand to this movement. Mendoza gave special grants to encourage matrimony and made it a rule to appoint only married men as *corregidores*. Bachelors were threatened with loss of lands and offices. "In this New Spain," the viceroy pointed out to Velasco, "there are many young girls, daughters of very respected persons. Your Excellency must offer every inducement for their marriage, for this is of the greatest importance in the perpetuation of the land, and therefore very urgent. I have favored marriage in every way that I could, because, besides realizing that this was clearly the service of our Lord, I was given orders to this effect by His Majesty; and to encourage matrimony, I have promised and given various persons special grants and financial assistance. Your Excellency will have to do the same."[5]

Apparently the vast majority of the Spaniards in Mexico were both thrifty and law abiding. Mendoza was quick to recognize their virtues, and he pointed out that they, not the Indians, were the principal source of revenue for the state. "The Spanish people of New Spain," he declared, "are the most easily governed of all that I have ever dealt with. They are more obedient and take more satisfaction in pleasing their authorities, if properly treated; but if they are given offense, the contrary is true, for they respect neither wealth nor persons."[6]

The later policy toward Spanish colonials was far from satisfactory. The conquerors and first settlers became the first upper class, the *gachupines* or spur wearers. Their descendants, Mexican-born Spaniards or creoles, were never fully trusted by Spain and were granted only secondary positions and local power in the government. This odious difference between the Spanish officials and planters and the Mexican creoles, who had, as it were, become naturalized to the New World, was ultimately to lead to revolt and Mexican independence.

So far as the products of the Indians were concerned, Mendoza saw little promise except by a rise in price. "There are three things," he maintained, "from which the Spaniards in this country have derived the greatest profit, but the Indians have developed none of them, namely: the silver mines, because the natives have no knowledge of metals or their use; mulberry leaves for silk worms; and pasturage for sheep. In all these products, everything is ready for the profit of the Spaniards without any loss to the Indians."[7]

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[5] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 235.

[6] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 229, 230.

Nevertheless, the Indians were encouraged to improve the cultivation of native crops, such as maguey, cotton, maize, cacao, and fruits. Until free competition with Spain was forbidden by the monopolies of Seville, nearly every line of industry and agriculture made tremendous steps forward. Wheat, sugar, silk, cattle, and sheep soon became products of the first rank, while the introduction of beasts of burden and machinery contributed notably to spare human energy and life. Mendoza himself was particularly interested in the sheep industry, introducing the merino variety on his ranches and fostering the weaving of woolen cloth.

Under his regime also took place what was perhaps the first experiment in the New World with price fixing by the government. In an attempt to prevent profiteering, legal prices were determined by the *cabildo* of Mexico City, for the necessities of life, for carrying loads, and for the wages of Indians. Payment was made in weights of gold or silver, although the Indians used cacao as a medium of exchange among themselves.

To place money on a sound, governmental basis, the first mint was authorized, on May 11, 1535. The growth of trade and the rapid development of real estate after the discovery of mines and the extension of arable and grazing lands, brought thereafter repeated demands for increased coinage.

The great social and economic problem, of course, lay in the mass of the population, which was Indian. The problem was not, nor is it today, a simple one. Special rights and privileges were accorded those tribes, like the Tlaxcalans, which had shown themselves friendly during the Conquest; and friendly members of the Indian nobility of various tribes were retained in their local rule, treated practically as equals, and even granted knightly privileges.

Below this class among the pure-blooded Indians were the Indian masses, the *macequales* or workers and the *tamemes* or burden carriers — from whom the peons or peasants of today are descended. Large numbers were "free" in the cities or in the *corregimientos;* but generally placed in *encomienda,* they paid a tribute of one or two pesos a year while being granted communal rights to lands.

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[7] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 234.

Mendoza saw also the rise of the Indian castes with reference to mixed blood and color. A considerable number of the Spaniards intermarried with Indian women or lived with them. Miscegenation took place at the same time with Negro slaves. In this way arose the *mestizos* or half-breed classes, which are today dominant in Mexican affairs, the *castizo,* or offspring of a *mestizo* and a Spanish woman, the *morisco,* or child of a mulatto father and Spanish mother, the *salta atras,* or Negro throwback in a white family, the *chino,* or child of a throwback and an Indian woman, and other combinations known as *lobos, zambos,* and *coyotes.* While lacking the power of definite national and social amalgamation, all these groups have been formed in the elements of Spanish culture, under the current trend of *mestizo* dominance.

The character of the Mexican Indian, which has disturbed sociologists ever since, was variously represented to the viceroy as shiftless and untrustworthy by some observers and, by others, as meek, badly treated, and without guile. Mendoza soon learned that neither extreme could be accepted as a true generalization. Each case had to be taken for what it was worth after careful investigation. Every Tuesday and Thursday morning he devoted to a patient hearing of the Indians' complaints. Because of their frequent prevarications, he found himself constantly obliged to guard his judgment until all sides had been heard. "Some persons," he said, "maintain that I make bigger liars out of them because I do not punish them; but I think it would be more prejudicial to make them afraid of coming to me with their troubles, if I refused to give up my time in hearing their childish complaints."[8]

Obliged to cooperate with the *encomienda* system, Mendoza did everything in his power to check the advance of Indian slavery and to enforce humane treatment of the natives. At the same time, while recognizing that abuses had been visited upon the natives, he was aware that both discipline and diplomacy in the new social and economic system required some consideration for the Spanish settlers. Thus, he handled the problem of the *tamemes* by forbidding loads greater than 100 pounds to be given any carrier at a given time and enacted special restrictions for long trips, particularly in the hot regions. In spite of the introduction of horses and mules, he realized that a complete elimination of porterage was impractical and would even work hardship to the Indians. Burden carrying remains an important source of livelihood in Mexico today.

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[8] *Instrucciones cit.,* p. 229.

To insure at least the minimum of justice for workers, he required the Indians to declare whether they had undertaken their labor freely and were receiving satisfactory wages. Employees had to keep records and produce them in cases of dispute. Native bosses, who hired out their subjects, frequently took most of the wages for themselves and silenced the workers, so that, later on, the business of paying the laborers was entrusted to a priest and a local Spanish official.

Special efforts were made to remedy the terrible conditions that prevailed in the mines; and regulations were enacted to protect the Indians in their right to live where they desired. Restrictions were placed likewise on the personal services of the Indians, although Mendoza informed the Council of the Indies, relative to the enforcement of the "New Laws," that these services were an ancient practice in the country and essential to good order. In his own household 120 Indians served him in shifts. Among the charges subsequently brought against him were listed that ten to twelve Indians took his wheat to be ground at least every third day, that twenty-one loads of wood, including five for his guests were required every day, and that his horses consumed eighty loads of hay daily. Mendoza pointed out that only fifteen Indians served him free. The others came voluntarily, and he rewarded them with wheat and clothing. Moreover, the Indians of his household were given instruction, particularly in music and art.

Thrust brusquely into this whole system, the "New Laws," inspired and largely conceived by Las Casas, were undoubtedly one of the greatest embarrassments of Mendoza's rule. The complete text of the laws contained thirty-nine points, which, if enforced, would have freed the Indians, put an end to the *encomienda* system, discouraged further exploration, and, at least in the mind of most of the conquerors, merchants, and landholders, destroyed the Spanish dominion in the New World. Even the three religious orders — the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians — favored the continuance of the *encomiendas* and sent their respective heads back to Spain to show the danger of the "New Laws" to Mexico. The point was that the Spaniards could not get along without Indian labor. A panic was the immediate result of the publication of the decrees, with fear of an Indian revolt, and over 600 settlers left in despair on the first fleet returning to Spain.

While counseling patience and caution on the part both of Tello de Sandoval, who came to publish the Laws, and of the Spanish populace who opposed them, Mendoza saw the inevitable result of their enforcement and threw in his lot, like the members of the *Audiencia*, with the interests of the colonists. "All the provisions made or which could be made," he declared, "would not be a sufficient remedy. Even if His Majesty deprived them of their offices and cut off their heads, he could not make them enforce the laws which destroyed his rents and his vassals and depopulated the country, which needed inhabitants."[9] As a result of all these protests, the provisions of the "New Laws" concerning *encomenderos* were suspended, on October 20, 1545, and the principle of compulsory labor became permanent.

Whatever may be the final judgment of observers on this decision, it was not the intention of either Mendoza, or of the churchmen who sustained him in his opinion, to abandon efforts for the welfare of the natives. Enough has been said to show that quite the contrary was true. Hospitals were established in the various cities, and the viceroy gave every assistance to the religious orders and to individuals like Zumárraga and Pedro de Gante in the education of the Indians. This was the mind of the home government itself.

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[9] Mendoza, *Relacion sobre los servycios personales que facian los Yndios et aquellos provyncias*, Mexico, 1537, cf. Pacheco y Cárdenas, *Colecion de Documentos Inéditos* (Madrid, 1864–1884), XLI, pp. 149, 157, 158.

Thus Mendoza declared, "Her Majesty the Empress several times commanded me to arrange for the care of the *mestizo* children of the Spaniards, since many of them became lost among the Indians. To remedy this situation and fulfill the royal mandate, a school for children has been instituted, not only for waifs, but also for many others whose parents are living, to learn Christian doctrine, reading, writing, and good manners. Likewise a house has been built where little girls of this class may be protected and learn the domestic arts . . . a holy work and necessary for this republic."[10] This was the college of San Juan Letrán.

He provided also for the College of Santa Cruz in Tlatelolco for the instruction of the Indians in the liberal arts — Latin, rhetoric, philosophy, music, and medicine — in which they showed themselves so proficient as to arouse envy. Of the college at Michoacán for Spanish boys and the sons of Indian chieftains, he noted, "Experience has shown the great value that has proceeded and continues to come" from it. With regard to the education of the clergy, he believed that admission to the priesthood ought not to be open to the Indians "until this nation has reached our own stage of civic advancement." Nevertheless he saw the necessity of a creole clergy, and declared, "Until this comes about and the sons of the Spaniards who know the language become priests, we shall never have a perfect Christianity, nor will all Spain be able to make up the deficiency."[11]

In an earnest effort to raise the moral life of the country, Mendoza and Zumárraga again collaborated. Special enactments were made against the sale of pulque and other intoxicating drinks to the natives, in whom Mendoza noticed an excessive addiction, and attempts were made to stop gambling and to close commercial activities on Sundays and feast days. In this collaboration, the viceroy was simply keeping in mind what both his commission and good reason dictated.

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[10] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 229.

[11] *Loc. cit.*, p. 229.

"The principal responsibility," he stated, "which His Majesty has constantly placed upon me has been the Christianity and good treatment of the natives. The means by which I have carried out these injunctions have been the religious orders. In this work they have given me the greatest assistance. Without them, little could be done, and for this reason I have always tried to favor, honor, and love them as the true servants of God and of His Majesty."[12] Mendoza's commendation was not one of blind respect. He recognized that not all the clergy who came to America were worthy of their calling. Referring to the type which had come principally to make a fortune, he remarked, "If it were not for the command of the King and for baptism, the Indians would be better off without them."[13]

The Church at this time was organized into four dioceses, Mexico, Michoacán, Tlaxcala, and Oaxaca, with Guatemala and Nueva Galicia added later. It was supported by grants of Indians, in *encomienda* or on the missions, and by state tithes, from which the natives were exempt. Special expenses like those of hospitals and schools, or churches like the cathedral of Mexico city, were shared by the royal treasury.

iv

Throughout his regime, Mendoza showed himself not merely an administrator of the first rank, but as one bent upon the expansion of the territory of New Spain and the development of means of communication. Roads were opened in every direction from the capital for the accommodation of pack animals and carts. Transportation was thus possible between Mexico to Acapulco, to Oaxaca and thence to the ports of Zacatula and Tehuantepec. Michoacán, Jalisco, and Pánuco were also placed on the lines of travel, with access to the mines at Taxco, Zultepec, and Zumpango. The roads between Mexico City and Vera Cruz were repaired, and resting places were erected for Indian pack carriers along the routes.

Not content with organizing the area already under control, Mendoza now resolved to push on, to pacify the Mayan confederation of Yucatán in the South and to discover what lay in the mysterious regions of the North. Marvelous tales had been circulated about these latter territories, including reports of seven fabulous cities and an Amazon island.

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[12] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 227.
[13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 228.

His two principal rivals in the field of exploration were still Cortés and Guzmán. The latter had penetrated and conquered Jalisco and Sinaloa, within two years after his hasty departure from Mexico City, and had founded the city of Guadalajara in 1531. His discoveries, however, failed to reveal the treasure he had promised; and on his return to Mexico he was arrested and went back in disgrace to Spain in 1538.

Cortés offered a more formidable opposition. When he came back from Spain in 1530, he was in possession of large privileges of exploration and authority in the South Sea, and began at once to make use of them. His first expedition, launched in 1532, succeeded in discovering the Tres Marías Islands, but ended in shipwreck. The following year his lieutenants Bercerra and Grijalva discovered Lower California; but one of their vessels was wrecked, and the other was seized by Guzmán. After an unsuccessful attempt to make a settlement at Santa Cruz in 1534–35, he returned to greet the arrival of Mendoza in the hope of getting better support than he had received from the Second *Audiencia.* In addition to his claims to rights of exploration, he was resolved to advance also as a title of respect his commission as captain general of New Spain.

Mendoza, however, was determined not to acknowledge Cortés as his equal; it was against his orders that Cortés sent Francisco de Ulloa to explore the Gulf of Lower California. The wreck of this expedition brought a subsequent plea for rescue. When the viceroy refused to cooperate, the Conquerer went back on his last journey to Spain, to look for vindication.

Another rival of the viceroy appeared in the person of Pedro de Alvarado, who returned from Spain in 1540 with a fleet of twelve ships, a force of 600 men, and a commission to discover and conquer islands in the Pacific. In this enterprise the viceroy was to have a third interest. Alvarado's needs still further played into Mendoza's hands; and on November 29, 1540, a contract was drawn up between the two men, in which Alvarado was practically placed at the viceroy's disposal. On May 25 of the same year, the Council of the Indies gave Mendoza exclusive right to discovery in the North, and thus he issued supreme in the field of territorial expansion.

As early as 1536, the return of Cabeza de Vaca and his companions across continent, from the tragic expedition of Narváez to Florida in 1528, had given Mendoza a new train of thought. He had acted as host to these survivors for several months, and, inspired by the story of their experiences, applied to the Council of the Indies to explore these new regions. Now provided with the necessary authorization, he appointed Francisco Vásquez de Coronado military governor of Nueva Galicia and sent out an advance party under Fray Marcos de Niza, vice-commissioner general of the Franciscans in New Spain. A Moorish slave, Estevánico, who had accompanied the Cabeza de Vaca group, was engaged to act as scout and arrived as far as the Zuñi pueblo Hawaikuh in western New Mexico. In reprisal for his insolence, Estevánico was later killed by the Indians; but Marcos de Niza followed up, close enough to glimpse the settlement from a distant height, and in an excited mood reported it to be larger than Mexico City itself.

Mendoza, not realizing the exaggerated character of these reports, took every precaution to conceal them from De Soto and other possible claimants to discovery, and now authorized Coronado to organize volunteers for the great expedition. On February 22, 1540, the final review of the forces was held at Compostela. Some 300 Spaniards had been secured, most of them adventurers and floaters from Mexico City, whom Mendoza was pleased to put under occupation, and nearly 1000 Indians. These were accompanied by a baggage train of horses and mules, besides a large caravan of cattle, sheep, and pigs to be killed as needed. The following day, the extraordinary and colorful procession set forth with Mendoza, who accompanied it for two days.

By July 8, Coronado had reached and captured Hawaikuh. About the same time, his lieutenants, Pedro Te Tovar and López de Cárdenas subdued the Moqui pueblos and discovered the Grand Canyon of the Colorado River. Thereafter, vast plains, buffalo herds, and occasional Indian tribes were the only answer to his quest for treasure. The expedition had opened up a realization of the extent of the continent, but once and for all removed the hope of discovering more civilizations like those of the Aztecs and Incas. The seven fabulous cities were never found, and the Gran Quivira of which the Indians spoke turned out to be only a wigwam village of the Wichita Indians in Kansas.

From this farthest point, Coronado turned back, in September, 1541. On the return journey his men became mutinous and disorganized, and he himself carried the injuries of a tournament. With hardly more than 100 men, he arrived in Mexico City on a litter, and "very sad," as one observer declared, "and very weary, completely worn out, and shamefaced came to kiss the hand of the viceroy."[14] This, with the adventure of Hernando de Soto from the other direction, was the last great conquering expedition of the Spaniards. It meant great loss of money and disappointment to Mendoza.

Meanwhile Mendoza had dispatched an expedition by sea in the thought that Coronado's land route would follow the western coast. On May 9, 1540, his chamberlain, Hernando de Alarcón, set out from Acapulco and reached the mouth of the Colorado River, whence he proceeded upstream with two small boats as far as the vicinity of Yuma, without obtaining more than vague reports from the Indians concerning Coronado's men. His explorations, however, proved, among other things, that California was not an island as had been and was even subsequently believed.

The following year Mendoza decided to push these discoveries still farther. With the death of Pedro de Alvarado, the entire fleet came into the possession of the viceroy. Half of the fleet he now placed under the command of Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo, with Bartolomé Ferrelo as chief pilot, and sent it forth from Navidad, on June 27, 1542. By the end of August, Cabrillo entered San Diego Bay, calling it San Miguel.

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[14] Later investigations showed glaring defects in Coronado's administration of Nueva Galicia, particularly in the treatment of Indians in the mines, and in 1544 he was deprived of his office. In 1549 he received an *encomienda* for his services in conquest and discovery.

Then pressing on through the Santa Barbara channel, he proceeded amid storms to San Miguel island and later as far north as Drakes' Bay, without, however, discovering either the Bay of Monterey or the Bay of San Francisco. The following January, Cabrillo died on San Miguel island, and Ferrelo, who assumed command, turned the ships northward once more, to penetrate as far as Rogue River in Oregon. The other half of the fleet, Mendoza sent under Ruy Gómez de Villalobos to make a settlement at Zebú in the Philippines. It is supposed that on this voyage two of the vessels were wrecked on the Hawaiian islands and the two survivors became the founders of the royal family of Hawaii. Unfortunately, the expedition disregarded its charter and settled in territory claimed by the Portuguese, so that the King of Spain gave orders for its revocation. Mendoza, angered at the Portuguese representations, planned to rescue the expedition with the Ferrelo fleet, but on an intervening trip, his ships were seized together with cargo and men in Peru.

v

While these explorations were going on, there flared up a revolt among the Indian natives of the country, known as the Mixton War, of such proportions as seriously to threaten Spanish domination. The problem of maintaining submission and discipline in the great body of workers was one which had kept the Spaniards constantly alert and apprehensive. This extended not only to the Indians, but also to the Negroes and the Moriscos, or Moorish converts to Christianity, who had been brought to Mexico as slaves.

Real danger of insurrection lurked in the ranks of the Negro slaves who were imported, partly at the suggestion of Las Casas, to relieve the Indians in the heavier work of the mines. In 1523, their number was limited to one for every three Spaniards. Nevertheless, a general plot among them was discovered, September 24, 1536, which Mendoza promptly quelled; the leaders were publicly drawn and quartered in the capital as a warning. The viceroy recognized the continued danger, however, and declared, in a letter to the Emperor, December 10, 1537, "that if so small a number of Negroes in this country have dreamed of such an enterprise, the number of Negroes sent here should be curtailed for the present, since a large number of them under similar circumstances could place the country in serious jeopardy of being lost."[15]

He warned his successor to the same effect. "The lack of hands," he declared, "has caused a large number of Negroes to be brought here, and although not in such numbers as at present, they attempted to revolt in this city and twice in the mines. To make certain that this will not happen again, I have issued regulations modelled after those in the Islands [the West Indies]."[16] These forbade Negroes to assemble, carry arms, or be out at night. Velasco himself brought 100 Negro slaves with him when he was appointed viceroy in 1549, and to effect further relief of the Indians, the general number was increased up to 20,000, with further disorders.

The Mixton Revolt, which was strictly one of the Indians, dated back in its causes to the bad treatment dealt the natives by Nuño de Guzmán as governor of Nueva Galicia. A revolt of the tribes near Jocatotlán in 1538 was put down at the cost of the life of his successor, Diego Pérez de la Torre. Coronado was appointed to take his place but so neglected the province during his preparations for the conquest of the North, that it was left in a dangerous condition.

A number of immediate causes have been assigned for the uprising, the principal one being the harshness of the *encomenderos*. In his charges against the viceroy, Tello de Sandoval alleged the abuse of the natives at the hands of Coronado's army, but the latter as well as Mendoza showed that the line of march was definitely outside the zones of revolt. Cortés also accused Mendoza of seizing men and supplies from the already impoverished Indians. Mendoza countered that the real cause was the incitement of the wild, unconquered tribes of the North with their medicine men, from Tepic and Zacatecas, who then aroused the peaceful Indians of Nueva Galicia to a fanatical war on Christianity and the destruction of the Spaniards. Various wonders were promised in the revival of the old gods and practices. As the viceroy put it, "The devil persuaded them that they should take wives as they pleased and not merely one as the friars had taught . . . and they held it for certain that the Indian man or woman who believed in God and not in the devil would die immediately and be eaten by the beasts."[17]

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[15] Cf. Pacheco y Cárdenas, *loc. cit.*, II, p. 209.

[16] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 231.

The first preparations for insurrection certainly developed from the winning of the chieftains of Tlatenango, north of Guadalajara, back to paganism. The tribes infected withdrew to fortified centers, where the ancient bloody rites were renewed and enthusiasm for revolt was kindled. The Spaniards, who were slow to realize what was happening, because of the Indians' duplicity, gradually awoke to the gravity of the situation; and Miguel de Ibarra, visitor and captain of Tlatenango, took the matter in hand. Peace was offered to the revolting Indians, but without avail, and the movement gathered force, with violence against the Spanish families and even against the Negroes throughout the region northwest of Guadalajara.

At this time Mendoza was on a tour of inspection southeast of this center. When news of Ibarra's reverses reached him, he went at once to Guadalajara. His first move was to send Fray Martín de Jesús and the notary Juan León as peace messengers. When their lives were threatened, it was decided to reduce the revolt by force. A meeting of the leading men of the province was called, with Pedro de Alvarado, Cristóbal de Oñate, and Bishop Marroquín of Guatemala, and Oñate was placed in charge of the army. Being advised that the situation would soon be under control, Mendoza returned to Mexico City.

Oñate had underestimated the strength of the natives. In an attack on the stronghold of Mixton, his troops were practically cut to pieces. This was the signal for widespread revolt, and an advance was made against the various Spanish settlements including Guadalajara itself. As soon as Mendoza became appraised of the true state of affairs, he ordered Alvarado to abandon his fleet, which was on the point of departure for new discoveries, and called upon various other captains to proceed at once with men and supplies to the scene of action.

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[17] Cf. *Archivo General de Indias,* 48–1–2/24.

The arrival of Alvarado and his colleague Luís de Castillo, on June 12, 1541, forty-eight hours after they had received orders, and the reinforcements placed at different garrisons, did much to halt the Indian advance. Alvarado, however, was anxious to return to his own enterprises and decided that he would quickly bring the war to an end. Disregarding the more cautious advice of the council, he set out ten days later, with 200 Spanish soldiers and 5000 Indian allies from Michoacán, to dislodge the rebels of Nochistlán.

Poor strategy converted his badly timed attack into a retreat. Retreat turned into rout, made more tragic by the swampy condition of the roads. Alvarado himself was thrown under his horse by the cowardly flight of his secretary, and died from his injuries on July 4. As a result of this defeat, Guadalajara was placed under siege before October by 50,000 Indians; and the Spanish defenders, their women fighting along with the men, had all they could do to hold off the attackers. Mendoza was soon informed of the desperate character the war had assumed, with rumblings of other restive tribes. Gathering together a large army of Spaniards and native allies, he set out in person to bring the enemy to terms.

Last-minute pleas for surrender and peace were scornfully rejected by the natives, and he attacked the heights of Cuiná, where he discovered that human sacrifice and idolatry had been renewed. Vigorous punitive action here had a wholesome effect on other tribes as well, but the viceroy found that further offers of peace on his part simply resulted in contempt by his Indian foes. Nochistlán was subsequently reduced by siege, and the viceroy's forces found themselves confronted by the almost impregnable mountain of Mixton, where the rebellious natives had gathered together in confidence, over 50,000 in number.

There was nothing to do but to lay siege to the place. Three weeks passed with a constant interchange of arrows and artillery, until the defenders began to lose faith in their god Tlatl and deserting warriors of the neighboring tribe at Teul revealed a secret pass to the mountaintop. The fall of this stronghold was the decisive turn in the war. Mountainous districts of the North fought off invasion until the eighteenth century, but this was the last serious threat to Spanish supremacy in Mexico. Mendoza allowed a large number of the rebels to escape and distributed the captives as slaves among his troops. Needless to say, his return to Mexico City was a veritable triumph. By May, 1542, Oñate reported to the viceroy that "the land, praise God, is fine, and I have never seen it better since I have been in it."[18]

It was inevitable that Mendoza should have incurred the hostility of those whose power he had curbed or who had suffered his reprimands in office. In particular, he was called upon to face the wrath of Cortés whose plans for exploration and discovery he had materially thwarted. Thus as a result of the Mixton War he was charged with having enslaved the Indian captives, mutilated others or thrown them to the dogs, and having others shot out from the mouth of cannon. He answered these charges by pointing out that the sentences were passed by Maldonado, not by himself, and executed by Cristóbal Oñate. Then hastening to the defense of these officials, he pointed out that comparatively few Indians had been enslaved, and that this sentence had been passed by order from the home government as preferable to death. The mutilation and stabbing was shown to have taken place in the midst of the conflict. "To throw some of the most guilty Indians to the dogs or have them shot is justifiable as a lesson and warning," he maintained, "for at Granada many renegade Moors were cannonaded or stoned."[19] With regard to punishment, the viceroy was a man of his century, and felt the need of unmistakable action when all attempts at peaceful persuasion had failed.

vi

When Cortés returned to Spain to voice his complaints against Mendoza, he met with scant attention at first. In connection with the framing of the "New Laws," however, he was able to make himself heard and presented an eloquent picture of abuses. "I beg Your Highness to have compassion on that country," he cried, "and on its subjects and natives who have been so faithful to Your Majesty, and to provide a judge of *residencia* for its viceroy and officials with the power of suspending them from office."[20] His testimony was collaborated by thirteen witnesses. Tello de Sandoval was commissioned to publish the "New Laws" and empowered as visitor to make an investigation of Mendoza's regime. At this time Cortés drew up thirty-three charges against the viceroy, which later appeared in the process of Sandoval, and he wrote to his friends in New Spain to testify to the same effect.

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[18] Cf. *Cartas de Indias* (Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid, 1877), p. 255.

[19] *Archivo General de Indias,* 48–1–2/24.

Wastefulness, abuse of the natives, favoritism, and lack of leadership were the principal charges, but the list came to include such matters as an accidental death in the viceroy's palace and the allegation of force in his sister's marriage. Sandoval showed himself prepared to make the most of Cortés' vindictive representations, and, if possible, to turn them to his own advantage.

Possessed of full royal powers and commissioned as Inquisitor of New Spain, with right of vote in the *Audiencia,* the Visitor's office, as A. S. Aiton remarks in his excellent study of Mendoza, amounted to that of a "super-viceroy."[21] Sandoval landed at San Juan de Ulúa, February 12, 1543, and proceeded at once to inspect the mole at Vera Cruz, which Cortés had described as extravagant. From there he continued to Mexico City, where he was given a cold reception by the populace, who had already learned of the "New Laws" he was about to publish. In fact, they had determined to greet him in mourning costume, but were dissuaded by the viceroy. He then put himself to make an exhaustive examination of Mendoza's rule.

Apparently Sandoval hoped to succeed Mendoza in the viceroyalty and seized at every piece of incriminating evidence, which he hastened to send back to Spain without the slightest regard for what might be said on Mendoza's side. His insolence and his deprecating manner toward the latter — even suggesting that he would "send him home on a ship when he pleased" — did not serve to lighten his task or increase his prestige with either the viceroy or the *Audiencia.* Mendoza fully appreciated what was going on and repeatedly complained to Spain about the deal he was getting.

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[20] *Archivo General de Indias,* 48–1–1/23.

[21] A. S. Aiton, *Antonio Mendoza* (Durham, N. C., 1927), p. 162.

On June 21, 1546, Sandoval listed his charges against the viceroy, including those already made by Cortés, and blamed Mendoza not only for the summary punishment of the rebels in the Mixton War but also for having been largely responsible for its origin and growth. Mendoza immediately proceeded with an answer and drew up a list of 309 questions which he submitted for reply to the principal men of the country. The result was a complete vindication of the viceroy, which Sandoval simply ignored.

Meanwhile, in 1545, Mendoza's brother, Bernardino, former captain general of the galleys of Spain, was made president of the Council of the Indies, and Sandoval was ordered back to Spain to make his report. It took three orders to get him to obey, for, as he said, "If I could have stayed another year, I thought I could have rendered much service to His Majesty."[22] When he finally departed, in 1547, there was a feeling of general relief. His attempts to enforce the "New Laws" were ineffective, and his attitude toward the government had caused widespread unrest and dismay.

To defend himself, Mendoza sent two representatives to the Council of the Indies and succeeded in preventing Sandoval, as a prejudiced person, from passing judgment on the evidence gathered. During the proceedings, the visitor was obliged to admit that he had entertained suggestions to remain in Mexico as the president of the *Audiencia.* Examination of the records soon revealed letters against the viceroy which Sandoval had sent to the King even before he had begun his judicial investigations, and Mendoza's defense won the day.

The final period of Mendoza's rule in Mexico was not to see any alleviation in the problems of the country. Disorders arising from the fruitless publication of the "New Laws" and from the Mixton War were joined to a scarcity of labor resulting from war and the smallpox pestilence of 1545 which wiped out hundreds of thousands of natives. A great development of colonization along the northern frontiers contributed to enlarge the labor problem. As a result Negroes were imported in larger numbers, and Indians from the North were illicitly brought into slavery.

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[22] *Archivo General de Indias,* I, 48–2–20/2.

At the same time restive reactions continued to encourage plots among dissatisfied Spanish *encomenderos,* particularly those who insisted upon a permanent title in their grants. Another Negro insurrection was uncovered in 1546, and uprisings of the Indians called for occasional suppression. In all these emergencies Mendoza showed himself quick to act as master of the situation. Thus the Tequipan tribes of Oaxaca were put down in 1548, and the Zapotecans, who had come under the influence of a chieftain claiming to be Quetzalcoatl, were suppressed in 1550. In the North, Querétaro was taken from the wild Chichimecan and Otomi Indians in 1531, and the region was pacified by 1550 with the aid of loyal Indian allies under a native chief, Nicolás de San Luís de Montáñez. For his services, the latter was made a knight of the order of Santiago and a captain general in the army.

Mendoza's health, which was not the best after 1540, now began to give him increasing trouble. After the death of Zumárraga in 1548, he became so weakened that he was unable to handle his official duties. Accordingly on October 30 of the same year he wrote to the King for permission to return to Spain. "It is now fourteen years," he said, "since I left Spain to serve in these parts, and my affairs and finances require this visit; and so I beg Your Highness to send me permission for the necessary time, for, thanks be to God, affairs here have been so well established that there is no need for care of more than ordinary business."[23] Nevertheless, the permission was not forthcoming.

The following year, physical complications forced him to take a complete rest. During this time, his son Francisco took charge of affairs, in place of the *Audiencia.* Mendoza, in accord with popular sentiment, began to entertain the hope of making his office hereditary. The Emperor responded to this suggestion by praising Mendoza as our "very faithful servant," but put an end to the plan by asserting that it would be "a new thing and against the universal custom of these kingdoms."

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[23] *Cartas de Indias cit.,* pp. 253–255.

On July 4, 1549, the answer to his plea for release was granted by the appointment of Luis de Velasco as his successor. Mendoza, however, was destined to die in the service and received, instead of a recall to Spain, a promotion to the viceroyalty of Peru. The home government realized the poor state of his health and instructed Velasco to take the appointment to Peru in case Mendoza's condition obliged him to remain in Mexico.

Velasco arrived in Mexico, November, 1550, and was received in great state at Cholula by Mendoza personally. As a result of their conferences, the latter decided to act on the original orders, and transfer his office to his successor. He remained in the country for some time, giving Velasco the fruit of his experience and writing his notable "Instruction," which has been quoted repeatedly in this chapter and which served as a model for the instructions left by succeeding viceroys.

Mendoza sent his son Francisco to Peru to make a preliminary survey and report. He himself was welcomed at Lima, September 12, 1551, with royal honors. The former viceroy of Mexico was already well known in his new jurisdiction, for in 1547 he had offered military aid to restore the rule of that country to accredited officers after the revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro.

During the short interval allowed him, Mendoza distinguished himself in his new field, as in Mexico, by a solicitude for the natives, but in working slowly through the existing economic system rather than by sudden or revolutionary action. Then a letter of Las Casas to the Dominican provincial of Peru, demanding the enforcement of the already rescinded laws against the personal services of the Indians, threatened to renew all the disorders of 1544 in that country. Against the more moderate counsel of the viceroy, the intimidated *Audiencia* decided to publish again the provisions of the "New Laws" on this matter. Mendoza, who was dying at the time, foresaw the outcome of this procedure and refused to sign the order until he could consult with the king. His death, on the twenty-first of July, 1552, cut short any such possibility.

vii

Final judgment upon the career of Mendoza in Mexico must be based upon the exigencies of his times and the state of his office when he left it. Mendoza could have listened to all the strictures of Las Casas and attempted to put into force all the provisions of the "New Laws." He did, as a matter of fact, show extraordinary patience and consideration toward the great missionary and even with Sandoval, who was attempting to undermine his authority at the same time as he was publishing the "New Laws." But Mendoza chose to do what the American colonists chose to do, namely, retain hold of the New World in the name of the King, and from its poorly defined territories build up a nation, under white leadership.

To say that, as the representative of the King, he was interested only in exploiting the country of its resources, even at the cost of the extermination of the natives, is not true. On the contrary, within the limitations of the *encomienda* system, which was designed to protect as well as to employ a primitive people, he showed every consideration for the Mexican Indians, appointing and confirming them in positions of responsibility where they merited and even absorbing the wild tribes of the North into the nation, according to their capacities.

That he was not without his enemies is simply evidence of the fact that he was a man of decision. As a good governor, he recognized the fact that the age of adventure had ended and that the time had come for centralized action if Spain was to act as a responsible head through its colonies. He left his office in a thoroughly organized and stable condition. The fact that his immediate successors were, like Velasco, able and honest administrators does not in the least dim his glory.

After all the smoke of battle and recrimination has been swept away, perhaps the best judgment is to be derived from what a man can say in his own defense. On June 20, 1544, Mendoza wrote to the King of Spain concerning the charges brought against him by Tello de Sandoval and asked the monarch not to condemn him without hearing what he had to say on his own behalf.

"Nine years have passed," he wrote, "since I came to this country by order of Your Majesty. In this time I have worked and striven to serve God and Your Majesty, so that these people may know Him and that our holy Faith and the Christian religion may be spread, that the natives may be taught good ways of living and civilization. Thanks be to Our Lord, what I have done under your command is well known. Not only have I put the royal treasury in order, although before my time it did not exist, but I have increased the royal revenues to twice what they were, as can be ascertained in the royal ledgers; and it can be verified that I have not taken one cent more than the salary which Your Majesty granted me. This city and beyond, as Your Majesty can learn, have under my government more than tripled in buildings and residents from what they were when I first came to the country.

"Justice has never been so respected or observed within reason as in my time, nor have the Spaniards been so contented and harmonious, and the natives of the land so happy and well treated. In everything, by God's bounty, there has been a notable increase in good and virtuous habits as well as in the tendency of men to establish themselves on the land. In this condition of which I speak, the lawyer Tello de Sandoval has found it, since by orders of Your Majesty he came to examine this royal *Audiencia* and investigate my personal record and the way in which I have carried on the government, in which I have been honored and rewarded.

"I beg Your Majesty to remember that, when you ordered me to come, I asked you to do me the favor of noting that I was going 2000 leagues to serve Your Majesty and, since I should naturally have rivals, that you would not give credit to their charges against me until I had a chance to defend myself. This you promised. I now come to ask this favor, since the time is short, that Your Majesty may not judge me by letters or summary reports, since I already know that many of them contain falsehoods with the intent of denying me credit with Your Majesty in the proper discharge of your affairs."[24]

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[24] *Carta* in *Instrucciones cit.*, pp. 240, 241.

The King did not forget his promise; and to Mendoza may well go the credit, both by official recognition and by the testimony of history, of having laid the solid foundations of colonial Mexico.

CHAPTER VII

Count Revilla Gigedo II

FIFTY-THIRD VICEROY OF NEW SPAIN

i

Of the sixty-three viceroys who guided the destinies of New Spain from the time of Mendoza to the wars of independence, few equaled the vision and public-spirited energy of the second Count de Revilla Gigedo.[1] Born Juan Vicente de Güemez Pacheco Horcasitas y Aguayo, in 1740, in Havana, Cuba, where his father had been captain general, he returned to Spain in his youth and distinguished himself in the royal army, particularly as lieutenant colonel during the siege of Gibraltar, defended by the British (1779–1783). His father was advanced from Cuba to the viceroyalty of Mexico in 1746 and held office until 1755. Although the latter had enriched himself in speculative enterprises and was known as "Don Juan Tobago," because of his illicit engagement in the Havana tobacco trade, he commanded respect because of his efficient administration and personal valor.

Juan Vicente, who served as captain of the viceregal guard under his father and inherited the latter's title of nobility, was appointed to the viceroyalty, succeeding Manuel Antonio Flórez. He arrived at Vera Cruz, October 8, 1789, and assumed office at Guadalupe, October 16. Hardly had he installed himself in the palace, when report was brought of the murder and robbery of a household of eleven persons. Revilla Gigedo gave the first evidences of his energy in the case, apprehending the guilty parties and securing their conviction, with decapitation, in thirteen days. From this incident dated the attaching of the title *justitiae vindex* – vindicator of justice – to his portraits. On December 27, the coronation of Charles IV was proclaimed with the greatest solemnity, and he threw himself into the work of administration and reform.

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[1] Cf. Lillian Estelle Fisher, *Viceregal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies* (Berkeley, 1926), p. 4.

The New Spain which he was called to govern had now seen some 250 years of development and represented a far larger territory than the first conquerors had dared to dream of. The expeditions of conquest and expansion which had been carried on by Viceroy Mendoza were supplemented by a considerable expansion along the North during the final years of the sixteenth century. New Mexico was conquered by Juan de Oñate, and Santa Fe was founded in 1609. Although the Puebla Indians subsequently revolted, they were pacified, so that the reconquest was completed by 1696.

Along the Gulf of California and in the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa, the settlement of the Indians was achieved principally by the Jesuits, who, until their expulsion, had come to exercise a missionary influence comparable with that of the early Franciscans.[2] They were given exclusive colonizing rights in Lower California, similar to those which Las Casas had asked for in Guatemala, and succeeded in creating a veritable Jesuit republic among the Indians like the establishments in Paraguay. Their removal in 1767, of course, put an end to all this activity. Upper California still remained an indefinite territory, but by 1700 the Spanish flag had reached the line of the Colorado River.

The occupation of Texas was undertaken largely to offset the reported advances of the French down from the North. Missions were established in eastern Texas as early as 1690, and although these were abandoned three years later, a new and permanent chain was begun by the Franciscan Fathers in 1716. To offset the extension of the Russians down from the Behring Strait and the Northwest, a systematic settling of California was then begun. San Diego Bay was occupied in 1768, and that of Monterey, in 1770. In 1776, San Francisco was established and fortified, and the explorer Juan Pérez penetrated as far north as Nootka Sound. In 1790, Revilla Gigedo sent Francisco Eliza to fortify the colony at this point.

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[2] Cf. Jerome V. Jacobsen, S.J., *Educational Foundations of the Jesuits in Sixteenth Century New Spain* (Berkeley, 1938).

A number of elements contributed to halt the extension of Spanish frontiers in the New World. One of the most important was the rise of the colonial power of England and the increasing piratical aggression of English ships against Spanish commerce. Continuing to hold Gibraltar and the island of Minorca in the Mediterranean, England proceeded to impede the fishing rights which Spain claimed off the banks of Newfoundland and to establish logwood camps at Honduras, in the very heart of Spain's New World empire. When the Spaniards were deserted by their French allies at the end of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), they were obliged to relinquish all their territory in North America east of the Mississippi as well as their Newfoundland claims. France transferred Louisiana to Spain, but this region, bounding the American holdings of England, simply perpetuated the old rivalry and conflict. When Spain was practically forced to return Louisiana to France, in 1800, France promised never to transfer the territory to any power besides Spain. In 1803, however, Louisiana was sold to the United States.

When the American colonies revolted against England, Spain seized the opportunity of embarrassing its old enemy by secretly supplying munitions and money to the revolutionists, even before France sent over men in 1778. This action brought about a formal declaration of war, when England refused the offer of Charles III to mediate; but, apart from the military campaigns of Bernardo de Gálvez in Florida and the lower Mississippi, Spain's action on the field of battle was of comparatively small consequence. Peace in 1783 brought certain temporary advantages to Spain, but the establishment of independence and democracy in the United States was later to have the most important repercussions, both in the loss of Mexico to the mother country and in the future career of Mexican independence. By 1790, Spain had to grant England important rights in trading with Spanish settlers and in founding settlements; and the era of Spanish enlargement came to an end.

When Revilla Gigedo came into office, he immediately recognized that Spain was not equipped to dislodge the Russians, who had made settlements practically as far southward as Nootka, and he even believed the ceding of that point to the

English advisable. In his exhaustive report on the Department of San Blas and the Californias, he commended Viceroy Bucareli for the occupation of Upper California, but he definitely expressed himself as opposed to further conquest in this direction. "From now on," he declared, "there ought to be an end of such projects as compel us to incur heavy expenses, even if they may be recommended with the most positive assurances of advantageous results, for it is always understood that these results are to be in the future, whereas the expenditures have to come out in cash from a treasury which has a maximum of urgent matters requiring attention and which is constantly under a strain on account of its considerable debts. Once its funds and those of the money-lenders are exhausted, the projects cannot be sustained, their advantages will disappear, the return of the sums expended will be difficult, and perhaps it may be necessary to incur still greater outlays, with the almost self-evident risk of their being yet more fruitless. In the course of twenty-five years many millions of dollars have been consumed in founding and maintaining the new establishments of Alta California, in repeated explorations of its northern coasts, in the Department of San Blas, and in the occupation of the port of Nootka. But if we engage in other yet more distant and venturesome enterprises, there will be no funds left with which to sustain those we have already taken upon ourselves."[3]

ii

To defend this enormous area, bounded by the commandancy general as far north as Nootka and ranging from the Caribbean possessions to the Falkland Islands and Tahiti, Spain was obliged to create a large colonial army. Thus, while English ambitions were being stemmed, the way was paved unwittingly for the armies of independence in New Spain. There can be no doubt, moreover, that the militarizing of New Spain, from about the year 1765, was one of causes of the demoralization of the country and gave rise to the swarm of civil wars and social woes that plagued and ruined the nineteenth century. Up to this time, an army of less than 3000 native soldiers had sufficed to maintain order and garrison the frontiers.

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[3] Tr. in *Land of Sunshine* (Los Angeles), XI, p. 229, Sept., 1899.

On November 1, 1765, Lieutenant-general Juan de Villalba arrived from Europe to whip the army into shape. He was accompanied by various officials and 2000 Walloon and Swiss soldiers. "Then," according to an observer, "the inhabitants began to leave the hearth of the citizen to enter into the camp; they began to cease being a people, to become soldiers and to feel themselves as belonging to a distinct, privileged, and superior class, on whose judgment depended social tranquillity, political instruction, and administrative development. The organization and armaments soon gave the army a consciousness of its force and, with this, the security of its power; from this moment the destinies of the colony, and later those of the Mexican Republic, remained at the mercy of the army. Henceforth, the people were to be powerless to shake off the yoke of armed force."[4] It was a matter of common observance that the European soldiers and their officers fell into an indolent and arrogant way of living almost as soon as they reached Mexico, and their vices were soon copied by the lower classes, with considerable social detriment.

In 1778 a plan for placing the army on a basis of organized efficiency was presented by the subinspector Crespo, and the entire force was to number about 35,000 men. Revilla Gigedo protested that this would be too expensive and proposed another plan, which was adopted, saving the treasury nearly 240,000 pesos, but reducing the total force to 20,000 men. He was, in general, opposed to an indefinite expansion of native forces, pointing out by the census that this would take men from peaceful occupations. Moreover, he was not impressed by the military caliber of the Mexicans and preferred to place reliance, in cases of necessity, upon troops from Europe to fight off foreign invaders. The natural difficulties involved in any attempt to conquer Mexico he believed were so great that with small aid it could defend itself. Hence he preferred the policy of developing internal prosperity and loyalty toward Spain.

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[4] Quoted in Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), tomo IV, p. 389.

Even so, he found himself obliged to look to the national defenses, and on August 25, 1790, he drew up regulations for guarding the coasts of Vera Cruz. By 1793, these were fortified in four divisions. In the harbor of Vera Cruz loomed the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, protected by 3000 pieces. The interior fort of Perote served as a rallying place between Vera Cruz and Mexico City. Five divisions of defense were organized on the south and western coasts, while the fort of San Diego at Acapulco protected the main line of commerce on the Pacific. To subsidize these points as well as the far-flung line of presidios that guarded the frontiers of New Spain, Revilla Gigedo had to appropriate 3,400,000 pesos, although only 1,500,000 pesos were assigned for maintenance of the government.

His successor, Viceroy Branciforte, believed that these forces were too small, particularly in case of an uprising, and reorganized the provincial militias which Revilla Gigedo had disbanded, creating a total force of over 31,000 men. Indeed, Revilla Gigedo's policies relative to the army served as one of the sorest points of attack by his enemies and were one of the principal causes of his removal before the last year of his term of office. In reply to the official demands for more and more armaments, he maintained: "That authority which is commonly believed to reside in the viceroy, to enable him to secure peace and good order in these dominions, would have produced much better results if it had extended to all branches of the government as well as the military, and this is proved by the amount of progress and reform in the time of my command in the army and in the great economies secured in the reforms of the militia, in contrast with the slight progress secured in the administration of justice and the political side of the government."[5]

iii

It will be recalled that in 1534 Mexico was governed through four provinces, to which were later added those of Nueva Galicia and Pánuco. The *Audiencia*, or Supreme Court, of Mexico, organized in 1528, was supplemented by that of Guatemala, known as the *Audiencia de los Confines,* in 1543, and by that of Guadalajara, for the West, in 1548. During the term of the second Velasco (1590–1595), the power of the viceroys began to be limited by that of the *Audiencia,* and thus the latter body served, not only as the final court of justice, but also as regional organizer of judical boards and as assessor, although the Council of the Indies remained the final court of appeal.

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[5] *Instruccion Reservada del Conde de Revilla Gigedo* (Mexico, 1831).

A number of important changes and reforms took place in New Spain as a result of the recommendations made in 1768 by José de Gálvez, who made an official visitation of the country.[6] Of primary importance was the establishment of a new system which divided the viceroyalty, in 1786, into 12 intendancies and 3 provincias. The intendants and their delegates, who were Spanish born, were made responsible for many departments of government formerly under the direct control of the viceroy, notably in collecting revenues, administering justice, and organizing the economic structure of the country. In addition, a commandancy general was established for the North, on Gálvez's recommendation, to withstand aggressions of the English, Russians, and French as well as of hostile Indian tribes. In 1772, a boundary line of forts was established from the Western coast to the Gulf of Mexico to hold in check the rebellious Indian tribes, particularly of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua.

After the death of Gálvez, in 1787, the provisions of the intendancy system which had removed the power of the viceroy over finances were modified, and as a result Revilla Gigedo was enabled to work with more freedom. Thus, in 1788 the superintendancy general of the treasury was restored to the viceroy. By a decree of December 2, 1794, he was given supervision of all public works, like roads and bridges. Nevertheless, while urging that the system of intendancies should be continued, Revilla Gigedo was one of its leading critics. A centralist in principle, he believed that the intendants should be directly subordinate to the viceroy in all affairs and should await his approval and confirmation. Moreover, he maintained that 12 intendancies were not enough for the territory, that sufficient allowances were not made for different types of districts, and that inferior men had been appointed to offices which required extraordinary qualifications.

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[6] Cf. H. I. Priestley, *José de Gálvez: Visitor-General of New Spain* (Berkeley, 1916).

Of equal consequence, in the plan of Gálvez, was the abandonment of Spanish commercial monopolies and the establishment of a limited free trade for the colonies. This gave rise to a wider spread of productive enterprise and a new period of prosperity. Later European wars resulted in an increased demand for revenues, and this beneficial system was again revoked. Revilla Gigedo himself was imbued with the idea that colonial industries should not compete with those of the mother country, but he realized that governmental attempts to crush all initiative along this line were bound to be both ineffective and disastrous. "There are many persons," he reported, "who are unable to devote themselves to agriculture, and many more who cannot work in the mines where so much physical strength and robustness are required, and it is necessary to leave some form of industry to these people so that they can exist, without which the severest and harshest penalties and prohibition are insufficient, because the simple necessity of living forces these people to contravene the law. The one means of destroying the manufactures of this realm is to bring from Spain the same or equivalent products at a lower price. That is what has happened to the great silk corporation and industry which manufactured all kinds of silk textiles and of which there remains scarcely a memory."[7]

To state that Spain maintained a constant policy of discouraging or curbing manufactures or industrial enterprise in the colonies would not be true. Rather it was the intermittency of royal orders to destroy particularly textile factories that caused uncertainty and discontent. The raising of silk, which had been encouraged by Cortés and the early monarchs, was ended by royal decree in 1679 under pressure from the Andalusian silk growers. Revilla Gigedo tried to revive interest in the more elementary preparation of silk but was unsuccessful. He also recommended new branches of commerce by export of various raw materials and the development of native handiwork, including spinning.

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[7] *Instruccion cit.*

The fact is that, although under difficulties, considerable vitality was shown by industry in New Spain. There were 43 cloth factories at Puebla in 1794. Valladolid had 34 mills for making coarse woolen materials. In the intendancy of Oaxaca, there were 2 factories of indigo, 500 looms for rebosos or shawls of cotton, and 7 for silk. By 1802, Puebla gave occupation to 1200 cotton workers, while over 5000 persons worked in the cigar factories of Mexico City.[8] Industry was organized under the medieval guild system, with apprentices and master workers, largely responsible for the excellence of the work produced during the colonial era. The guilds were under municipal control and had their religious counterparts in the *cofradías* or pious brotherhoods. By the seventeenth century there were over 100 guilds in Mexico City alone, although Indians and Negroes were debarred from membership in these organizations.

Nevertheless, the colony was obliged to depend principally upon the development of its natural resources. Agricultural progress was slow, owing to the lack of laborers, a situation which gave rise to the development of enormous estates or *latifundias*. The *encomienda* system was gradually modified, many of these estates being abolished by law or reverting to the Crown. The Indians, however, retained their *ejidos* or communal lands, until they were broken up and sold by Juárez, Lerdo, and Díaz under the decrees of 1856 and later.

Frequent crop failures were in part responsible for the retarding of population, although the Spaniards tried to remedy this by establishing granaries. Nevertheless, Humboldt estimated the value of the agricultural products at the end of the eighteenth century at 30,000,000 pesos, and pointed out that in the year 1800 Mexico was not only self-supporting but was exporting annually its surplus. Wheat, introduced by the Spaniards, remained the important staple, although pulque, an intoxicating liquor made by the Indians from the maguey, a variety of cactus, continued to be a leading agricultural product.[9]

Legislation protecting the mining industry was codified in

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[8] Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo Politico sobre el Reino de Nueva España,* lib. V, cap. 12, and *passim.*

[9] Cf. Humboldt, *loc. cit.,* lib. IV, caps. 9, 10.

1680, but since this favored large operators, it resulted in great riches for a minority. During this era fabulous fortunes were made, like that of the Frenchman Borda who came to Mexico in 1716 and developed silver mines in Zacatecas, Tlalpujahua (Michoacán), and Taxco. From the tithes and offerings of these men were constructed the magnificent churches, monastic institutions, and mansions of the era. It was not until 1782 that the miner's guild was given government protection and the price of quicksilver was brought within the reach of smaller operators. The mining industry is still a national problem, inasmuch as many of the owners are absentees or foreign corporations.

Relative to labor in the mines during the later viceregal era, Humboldt, whose investigations are generally free from bias, declared: "In the kingdom of New Spain, at least for the past thirty or forty years, the work in the mines is done by free labor; notwithstanding that one well-known author, Robertson, has asserted to the contrary, there is no trace of forced labor. In no country do the common people enjoy more fully the fruit of their labor than in the mines of Mexico; there is no law whatsoever that forces the Indian to embrace this class of labor, or to accept the work in one mine in preference to that in another; if the Indian is discontented with the owner of one mine, he pays him his respects and offers his services to another, who pays better wages or pays in cash."[10]

During the viceregal era, the principal avenue of trade was between the port of Acapulco on the Pacific and Manila, which served as a depot for the Orient. Rich galleons arriving at Acapulco distributed their cargo between New Spain and Peru. A constant source of annoyance and loss, however, were the Dutch and English pirates. Secondary to this commerce, was trade with Spain, likewise imperiled by corsairs of the same nations. It was exasperation with this constant molestation that led Spain to launch the fatal expedition of the Great Armada against England.

One of the reasons why Spain did not occupy the leading place in trade with its rich colony was that the mother country imposed excessive protective duties upon imports and exports. A ban was placed against non-Spanish ships in Spanish ports; nevertheless, the colonists bought contraband, and much more cheaply, from Dutch and English traders. Customhouses were established at Acapulco and Vera Cruz in 1646, but this simply increased and organized contraband trade, to the enrichment of the grafters' rings in these ports.

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[10] Humboldt, *loc. cit.*, lib. IV, cap. 11.

In general, the viceroyalty of New Spain reflected the fortunes of Spain's European power, and since the latter was seriously challenged by a long series of expensive wars, the colony was called upon to contribute generously to the treasury. From the beginning, the theory was that the colony existed for the benefit of the mother country. Hence, taxes were imposed in accordance with the immediate needs of the crown. By the end of the colonial period, there were sixty kinds of taxes; and, while the annual revenues between 1522 and 1804 averaged almost 7,000,000 pesos, the collections in later years amounted to over 20,000,000 pesos.[11]

The Indians, when not under military service, paid a tribute of from one to two pesos a year, partly discharged in personal services. Negroes paid double this rate. Miners paid the *quinto,* amounting to one tenth, on all metals mined. Late in the eighteenth century the tax on gold was levied at the rate of 3 per cent, that on silver, at 11 per cent. The hated *alcabala,* or sales tax, was levied on practically everything, from the year 1575. It began at 2 per cent, but during the wars of the eighteenth century ran up as high as 14 per cent. Indians were exempt from this tax, as were churches and churchmen except when engaged in gainful occupations. A transportation tax was assigned for the maintainence of roads. The *almojarifazgo,* or import and export tax, was begun in 1522 at 7½ per cent. It was paid on goods, first when entering or leaving Spain and again when entering or leaving Mexico. The officials and merchants of Vera Cruz managed to defeat this tax in a large measure by organizing a ring, which came to be known as the "Vera Cruz Pig."

Other sources of revenue were government monopolies on salt, tobacco, gunpowder, quicksilver, ice, playing cards, and even cockfighting. "The extraordinary attachment of the inhabitants of this realm for cockfights," declared Revilla Gigedo in his *Instruccion*, "has given this diversion the proportions of a formal establishment, with a revenue to the royal treasury of not less than 50,000 pesos, excluding the costs of administration of the tax." The Church was also generously taxed for the expenses of the state. Tithes were paid to the king, and the surplus which was not used for Church necessities went into the royal treasury. The salaries of ecclesiastics were taxed, and the sums derived from the preaching of the Santa Cruzada or Crusade Bull likewise went into the coffers of the state.

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[11] Of this latter sum, 6,000,000 pesos was sent to Europe. Cf. Humboldt, *loc. cit.,* lib. VI, cap. 13.

Nevertheless, the treasury lacked what might be called systematic development. The mint, which was established and leased out in 1535, was restored to the government in 1730. Revilla Gigedo put himself to the task of systematizing expenditures and receipts and notably increased coinage. Moreover, he ordered the compilation of an important *General History of the Royal Treasury* by Fonseca, Fabian, and Carlos Urratia. The treasury, which was free from deficit in 1673, was bankrupt in 1716. Branciforte complained that it was empty in 1794, at the end of Revilla Gigedo's rule, although he seemed to have no difficulty in improving the situation rapidly upon his own accession, both for himself and for the government. The later wars of Mexican independence and the century of civil strife that followed were destined to ruin, not only the treasury itself, but the sources of income that had been sufficient to maintain the viceroyalty.

iv

The energies of Revilla Gigedo were by no means consumed with the problems of military defense and of taxation. Perhaps it was in the field of public improvements that he showed his greatest zeal. "It was most necessary," he wrote, "for works of these and other kinds, and to carry them through with complete information, that there be engineers in these dominions for that particular object. With this in mind, I asked that there be sent over, knowing their lack, two engineers of ability and industry in the work, to prepare a topographical map of the country." Both for national defense and commerce, he realized the urgent need of better highways, and began a road, in 1793, from Mexico City to Toluca, which was known as the granary of Mexico. He laid plans also for roads to Acapulco, Vera Cruz, and Tampico, from the capital; but these were not realized during his time. Lack of resources, in population and money, as well as the inefficiency of local governments, combined with engineering difficulties to block his larger dreams.

He was himself opposed to a projected road from Louisiana through Texas to Mexico City as dangerous to Spanish security from the colonists of the northern countries. Because of "suspicion with which it is necessary to regard the American colonies, those our neighbors of that territory, and even the inhabitants of New Orleans," he thought such developments unwise; and he even recommended the abandonment of the town of Nacogdoches for the same reason.

"Much more advantageous than the roads," he maintained, "would be the construction of canals, or rendering navigable certain rivers, which could be accomplished at slight cost." With this conviction, he projected a waterway between Mexico City and Vera Cruz, but this was not carried through because of the diversion of revenues to subsidize Spain's wars in Europe. It is to Spain's credit, however, and particularly due to its viceroy, that plans should be made for such wide public improvements, to be executed when peace, population, and trade should justify and permit the expenditures.

He was more successful in seeing the completion of his plans for improvements in Mexico City. Bustamante has described the city at this time as "a cesspool, filthy and pestiferous, with its center in the principal square." In view of the many magnificent buildings of this era and the culture, at least of its leading citizens, such a statement is an obvious exaggeration. The sanitary conditions of the capital were about the same as those of the European centers at the same time. On the other hand, there were a number of special problems that the city had to face.

At the time of the Spanish invasion, Tenochtitlán consisted of a number of islands in a lake. The sluices were later filled from the debris of the ruined Aztec strongholds, but repeated floodings rendered some form of artificial drainage necessary. Plans were submitted, by Enrico Martínez, a Dutch engineer, and the Jesuit Father Juan Sánchez, to divert the waters from the Cuauhtitlán River by canal to Huehuetoca. Thence a tunnel over one league long led to a canal to the Tula River. This canal was completed May 15, 1608. The real solution of the problem was not reached until the era of Porfirio Díaz; but in the meantime this scheme served its purpose. The canal, according to Revilla Gigedo, was "always and of right order ought to be one of the principal cares of the viceroys, as upon that depends the freedom of this capital from a contagion as fearful as that of the inundations, and for which purpose there have been assigned sufficient funds derived from the three taxes which yield 20,000 pesos annually."

Among other health measures, he improved the water supply, which had been badly neglected, ordered economy in its use, placed lead conduits along the sides of the streets instead of in the middle as formerly, and improved the ten public fountains for economy and sanitation. Employees of the government were forced to dress properly, and in one year 10,000 workmen of the tobacco factory and other government shops and industries were compelled to wear suitable clothing instead of the single garment which previously served all purposes for a large proportion of the inhabitants. Cemeteries were removed to outside the cities, and it was forbidden to sell for wear the garments of the dead. In 1792, he ordered all dogs in the capital to be killed, because they had become either a public nuisance or a source of contagion. In this work of sanitation he was assisted by a protomedico or government health officer who examined and licensed physicians and drew up hygienic ordinances, particularly with the object of reducing epidemics.

To improve the general appearance of the city and lay out a plan for its future beautification, he ordered that the sheds which had been placed in front of the doors of houses and upon the balconies should be removed and that in the future no building should be erected without a corresponding license to insure its proper construction and appropriate character. Only a few of the streets had been paved, namely, those of Palma, Coliseo, and San Francisco, and even this work had been abandoned for lack of funds. With 100,000 pesos which he appropriated from the funds for drainage and 50,000 pesos advanced by the department of commerce, he ordered this work resumed and succeeded in paving practically all the streets, besides providing proper drains and fill-ins for water. At the same time, he organized patrols and night watchmen for the city, a matter which had apparently been neglected up to his term of office.

The streets of the Alameda and the Paseo de Bucareli were reconstructed during his time, and the highways of San Cosme, la Veronica, and la Piedad were formed, in addition to the road of Tacubaya and Tlalnepantla and a number of streets in the suburb of San Augustin de las Cuevas. He completed the project of the botanical gardens, which he established in Chapultepec. And thus, he may be given much of the credit for laying out the capital in the form in which it finds itself today.[12]

For public security, he had the city council make provision for a system of street lighting by oil lamps, at public expense and under public administration. He also provided fire pumps to protect the tobacco factory, mint, and other important buildings, and drafted a list of rules for fighting fires and protecting property. The market places, which had been violating every rule of cleanliness, he insisted should be put into orderly stalls, with a notable reduction of crime and disputes and an increase of revenues.

His summary treatment of criminals and unjust officials had a similarly salutary effect. He removed the governor of Texas from office because that official killed five friendly Indians who had come to visit him, and he considerably reduced violence in the capital. Viceroy Croix (1766–1771) estimated that from 800 to 1000 murders took place every year in Mexico City, although this figure seems hardly credible.

A good deal of social disorder was, and still is, due to the excessive use of pulque. That this liquor constituted a problem of some concern to the government can be seen from the fact that as early as 1663 the king ordered an investigation to determine whether it was detrimental to the health of the Indians. An official report the following year replied that it was not. Nevertheless, in the capital pulque shops were reduced to 36, of which 24 were reserved for men and 12 for women. Viceroy Gálvez (1688–1696) forbade its sale, but it was again permitted on the market in 1697.

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[12] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *Disertaciones* (Mexico, 1844), 8, 9; also Donald E. Smith, *The Viceroy of New Spain* (Berkeley, 1914).

Revilla Gigedo the elder, who dealt extensively with the problem, believed that the source of the difficulty lay in the laziness of the natives or in the "evil propensities of the lower classes, a numerous and obstinate mass of debased and uncivil folk, generally of bad inclinations, for this capital is a cave, a woods, or a refuge of every kind of vicious vagabond there is in the realm." Consequently, he added, "the vices of robbery and drunkenness are dominant."[13]

After reporting on the evils of chinguirito, a drink distilled from honey, the same viceroy declared that "a much more abundant material of intoxication is the drink of white pulque, which is extracted from a plant called maguey, drawn in a cavity made in the heart of the shoot of the young plant, and fermented in leathern containers. Although this drink is permitted as a wine of the region and is approved and esteemed as a medicine, it is vitiated and fortified with various herbs to make it more palatable for the Indians, among whom it is distributed with such abuse that they spend more in getting drunk than in providing for their clothing or natural sustenance. Since its use has been extended, not only among the mulattoes and other castes, but also among many Spaniards, it has become an article of principal consumption and provides for the royal treasury a revenue as high as 128,000 pesos, as in the year just ended, here in the city alone. I find that it has been sold under various conditions, some of them excluding even ordinary justice. This is the reason for the abominable scandals of the drunkards and of the pulque shops, which have come to the attention of Your Majesty, and your Catholic zeal seeks the remedy of such evil."

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[13] *Instrucciones que los Vireyes de Nueva España Dejaron a sus Sucesores* (Mexico, 1867), pp. 8–10.

He admitted that it was impossible ever to extirpate entirely a vice such as this, known in all nations, but, he declared, "this is no reason why all possible means should not be used to restrict the public evil, particularly among Catholics, whose governors have the indubitable obligation of reducing sins of scandal." For this purpose, commissions were established to regulate so far as possible the taverns where the drink was sold.

Revilla Gigedo, the younger, found himself confronted with the same problem and ordered the closing down of the large taverns. He ordered, moreover, that lunches should not be sold in liquor shops and that steps should be taken to prevent the taverns from becoming places of reunion for thieves and drunkards. The beneficence of his project, however, can hardly be said to have effected any radical reform.

The population of the capital, according to the census which Revilla Gigedo took in 1790, was 113,000 persons, although there were 1,500,000 in the intendencia and about 3,500,000 in the entire country.[14] Cortés reported 30,000 in the city, in 1524. The historian Gomara reported 2000 Spanish settlers there by the middle of the sixteenth century. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Humboldt estimated the population at 137,000, of whom 2500 were Europeans, 65,000 creoles, 33,000 Indians, 26,500 *mestizos,* and 10,000 mulattoes. Commenting upon the latter era, Riva Palacio declared the population of the entire country to be 8,000,000, of whom 1,000,000 were white and of these only 20,000 were European born. Besides these groups, there were about 6000 Negro slaves in 1793, principally in the plantations along the coasts.

In his report of 1755, the elder Revilla Gigedo made a clear distinction between the whites and the Indian castes, praising the former in terms which recall the judgment of Mendoza but allowing scant admiration for the lower classes. "The majority of the inhabitants of this dominion," he wrote, "are pacified Indians brought together in villages under ecclesiastical and royal supervision committed to the pastors and alcaldes mayores.

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[14] According to the detailed census rendered by the *intendentes* and governors in 1793, the population totaled 4,483,569.

Next are the Negroes, mulattoes, *mestizos*, and other castes, scattered through the cities, villages, and plantations. The smallest number is composed of those who call themselves Spaniards, a common and generic name applied both to those who come from Europe and their descendants who were born in this country and are known by the special denomination of creoles. The diversity of these castes can be seen in this city, which is composed of all kinds in addition to some foreigners. Although the lower classes are mean and vicious, they are so cowardly that a few soldiers are sufficient in the large public gatherings to prevent disorders and excesses. But neither among them nor among the white and distinguished element has there been, in my time, any tumult or uprising that might have disturbed the public peace or caused any suspicion of disloyalty. On the contrary, repeated experiences have convinced me that force should be employed only when the extremes of forbearance have been reached, since particularly the higher classes are docile and amenable to the rule of the viceroy and have a deep respect for authority."[15]

Not all of the viceroys were able to report such perfect docility. Besides various Negro and Indian uprisings, may be mentioned the plot of the Ávila brothers, under Martin Cortés, son of the Conqueror, who agitated against the dissolution of the *encomiendas* and laid plans for the independence of New Spain. The sixteenth viceroy, the Marqués of Cadereita (1635–1640), likewise was faced with a threatened uprising of creoles and *mestizos* bent on independence. Revilla Gigedo the second, was harassed by obstinate officials; but this attitude did not reflect public opinion, and in general it might be said that not until Spain itself became disrupted by the Napoleonic wars did New Spain ardently desire independence from the mother country or seriously challenge the authority of the viceroy.

v

One of the most important offices which were inherited by the viceroys from the time of Mendoza and which Revilla

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[15] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 6.

Gigedo exercised with considerable judgment was that of vice-patron of the Church, consisting in the official nomination of ecclesiastical officials, from archbishops and bishops to parish priests.[16] Lists of eligible names, of course, were offered to the viceroy by competent Church bodies. Referring to this privilege which resided in the Spanish monarchs, as "the richest jewel in the royal diadem," Revilla Gigedo declared: "The functions of the royal patronage which the viceroy exercises as vice-patron are those which most exalt the authority of that office, not so much by the direct authority which they give to the government, as by the indirect influence which is conferred upon the person who rules in the churches and by the ecclesiastics who were always an object of veneration among the peoples of all nations."

In the course of 250 years of intimate union between the Church and the State, it was inevitable that there should be occasions of dispute. Nevertheless, a remarkable harmony was the general rule. "In nothing else," wrote the same viceroy, referring to the administration of the tithes, "has there been better evidence of the generosity, piety, and religious spirit of our sovereigns than in the use which they made of this large donation, all of which and more, they have employed in the building and endowment of the beautiful temples which now stand in these realms and in the propagation of the faith, and the teaching of that doctrine to the Indians."

His successor was able to pay a similar compliment to the bishops, as "adorned with the same admirable qualities and . . . resplendent virtues . . . corresponding to the holy cathedral churches and Royal College of Guadalupe, well served by distinguished, cultured, and exemplary priests, dedicated to the fulfillment of their sacred offices . . . with that decorum, propriety, and apostolic zeal and magnificence which induced true sentiments of religion and piety into the hearts of the faithful." This harmony between the clergy and the civil government during the last days of the viceroyalty was to be reflected in the loyalty of the bishops to the Spanish Crown when the wars for independence began.

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[16] Cf. Antonio Joachin de Ribadeneyra y Barrientos, *Manuel Compendio de el Regio Patronato Indiano* (Madrid, 1755).

In spite of these sentiments and the amicable relations which he maintained with the archbishop and the Church, Revilla Gigedo was not satisfied with the spiritual development of the natives. "The most grievous thing about it," he declared in this report, "is, that so great expenditures, care, and zeal, and such wise measures taken during all these times upon this point, have not produced the effect which one ought to expect, and the Indians are still very ignorant and rude in matters of religion, as Your Excellency will discover when you inform yourself regarding their devotions and the way they fulfill their religious duties."

To some extent the clergy in charge of the missions and parishes have been blamed for this condition. More responsible, however, seem to be the economic and cultural capacities of the Indians themselves. Yet, it is a remarkable fact that, after a century of religious persecution, the Mexican Indian remains devoted to his Catholic faith today, primitive though his theological understanding may be. Other causes must also be sought to explain the retarded condition in which Revilla Gigedo found the Indian. One of these undoubtedly was the spiritual confusion promoted by the secularization or transfer of the doctrinas, or mission centers, and parishes of the Indians, from the religious orders to the secular clergy. The order for this change was issued by Ferdinand VI, October 4, 1749, but its immediate execution was impeded both by the opposition of the powerful religious orders and the dearth of secular clergy conversant in the Indian languages. It was gradually put into effect, beginning with the doctrinas which had been abandoned by the friars. The California missions were secularized by proclamation of Governor Figueroa in August 9, 1834. Their final secularization and removal from Church jurisdiction was made in 1845, when they were made ready for sale.

Revilla Gigedo maintained that the spiritual welfare of the Indians was one of the prime desires of His Majesty, but he believed that the religious orders were better equipped than the secular priests for evangelizing the Indians.

Another heavy blow had been struck at the work of the Church, by the dissolution of the Jesuit Order. On the night of

June 24, 1767, the Viceroy Croix summoned various ecclesiastical authorities to the palace and read the order which he had received from the Emperor Charles III. "I remind you of all my authority and of all my royal power," the instruction declared, "so that you may immediately direct yourself with force against the houses of the Jesuits. Seize all of their persons and send them as prisoners within twenty-four hours to the port of Vera Cruz. There they shall be placed on boats made ready for this purpose. At the moment of the execution of this order, the archives of their houses and their private papers shall be placed under seal. No individual shall be permitted to take anything besides his prayer books and such clothing as is absolutely indispensable for the journey."[17]

With this cruel order, which began a long series of autocratic confiscations and suppressions of legitimate religious and cultural activity, New Spain was deprived of thirty colleges of free education, with their corresponding libraries and churches, and of the work which the Jesuit Order had nobly carried on in its Indian missions for 200 years. The economic resources of the order, which were seized in the name of the King, proved to be no more than ample to maintain these extensive enterprises in a system in which the members of the order observed the most rigorous individual poverty; but whatever temporal advantages may have accrued to the royal treasury could not begin to compensate, much less replace, the spiritual and human values that were lost in this official work of destruction.

It was only natural that such a violent social wrenching should have resulted in profound popular indignation. It has been estimated that at the time of the expulsion, there were 2260 Jesuits in Spanish America in charge of 717,000 mission Indians. While the Jesuits themselves had nothing to do but peacefully submit to the decrees, there were uprisings and tumults throughout the country, and both Croix and the visitador José de Gálvez were obliged to put down revolts. Viceroy Croix issued an order forbidding discussion or commentaries on the expulsion and asserted that vassals "ought to know that they were born to keep still and obey, and not to discuss or give vent to opinions about the high affairs of the government." There can be no doubt that this and subsequent legislation of the same character from Spain was largely responsible for the development of a revolutionary spirit in New Spain; and one of the proposals of the insurgent leader Morelos was to restore the Jesuits to the country to provide for the education of its youth.

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[17] Cf. *Cuevas, loc. cit.,* tomo IV, pp. 413 sq.; also Lucas Alamán, *Disertacion,* X, pp. 302–326.

It seems to be an exaggeration to state, as authors have done, that, when Revilla Gigedo came to New Spain, all primary free schools, both in the capital and elsewhere, had disappeared. Nevertheless, the situation in this regard was critical, and he immediately began to remedy the situation so far as he could. "Progress must be made in Mexico," he stated, "in that branch of policy which looks to the betterment of the customs and education of the people. Various measures have been taken during the time of my rule, for the establishment of schools of primary letters, both in the capital and in various cities: namely, Santiago, Hutuzco, Tepic, Santa Ana Azacán, the parish of San Sebastián de Querétaro, Tepetlaxtec in the city of Santiago, in the town of Tequizquiapán, in that of Acotepéc, in the ranch of San Felipe, in that of Coscomatepec and that of Choramán. In this city, I have provided that men and women teachers be of good morals and standards, and there is an order to this effect in consequence of the last visit made by the principal teachers of the primary school."[18]

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most important schools under royal patronage were San Ildefonso, San Juan de Letrán, San Gregorio, the Royal and Pontifical University of Mexico City, which had been established in 1539, El Carolino in Puebla, and the Royal University of Guadalajara. All colleges and seminaries, including those which belonged to the expelled Jesuits, were under the royal patronage and placed in charge of the clergy and religious orders. As an example of the activity of these institutions, the University of Mexico City alone, between the years 1553 and 1775, issued 30,000 bachelor degrees, 1000 doctoral degrees, and many others, principally in laws, theology, and philosophy. Among the notable colleges of the Jesuits had been those of Zacatecas, founded in 1616, San Pedro y San Pablo in Mexico City, in 1573, Guadalajara, in 1659, and San Luis Potosí, in 1623.

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[18] *Instruccion reservada cit.*, pp. 335, 336.

Most of these institutions were for students of white blood, but the Indians of talent were also given opportunities. As in Europe during the same era, the lower classes were not generally taught to read and write; but in the traditions of Quiroga, they were trained in the useful arts by the friars and offered further advance in individual cases.

Revilla Gigedo personally took an interest in higher as well as elementary education, providing 42 fellowships and 20 scholarships in the university. He complained, however, that "little is studied of the learned tongues. There is no laboratory or collection of machines to study modern experimental physics. The library is short of good works, particularly of modern books." The mathematical and natural sciences, nevertheless, were not ignored. The flora of New Spain were studied by the Spaniard Sessé and two native assistants, and their discoveries were published as early as 1651 in a monumental work by Hernández, on the flora, fauna, and minerals of the country. Other men of the seventeenth century, like Carlos Sigüenza y Góngora, made notable scientific contributions to their age. The school of mines was established at Mexico City in 1783, and Revilla Gigedo prepared two large reports on this branch of industry.

The Royal Academy of Beaux Arts was founded in 1773, to provide free education in architecture, sculpture, and painting, and was richly endowed by the same viceroy. The appreciation and creation of fine arts was widespread in New Spain long before this, and systematic instruction was provided both to the whites and the Indians, from the time of Friar Pedro de Gante. As a result, almost from the beginning of the colony, art of high excellence flourished in the country, culminating in the great work of such men as Miguel Cabrera, Juan Rodríguez Xuárez, Francisco Eduardo Tresguerras, Sebastian de Arteaga, and José Alcibar. There is little in the New World to equal the abundance and rich beauty of the ecclesiastical architecture of colonial Mexico, including such masterpieces as the cathedrals of Mexico and Puebla.[19] Domestic architecture likewise produced notable examples of composition and fanciful decoration. Indeed, before the despoliations and wars of almost systematic destruction in the nineteenth century, Mexico stood with the foremost nations of the world in the patronage and production of the fine arts. Even today, behind wreckage, neglect, and decay, the colonial glories of Mexico stand out as the monuments of a great culture and a profound spiritual devotion.

But the attention of the age was by no means confined to the magnificence of temple and palace. "It would be difficult," says Bancroft, "to find another city so richly endowed by benevolence as Mexico." This was true, not merely of Mexico City and of the other large centers, but wherever communities were formed. The large number of churches, large and small, still standing in Mexico is sometimes a scandal to the casual traveler. But it must be remembered that these structures, built slowly and by the communities, much in the manner of the medieval cathedrals and chapels, served as the community centers, in conjunction with the community school and hospital, or were the adjunct of a benevolent institution organized under spiritual motivation. By 1736, there were nine government-controlled hospitals plus several private ones in Mexico City alone, under the management of religious orders. The disappearance of these and other foundations, or their conversion to other uses, came subsequently and can be explained only in the light of developments in the nineteenth century.

vi

No study of viceregal New Spain would be complete without at least a passing notice of one of its most characteristic institutions, that of the Holy Inquisition. By the time Revilla Gigedo came to office, that tribunal had largely lost its vigor and spirit, and repeated royal decrees limited its jurisdiction in important respects. By decrees of Charles III, the viceroy was given the last word in matters of disputed jurisdiction, so that the only complaint of Revilla Gigedo, in 1794, was that the Inquisition was accustomed to publish its decrees and decisions without first presenting them to the viceroy. As a result of this complaint, the viceroy gained his point.

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[19] Cf. Walter H. Kilham, *Mexican Architecture of the Viceregal Period* (London, 1927).

It was not until 1571 that the Inquisition was formally established in New Spain with participated powers derived from the tribunal in the mother country, but to a certain extent its jurisdiction had been exercised before that time. In Spain, it came to be a powerful instrument in weeding out elements believed to be detrimental to national unity. Its spiritual basis, however, was outlined in a "Tract against Heretical Depravity" written by one Gonzalo de Villadiego, about 1483, and published in 1519, dedicated to Queen Isabella. Gonzalo founded his doctrine on Sacred Scripture, particularly on the passage "And if thy hand or thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to go into life maimed or lame than, having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire" (Matt. 18:8). The Spanish Inquisition, with the principal intervention of the civil power, that is, ruled and supported by it, was founded by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1484. In 1517, Cardinal Cisneros, inquisitor general, gave the power of the Inquisition to all the bishops of the Indies.[20]

In 1524, Friar Martín de Valencia arrived in New Spain with limited powers of the Inquisition, but when the first Dominicans arrived two years later, under orders of Tomás Ortiz, they assumed these faculties. Upon the departure of Ortiz, Friar Domingo Betanzos arrived as head of the order and of the Inquisition and proceeded with vigor against the crime of blasphemy. The penalties consisted for the most part of works of piety and humiliation, such as pilgrimages and offerings to charity, but death was later inflicted upon two Judaizers. In 1532, the office passed into the hands of Zumárraga.

About this time, Cortés himself asked Charles V for the establishment of the "full authority required for the Holy Office of the Inquisition," "because of certain vices among the persons who come to these lands . . . and seize the license of offending Our Lord when they are alone amid the Indians and natives of this country. . . ."[21] Large powers were accordingly conferred upon Juan de Zumárraga, June 27, 1535. The solemn establishment of these powers did not take place until June 5, the following year, with music and a procession which left the Hospital de Jesús. The fiscal and the inquisitor began by penalizing two musicians for their refusal to play and their irreverence toward the tribunal.

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[20] Cf. Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, I, pp. 220 sq., 367 sq.

In the six years of the Inquisition under Zumárraga, 131 persons were tried, of whom 118 were Spaniards and 13 were Indians. One of the latter was Don Carlos of Texcoco, who was condemned to death for attempting to procure the apostasy of Christian Indians back to the bloody cult of the Aztecs. The records show that Zumárraga attempted in vain to reconcile the culprit before he should become subject to the death penalty prescribed for this crime by the civil law. Although other Indians were tried for idolatry, orders were issued in 1575 to exempt them from this tribunal "since they are new in the faith, a weak people of little substance." When the visitador Francisco Tello Sandoval came to Mexico, armed with Inquisitorial powers, he had an opportunity of passing judgment on the institution; and on September 19, 1545, a year before his return to Spain, he reported to the Prince Philip: "I have advised Your Highness of the necessity of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in this country and I am convinced of this by experience."[22]

During the office of Archbishop Alonso Montúfar, Zumárraga's successor after a lapse of six years, cases were instituted against blasphemy, bigamy, and Lutheranism, with efficient results. These trials were frequently begun with episcopal authority, but Montúfar proceeded cautiously, "consulting all three *oidores* and the fiscal of this illustrious royal *Audiencia,* and other men of degrees, jurists, and theologians, in conformity with law; and nothing has been done without their opinion."[23]

The full tribunal or court of the Inquisition was inaugurated by royal decree on January 25, 1569. Inquisitor Moya y Contreras arrived in Mexico, August 18, 1571, and the proclamation was read by the secretary Ríos, in Mexico City, the following November 4. From that time until December, 1600, about 900 cases were reviewed by the tribunal, most of them minor crimes, although 13 received the death sentence for offenses judged to be grievous. Eleven *autos de fe,* or solemn readings of sentences, were held during the same period, three of them public. Much solemnity was given to the public act of February 28, 1574, so that, as Moya declared, "the most remote parts of the country may refresh their memory that there is an Inquisition." An enormous throng came to attend the ceremonies on this occasion, which was presided over by the chief secular as well as ecclesiastical authorities and representatives of the university. The tribunal of New Spain included, not only the whole viceroyalty, but also the kingdom of Guatemala, the Windward Islands, and the Philippines.

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[21] J. García Icazbalceta, ed., *Colección de documentos para la historia de México* (Mexico, 1858–66), tomo II, p. 60.

[22] *Archivo General de Indias,* 58–5–8.

[23] *Archivo cit.,* 60–1–15.

Three general cases came under the jurisdiction of the court: bad morals, heresy, and impiety, with which was associated Judaism. It is interesting to note that a large percentage of the early culprits brought before the Inquisition were French, Dutch, and English pirates accused of desecrating churches, sacred vessels, and images. In 1605, however, orders were issued by the King, in virtue of a commercial treaty with England, not to bring heretical sailors and merchants to trial so long as they made no open scandal. Vigorous action was also launched against Portuguese Jews who were accused of spreading their sect secretly in the country. Among those processed in the *auto de fe* of 1579 was Luis de Carvajal, the colonizer, who imported large numbers of "Judaizers" into New Spain at the same time as he was entrusted with Christian education of the Indians in the *congregas* under his care. Members of this family fell under the Inquisition also in 1596 and later. The papal bull *Postulat a nobis,* of Clement VIII, secured a pardon for Portuguese Jews, but, after the war of Portuguese independence against Spain in 1640, the freedom of Jewish ritual and propaganda was again notably diminished by the Inquisition.

In the seventeenth century, 1402 cases were brought before the tribunal. During the eighteenth century, the rigor of the body began to decay notably. Only one person was condemned to death, and there was a general leniency of penalties. In December 4, 1808, the Inquisition ceased to exist in Spain, in virtue of a decree of Napoleon. The Inquisition in Mexico never had more than a participated jurisdiction with this tribunal, and therefore ended its legal career at the same time, although it lingered on for another decade after this.

During its career, a number of disputes, principally of a jurisdictional character, arose between the inquisition and the viceroys. In 1610, Philip III issued a Concordia, to establish an understanding between the two spheres of authority, but even after this instances arose in which the inquisitors threatened the viceroys with excommunication for trespassing on sacred ground, while the latter replied with threats of banishment and confiscation against the inquisitors. In 1770, a royal decree confined the activities of the tribunal to crimes of contumacious heresy and apostasy, transferring those of blasphemy, bigamy, sodomy, and the like, to the civil courts. Four years later, it was prohibited from chastising any civil or military official without first presenting the case to the King for review.

In general, however, the viceroys respected the institution. Thus Viceroy Mancera declared in 1673 that "the tribunal of the Holy Office which resides in Mexico, having been granted the fullest jurisdiction and having been ennobled by many pontifical and royal privileges and exemptions, has been and is feared and respected with all veneration in these provinces."[24]

The Inquisition has been accused of inhuman cruelty in its examination of accused persons; and judged by the legal methods in use today, many of the practices and penalties do seem excessively cruel. Nevertheless, they were those which were sanctioned by the legal code of that day; and are not to be compared with the witch burnings and similar practices that disfigured the history of New England at an even later date. In its functioning of practically two and one-half centuries, the total number of persons tried and condemned hardly exceeded 2000, the majority of whom received, for crimes of a minor character or implication, penalties ranging from pious works, such as prayer and charitable offerings, to temporary confinement with spiritual exercises. More grievous crimes were assigned corporal punishment, banishment, and confiscation of property. The death penalty was administered only in cases stipulated by civil law, and these were turned over to the state, less than 50 in number, as unreconciled heretics.[25]

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[24] *Instrucciones cit.*, p. 270.

That there were frequent disputes of jurisdiction between the tribunal and the viceroy is simply an indication that the offenses under consideration were often of a mixed civic and religious character. It seems clear that in many instances the Inquisition was urged by the civil arm to make investigations, as in the case of Portuguese Jews following the Portuguese war of secession from Spain. A good deal of the vigilance against dangerous literature emanating from France in connection with the French Revolution was also inspired by the Spanish Government under monarchical ideals. A royal order of August 10, 1785, commanded the viceroys to collect and destroy all copies of the works of Montesquieu, Raynal, Machiavelli, Legros, Linquet, Belisario de Marmontelo, and the French Encyclopedists.

The immigration problem of the late eighteenth century also complicated the task of the Inquisition. Large and unwelcome groups of French refugees, undesirables from Spain with the coming of the European troops, and deserters, introduced a decidedly new situation into the colony, which gave even Revilla Gigedo considerable concern. To keep himself informed of their activities, he even ordered the post office of the capital to give him notice of all foreigners who received letters and where they lived, and he threatened to extend this policy if necessary. Foreigners in the country at this time included not only French and Portuguese, but also Germans, English, Italians, Jews, and even Chinese and Malayans.

There can be no doubt that this general policy, both on the part of the Church and of the State, of surveillance over literature and discussion — a policy, by the way, which has by no means been confined to Catholic Mexico or monarchical Spain — notably restricted the directions of free thought and literary production. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said that New Spain was without literary appreciation or output. Perhaps no story of colonial development has been so completely documented for later ages to read as that of Mexico. Moreover, in an era when the rest of the continent was largely a wilderness, the Mexican Press distinguished itself. After the installation of the first printing press in Mexico City early in the sixteenth century, others were set up at Puebla, Guadalajara, Vera Cruz, and then throughout the country. By 1761, six presses were functioning in the capital alone.

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[25] *Cuevas, loc. cit.*, tomo II, p. 273.

The first periodical was the *Mercurio Volante* (Flying Mercury), established in 1693 and edited by the noted Sigüenza. The *Gaceta* of Mexico was begun in 1728. Much creative literature of a mediocre character was turned out, but poets of high merit also appeared, pre-eminently the nun Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, upon whom was conferred the title of the Tenth Muse.[26] The legacy of historical writing bore great fruit even later during the turbulent days of the wars for independence, with a quality and abundance that speaks well for the cultural backgrounds of the Spanish colony. Revilla Gigedo cannot lay claims to literary merit as such, but his voluminous reports and his *Instruccion* to his successor bear witness to a contemporary esteem for the written word and serve as the principal source of knowledge regarding his personal character and the projects of his regime.

vii

The unselfish energy and zeal with which Revilla Gigedo threw himself into his work are evident not only from the material fruits of his regime, such, for example, as raising the public revenues to the highest figure reached during the colonial era, but also in the personal solicitude for human betterment that animated his work. This is particularly evident in the last paragraph of his report to Branciforte. "I offer to Your Excellency," he wrote, "all the felicitations which I do not doubt will be merited by your pains and ability in the government of these dominions. It is indeed deserving that there should be improved the unhappy situation and that backward condition in which for entire centuries have lived some of the vassals, so faithful to their sovereign, so obedient to their leaders, and so appreciative of whatever the latter do for their benefit. Your Excellency will experience this with that satisfaction which comes from a good work and you will reap the fruit of tasks undertaken in the greatest service of the King and the benefit of the public, which is the greatest recompense for the fatigues that are inseparable from office."

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[26] Cf. Ezequiel A. Chávez, *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz* (Barcelona, 1931).

An indefatigable worker himself, he slept only three or four hours a night, and usually arose at one o'clock in the morning to attend to the planning of business or to make the rounds of the capital to see that everything was in order. It was his custom to drop in unexpectedly at various offices and departments; and as a result of his findings, he completely reorganized the national archives besides placing several other departments on a more efficient basis. In the viceregal palace, he placed a letter box where all who had complaints of any kind might make them. This measure was generally regarded by officialdom as a dangerous precedent.

He was extremely meticulous in the care of his own person, and insisted that those around him should be presentable at all times. The story is told of one of his secretaries who entered the office with large and soiled fingernails. The viceroy said nothing, but the secretary soon received a small pair of scissors with a message to the effect the nails should be cared for every day before employees came to the office. He set a good table for the palace, but ate only twice a day himself and had his own food sent in from a convent of Capuchin nuns, in a locked container for which he held one key and the sister superior, another.

A stickler for etiquette, he declared in his report: "On taking possession of this command, I found the abuse that the personal guard to the viceroys accorded the honors of a captain general to the archbishop and the honors of governor of the province when it appeared before the *Audiencia*. Before trying to remedy this abuse, I had a talk with the archbishop and two representatives of the *Audiencia*, in which I told them I did not wish to violate the military ordinances governing such matters, and accordingly I suspended the rule which related to military honors on the plaza." The archbishop and the *Audiencia* promptly appealed to the King, in the belief that these military honors were of value to their public prestige, and they gained their point.

A number of factors, however, contributed to diminish his standing with the court in Spain. His economies in connection with military expenditures and his general opposition to a large standing army were regarded as dangerous, and the feeble monarch Charles IV was incapable of realizing the value of large governmental reforms in the colony which might cut into the royal revenues. At the same time, many of his subordinates in New Spain resented his close supervision of their activities and the reforms which he undertook. Accordingly, he was summoned back to Spain a year before his term of office was completed, and Branciforte, who promptly added to the accusations made against him, was sent to take his place. He left Mexico City on May 15, 1794, as his successor arrived, and shortly thereafter took the boat for the mother country.

The *residencia,* or official auditing, of his office was conducted after he sailed; and, although the King appointed him director of the royal artillery, his last days were embittered by the accusations of his enemies. Revilla Gigedo felt that the *residencias* by this time had lost much of their value. "The *residencias,*" he maintained in his official report to his successor, "have been considered as a means of avoiding disorders in the administration of justice; but experience clearly proves how little progress is made by this means, which as a rule is more burdensome to the good servants of the King, whom it obliges to go to an expense which they cannot afford."[27]

Nevertheless, he was finally vindicated from the charges leveled against him, and Charles IV ordered the *regidores* of Mexico City to pay the costs of his *residencia.*[28] He died at Madrid, May 2, 1799, generally respected, on both sides of the

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[27] *Instruccion reservada cit.,* art. 140.

[28] Lucas Alamán, *Disertacion* III, apend. 81–82.

Atlantic. But the benevolent spirit of his regime was not enough to stem the tide of revolt that was shortly to end the security of the viceroyalty and bring the colonial era to a close. Internal conditions in Spain, managed by the unscrupulous favorite Godoy, the outbreak of war with France and Great Britain, the rapid growth of population and developed resources in New Spain, and the feeling of self-sufficiency in the New World, combined to weaken Spain's hold upon its colony and to create a form of national aspiration which nothing but independence could satisfy.

CHAPTER VIII

Miguel Hidalgo

LEADER OF INSURRECTION

i

Eleven miles from the provincial capital of Guanajuato is the little city of Dolores, founded in the sixteenth century as a municipal community or *Congregacion,* to bring the Indians of the region together. It was here, on September 16, 1810, that the pastor of the parish church, Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, raised the cry, "Hail Our Lady of Guadalupe! Long live Independence," and with this *Grito de Dolores* stirred the Mexican nation into revolt against the colonial rule of old Spain. "Past middle age," says Bancroft, "as he was now approaching fifty-eight, he had reached the period when most men are ready to lay aside some portion of life's burdens; yet he was about taking upon his shoulders the most vital issues of his country, and that before his country was ready fully to respond to his efforts."[1]

Hidalgo was born on the hacienda of Corralejo near Pénjamo, Guanajuato, on May 8, 1753, the second son of Cristóbal Hidalgo y Costilla and Ana María de Gallaga. His early years were spent on this ranch, of which his father was the administrator. Later he went to Valladolid, today the city of Morelia, where he distinguished himself as a student at the college of San Nicolás, founded by Quiroga. Here he came to teach philosophy and theology and was made rector. The students nicknamed him "The Fox."

In 1778 or 1779 he was ordained to the priesthood in Mexico City and received the degree of Bachelor of Theology. The loss of the archives of the diocese of Michoacán makes it impossible to state with certainty when he relinquished his rectorship of San Nicolás or served in the various curacies before he assumed the congregation of Dolores. He received the latter post, which proved to be a lucrative one, on the death of his older brother, Dr. Joaquín Hidalgo.

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[1] Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1885), IV, p. 103.

As the rector of San Nicolás, Hidalgo had been known for his spirit of change and innovation. Possessed of a soft-spoken voice, and gentle in manner, he was nevertheless known to give cold analysis in a skeptical spirit to matters which other ecclesiastics feared to touch; and when the die of revolution had been cast, he had no scruples in ignoring the fulminations of his ecclesiastical superiors.

At Dolores, his advanced ideas began to disturb both the government and the Inquisition, and on July 16, 1800, he was denounced by a Father Joaquín Huesca before the deputy at Valladolid. His readings in French were said to have stirred his sympathies for the French Revolution and brought about a dangerous desire for a change of government. Without specification, he was accused of being lax and imprudent as a priest, and of failing to administer to his flock. He was a great lover of music, organizing an orchestra among the Indians of his parish, and held frequent gatherings and parties in his home. This succeeded in increasing the scandal for small minds.

At the same time he gave considerable energy to the encouragement of specialized farming and industry. He enlarged the vineyards of Dolores, which were the best in the province, and planted mulberry trees for the raising of silkworms. Besides this, he started a china factory, another for tile and bricks, a tannery, and similar enterprises. Later he bought the hacienda of Jaripeo, where he engaged in bee raising. His generosity, combined with all this activity, made him a favorite with his parishioners, especially the Indians, whose dialects he had learned. This admiration was shared by others who were truly interested in the progress of the country, including the bishop-elect of Michoacán, Abad y Queypo, and Riaño the *intendente* of Guanajuato.

"Rather above than below medium height, of somewhat stout proportions, large limbs and ruddy-brown complexion," according to Bancroft's description, drawn from Alamán, "he presented altogether a robust constitution. The head was large and well modeled, bald and shining on the top, with many brain-compelling bumps; hair, what there was of it, nearly white; massive features, forehead of course high, neck slightly twisted to the left, nose straight, lips thin, eyebrows prominent, and as usual with the cloth, clean shaven. He wore at this time short black trousers and stockings of the same color, leathern shoes with buckles, and a long gown with cape. . . . He had the true scholarly stoop; and in all his features, air, and attitude a profoundly meditative expression — a fitting incarnation of a great soul bathed in settled calm. Yet the clear, black, brilliant eyes betrayed the activity of the mind, and through them shone the light from the burning fires within."[2]

This was the man destined to lead the wars for independence. Of his power for enterprise he had given ample evidence. In many ways, his social vision recalled that of Quiroga, and, in spite of accusations later brought against him, there is no evidence that he sacrificed his Catholic faith or minimized its importance in social progress. On the contrary, he provided a generous salary for Padre Francisco Iglesias to assist him particularly in catechizing the Indians. Charges of immorality were brought against him by two women as early as 1800, but inasmuch as the Inquisition did not proceed against him on this score or on the accusations of heresy, they were probably not worthy of serious consideration.[3]

ii

The political movement in which Hidalgo soon found himself involved was by no means a simple one nor were its aims clearly defined. A number of causes contributed toward dissatisfaction and unrest in the colony. At the same time, the various leaders who were involved in plans for revolt nourished their own personal grievances and widely divergent points of view.

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[2] *Loc. cit.*, IV, p. 103; Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (1849), tomo I, p. 354.

[3] On the matter of his personal morality, there is considerable difference of opinion, some authorities insisting that he had two daughters.

Undoubtedly, the underlying cause was the resentment of the creoles, or Mexican born Spaniards, against the position of political and social inferiority which they held as colonials. Spanish Americans were admitted to the lower offices of the country, but promotion to key positions in the government was practically closed to them. In general, the Church was more considerate than the State in this regard, but during the last century of colonial rule there was a reversion to more rigid Spanish control, so that in 1808 practically all the bishoprics and important benefices were confided to European clergy. The Spanish merchants, moreover, exercised a complete monopoly in trade and commerce, severely affecting the lower classes. To these injustices were added the burdens of excessive taxation and forced loans to Spain, as insulting as they were merciless.

On top of these grievances, reflecting a weak and corrupt home government, came the Napoleonic invasion of Spain after the shameless rule of Godoy, and the demand for more and more funds. On December 26, 1804, a royal order was issued to sequestrate all the real estate belonging to charitable institutions, principally managed by the clergy, including their investments and loans on property on which the mortgages had lapsed. According to Humboldt, the value of these properties and invested funds in 1804 totaled $44,500,000.[4] The recall of such mortgages spelled widespread ruin, as can easily be imagined. While these orders were being carried out, the Viceroy Iturrigaray was instructed to seize all funds of corporations and communities, Indian tributes, the treasures of sacred shrines, and even money held for the ransom of prisoners.

If the Church and the lower classes had bitterly resented the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, the clergy now beheld themselves humiliated in various ways, touching their most sacred interests and indeed their very sustenance. It was only natural that they should become alienated from the Spanish rule and throw in their lot with the cause of independence.

General resentment against these policies had even gone a step farther and begun to create something of a national bond between the creoles, *mestizos,* and Indians. So far as revolt was concerned, Mexico might have been encouraged by the fact that in 1783 Spain had recognized the independence of the English colonies. At the same time, there was a great deal of reading of French political and moral writers, notably Rousseau, although these works were forbidden by the government. Undoubtedly their spirit was imbibed to a large extent by Hidalgo, who began to study them while he was still at San Nicolás.

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[4] Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo sobre el reino de La Nueva España*, lib. IV, cap. X (ed., Paris, 1822), tomo II, p. 463.

The actual beginning of the break with Spain, however, was occasioned by the deposition of Ferdinand VII. For some time the secret agents of Joseph Bonaparte were stirring New Spain to revolution; and in 1809, Bonaparte announced "that the time had already arrived for the Spanish Americas to be independent and that the French Government would not be opposed to this necessary step." Amid the confusion of the French seizure of Spain and Ferdinand's exile, the Viceroy Iturrigaray was encouraged to govern Mexico without dependence upon the Spanish Crown. He was seized in a countermovement of European Spaniards and brought to answer the charge of disloyalty to Ferdinand, but vigorously denied the charges. Later, after the Declaration of Independence in 1821, his widow and family pleaded in Mexico that he had been the first victim in the cause of independence.

Incompetence and vacillation in the next two viceroys, Garibay and Archbishop Lizana, greatly facilitated the disintegration of Spanish allegiance. To this was added grave dissatisfaction with the very limited representation accorded the Mexicans in the Spanish Cortes.

In 1809 a group of persons had conspired in Valladolid with the idea of forming a congress to govern New Spain in the name of Ferdinand VII, in case Spain should fall into the hands of the French. With a slight manipulation this could easily lead to independence. Pátzcuaro, Querétaro, and Zitácuaro were canvassed, and the standard of revolt was to be raised on December 21 in the intendencia of Guanajuato. The conspirators were apprehended, although treated with great leniency, and the viceroy announced that the incident had resulted only from a difference of opinion on the situation in Spain.

The conspiracy then betook itself from Vallodolid to Querétaro, where its elements worked secretly under the protection of the *corregidor* Miguel Domínguez. Perhaps no direct connection can be shown between this conspiracy and that of Hildago, but the general movement was the same. Many of its leaders found themselves active again and out in the open when less than a year later the cry of revolt was made at Dolores.

iii

Among the early leaders of the conspiracy was the handsome and dashing Ignacio Allende, a wealthy creole, who had espoused the cause of Iturrigaray and had sworn to avenge that viceroy by promoting the cause of independence. The conspirators met at social gatherings and balls to avoid suspicion, first at San Miguel, Allende's native town, near Querétaro, and later in the neighboring cities, where branch groups were established. By 1810, Querétaro had become the center of the movement, although Allende and his confederate, Aldama had made contacts in Mexico, Puebla, and other centers in the country.

Just when Hidalgo joined the cause is unknown. It is certain, however, from his own statement that he took part in conversations with Allende and others on various occasions concerning independence but "without any other object on his part than that of pure discourse."[5] Even after he became persuaded that independence would be beneficial to the nation, he was in favor of deferring the movement, against the judgment of Allende that it should be unleashed at once, and warned the latter that "the authors of such enterprises did not live to enjoy their fruits." Allende's plan was to effect a general seizure of rich Spaniards and authorities in the various towns, a plan later endorsed by Morelos, and to proclaim independence. The property of the Spaniards was to be nationalized, and a representative government was to be set up, to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII without allegiance to Spain as dominated by Napoleon.

Time passed by without definite action until the beginning of September, 1810, when Hidalgo received a letter from Allende urging him to come to Querétaro on a matter of considerable importance. There the priest was presented to a number of persons of small consequence with such limited resources that he returned to Dolores in the belief that the time was not yet ripe. Whether Allende did not wish to reveal his full strength or whether he acquired better backing after this interview is not certain; but, returning to San Miguel, he wrote to Hidalgo in such convincing terms that the latter decided to go ahead on his own account with practical preparations for combat. Accordingly he had some 25 lances made in Dolores and on the hacienda of Santa Barbara, and through the aid of two sergeants and the bandmaster, Juan Garrido, made attempts to win the provincial infantry of Guanajuato over to the cause.

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[5] Cf. *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1854), IV, p. 100.

As early as August 11, the government had been acquainted in a general way with these proceedings through the post-office department, and, without taking definite measures, maintained a watchful policy. Hidalgo himself was delated by Garrido to the *intendente* of the province, Riaño, who sent agents to Dolores to keep an eye on developments there and gave orders for the arrest of Allende and Aldama at San Miguel. Allende was able to intercept these orders, having received notice of Garrido's betrayal, and he began to take advice with his friends. On September 10, Captain Arias, who had been involved in the plot, denounced the whole procedure to the mayor of Querétaro, who promptly dispatched the report to Viceroy Venegas now on his way to the capital from Vera Cruz. Three days later, information was given the authorities of a plot to assassinate all the Spaniards, with guns hidden in two local houses. The *corregidor* Domínguez was suspected of guilty knowledge. To save himself and carry out his office, he was obliged to institute a search of the places in question, with the result that the weapons and ammunition were discovered.

Vague reports of these events began to reach Hidalgo on September 12 or 13, and he sent at once for Allende to discuss what should be done. While this was going on, the wife of the *corregidor*, Josefa Ortiz Domínguez, sent word to Allende, either at San Miguel or Dolores, of what had happened, and, unaware of Arias' treachery, informed him also to the same effect. On the morning of the fourteenth, Domínguez found himself reluctantly obliged to proceed against those in whose houses the ammunition had been found. The next day Arias arranged to have himself arrested, carrying papers which implicated not only Hidalgo and Allende, but also the *corregidor* and his wife and a number of others who had attended the secret revolutionary meetings. As a result, the mayor Ochoa immediately had 300 soldiers put under his command, and Domínguez and his wife were placed under arrest in separate confinement. For some unknown reason, however, the viceroy later dismissed the charges against the *corregidor* and restored him to office.

In Dolores matters were taking an even more rapid course. Allende arrived in the town either on the night of the fourteenth or the early morning of the fifteenth. According to the historians Alamán and Orozco y Berra, who drew their accounts from the statements which Hidalgo, Allende, and others made at their trials, Doña Josefa Ortiz Domínguez sent a warning of what had happened in Querétaro to Allende in San Miguel. Not finding the latter in the town, the messenger communicated with another conspirator, Aldama, who hastened to Dolores, whither Allende had already taken himself. According to this version, Allende and Hidalgo had spent the night of the fourteenth and all the following day without arriving at any decisive conclusion. Aldama arrived in Dolores at two o'clock in the morning of the sixteenth, and roused Allende, who was sleeping in Hidalgo's house. The two then presented themselves to the priest who had been awakened by the noise. On hearing Aldama's story, he exclaimed, "Gentlemen, we are lost; the only recourse left is to seize the *gachupines*."[6]

Sotelo, who was present at the time, reports that Allende and his companions had received word from Doña Josefa before he left San Miguel. When they arrived at Dolores, Hidalgo was entertaining guests. They waited until the latter had departed, and then entered to divulge news of the arrests and the discovery of the conspiracy. Hidalgo listened calmly and replied,

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[6] Alamán, *loc. cit.*, I, pp. 373, 374.

"Action must be taken at once; there is no time to be lost; we shall yet see the oppressors' yoke broken and the fragments scattered on the ground!"[7]

In either case, Hidalgo decided to make the most of the few elements at his command and strike for liberty, even though it would mean his death. He at once assembled about 15 of the workmen from his pottery and silk factories, and distributed weapons among them. With his brother Mariano, José Santos Villa, Aldama, Allende, and this small force, he proceeded to seize Padre Bustamante, who was the first sacristan of the parish, a Spaniard, and addressing himself to the crowd that rapidly gathered, he raised the battle shout, "Long live Our Lady of Guadalupe! Long live Independence!"

Then the group moved to the jail where they forced the warden, at the point of a gun, to free the prisoners. These swelled the ranks, making about 80 men, who were promptly armed with swords taken from the companies of the Queen's Regiment stationed in the town.

All this took place Sunday morning, September 16, as the dawn was coming up. Hidalgo gave orders to ring the church bells earlier than usual, and the people from the town and neighboring ranches, with a strong intimation of what was happening, came running to the church.

"There was no Mass that day," writes Bancroft. "The cura entered his pulpit and looked abroad upon the sea of upturned anxious faces with deep and yearning solicitude. 'My children,' he said, 'this day comes to us a new dispensation. Are you ready to receive it? Will you be free? Will you make the effort to recover from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your forefathers three hundred years ago?' Thus the great project of independence was laid before them, and they were called upon to prove their devotion to their country. For the last time Hidalgo addressed his flock as cura of Dolores. Henceforth he would be their guide to liberty; they would fight for it; they would die for it; he would lead them himself to battle and to victory! 'Today,' he continued, 'we must act. The Spaniards are bad enough themselves, but now they are about to surrender us and our country to the French. Danger threatens our religion, and oppression our homes. Will you become Napoleon's slaves? or will you as patriots defend your religion and your rights?' 'We will defend them' shouted the people. '*Viva Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, muera el mal gobierno, mueran los gachupines!*'[8] 'Live, then, and follow your cura, who has ever wached over your welfare,' was Hidalgo's answer. The *Grito de Dolores* has gone forth! The poor and ignorant and downtrodden of this little Indian town proclaim the future independence of this great nation! Enthusiasm rises to religious height, and unarmed as they are, they will follow no matter where, and fight and die no matter how."

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[7] Cf. Hernández y Dávalos, *Colección de Documentos* (Mexico, 1877–82), II, p. 322.

From this assembly, the insurgents soon formed a nucleus of 300 men, and proceeded to seize the subdelegate of the city, Rincon, and some 66 Spaniards, without the slightest resistance. The city was theirs, and the war for independence was on!

iv

The problem that faced the leaders, once the die was cast, was the organization of an army. Allende, as a military man, favored a small, select body of soldiers, but Hidalgo felt that the popular appeal of the cause would be heightened by the spontaneous enlistment of as many as cared to join. The latter prevailed in his opinion, and the same day the leaders set out with a rabble following to San Miguel. At Atotonilco, Hidalgo acquired a picture of the Virgin of Guadalupe and had it raised upon a pole to arouse enthusiasm by religious feeling. This standard became the banner of the army, with the mottoes: "Long live religion. Long live our most holy mother of Guadalupe. Long live Ferdinand VII. Long live America, and down with the bad government."

They entered San Miguel the same evening amid the cheering of the populace. Allende proceeded to seize the Spaniards of the town and confine them in the college of San Francisco de

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[8] "Long live Our Lady of Guadalupe, down with the bad government, and death to the Spaniards." H. H. Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, IV, p. 117.

Sales with the prisoners brought from Dolores. The next move was to win over the dragoons of the Queen's regiment, who revolted against their major, together with a section of the Celaya infantry.

At Dolores, the houses of the Spaniards were ransacked for weapons and ammunition, but relatively little was secured. Bows and arrows, clubs, slings, Indian scythes or *machetes,* and homemade lances were practically the only weapons of the undisciplined mob that trailed after their leaders on the march. The available cavalry was organized into a troop, while the better armed natives on foot formed the infantry. Then came a motley throng including women and children. Swollen by new enlistments from the countryside near San Miguel, this crowd soon began to show its hand for destruction and pillage and was not long in getting completely out of hand. With cries of "Death to the *gachupines,*" the mob stormed the houses and stores of San Miguel, battering down the doors and sacking everything in sight, in spite of all that Hidalgo and Allende could say or do. "They threw themselves like ravening wolves," according to Torrente, "against all the Europeans and their properties, not sparing even their own compatriots."[9]

The conspirators themselves seized the treasury of the town and whatever they could take from their Spanish captives, and set out on the morning of September 18 with their followers, now numbering about 50,000. The route lay through Chamacuero, with Celaya as the objective. The officials of Celaya realized the impossibility of holding out against such numbers and withdrew in company with the Europeans to Querétaro. The next night the town of Celaya received the following dispatch from the insurgents: "We have approached this city with the object of securing the persons of all the European Spaniards. If they surrender at discretion, their persons will be treated with humanity; but if, on the contrary, resistance should be made, and the order to fire upon us is given, they will be given corresponding treatment. May God protect Your Excellencies many years. Field of battle, September 19, 1810. Miguel Hidalgo,

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[9] Quoted in H. H. Bancroft, *loc. cit.,* IV, p. 121.

Ignacio Allende. P.S. The moment that the order is given to fire upon our troops, the 78 Europeans whom we are holding will be beheaded. Hidalgo, Allende."[10]

Up to this time the revolution was without an official head. Leadership had been divided among the moving spirits, although Hidalgo, because of his age, knowledge, and priestly character, assumed the first place of prestige. Inasmuch as a difference of policy had already come up between him and Allende regarding enlistment and discipline, he now believed it necessary to determine the extent of his official power. Allende recognized the fact that popular veneration of the priest made him the logical man for the place of supreme command, and insisted on this point. Hidalgo accepted the grandiose title of captain general of America and conferred the rank of lieutenant general on Allende, Aldama, and Abasolo. Others received definite commands at this time, and even Captain Arias, whose double dealing was suspected by the insurgents, joined the camp.

On September 21, the army entered Celaya, amid the same scenes of looting and wanton destruction as had characterized the mob at San Miguel. The next day Hidalgo rearranged the town council so as to have his rank given municipal recognition, and two companies of the Celaya regiment which had remained in the city joined forces with the insurgents. Hidalgo would have liked to march on Querétaro, whence the Europeans had fled, but judging that this place was too well defended, he directed his troops, on the morning of the twenty-third toward Guanajuato.

The fate in store for Santa Fe de Guanajuato was undoubtedly the cruelest endured by any city during the revolution. A city of some 66,000, prosperous and beautiful before the onslaught of Hidalgo's army, it soon declined to a settlement of fewer than 6000 inhabitants, in shambles and ruin by the end of the war. News of the events at Dolores and San Miguel reached the *intendente* of the city, Riaño, on September 18. Believing that Hidalgo was already on his way, he decided to resist, and ordered barricades thrown up in the principal streets.

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[10] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, apénd., *doc. num.*, 16.

A week passed without any appearance of the rebel army. During this time, Riaño beheld not only a growing indifference among the lower classes, but also a positive hostility to his plans. On September 26, he wrote to General Calleja: "The seeds of rebellion are spreading; security and confidence are gone. I have neither rested nor undressed myself since the seventeenth, and for the last three days I have not slept an hour at a time."[11]

In this situation, he believed it wise, on the twenty-fourth, to move his garrison to the Alhóndiga de Granaditas, a government granary which had the advantages of a fort. The transfer was effected secretly at night, and included the moving of the official archives, the treasury, and a large amount of private funds, together with ammunition and provisions judged sufficient until help should come from Calleja.

Hidalgo drew up his forces before the city early on the twenty-eighth and sent messengers to Riaño, demanding its surrender. "The numerous army which I command," he wrote in his dispatch, "elected me Captain General and Protector of the Nation in the fields of Celaya. The same city in the presence of 50,000 men ratified this election, as have all the places through which I have passed; this will make Your Honor aware that I am legitimately authorized by my nation to undertake the beneficent projects which have appeared necessary to me for its welfare. These projects are of equal usefulness and value to the Americans and those Europeans who are disposed to reside in this country, and they are reduced to the proclamation of the independence and liberty of the nation. Consequently I do not regard the Europeans as enemies, but only as an obstacle which hinders the successful outcome of our enterprise.

"Your Honor will be pleased to inform the Europeans who have united together in the Alhóndiga to this effect, so that they may decide whether to declare themselves as enemies or agree to remain as prisoners, receiving humane and kind treatment, such as those whom we bring with us have experienced, until the liberty and independence of the country shall be gained. In the latter case they will be included in the class of citizens with right to the restitution of their property, which we shall make use of for the present, for the needs of the nation. If on the contrary they do not accede to this demand, I shall use all force and means to destroy them, without leaving them the hope of mercy."[12]

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[11] Cf. Hernández y Dávalos, *loc. cit.*, II, pp. 277, 278.

Riaño gave the answer of a loyal servant of the government: "Señor Cura of the town of Dolores, D. Miguel Hidalgo: I recognize no other authority, nor is it evident to me that any other had been established, nor other Captain General in the Kingdom of New Spain, than His Excellency Señor Don Francisco Xavier de Venegas, its Viceroy, nor other legitimate reforms than those which the Nation at large may adopt at the general Cortes to be held. My duty is to fight as a soldier, and this noble sentiment animates all those around me." Riaño's company under arms numbered hardly more than 500 men.

By the time the messengers were dispatched with this reply, Hidalgo's huge forces were already advancing up the road, and entered the city, without resistance, about noon on the twenty-eighth. As the insurgents, armed with their strange weapons and carrying numerous banners of the Virgin of Guadalupe, surged through the streets, they were joined by a large part of the populace. With the first exchange of hostilities Riaño himself fell, from a bullet of the Celaya regiment. Thereafter the confusion that reigned, both inside and outside the Alhóndiga, meant carnage and destruction, which not even the fall of the stronghold or the proclamations of Hidalgo, issued two days later, could stop.

Of the defenders, over 600 soldiers and civilians were killed. Riaño's body was exposed for two days, as Alamán states, to satisfy the curiosity of the Indians, many of whom believed that the Spaniards had tails![13] On the side commanded by Hidalgo, at least 2000 Indians, besides those in the regular companies, were killed. The treasures stored in the Alhóndiga were seized, and the whole town fell prey to the drunken and bloodthirsty redskins. Orozco y Berra maintains that the worst excesses were committed by inhabitants of the city. To put a stop to the reign of terror, Hidalgo was finally obliged to turn his guns on the depredators.

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[12] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo I, p. 421. The single word "independence," Alamán notes, suffices to prove this statement inexact, since Hidalgo never used it publicly.

[13] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo I, p. 435; also Niceto de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1878), tomo VI, pp. 394, 395.

Upon these ruins, the insurgent leader began to reorganize a local government, established a mint, and attempted the manufacture of munitions.

Up to this time, Hidalgo had advanced with comparatively little challenge from the viceregal government. Venegas was in the country but a few months when the revolution broke out and therefore at a disadvantage so far as detailed knowledge of the situation was concerned. There were no European troops in the country, and the dispersed forces of Iturrigaray were not to be trusted against a revolutionary cause. Since the Indians were exempted from military service, the total number of soldiers available for service, including various *mestizo* castes, was not over 12,000, under the high command of European Spanish officers, with intermediate chiefs drawn from the creoles.

As soon as the viceroy realized the gravity of the situation, he ordered the mobilization of these elements and centered his forces at Querétaro, Valladolid, San Luis Potosí, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. By proclamation of September 27, he offered a reward of 10,000 pesos for the capture or death of Hidalgo, Allende, and Aldama. At the same time the bishops and higher clergy made a general appeal for loyalty to the established government, and extended the arm of the Church to excommunicate the leaders of revolt.

The first ecclesiastical edict to this effect was launched, September 24, by Abad y Queypo, bishop-elect of Michoacán, who based his action upon the violence used against the sacristan of Dolores and other clergy and religious. "Moreover," he declared, "this same Cura Hidalgo and his followers are seducers of the people and calumniators of the Europeans." The validity of this excommunication was seriously questioned, inasmuch as Abad y Queypo, himself a European, was not yet consecrated bishop. To remedy the possible defect, Archbishop Lizana ratified the excommunication, on October 11, followed by the bishops of Puebla and Guadalajara. Father Cuevas in his *Historia de la Iglesia en Mexico*, has seriously challenged these censures, inasmuch as Hidalgo was outside the territory of the respective bishops when they were issued.[14]

This action was reinforced by a summons of the Inquisition to Hidalgo, recalling the process which had been entered against him in 1800 and stating in detail the Catholic dogmas which he was alleged to have denied. Hidalgo recognized the gravity of these charges and the necessity of refuting them, if he was to retain his leadership over a people profoundly religious and faithful to the Catholic Church, and some weeks later issued a detailed rebuttal of the charges.

"I find myself," he declared, "in the sad necessity of satisfying the people on a point which I never thought I could be accused of or even be under suspicion by my compatriots. I speak of the most interesting, most sacred, and for me the most loved thing: holy religion, the supernatural faith which I received in baptism. . . . I swear, from the outset, my beloved fellow citizens, that never have I departed even in the slightest from the beliefs of the holy Catholic Church; never have I doubted any of its truths; I have always been intimately convinced of the infallibility of its dogmas, and I am ready to shed my blood in defense of each and every one of them."[15]

Then referring to the charges made against him, he continued: "I am accused of denying the existence of hell, and a little before this I am charged with having asserted that a canonized pope is in this place. How can one reconcile a statement that a pope is in hell with a denial of its existence? I am imputed likewise of having denied the authenticity of Sacred Scripture and at the same time of following the perverse dogmas of Luther. If Luther deduced his errors from the books which he believed inspired by God, how could one who denies this inspiration maintain his deductions from the same books which he regards as fabulous? All these accusations are of the same mold."

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[14] Cf. *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 60–68.

[15] *Diccionario cit.*, IV, pp. 103, 104.

Hidalgo never felt that his rebellion was more than a break with the rule of European Spaniards or that the fulminations brought against him by ecclesiastics had any significance beyond that of loyalty to the cause of Spanish solidarity. "Who would believe, beloved fellow citizens," he cried, "that the effrontery and audacity of the *gachupines* would go so far as to profane the most sacred things, to retain their intolerable domination, to make use of this same holy religion to combat and destroy it, to use excommunications against all the mind of the Church, to issue them without the motive of religion? . . . Do you believe that a person who is not subject to the Spanish despotism is incapable of being a good Catholic? Whence comes to us this new dogma, this new article of faith?"

That the prelates appointed by Spain were more concerned with the preservation of civil order and the security of the Spanish dominion than with the dogmatic aspects of Hidalgo's move is evident from the edict of Archbishop Lizana, issued October 18, 1810, to refute the motives alleged in favor of the revolt. "Hidalgo errs grievously," he declared, "in his project of reconquering America for the Indians. Not only is it anti-Catholic, but chimerical, extravagant, ridiculous, and highly prejudicial to the author who proposes it as well as to the nation that it tries to re-establish and its inhabitants. There is hardly any nation in the world today that has not been taken by conquest, and consequently which should not, on this principle, stir itself up against the sovereign or republic which governs it." Such restoration, he maintained, would mean a redivision of Mexico to the original tribes, like the Aztecs and Tlaxcalans, each with its own jurisdiction.[16]

"What will be the length and outcome of this war?" asked the archbishop. "Who in the end will be the conquerors and the conquered? Hidalgo now tells the Indians that they are the owners and lords of the land, of which the Spaniards despoiled them by conquest, and that by this means he will restore it to them. . . . My children, do not allow yourselves to be deceived: the Cura Hidalgo has been tried for heresy: he does not seek your fortune, but his own."

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[16] *Diccionario cit.*, IV, p. 105.

v

Nevertheless, Hidalgo refused to be intimidated. He reorganized the city and provincial government of Guanajuato, appropriated large sums from public and private funds, and proceeded to whip his army into shape. More than ever he was determined to wrest control of the country from the Spaniards, and when the officials of Guanajuato found his principles of independence difficult to reconcile with their loyalty to the monarch, he angrily declared: "There is no longer a Ferdinand VII!"[17]

The European survivors, he imprisoned in the Alhóndiga. On October 8 he sent his vanguard toward Valladolid and two days later followed with the main forces. The authorities of Valladolid together with the bishop-elect, Abad y Queypo, had begun to organize resistance, but as Hidalgo's huge army approached the city, they fled by different routes to the capital. The insurgent vanguard reached the outskirts of the city on October 15. On the seventeenth, Hidalgo arrived at the head of his division.

He was met by a welcoming committee from Valladolid, and with great solemnity proceeded to the cathedral to offer thanks. A number of the canons, however, had fled and the doors had been locked. The church was finally opened; but he was received with scant enthusiasm, and the *Te Deum* was so poorly sung that in his exasperation he declared all the canonical seats vacant except three. He then compelled the representative of the bishop to rescind the declarations of excommunication which Abad y Queypo had leveled against him. The next day, in spite of his guarantees, the Indians in his following proceeded to sack the houses of the Spaniards. Only the presence of mind and the stern measures of Allende put a stop to the pillage.

At Valladolid, Hidalgo augmented his troops with the regiment of provincial infantry, known as the dragoons of Michoacán, or Pátzcuaro, and eight companies which had been enlisted for the defense of the city. He seized some 400,000 pesos from the treasury of the cathedral, including funds deposited for security by individuals, reorganized the local government under his own partisans, and started for Mexico City, October 20. At Acámbaro, he held a review of his combined forces and was proclaimed Generalissimo, a rank superior to that of the Spanish viceroy. The uniform of his new dignity was a blue coat with red collar and cuffs and a black shoulder belt, all richly embroidered in gold and silver. On his breast he wore a large gold medal with the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe.

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[17] Cf. H. H. Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, IV, p. 165.

From Acámbaro, the army advanced through Maravatio, Tepetongo, Ixtlahuaca, and Toluca, and on October 30 encountered the troops of the viceroy under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Torcuato Trujillo on the mountain of Las Cruces. Trujillo possessed a force of 7000 men, and numbered among his assistant officers Lieutenant Agustín Iturbide, a distinguished young soldier of Valladolid who had refused an invitation to join the cause of Hidalgo. In spite of a long resistance, the loyalists were overwhelmed by the insurgents and were forced to withdraw.

With this victory, the road to Mexico City was open, and Allende urged an immediate advance to end the war with a single blow. The capital was in an uproar of excitement and apprehension, and Venegas himself, on the point of flight, was induced to remain in the city only through the pleadings of the royalist leaders. Such was the extremity of the viceregal government, that the viceroy, as a last resource, ordered the miraculous image of Our Lady de los Remedios to be carried from its shrine at Totoltepec to the cathedral in Mexico City for public veneration. Then, like Hidalgo, invoking the aid of the Blessed Virgin for success on the battlefield, he placed her image, under the title of *los Remedios,* on the royalist banners, to oppose the insurgents, who were likewise calling upon her help under the title of *Guadalupe.*

Contrary to Allende's advice, however, Hidalgo did not believe the time ripe for pressing his advantage. Against his colleague's arguments, he pointed out his lack of munitions, the great losses he had already suffered in battle, and the disorganized conditions of the rabble army. Moreover, he was apprehensive of the approach of the viceregal troops of Calleja and Flon and realized that the capital itself was well guarded. Difference of opinion between the insurgent chieftains at this turning point naturally reflected itself in the unsettled minds of their followers. Practically at the gates of the city, Hidalgo now sent emissaries to treat with Venegas; the viceroy contemptuously refused to grant them an audience. Then, after three days of inactivity, Hidalgo gave orders, on November 2, to withdraw toward Querétaro.

One of the first results of this decision was the melting away of half of his disappointed forces, which had come thus far with the purpose of sacking the capital. The climax had come and gone. Hidalgo's star was soon to wane.

His line of march in the first place had been determined to a large degree by the menacing forces of Calleja at San Luis Potosí and of Flon at Querétaro. Now that these places were sufficiently organized for defense against the insurgents, the two generals decided to unite their forces of 7000 men under Calleja's leadership and follow Hidalgo to the capital. Reports of an uprising at Querétaro after Flon's withdrawal brought the royalist forces to that city on November 1. From there they proceeded toward Mexico City. In this way the opposing armies came quite unaware upon one another near the town of Aculco, November 6, and battle was inevitable.

The following morning Calleja decided to attack, although he held a disadvantageous position and the insurgent forces still amounted to 40,000 men. Hidalgo, alleging lack of ammunition, decided to execute a careful retreat. A certain apathy in his troops, arising from the distrust which Allende and the Aldamas began to feel for his military judgment, had also begun to shake his confidence. The retreat, however, soon reached the proportions of a rout. Rout turned into panic, and the insurgents fled in every direction, leaving their equipment and supplies on the field. When the survivors assembled ten days later at Celaya, Allende decided to lead his troops back to Guanajuato. Hidalgo, with a handful of followers, retired to Valladolid, to enlist new divisions and gather munitions and supplies.

vi

The disaster at Aculco dealt a heavy blow to the insurgents, but it did not put an end to the movement for independence. On the contrary, the majority of the cities of the interior were now in the hands of the revolutionists, and, on November 11, Guadalajara fell into their hands. News of the capture of this important center reached Hidalgo on the fourteenth, and he forthwith decided to go in person to settle a dispute that had arisen between the officers regarding the exercise of authority. Having communicated his intention to Allende, he set out from Valladolid on the seventeenth.

Before leaving, he either gave orders or consented to have 41 Spaniards secretly led out and brutally butchered. Afterward, their stripped bodies were exposed to the wild beasts. On the night of the eighteenth the same fate befell another group of helpless persons, with no other offense than their Spanish birth. These inhuman crimes were later charged against him by his enemies, and indeed the best that can be said in his defense is that the thirst for blood was shared by both sides. He allowed the same ghastly vengeance to be wreaked later upon 300 innocent Spanish victims at Guadalajara. Confronted with these facts, at his trial, Hidalgo replied that "he recognized all the force of the argument, but really he had entertained no other motive than a criminal condescension with the wishes of his army." Allende and other insurgent leaders were thoroughly disgusted with these massacres, and this was one of the reasons for their open declaration of bad feeling against the Generalissimo.

At Guanajuato, Allende became extremely apprehensive upon the approach of General Calleja, and appealed to Hidalgo to come to his aid. Apparently, he felt that the latter had withdrawn to Guadalajara for his personal safety. When repeated communications failed to produce any result, he charged his superior with trying to collect money at Guadalajara and escape with it. In the end, Allende was unable to withstand the assault of the viceregal forces and fled from Guanajuato on November 15, taking with him a small detachment of cavalry, his fellow officers, and such treasure as he could carry. The loss of this stronghold and its capture by Calleja simply renewed the bloody scenes it had witnessed before; but this time the tables were turned.

From Guanajuato, Allende proceeded to Zacatecas, and thence to Guadalajara, where he arrived on December 12. This had now become the center of the revolution. Hidalgo had reached the city on November 26, with 7000 cavalry and 240 infantry, all poorly armed. His march had been a triumph all the way from Valladolid; and as he approached his destination, he was greeted with extreme enthusiasm, given a regal dinner, received with the greatest solemnity at the cathedral, and escorted as a monarch to the palace.

Here, with the title of Serene Highness, he proceeded to establish a national government. "Let us establish a congress," he declared, "composed of representatives of all the cities, villages, and places of this realm, which will have as its principal object the maintenance of our holy religion and will enact equitable laws, beneficial and suited to the circumstances of each people." At the same time he decreed the freedom of slaves and abolished the payment of tributes by the Indians.

Precisely what political form he contemplated for the new nation is difficult to say, but apparently he was thinking of a constitutional monarchy with its parliament or Cortes as in Spain. No one was mentioned as the probable king, but in the event of victory, Hidalgo would undoubtedly have been acclaimed the chief. Indeed, the pomp and circumstance with which he surrounded himself at Guadalajara gave suspicion that he already had this in mind.

In imitation of the Spanish government, José María Chico was now appointed minister of "Grace and Justice" with Ignacio López Rayón as secretary of state and communication, and the *Audiencia* was reorganized. At the same time, Hidalgo took over the printing presses of Guadalajara, which he used to publish his replies to the Inquisition and the partisans of the Spanish cause and to issue a periodical called the *Despertador Americano* ("The American Awakener"). He also appointed Pascasio Letona as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States, to seek aid and to "consider, prepare, and order an offensive and defensive alliance, as well as commercial treaties useful and beneficial to both nations."[18] Unfortunately for the cause, Letona's purpose was discovered when he reached the state of Vera Cruz; and he took poison after being apprehended.

A more important problem still confronted Hidalgo, that of putting his troops into shape to meet Calleja, who was already advancing. He was hampered by the lack of capable officers and was woefully deficient in military equipment. To meet this want, guns and artillery were made at the arsenal of San Blas and conveyed under enormous difficulties to Guadalajara. For the rest, he depended upon hand grenades, large iron-pointed rockets, and similar expensive devices of doubtful value. The army which he managed to assemble was the largest which he had ever led to combat, and consisted of nearly 100,000 men with 20,000 cavalry and 95 cannon.

As Calleja approached the city, conflict of opinion again arose between Hidalgo and Allende. The latter proposed that they should send out the organized troops with the available artillery in waves of attack, so that in case of a reverse, the main body of their forces would still remain on foot to block the enemy until an orderly retreat could be made. Hidalgo, on the contrary, insisted again that the entire army should be led out at once, and, as usual, he gained his point.

With the news of Calleja's approach, on January 13, this mighty host was led out of Guadalajara and the following day arrived at the bridge of Calderon, twelve leagues away. Here a strong position was selected by Allende and Abasalo and was fortified. Calleja arrived on the sixteenth with only 6000 men; but these were well drilled and amply equipped, and he soon succeeded in getting control of the bridge. The next day he attempted to break through the lines of the insurgents, but was repeatedly thrown back, and would have been forced to retreat in disorder but for an amazing accident. One of his bombs struck an ammunition wagon of the insurgents, with a tremendous explosion. The fire quickly spread to the dry grass, and the wind, blowing against the insurgents, soon wrapped them in the general conflagration. Demoralization was complete. Within six hours, Calleja's victory was assured, with comparatively few losses on his side. The next day he rested and then proceeded to Guadalajara with the serviceable munitions which the insurgents had abandoned in their flight. He arrived in the city on January 21, where he was received with the same acclaim as had been accorded Hidalgo but a short time before.

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[18] Cf. *Diccionario cit.,* IV, p. 108.

The insurgent chieftains fled in different directions to Zacatecas. Rayón managed to escape with about 300,000 pesos of army funds. Hidalgo found his way to Aguascalientes. On his way thence to Zacatecas, he was met by Allende, Arias, and other leaders at the Hacienda del Pabellon, and was deposed from his command, political as well as military. This action was not made public. He remained as a figurehead for reasons of popular sentiment; but in reality he was henceforth to follow the movements of the army as a prisoner.

vii

One by one, the cities occupied by the insurgents fell back into the hands of the royalist troops. From Zacatecas, the remnants of Hidalgo's once large following – now a poorly armed force of less than 5000 men – retreated to Saltillo. Further action would be fruitless. Accordingly, a plan was laid that the principal leaders should go to the United States to secure weapons and ammunition for reorganization. About this time, a general pardon was offered to the revolutionists by the Spanish Cortes and communicated by General Cruz to Hidalgo. The latter declined the offer but kept knowledge of the overture to himself. According to Bustamante, he replied in a letter: "Pardon, Your Excellency, is for criminals, not for the defenders of their country. . . . The entire country is in a ferment; these movements have aroused those who lay in inactivity. . . . The agitation is general, and Mexico will soon learn its mistake if these evils are not shortly removed."[19]

The hopes and plans of the revolutionists, however, were soon to be dashed to pieces. Ignacio Aldama, who had been elected as minister plenipotentiary to the United States, to purchase arms and enlist men, and his companion, Padre Juan Salazar, were seized at Béjar, on March 1, during the course of a counterrevolution, and delivered to the executioner. A most incredible fate was in store for the other leaders.

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[19] Carlos María de Bustamante, *Cuadro histórico de la revolución de la America Mexicana* (Mexico, 1823), tomo I, pp. 237, 238.

On March 16, a council was held by the high command, and Ignacio Rayón was designated as chief of staff during the absence of the leaders on their mission to the United States. Allende departed from Saltillo with 2000 soldiers, some artillery, and the treasury consisting of a great amount of jewelry and about 500,000 pesos. Fourteen carriages carried all the principal leaders, numbering 60, Hidalgo among them. News of the events at Béjar had not reached this command, and no particular danger was apprehended, so that military order was neglected in the march across the desert. The first objective were the wells at Baján.

In the meantime a disaffected insurgent, Lieutenant Colonel Ignacio Elizondo, decided to take revenge on Allende, who had refused to promote him to the rank of lieutenant general. When Elizondo learned of Allende's line of march, he organized a troop of 300 soldiers and sent word that he would welcome him on the way. Accordingly, he concealed his men and prepared to receive the general, whose straggling line began to appear at nine o'clock on the morning of March 21. In accordance with Elizondo's advice, the carriages and leaders advanced before the main body of troops, so as to give time for the wells to fill up again for those following. He arranged for the leaders and carriages to pass through files of his men and, after being saluted, to continue to the rear where the ambush had been prepared.

The first to arrive was Fray Pedro Bustamante with a guard of five soldiers. Without the slightest suspicion, he passed through the line until he suddenly found himself surrounded and made captive. A troop of men followed into the trap. The same thing happened to the first carriage, which was occupied by women. One after another the leaders were seized and bound as they came along. Allende reached for his gun as soon as he realized the treachery, but his son and Arias paid with their lives before he was overpowered. Hidalgo was the last to arrive, and prepared to resist, pistol in hand, as soon as he was told to surrender; but recognizing the futility of such action, he gave himself up with the rest.

Elizondo then directed a portion of his troops against the demoralized insurgent line. Those who were not dispersed by his onslaught passed over to his side or were taken prisoners. With all the equipment and treasury of the insurgents and nearly 900 captives, the traitor made his way to Monclova where a heavy guard was placed over the prize. On the twenty-sixth of March, Hidalgo was shackled, like the other leaders of the revolt, including several clergy, and escorted on pack animals over 200 leagues of heavy road to Chihuahua, for trial. It was not until April 23 that the prisoners reached the city.

viii

Preparations were begun at once for court martial. The cases rested upon the statements of the prisoners which were made to specially appointed judges. On May 7, a military court was set up, composed of a president, auditor, secretary, and four voting members, and the first declaration was taken. Hidalgo stated that his inclination toward independence had thrown him into the movement, that the sudden turn of affairs did not give him time to take what might be considered necessary steps for the revolution, and that later the ease with which thousands of recruits were enlisted relieved him of further worry along this line. He admitted that he had not adopted a definite plan of organization to systematize the revolution. He had been moved toward it simply by thought "of the advantages that would result from independence, without calculating the obstacles or taking into account the different interests that always manifest themselves in the execution of such enterprises." He had attempted to fan the flames of hate against the Spanish Government, he said, not because he had a rational foundation, but because this was necessary to build up the cause.

In general, the testimony of the revolutionists did not measure up to the glorious cause as they had conceived it, and the declarations of Allende and Hidalgo hindered rather than helped each other. Hidalgo accused Allende of massacring the Spaniards in various places, while Allende admitted that because of his bitter disappointment in Hidalgo, he had wished to poison the priest.[20] There can be no doubt, however, that a great deal of the evidence and testimony in the case was officially offered and worded in such a way as to present the insurgent leaders, in particular Allende and Hidalgo, as traitors and cravens. Precisely what were Hidalgo's final sentiments may possibly be never known.

Nevertheless, the documents of the Spanish colonial government show him as having repented his insurrection, declaring that the entire enterprise was unjust, unwise, and diametrically opposed to the principles of the Gospel. On August 3, 1811, the *Gaceta* of Mexico inserted a copy of a retraction which he was asserted to have written on May 18, confessing his errors committed against God and the King, begging pardon of the bishops and the Inquisition, and asking the insurgents to abandon the cause.[21] Bancroft considers that this was a "spurious statement," probably promulgated in order to turn independents against the cause.[22] Other historians, like Priestley, are inclined to maintain its authenticity, while regretting that Hidalgo was induced to write it.[23]

The first executions took place on May 10. On June 6, Mariano Hidalgo, brother of the general, was led out to be shot, and on the twenty-sixth, Allende and others suffered the same fate. These men were shot in the back as traitors, and their property was confiscated. Inasmuch as Hidalgo was a cleric, his sentence had to be delayed because of ecclesiastical formalities. When Doctor Olivares, bishop of Durango, refused to degrade six other priests who had been condemned to death for taking part in the movement, the civil authority had them executed without their religious garb. They were later dressed in their proper robes and then delivered for church burial.

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[20] Hernández y Dávalos, *Documentos cit.*, I, pp. 14, 15, 39.

[21] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, apénd., *doc. num.*, 14.

[22] H. H. Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, IV, p. 286, footnote.

[23] Herbert I. Priestley, *The Mexican Nation* (New York, 1935), p. 222.

The ecclesiastical degradation of Hidalgo took place, by order of the bishop of Durango, July 29, 1811, and after the touching ceremony, in which he was divested of his priestly vestments, the ecclesiastical judge begged the civil court that neither the death penalty nor mutilation might be decreed. The answer to this was that Hidalgo should face the firing squad, but not be executed in public like his companions.

To the very end, the old warrior maintained a remarkable serenity. The night before his death he wrote with charcoal upon the walls of his cell two stanzas of verse in appreciation of the two men who were assigned to attend him. Before daybreak on July 31, he was led out to the place of execution. To the soldiers of the firing squad he distributed some pieces of candy that he had saved. Then, after being secured to a seat, he placed his hand to his breast, saying: "The right hand which I shall place on my breast, my sons, will be the certain target for your aims." He then recited the psalm *Miserere mei* and waited the end.

As a warning against further revolution, the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jiménez were delivered to Guanajuato and hung in iron cages at the four corners of the Alhóndiga, where they remained for ten years. Their bodies were buried in the Franciscan chapel, until an order of Congress in 1823 decreed their transfer, with the skulls, to the cathedral of Mexico, where they were received with great veneration and solemnity. In 1926, the government removed them from the church to the monument of Independence in the capital.

With Hidalgo passed the first phase of the revolution. Judged merely by his military contributions, he left little of permanent value. Death and destruction had followed in the wake of his armies. The Spaniards who were so unfortunate as to come in the way of the insurgents were cruelly treated, irrespective of guilt. Not even the clergy were spared. Capable of arousing a tremendous enthusiasm in the Indians and simple people of the land, he was unable to restrain their rapacity, once aroused, or discipline them for effective action. Hidalgo was not a great organizer, and the revolution shortly rose to proportions beyond his control. He allowed himself to be carried away, as at Guadalajara, with external ceremony and ridiculous pomp, without laying solid foundations for his position. Inspired by dreams of a glorious, independent Mexico, he failed to realize the extent of the task and the necessity of a plan, or the lethargy and even opposition of a people who preferred peace and order, even with limited self-expression, to the bloodshed, ruin, and uncertainty of revolution.

"In his plan of revolution," wrote Alamán, an eyewitness of the frightful events at Guanajuato, "Hidalgo followed the same ideas as those of the promoters of independence in the juntas of Iturrigaray. He proclaimed Ferdinand VII: he pretended to sustain his rights and to defend them against the intentions of the Spaniards to deliver the country into the hands of the French, who were already the masters of Spain and would destroy religion, profane the churches, and extinguish Catholic worship. Religion, therefore, assumed the leading rôle; and, as the image of Guadalupe is the preferred object of the religious veneration of the Mexicans, the inscription placed on the banners of the revolution was: 'Long live religion. Long live Our Most Holy Mother of Guadalupe. Long live Ferdinand VII. Long live America and down with bad government.' But the people who rushed in to follow this banner simplified the inscription and its effect by shouting simply 'Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe and death to the *gachupines*.' Monstrous union of religion with assassination and plunder, the cry of death and desolation, which I heard thousands upon thousands of times in my early youth and, after so many years, still sounds in my ears with a frightful echo!

"It is not strange in a people among whom, unfortunately, religion had decayed almost to mere external practices, many of its clergy, particularly in the small villages, abandoning themselves to a most licentious life, and a propensity to theft the dominant vice of the mass of the population, that followers should be found for a revolution whose first step was to put criminals at liberty, deliver the more wealthy element of the country over to unlimited plunder, inciting the people against everything which they had up to this time feared or respected, giving loose rein to all vices, lavishing military honors, and opening a vast field to the ambition of its minions. Thus it happened that the Cura Hidalgo everywhere found a predisposition so favorable that he needed only to present himself to attract the masses to himself. But the means which he employed to win this popularity destroyed the very foundations of the social edifice, suffocated every principle of morality and justice, and gave origin to all the evils which the nation laments and which all proceed from that poisoned font."[24]

Nevertheless, Hidalgo must be considered the first to initiate the movement for independence, which, by a strange turn of fate, was completed by a man who was instrumental in his defeat, Agustín Iturbide. Without Hidalgo, as Orozco y Berra says, there would not have been Iturbide. The glory of Hidalgo and of his associates was not that of success, but rather that, counting no sacrifice too great, they launched the movement for independence with the thought of doing good for their country.

The sixteenth of September, anniversary of the *Grito de Dolores,* has therefore become a national holiday in Mexico because it recalls the beginning of the movement which eventually brought independence. Inseparably linked with that event is the challenging name of Miguel Hidalgo.

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[24] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.,* tomo I, pp. 379, 380.

CHAPTER IX

José María Morelos

SOLDIER OF INDEPENDENCE

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THE movement for Mexican independence in its culmination under Iturbide was directed by the creole *latifundistas* or large landowners. In its complete evolution and natural cycle, however, it was undoubtedly the product or reflection of a contemporary revolutionary sentiment which had enveloped the world. As a world phenomenon, this sentiment took the form of a protest against the retention of political power by the old feudal nobility. But in Mexico, where the rising middle classes constituted a small body and the lower classes lacked cohesion, the movement, attracting the small farmers and lower clergy at the head of the Indian masses, must be attributed to the personality of two leaders, Hidalgo and Morelos.

In the beginning, at least, the so-called War for Independence was, more properly, a series of civil wars – not so much a struggle of the colony against the mother country as one between the minorities of two confused groups. On the one hand, there was the partly organized colony, on the other, the highly organized but decadent officialdom of the capital, both sides falling back for military support upon the Indians.

Hidalgo's fight was for a general housecleaning of European Spanish minorities and monopolies in Mexico rather than against the rule of Bourbon Spain. Morelos, who carried on the struggle, proceeded to repudiate the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII, whom Hidalgo had, at least in the beginning, glorified, and to declare for national independence. But the creoles who held governmental positions or owned property were horrified by the apparent anarchy that characterized a good deal of these movements and, although dissatisfied with many elements of Spanish rule, resisted both Hidalgo and Morelos as they would a plague. There was, of course, a definite international intervention in favor of the independence of the colonies from Spain, on the part of both England and the United States, ranging all the way from piracy to shipment of arms and diplomacy, and this was resented quite as much by sectors of creole sentiment as it was by Spain itself.

A deeper view of the situation must see the rise of a new concept of the social fabric of the country and a move against the political and social organization that Spain had been developing for three centuries in viceregal New Spain. For the traditionally loyal groups and friends of order in Mexico, the country was a province of Spain, attached to the capital, without any distinctive nationality conferred upon it by the suppressed Indian tribes within its borders. But the Indian natives, the *mestizos*, and the disaffected creoles at their head, began to feel the existence of a new national sentiment arising, as it were, from a distinct social entity.

If the first stages of this struggle, as brought to a head by Hidalgo, were characterized by a bloody encounter between the races, without a clear-cut political or social program, the appearance of Morelos upon the scene converted the movement into one of definite aims and national concepts. Morelos did not possess the personal magnetism of Hidalgo. Nevertheless, he was a far greater military leader, with the strength of character to carry on his campaigns after those of his contemporary and colleague had resulted in dismal failure. From the most meager and disorganized materials he knew how to create vital elements and with an army not exceeding 8000 men was able to carry on a campaign for over three years against government forces numbering 86,000. More than this, his vision looked beyond the merely military or vindictive and saw, with extraordinary keenness, a charter of national progress based on constitutional guarantees.

The birth and baptism of José María Teclo Morelos y Pavon are recorded in the city of Valladolid, today Morelia, as having taken place in the year 1765, on September 30 and October 4 respectively. From the evidence of this document and his own statement, Morelos came from a humble creole family. Lucas Alamán and other historians insist that he had Indian and possibly Negro blood in his veins. His father, Manuel Morelos, appears to have been a carpenter, and his ancestors were accounted to be "Christians for a long time back, of clean blood, and good reputation."

His father died while José María was still a child. Until his twenty-fifth year, the boy worked as a farm hand, although he seems to have secured an elementary education during this time. Then he decided to carry out his early hope to study for the priesthood, and in 1790 entered the College of San Nicolás in Valladolid. During his course there, Morelos must have come under the influence of Miguel Hidalgo, who was a teacher and later the rector of the institution and destined to become his mentor during the early part of the revolution. What may have been the personal relationship between the two men at this time is matter for speculation, but between the brilliant professor and the retarded and obscure student, the bonds could not have been very close.

Apparently the need for priests in the poorer and remote places was so great that they were ordained after the minimum of studies. Following his course at San Nicolás, Morelos entered the Tridentine seminary, where he studied scholastic philosophy, moral theology, and a little Latin. His work was satisfactory, so that in 1795 he received his baccalaureate of arts, after examination, from the University of Mexico. His work at the seminary continued; he was given the various clerical orders and ordained priest in 1797.

His financial condition during this time was extremely modest. He still had his mother to think of, and whatever the youth may have managed to save from his own labor was soon consumed. Even during his diaconate, he was obliged to accept the offer of the parish priest of Uruapán to teach grammar and rhetoric to the children of an elementary school. This occupation lasted from January, 1796, to February, 1798, so that he was granted certain exemptions by the seminary to carry on his work.

His first appointment came, January 31, 1798, when he was assigned to a poor curacy at Churumuco, with residence in

Tamácaro de la Huacana. He asked for a transfer to a cooler region shortly afterward and in early March was ordered to exchange places with Father Eugenio Reyes Arroyo, and take the parish of Carácuaro while acting as an ecclesiastical judge.

After eight months in the second place, Morelos found himself the object of a manifesto drawn up by the parishioners, complaining of the church taxes and the personal services due the pastor, and asserting that "he compelled them to pay, scolded them, annoyed and even maltreated them."[1] He defended himself point by point and offered to reduce his already humble allowance by one fourth. This would leave him sixteen pesos a month. His defense was thoroughly confirmed by Father Arroyo, and the entire incident passed off without any apparent change in his parochial fervor. Sometime later he constructed a church in the village of Nircupétaro. His duties included also a small settlement at Acuyo, and the religious services of the haciendas of Cutzian and Santa Cruz. In these spiritual capacities he remained until 1810.

There was little to indicate the future greatness of the man. His personal appearance was not prepossessing. A little less than five feet tall, heavy in build and stolid in manner, he had little of the martial about him. He fulfilled his parish duties with reasonable efficiency, but indiscretions in violation of his priestly vows, during both his pastoral and his military careers, gave him two sons and one daughter. What development in his political ideas took place during this period of his career is difficult to say. For some time, of course, Valladolid had been a center of advanced thought, where a brilliant circle of clergy had been drawn together in discussions on theology, economic problems, and contemporary literature.

It is interesting to note that the Spanish priest, Manuel Abad y Queypo, later bishop-elect of Michoacán and one of the most outspoken foes of the revolution, was one of the leaders for reform, pointing out the four social evils which Spain was unable to cure: economic disorder, oppression of the native races, administrative abuses, and abuses of the *Patronato*. At the same time he demanded the abolition of "the system of monopoly and general suppression which the government has extended to this country, degrading the nation in proportion to its extension and development and leaving it without agriculture, arts, industry, commerce, marine, military defense, without culture, glory, or honor, outside of a few short intervals in which the vision of certain monarchs gave it some opportunity. . . . The Americas and all their freeborn inhabitants ought to enjoy the same general rights as our laws grant to the provinces of the mother country and its inhabitants."[2]

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[1] Cf. Alfonso Teja Zabre, *Morelos* (Madrid, 1934), p. 35.

By 1808, the Viceroy Venegas reported that a conspiracy had been discovered and thwarted in Valladolid. "But," he added, "the fire continued to make subtle progress, until its flame was discovered in the extent of doing great damage. The secular and regular clergy of that city beginning with the greater part of those attached to the cathedral have supported the seditious and absurd ideas of Father Hidalgo, whom they regard as an oracle."[3] In this atmosphere, and under the influence of Hidalgo, the general viewpoint, at least, of Morelos must have been formed. Later experience in the impoverished missions under his charge undoubtedly increased his resentment against colonial rule and began to shape his determination in case the revolution should appear.

Some historians have seen during this period the beginning of a close association between Hidalgo and Morelos in planning insurrection. The first evidences of the latter's active interest are to be found rather in the news of Hidalgo's revolt in the early part of October, 1810. Morelos beheld the Spaniards fleeing from Valladolid and Pátzcuaro upon the approach of the Insurgent army. Consequently he went up to Valladolid to investigate the situation and there learned that his old teacher was at the head of the movement. He immediately set out to follow the Insurgents and caught up with them at Indaparapeo. Hidalgo gave him a warm welcome and proceeded to settle his scruples over the excommunication launched against the rebels by Abad y Queypo.

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[2] Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso), V, p. 49.

[3] Cf. *Archivo General de Indias,* 89–1–19.

Apparently his mind was easily made up, for Hidalgo issued an order naming him lieutenant with a commission of considerable importance. "For the present," his orders read, "I commission in due form my Lieutenant D. José María Morelos, parish priest of Carácuaro, to raise troops on the Southern coast, according to the verbal instructions I have given him."[4] These instructions included the arrest of Spaniards, reorganization of authority, collection of ammunitions, and the seizure of Acapulco. With no more external aid than this commission and the inspiration which he received from the personality and enthusiasm of Hidalgo, Morelos returned to his curacy to lay plans for a military career.

He reported his resolution to the governor of the miter, Mariano Escandón y Llera, who was already in sympathy with the movement and merely recommended that he try to avoid bloodshed. The following day, to regularize his position, he went to the bishop's secretary, early in the morning, but when that official failed to appear by nine o'clock, he wrote out an account of his commission from Hidalgo, explaining that he had not a minute to spare, and asked that a coadjutor be placed at Curácuaro, reserving one third of the income for himself. These provisions were later respected by the officials of the diocese, although Morelos was never to return to claim his parish.

ii

One of the chief reasons for the disorderly and anarchical character of the campaigns under Hidalgo was undoubtedly the scarcity of arms and ammunition. Hordes of men bent on violence and destruction attached themselves to the movement of which they understood but little and rendered military discipline practically impossible.

Morelos' first campaign, therefore, was an effort to collect arms and train a militia. In October, 1810, he marched out of

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[4] Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1850), tomo II, p. 314.

Carácuaro with twenty-five men equipped with muskets and lances, proceeding toward Zacatula. His troopers wore the ordinary outfit of the region, but the erstwhile humble pastor got himself up in garb which he deemed more suited to his new rank. On his head was a fine Peruvian sombrero, like those worn by the rich ranchers of the era. Under this was a white silk handkerchief tied in the back. A kind of white Moorish cloak partly muffled his face. He wore campaign boots and provided himself with a brace of pistols.

At Zacatula he was joined by the captain of the cavalry, Marcos Martínez, who offered him fifty armed men. At Petatlán, in the absence of the captain, 100 men and half as many guns were added; and Morelos began to take the offensive. The defensive forces of the viceroy in this region were, outside of the garrison at Acapulco, of the most meager character. For the most part they were composed of local volunteers who had no experience and were poorly organized. As soon as Morelos attacked the city of Tecpan, its captain withdrew toward Acapulco, and a considerable part of his forces deserted to the Insurgents. On November 8, he was joined by the Galeana brothers, who brought men, arms, and the first cannon. Thus, with similar additions, Morelos' army soon numbered 3000 men, although not all were armed.

On November 9, the new army set off for Acapulco. This city, with its stronghold of San Diego, had already been attacked by the Insurgents under Cortés and Rafael Valdovinos, who tried to cut its communications. Morelos improved his position by receiving recruits who had come from the city, and thus augmented, he returned to his headquarters at Aguacatillo. At the beginning of the following year he began to invest the forces of Acapulco, taking advantage of the secret promises of certain Spanish officers. By the end of February, however, his plans had gone awry, and he was obliged to retire in some disorder to Tecpan. From there he proceeded toward Chilpancingo, on May 3. In the meantime, during an enforced idleness due to his sickness, the viceregal government began to recruit forces from various parts of the country.

At the hacienda of La Brea, Morelos was joined by the Bravo brothers, Nicolás, Miguel, and Victor, and father, Leonardo, who had already distinguished themselves in the cause for independence, and later by Hermenegildo Galeana with his regiment of Guadalupe. Thus reinforced, he arrived at Chilpancingo, on the evening of May 24, and was honored with a banquet at the Bravo home, together with an assembly of Insurgent chieftains and officials.

His next move was to attack Tixtla, which was already preparing itself, under the leadership of Cosío and Guevara, to resist the combined Insurgent forces. The defense of the city lay in a fortress and eight pieces of heavy artillery besides some 1600 men. It was Cosío's plan to allow the Insurgents, who numbered about 600, to come in close and then fall upon them. As soon the Insurgent lines appeared, the drums of the city were sounded, and the cry of "Long live the King," went up.

Morelos appointed Father Talavera, as lieutenant colonel, to parley for surrender before blood should be shed. The parley was offered but haughtily rejected, and the Insurgents marched toward the city. The regiment of Guadalupe, under the Galeana brothers and Vicente Guerrero, penetrated as far as the last fortifications of the plaza. Miguel and Victor Bravo took the northern section of the fortified part, and Cosío and Guevara fled toward Mexico City. Six hours were ample for this triumph, and Morelos found himself in possession of 200 guns, 8 cannon, and 600 prisoners. He subsequently divided his forces, leaving Galeana and Bravo at Tixtla, and returned with the rest of the army to Chilpancingo.

From then on, in spite of counterattacks by the Spaniards under the command of Fuentes, everything was favorable to the Insurgent cause in the South. In the various engagements three royalist generals, Paris, Cosío, and Fuentes had been defeated. Only the garrison of Acapulco remained. Morelos now had a well-disciplined body of troops acting under a premeditated plan and working with some artillery and ample supplies.

In the period which followed, from August to November, 1811, Morelos was kept busy with preparations for his second campaign. During this time he turned his attention not only to military supplies but also to a strengthening of military discipline, acquiring a reputation for ruthless justice toward desertion and theft of munitions. So far as his revolutionary program and his idea of independence were concerned, he was content to take orders from Hidalgo. Nevertheless, he showed the vigor of his own character and the honesty of his purpose by refusing to turn any of the large sums of money or supplies that passed through his hands to his own personal advantage.

That he was not a mere obedient minion was soon to appear in events that followed. First came the crushing news of the capture of Hidalgo and Allende. The effect of this upon his own spirit can well be imagined; but he determined to keep the slightest intimation of the disaster from his troops. Later came the formation of the Junta of Zitácuaro, on August 19, dominated by Ignacio López Rayón, with José María Licéaga, and José Sixto Verduzco. Morelos was shortly afterward named the fourth member with the title of lieutenant general, although he showed himself frankly dissatisfied with the duplicity of that body in professing allegiance to Ferdinand VII.

"Your Excellency must have reflected," he was told by the rest of the committee, "that we have proclaimed in our Junta the name of Ferdinand VII, which up to this time has not involved anything. We certainly would not have done it if we had not seen definite advantages. With this strategy we have been able to secure the desertion of many European troops to our cause; and many Americans, vacillating in a vain fear of acting against the King, have become our strongest partisans."[5] The report plainly admitted that the Junta had no intention of keeping its oath to the King, and was using this simply as a bait.

Rayón, who called himself Captain General of all the Mexican Armies, President of the Supreme Court, and Universal Minister of the Nation, was destined to be a source of constant confusion and embarrassment to Morelos. The first open conflict came in the incident of Tabares and the American, David. Morelos had given these men an indeterminate commission to establish relations with the United States. On their way, they were stopped by Rayón, who made Tabares a brigadier and David a colonel, and sent them back to Morelos for recognition. The latter refused to ratify their new honors, whereupon the two began to organize an uprising, with the idea of nullifying the advantages gained by the Insurgents and killing Morelos. Morelos put himself energetically to suppress the movement, and the conspirators were soon apprehended and executed.

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[5] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, p. 382.

During these difficulties, poor health continued to afflict him. Although a man of good physique, he found himself troubled by a recurrence of the ailments which forced him to rest at Tecpan. During his rapid expedition against Tabares he had to ask for the last sacraments. Later, one of his legs was injured by a fall from his horse, and he was repeatedly afflicted with malarial fevers. To these adversities were added numerous threats against his life. Among the warnings which he received was one from Rayón who advised him to be on his guard against a person whom he described as a large, big-bellied fellow. Morelos answered: "There is no big-bellied fellow here besides myself, and my ailments have worn me down."

There was also the delicate and painful question of the morality of the war and of his standing in the Church. On November 14, 1811, Bishop Manuel Ignacio Campillo of Puebla sent him a lengthy communication denouncing him in the roundest terms and calling for his conversion to peace. In the first place he accused him of having imprisoned and badly treated various fellow priests. "Your conduct," he complained, "is certainly not that of a priest of the New Testament. Instead of leading souls to heaven, you are sending thousands to hell." He accused him of administering the sacraments and making ecclesiastical appointments in the diocese without his permission, of adding sacrilege to bloodshed. "When I try to calculate the crimes provoked by the insurrection," he declared, "my imagination is overwhelmed, and I see only an ocean of crime and sin, and you *submerged in it*. . . . What if you succeed in all your plans? What if you establish the independence of America? What if you finish with the Europeans and make this realm the most prosperous empire in the world? What will all these advantages and this glory serve you in the next life? There, political considerations and temporal convenience mean nothing." His picture did not omit even the prophecy of a sad end. "When you are locked up in a jail," he said, "and about to ascend an ignominious scaffold like Hidalgo, or stretched out upon a bed, a few moments before drawing your last breath, you will see the horror of the deeds you are now committing, although you do not now recognize them because of the blindness which the exaltation of your passions has wrought upon your understanding."[6]

Morelos replied briefly and point by point, maintaining that the clergy whom he had imprisoned were well treated and confined only because of their opposition to the movement. Only the sacraments of necessity were administered, and marriages were still awaiting the episcopal dispensation. Even the bishop of Michoacán, "our most bitter enemy," he declared, had given necessary dispensations to the Insurgents of Atoyac. "Your Excellency," he said, "has declared that independence is still a political problem, and I should add that the necessary means for prosecuting the present war can also be defended on this hypothesis. Would to God that Your Excellency might take up the pen to defend it in favor of the Americans! You would, without doubt, find greater reasons for it than that of the Anglo-Americans or the people of Israel. The justice of our cause is *per se nota*. . . . The truth is, Illustrious Sir, that Your Excellency has done us small favor in your manifestos, for in them you have done nothing more than to blacken our conduct, conceal our rights and praise the Europeans – a great dishonor to the nation and its armies. . . . For myself, it would be easier to apply to Rome for a dispensation after the war than survive the guillotine, and to preserve religion with more purity among my countrymen than among the French and similar foreigners."[7]

In any event, he was ready to undertake his second campaign early in November, 1811. The first place in the line of march was Tlapa, which fell into Insurgent hands easily, as the royal troops retreated toward Oaxaca. The next objective was the rich hacienda of Mateo Musitu, a Spaniard who had determined upon resistance and even named one of his cannon "Mata-Morelos"

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[6] *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1856), apénd., II, pp. 899, 900.

[7] *Diccionario cit., loc. cit.,* p. 901.

(Kill Morelos). With hardly more than 100 men of his convoy and a large body of Indian archers as auxiliaries, Morelos fell upon the place and took all the Spaniards as prisoners. Musitu pleaded for his life and offered 50,000 pesos, but Morelos ordered him shot.

He now divided his forces into three parts, one under Miguel Bravo for action against the city of Oaxaca, another under Galeana to proceed against Taxco, and the third under his personal direction, to strike where most needed. Bravo was defeated in Ometepec, but Galeana's division succeeded, after considerable difficulty, in taking Taxco. Morelos entered the city of Izúcar (today Matamoros), welcomed by the people; and, as it happened to be December 12, the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe, he preached the sermon in the parish church. He enlisted the aid of D. Mariano Matamoros, parish priest of Jantetelco whom he met in Izúcar, and began to prepare for the defense of the city against the government troops. Morelos successfully withstood the subsequent attacks, and, leaving Vicente Guerrero to guard the city, set out for Taxco.

Here he found the city under the domination of Marshal Martínez, who had been sent by the Junta of Zitácuaro. Reasserting his own authority, he took over the distribution of arms which Martínez had begun, and ordered the summary execution of the Spanish commandant García Ríos, who had already surrendered, together with various subordinate officers and European residents.

From there, he moved into the valley of Toluca, where large numbers of disorganized troops which had fought under Hidalgo were now being sorely pressed by Royalist forces. When the commander of the latter, Porlier, learned that Morelos was on his way to relieve the Insurgent chieftain Oviedo, he sent to the viceroy for aid from General Calleja. For some reason, this did not arrive, and Porlier had to rely on such local material as he could organize. The vanguard of Morelos' troops, under Galeana, arrived in the Toluca valley about the middle of January, 1812.

Galeana's first rash attack resulted in the loss of his artillery and the death of Oviedo. With the arrival of Morelos on the twenty-second, the tide of battle turned, and Porlier was forced to flee to the city of Toluca, leaving all his artillery behind. After taking Tenancingo, Morelos proceeded to take Cuernavaca and the neighboring ranches, on February 9. From there he moved on toward Cuautla.

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By this time the viceregal government was thoroughly alarmed at the situation. In his instructions to General Calleja, Viceroy Venegas declared that Mexico City was surrounded by Insurgents and was low in provisions. Its communications were intercepted, and the only free roads, to Toluca and Texcoco, were in constant danger. Communication with Valladolid, Puebla, and Tlaxcala was exceedingly difficult. Commerce with Acapulco, the port of the Orient, was impossible. Orizaba and Vera Cruz were likewise cut off, and access to the mines for powder and quicksilver was being rapidly closed.

All these evils, the viceroy declared were "rooted in the body of Morelos, the chief of the insurrection at present. We can say that he has been its genius, a man of the greatest determination, resources, and cunning, with certain circumstances favorable to his plans. . . . It is therefore essential to draw up a plan which will give Morelos and his gang a decisive blow, to terrify them into deserting this infamous chieftain, if he cannot be captured."[8] Accordingly, he called upon Calleja to leave the interior provinces and concentrate on the places taken by the Insurgents.

Calleja, however, who had drawn his recruits principally from Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, was unwilling to take the risks involved in a march to Taxco, and replied in a haughty tone to his superior. There was nothing for Venegas to do but accept his resignation and name a successor. The subordinate officers immediately protested to such an extent that Calleja was not only restored but given a triumphal entry into Mexico City, with general promotions for his army and, for himself, a conqueror's escutcheon with the motto, "He conquered in Aculco, Guanajuato, and Calderon." To this army were now joined the troops of the third battalion of the Asturian regiment and the first regiment of Lovera, fresh from Spain and the campaign against the French.

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[8] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, p. 486.

Inasmuch as the principal points held by the Rebels were Cuautla, Izúcar, and Taxco, it was decided to begin by attacking the first two places with troops from Puebla reinforced by men from Calleja's Army of the Center. On February 6, reinforcements for the Puebla division left Mexico City. On the twelfth, the main body set out, arriving on the seventeenth at Pasulco, two miles from Cuautla, where it pitched camp. Morelos had already determined upon resistance at this point, and had left instructions for its fortification during his expedition in the Toluca valley.

The resources at his disposal consisted of 1000 infantry and 2000 cavalry in the brigades of Galeana, Bravo, and Matamoros. To these were added 300 men sent by the Junta of Zitácuaro and about 1000 Indians for secondary aid. These were hardly ample to meet the forces of Calleja, which numbered almost 12,000, in open field or on the offensive. He was therefore obliged to rely upon the advantages of his position. Although Cuautla stood in the open, without natural defenses, it was built on a slight elevation, and the construction of the city lent itself to easy fortification.

On February 18, Calleja began to move cautiously toward Cuautla, looking for a favorable spot to fall upon the Insurgents. He was met by Morelos, who attacked his rear guard with a troop of cavalry but fell back in disorder. Morelos himself barely escaped with his life. Calleja began his assault upon the city early the next morning and felt so certain of immediate victory that he began to enter the city in a coach with his wife and baggage, surrounded by the Spanish administrators of the surrounding haciendas. As a matter of fact, the engagement was to continue sixty-two days.

The first attack lasted six hours, and the troops of Calleja, badly demoralized, were obliged to retreat toward Cuautlixco. The Royalist general then sent a dispatch to Venegas, assuring him of ultimate victory, but calling for reinforcements and supplies for a siege of six to eight days. No better luck greeted the royal forces at Izúcar. Two of the recently arrived Spanish columns were driven back by the insurgents under Father Sánchez, Vicente Guerrero, and Sandoval. From that position they were ordered back to reinforce the troops of Calleja. On the tenth of March, the latter began his bombardment of the city. This proved so ineffectual that he sent for heavier artillery. When this was seized by marauding parties, he was reduced to a blockade.

Morelos hoped that the siege could not last longer than a month. By April 11, Calleja himself began to complain that "the atmosphere is heavy and we have already suffered heavy rains; the ground is swampy and so slow that it would be very difficult and practically impossible to move the heavy artillery. We should probably be obliged to abandon it." His own health, he proceeded to add, was badly damaged by the climate, so that he was on "the threshold of the grave," and he asked to be relieved. With the government in this terrible dilemma and Rayón storming the gates of Toluca, victory appeared close at hand for Morelos.

Unfortunately for his cause, food supplies began to fail the Insurgents. By the twenty-eighth of April, food gave out completely, and rodents, the bark of trees, and even soap began to serve the hungry. In the midst of all this, Morelos organized a series of little fiestas to raise the spirits of his soldiers. "If the constancy and attitude of the defenders of Cuautla," wrote Calleja, "were morally justifiable and directed to a just cause, they would some day merit a distinguished place in history. . . . This cleric is a second Mohammed, who promises temporal resurrection and then paradise, with the enjoyment of all the passions, to his happy Mussulmen."[9]

On May 1, Calleja ordered the publication of the amnesty granted by the Cortes, in the name of King Ferdinand VII, and granted a period of four hours, with a suspension of firing and an offer for the surrender of the garrison. Morelos ceased firing for four hours, but had no intention of accepting the amnesty, and is said to have replied: "I grant the same favor to Calleja and his side." It was impossible, however, for him to hold out any longer.

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[9] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, p. 512.

At two o'clock on the morning of May 2, he began the evacuation, proceeding silently along the bank of the river north of the city. At the outposts of the Royalists, he was obliged to return the fire of its defenders, and this aroused the entire royal forces. The cavalry of Calleja immediately set upon the fugitives, and Morelos would have been captured were it not for the resistance of his guard, which gave him time to escape.

Government troops occupied the city and completed the destruction that the siege had begun. In his dispatch, Calleja maintained that during the siege Morelos had lost more than 3000 men, by wounds, disease, and hunger. His own losses were correspondingly great. Moreover, the cost of the siege was enormous, obliging the viceroy to resort to the most oppressive forms of taxation and increasing the general spirit of revolt. Both Calleja and Venegas were extremely exasperated by the escape of Morelos. While the latter was driven from his stronghold, his long resistance against the flower of the government troops was bound to increase his own prestige.

With the remainder of his troops, he now began to reorganize, and within a month he was ready to march south with 800 men. During the siege of Cuautla, the cities of Chilpancingo, Taxco, and Chilapa had fallen back into Royalist hands. On the reappearance of Morelos, Paris at once withdrew to Oaxaca, having experienced a setback from the Insurgent band at Citlala. In the meantime, the Insurgent chieftain Valerio Trujano was being sorely besieged at Huajuapán. Morelos therefore hastened to his rescue; and, by an attack upon the rear of the Royalist troops combined with Trujano's frontal drive, he sent his enemy flying toward Oaxaca. Together with the defenders of Huajuapán, he entered Tehuacán, on August 10, with 3600 men. These forces were increased by the levy of a new army by Matamoros on the haciendas of Santa Clara and Izúcar.

Tehuacán was now selected as a strategic point for a series of campaigns. On the north and west it held the key to Puebla and the road to Vera Cruz. On the south it threatened Oaxaca, and on the east it led to Orizaba, where the government had stored large supplies of tobacco. Morelos' first move was to send Nicolás Bravo against a government convoy of some 400 men at San Augustín del Palmar. Bravo took the entire force by surprise.

A few days after this, came word that Leonardo Bravo, who had been captured after the siege of Cuautla, was condemned to death in Mexico City. The viceroy had delayed the execution of the sentence in hope that his friends might accept the amnesty. Morelos gave permission to Nicolás to abandon the Insurgent cause, if he wished, to save his father. Nicolás refused the amnesty. Morelos then offered a number of the Spanish prisoners recently captured in exchange for Leonardo, with the threat of a general execution if the offer was not taken.

When Leonardo was put to death, on September 13, Morelos ordered Nicolás Bravo to shoot the prisoners in reprisal. The latter, however, decided to pardon them and set them free, much to the displeasure of his superior, who saw in this not only a breach of discipline but a loss of prestige and a general weakening of morale. When Bravo later showed the same indulgence toward the Negroes of Temiltepec, Morelos declared, "Such does not suit a conqueror," and justified his stand by pointing out the harm that was later done by those pardoned.

After a series of marauding expeditions, he was joined by Matamoros, who brought 2000 men, and Miguel Bravo, who had recruited another 2000. Thus prepared with an army of 5000 and 40 pieces of artillery, he set out to invest Oaxaca. At this time he conferred the order of marshal upon Matamoros and Galeana, making the priest his second in command, since Galeana did not know how to read. The Insurgents arrived at Oaxaca on October 25.

A number of factors contributed to make the position of the defending general, González Saravia, precarious. His garrison, recently organized, comprised 2000 men, including a corps of clergy and another of workmen organized by the Bishop Bergoza, a bitter enemy of the insurrection, who fled upon receiving news of Morelos' approach. The Spaniards of the city had shown themselves fearful and concealed their treasures in the monasteries and convents.

Morelos occupied the village of Etla on November 24 and demanded the surrender of Oaxaca. Receiving no reply, he ordered the attack the following day. The convents of Soledad, Carmen, and Santo Domingo, which had been fortified, were soon silenced, and by two o'clock in the afternoon, Morelos entered the central plaza. The Royalist cavalry commanded by Saravia disbanded after a little show of resistance, and the city fell into the hands of the Insurgents. Saravia and the other Royalist chiefs were captured and turned over to Morelos, who had them executed in spite of their entreaties and the offer of a considerable ransom by Saravia.

This campaign, with those of his allied commanders, once more gave Morelos control of the South. Miguel and Victor Bravo had driven the Royalist troops into Acapulco. Vicente Guerrero had cleaned out the coast of Tehuantepec, and, like Father García Cano, had seized large cargoes of supplies. Matamoros had put the Spaniard chieftain Dambrini to flight at Tonalá.

iv

By January 9, 1813, Morelos had completed his domination of Oaxaca and the neighboring country. On that date he began his march to Acapulco. This move is generally conceded to have been the prelude to the decline of his fortunes and to the end of the movement of independence so far as he was concerned.

A number of factors served to confuse Morelos in his plans. While the French were being ousted from Spain, his information led him to believe that they were really in the ascendancy. Thus he wrote to Rayón: "The French are in Cádiz, but are so exhausted that they will need a year to recover, and then we shall await them in Vera Cruz." At the same time he entertained the prevalent idea that France was the traditional enemy of New Spain and that England and the United States were eager to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Mexico as an independent nation. As a matter of fact, he even contemplated ceding Texas to the United States in return for aid which might be given by that nation, and believed it necessary to have Acapulco as a port to establish national relations.[10]

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[10] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, p. 341.

By this time, Mexico was in reality under two jurisdictions. Morelos and his associates commanded all of Oaxaca to Guatemala, Michoacán as far as Colima except Acapulco, a large part of the provinces of Puebla and Mexico, part of Cuernavaca, Cuautla and Toluca, and the southern region of Vera Cruz. Not only were troops organized and taxes imposed, but civil and even ecclesiastical officers were appointed by the Insurgent government. In both Mexico City and Tlaxcala, moreover, the cause had large numbers of sympathizers, known as the Association of Guadalupe and others derisively called *Ojalateros* or "Would to God-ers." The latter groups urged Morelos to march upon the capital. Such an offensive called for a compact, unified drive, whereas, apart from the divisions commanded by Morelos, Galeana, and Matamoros, the Insurgents themselves were weakened by the jealousies of rival chieftains.

Whether from personal determination to seize the part that had thus far resisted his attacks or from a consciousness of his first commission from Hidalgo, Morelos decided first to make himself master of Acapulco. On March 16, he seized the stockades abandoned by the Royalists and entrenched his position. By April 6, he was ready to begin his attack. At his disposal were 1500 men but little artillery and no heavy pieces. Pedro Vélez, the commandant of the fort of San Diego at Acapulco, was provided with ninety cannon and several supply boats.

After six days of bombardment, Morelos made an assault which drove the Royalist combatants into the fort. He then sent a demand for surrender, which brought only a rebuff from Vélez. On the twelfth, the latter began a counterattack, which the Insurgents held off, until a tremendous explosion of powder in the storehouse demoralized the Royalists and drove them into the fort. Inasmuch, however, as the besieged forces retained access to the sea, the blockade was only partial, and the struggle was destined to go on another four months. It was not until August 17 that Morelos succeeded in closing the circle around the fort. Three days later Vélez capitulated, and Morelos took command with the toast, "Long live Spain — but Sister Spain, and not the ruler of America."

The immediate result of this victory, besides the vindication of Hidalgo's orders and the opening of the port under Insurgent direction, was the acquisition of a large quantity of war material including eighty pieces of artillery. But these gains, as soon became evident, were unable to match other losses. From the time he left Oaxaca until the taking of Acapulco, Morelos had used seven valuable months. During this period the viceroy had been able to reorganize and to win back many valuable positions. Thus the regions of Querétaro, Hidalgo, and Puebla had fallen back into his hands; and the Insurgent leaders Villagran, Rayón, and Father Correa had been sorely pressed. Morelos was able to announce that he had completed the "Conquest of the South," but at that very moment the viceregal government had plans on foot that were to eventuate in his defeat and capture.

For some time the political disunion of the Insurgent chieftains had been a matter of grave concern to the Insurgent leader. Whatever may have been his general idea of the revolution at its beginning, he realized increasingly that a concerted plan of action and civic reform was necessary if the movement was to eventuate in anything more than a repudiation of European rule and the start of an era of disorder and bloodshed. "Up to this time," he wrote, on February 17, 1813, "I am proceeding logically with what I have promised and explained to the people. I have worked with understanding. They had confided their fate into my hands. I cannot deceive them, for a thousand hells would not have been enough to punish my crime. I do not wish to leave them as a pawn, much less to sacrifice them. I am a Christian and have a soul to save, and I have sworn to sacrifice myself for my country and my religion before falsifying in one point my oath."[11]

Accordingly he put himself to the task of forming a congress to constitute the nation. The Junta of Zitacuáro had shown itself unable to form a solid front, although in 1812 Ignacio Rayón had drawn up the first draft of a constitution and submitted it to the inspection of Morelos. The latter had found it satisfactory in general outline, but, as already stated, had opposed a number of its details, notably its proposal to retain the name of Ferdinand VII in the revolutionary program. The siege of Acapulco was still in progress when he began to lay plans for an assembly at Chilpancingo. The actual meeting began on September 13, 1813. Morelos dominated the entire meeting, from the elections and appointments, to the reading of his address entitled "Sentiments of the Nation."

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[11] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, p. 342.

In spite of his reluctance to accept the post, Morelos received the commission of Generalissimo and Executive Chief, but he rejected the title of "Serene Highness," which had been acceptable to Hidalgo, and took instead that of "Servant of the Nation." He was then given the oath of "defending at the cost of his blood the Catholic Religion, the purity of the most holy Mary, and the rights of the American nation, and to fulfill to the best of his ability the office which the nation had conferred upon him."[12]

These affairs occupied his attention until the first part of November. On November 6, the Act of Independence was approved, against the objections of Rayón; and the next day Morelos left Chilpancingo to begin his fourth campaign.

Calleja had now been named viceroy, to succeed Venegas, and, on June 22, 1814, issued a manifesto announcing a new plan of strategy against the Insurgents. The movements of Morelos were to be observed by sentinels and spies, while the main groups separated from him, under the direction of Rayón, the Villagranes, and Osorno, were to be attacked. The delay at Acapulco and Chilpancingo had given the viceroy ample time to prepare for the advance of the rebel chieftain.

Morelos had decided to march on Valladolid, which maintained only a small defense. To conceal his movements, various detachments were sent in different directions. These were later reunited and, with the exception of the forces of Ramón and Rafael Rayón, which had been defeated by Llano and Iturbide, drew up their lines against Valladolid. This was on December 22. The following day he called for the surrender of the city, and prepared for the attack, giving orders to his men, for some unknown reason, to paint their faces and hands black. In the meantime, Calleja ordered Llano to join his troops with those of Bajío under the command of Colonel Iturbide, at Acámbaro. On hearing of the siege of Valladolid, these contingents hastened to the scene, arriving in the city on the twenty-fourth, and the situation began to change its character.

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[12] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, p. 563.

In retrospect, the disaster that overwhelmed the Insurgents seems utterly incredible. And the irony of fate appears in the fact that the ruin of Morelos was caused by the man who later consummated the Independence of Mexico, Agustín Iturbide. During the night, Iturbide, disregarding orders, conceived the bold plan of falling directly upon the Insurgent camp. Although his men numbered fewer than 400, the movement was so sudden that the troops of Morelos were thrown into total confusion. From a resistance to the small Royalist troop, the movement rapidly became a demoralized butchery of Insurgents among themselves and then a general flight in all directions. The orders of their officers availed nothing. Morelos seems to have fled with the first fugitives and narrowly escaped with his life.

The conduct of the Insurgent chieftain on this occasion, and later at Puruarán, where he placed Matamoros in charge of the feeble resistance against the Royalists and withdrew himself from the battle, still remains undefined; but the results were tragic and disastrous, and Matamoros was taken prisoner. With the loss of Matamoros, Morelos lost his most valuable ally. There was nothing for him to do but beg for an amnesty. To this effect he addressed himself to Calleja:

"Most Excellent Sir: In more than three years of war, your government has violated scandalously the sacred rights of nations, burning the cities to the ruin of innocent persons, killing those who have surrendered, and shooting without distinction practically all the prisoners. Nevertheless, firm in my principles, I have been indulgent towards those who have been taken in the many battles with my troops. Witness Palmar, Oaxaca, Acapulco, and other places.

"The fortune of war has placed in the hands of Your Excellency my Lieutenant General, Sr. D. Mariano Matamoros. The obligations which I have contracted with the nation cause me to communicate with Your Excellency for the first time, offering in exchange 200 Spanish prisoners, and hoping in the immediate determination of Your Excellency upon the place of the exchange, if you grant it.

"May God preserve Your Excellency for many years. Headquarters, Coyuca, January 24, 1814."

The plea went unanswered, and Padre Matamoros was shot after a summary trial.

Following the skirmish at Puruarán, the war became hardly more than a bloody punitive expedition against Morelos and the remnants of his army. Oaxaca, Acapulco, and Tehuantepec were rapidly retaken by the Spanish forces, and Morelos was forced to flee from one to the other of the places which he had shortly before brought under his command. A price was put on his head, and the direst penalties were held over the city that should extend him aid. In the face of all this he was still able to write to Andrés Quintana Roo that "if it were not arrogance, he would add that there still remained entire a fragment of Morelos and God." But on June 27, Hermenegildo Galeana was killed in action, and he declared with deep realization: "They have destroyed my two arms. Now I am nothing."

v

With military disaster, came the reawakening of dissention among the Insurgent chieftains who had up to that time been kept in check by the authority and example of Morelos. The politicians of the Congress now began to feel that the best days of the Generalissimo were over and indicated, through his secretary, Rosainz, that his resignation would be acceptable. Morelos immediately took the hint and declared his willingness to become a private soldier and even to retire to a secret place as a civilian. At the same time, the Congress found itself in sore straits, being chased by Royalist forces from one stronghold to another.

Amid all this confusion, the Congressional body issued a constitutional decree from Apatzingán, on October 22, 1814, to declare the "sublime object of freeing the nation forever from foreign domination and substituting for the Spanish monarchy a system of administration which, reuniting the nation itself in the enjoyment of its august and imprescriptible rights, leads it to the glory of independence and secures on a solid basis the prosperity of its citizens."[13] The Insurgents celebrated this occasion with great solemnity. After a solemn Mass of thanksgiving and the oath of fealty, the *Te Deum* was sung. This was followed by a banquet and a ball, at which Morelos put off his ordinary gravity of manner and danced with the rest.

The great days of the Insurgent leader, however, were over. He now took his place in the wandering Congress as "deputy for the new realm of León," and was later named an executive member but without military command. He put on a front of cordiality in his relations with the group, but Dr. Cos revealed the true state of affairs in his manifesto of August 30, 1815. "It is of rigorous justice and necessity," he declared, "imperatively required for the nation that no order issued by these bodies be recognized or obeyed. On the contrary, their members should be seized wherever they may go, with the exception of Morelos and Sánchez Arriola, who are suffering a kind of captivity, without liberty to express their sentiments or to check arbitrary action. . . . The former should be relieved of this infamous oppression in which he has been degraded and debased, since he can achieve brilliant progress by force of arms, which might yet triumph over our enemies if he were allowed to operate as before."[14]

Morelos had hoped by the reunion of the Congress of Chilpancingo to form an Insurgent nucleus capable of bringing together and organizing the scattered elements of the revolution and constitute the official personality of the nation. Outside of the elements held together by his power and military prestige, the only Insurgent forces relatively organized were those of Ignacio Rayón. The latter, as minister and president of the Supreme Junta, reflected the authority of Hidalgo; but in practice his authority was limited and even frequently disregarded, inasmuch as he failed to achieve military brilliance. Rayón, who did everything he could to prevent the formation of the Congress, never gave it more than a grudging and insincere support. For the rest, the movement dwindled into bands led by small, mutually envious and ambitious caciques and congenital rebels, such as Julian Villagran, who called himself the Emperor of Huaxteca, and Albino García, who was designated as "Alteza" or "Highness" by the Junta of Zitácuaro but declared that he recognized no *junta* besides the joining of two rivers and nothing higher than the top of a mountain.

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[13] Cf. *Primer Centenario de la Constitucion de 1824* (published by the Camara de Senadores, Mexico, 1924), pp. 123 sq.

[14] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo IV, apénd., *doc. num.*, 11, p. 43.

As the Congress of Chilpancingo assumed a legislative character, the deputies were drawn from the professional and semiprofessional classes, outside the military, who had begun as secretaries and propagandists of the movement. Among these stood out the figures of Dr. Cos and Quintana Roo, steeped in the spirit of the French Revolution which they had acquired from forbidden French books and journals. It was this influence, resulting in a form of government adopted by the Constitution of 1814 which Morelos later declared impracticable, that led to the diversity and weakness of the revolution.

Morelos was successful, however, in eliminating all fealty to Ferdinand VII. As early as March 23, 1813, he issued the following order: "Observing that not all the inhabitants of Oaxaca have understood the system of the new American government, so that disorders and sins against the commandments of God and of the Church have resulted, I hereby make this announcement. Because of the absence and captivity of the King Ferdinand VII, the government has properly devolved upon the American nation, which has created a *junta* of individuals, natives of the country, in which resides the exercise of sovereignty. Let no European remain in governance of the nation."

The fact that the name of this monarch figured in the progress of the revolution from September 16, 1810, has led to the belief that Hidalgo must have retained it to avoid an open break with public sentiment rather than to support the cause of the Bourbon line. Hidalgo's idea, in the main, however, seems to have been a change of government from that of the Europeans to one of the creoles, without affecting allegiance to the Crown. After his death, Rayón continued to sustain this policy. Breaking radically with this stand, Morelos conceived the only logical idea, without equivocation or falsehood, to be that of a new nationality and regime.

As early as 1810 he showed clearly that his idea embraced a national regime integrated in the social and economic as well as in the political order. "By these presents and in the name of His Excellency (Hidalgo)," he declared, "I make public and known to all inhabitants of this America the establishment of a new government for which, with the exception of the Europeans, all are advised not to call themselves Indians, mulattoes, or castes, but generally Americans." He was particularly insistent, not merely on the abolition of hateful racial castes and on the creation of a free *American* people, but also on the idea that sovereignty comes immediately from the people, which confides its exercise to its representatives. This power, he maintained, should be divided into the legislative, executive, and judiciary. These democratic principles were a long cry from the feudalism of the early colony and indeed far ahead even of the political ideas that came with the consummation of Independence.

In his solicitude for the natives he determined not only upon the abolition of slavery and respect for the universal right of ownership but also upon legal aid in moderating the flow of wealth. Thus in his address at Chilpancingo, on September 14, 1813, he declared, "Since good law is superior to every man, the enactments of our Congress ought to be such as oblige constancy and patriotism, and control opulence and indigence so that the income of the poor is increased, their habits improved, and ignorance dispelled, together with rapine and theft."[15]

Lucas Alamán has published a document of questionable authenticity attributed to Morelos, in which far more revolutionary and radical theories are expressed. According to this statement, Morelos intended that all the rich, nobles, and high officials should be considered public enemies and their goods should be given to the poor and to the military treasury. For the relief of the poor not even the sacred treasures of the church should be spared. The royal palaces, customhouses, and all archives except those of the parishes should be burned. Properties over two leagues should be divided to encourage small farming. The offices and factories of the rich planters, as well as the mines and sugar refineries, should be taken over without leaving more than seed and food of bare necessity.[16] As a matter of fact, Morelos reduced practically all these principles to practice during his campaigns, but this does not indicate that they were intended as a normal peacetime program.

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[15] *Diccionario cit.*, apénd. II, p. 909.

It seems clear, however, that he envisioned not only the destruction of the old Spanish regime, but also the development of an original system deemed particularly adapted to the character and necessities of the country. He succeeded in organizing the provinces under his domination and redistributed the confiscated properties of Spanish Royalists. The sales tax or *alcabala* was to be abolished together with the tribute and state monopolies. In their place were to be substituted import duties, an income tax of 5 per cent, and rents from the confiscated estates of the Spaniards, who were to be deported.

So far as religion was concerned, the Catholic religion was to be the only one in the country, without toleration of others "for every plant that is not planted by God should be rooted out."[17] It was to be supported by full tithes, without other perquisites than those of voluntary devotional offerings. As a constitutional law, the twelfth of December was to be consecrated to the Virgin of Guadalupe, with recommendation for a monthly devotion on the same day. The sixteenth of September was also to be solemnized as the birthday of the Independence movement. The Jesuits were to be restored for the education of youth and work in the California missions.

The Constitution of Apatzingán which was produced by the Legislative Assembly in 1814 was something unforeseen by Morelos and subsequently rejected by him as impracticable.

vi

The Insurgent officials created by this Constitution now found themselves helpless as administrators, inasmuch as they were without sufficient armed force, and were kept constantly on the move by maneuvers of the Royalist forces. Among their number, as deputy of León, deprived of military command was Morelos. Escaping from Ario, the group went to Uruapán, and from there it was decided to move on to Tehuacán. The trip was full of risks and discomforts, so that a number of the members begged off by pleading poor health. Others remained as subordinate representatives in the province of Valladolid. The rest, in spite of a constitutional prohibition against any executive member's assuming military command, decided to put themselves under the leadership of Morelos; and the movement took on the character of a military expedition.

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[16] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, apénd., *doc. num.*, 19.

[17] Cf. Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 80.

The forces now at his disposal were hardly sufficient to assure success against a Royalist attack. Besides the 200 guards of the Congress, he brought together 1000 men of whom only 500 carried rifles. The rest were provided with lances, swords, and old muskets. Nicolás Bravo and Lobato arrived with a detachment of relative importance, but Guerrero, Sesma, and Terán failed to bring their reinforcements. With only two cannon and an unwieldy caravan of archives, equipment, and a large civil personnel, Morelos' only hope was to avoid contact with the troops of the viceroy.

To complete the odds, the viceregal government received word of the project, together with information that Tehuacán was the goal. This knowledge was, of course, of the utmost importance, inasmuch as seizure of the Insurgent Congress would put an end to the rebellion. If Morelos could be taken, the whole movement would be snuffed out.

The column left Uruapán on September 29, and the viceroy, uncertain as to the road it would take, stationed troops in every possible sector. Morelos did everything in his power to throw his enemy off guard and cover up the direction of his advance. Heavy rains and fatigue obliged him to give a day of rest to his line at Tezmalaca, and this was sufficient to permit the Royalist forces to meet their quarry. The troops of the Royalist Captain Concha came upon him, October 5; and Morelos, encumbered with civilians, was obliged to accept the encounter.

Dividing his fighting men into three camps, he placed the right wing under the command of Lobato and the left under Nicolás Bravo and held the center under his direct orders with the two cannon. The personnel of the government and such equipment as could be saved he put on the road toward Tehuacán and set himself to the task of countering the Royalist advance. The left wing held back the attack, but the right wing shortly gave way; and the flight, extending through the Insurgent lines, quickly developed into a complete rout. Morelos gave orders for every man to save himself as best he could, and he proceeded to lose himself amid the bloody scene of disaster.

The few Insurgent soldiers who were taken alive were vigorously questioned as to the whereabouts of their leader. Morelos meanwhile had thrown away his sword to walk more easily. Finally, he found himself at the mercy of a Royalist soldier named Matías Carranco, who had once fought under his command: "Señor Carranco," said the Generalissimo, "it appears that we know one another."

When he was delivered in the hands of Concha and Villasaña, the latter demanded, "What would you do if the situation were turned about, and you had captured me or Señor Concha?"

"I should give you two hours to make your confession," replied the laconic Morelos, "and then I should shoot you."[18]

Such mercy was not to be dealt him. Together with Father José María Morales, who had served as a chaplain for the Insurgents, he was placed under guard and sent to the capital. At Tepecoacuilco, the pair witnessed the execution of twenty-six prisoners who had been captured at Tezmalaca. His entry into Mexico City was far from the triumph which he had envisioned during the great days of his military successes. He was placed in the secret prison of the Inquisition and made ready for trial and certain death.

So far as the sentence awaiting him was concerned, it was obvious that his trial was to be hardly more than a formality and public example. The civil authorities were eager to obtain from him what information they could relative to the remnants of the insurrection. The ecclesiastical authorities were anxious to make a demonstration of their patriotism and loyalty to the Spanish Crown, which had secured their appointment, and to discipline the ranks of clergy who had compromised their position.

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[18] Alfonso Teja Zabre, *loc. cit.*, p. 236.

In no sense of the word had the war been one of rebellion against the Catholic Church. The Declaration of Independence at Chilpancingo amply demonstrated that. Nor was it one of insubordination to the duly constituted hierarchy. Morelos himself had resented this imputation when it was made by the bishop of Puebla and disregarded his excommunication because he believed it invalid. It was frankly one of popular nationalism against European domination and dependence upon the Spanish throne. Into this movement the lower clergy threw themselves with zeal, more than 125 being put to death by the Royalists as adherents of Morelos. Cuevas estimates that some 6000 of the 8000 clergy of Mexico worked for Mexican Independence in its first stages.[19]

That the majority of the Mexican hierarchy were either cold to the movement or actively opposed to it is readily comprehensible in view of the fact that the patronage or appointment of bishops by the Spanish Government was still the order of the day. The national phases of the Spanish Church thus were propagated in Mexico, so that those who were at least partially the beneficiaries of the Spanish Crown felt it their patriotic duty to defend allegiance to the mother country against those who were working for the extermination of Spanish dominance.

The revival of the Inquisition for the trial of Morelos, therefore, very definitely put the Church in an embarrassing position, and it was inevitable that the ecclesiastics whom he had derided as "adulators of Spain" should see in his insurrection an unwarranted plunging of the country into an era of bloodshed and disorder with "*lese majesté* against God and King."

It is true that Morelos could hardly be presented as the ideal pastor of souls. "I believed it more useful," he declared, "to offer my services to the revolution which Señor Hidalgo began than to remain in my curacy." But hundreds of other clergy felt the same way, and believed that patriotism called them, for the time being, to more arduous duties than those of parochial administration. The fact that he had and acknowledged illegitimate children stamped him with human frailty against his priestly vows, but it did not mean that he denied his Catholic faith or even intended to abandon his sacerdotal state.[20] He went to confession before battle and occasionally celebrated Mass, against the decree of excommunication launched against him, all in good faith, calling to his aid the large wartime faculties granted by Pope Clement V and arguing the invalidity of the excommunications from the justice of his cause. "We have heard with sorrow and sentiment," he said, "the declarations of the chapter of Oaxaca, but our consciences will remain certain and peaceful, so long as the defenders and adulators of Spain do not prove that the Mexican insurrection is unjust. Upon the truth or falsehood of this proposition depends the validity or nullity of the censures imposed by our bishops."[21]

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[19] *Loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 92.

Nevertheless, the Tribunal of the Inquisition denounced him as "a formal negative heretic, an apostate from our sacred Catholic religion, a deist, materialist, and atheist; guilty of *lese majesté,* divine and human, a libertine, excommunicate, seditious, revolutionary, schismatic, implacable enemy of Christianity and the state; seducer, perverse, lascivious, hypocrite, traitor to the King and country." Undoubtedly the members of the body felt that they stood on the side of law and order.

"It is not easily explained," writes Father Miguelez, "how the Viceroy Calleja, who a year before had nailed down the Tribunal of the Holy Office, on the orders of Spain, confiscating its properties, should now permit it to come out of the sepulchre to judge Morelos. Nor can the anxiety of the Inquisitor Flores be explained, in seeking to carry a candle at that entombment of justice, the last at which he publicly assisted. And with what inopportunity! It might be said that the Mexican Inquisition had, for a few moments, been brought back to life to condemn Morelos and then returned to the grave, to await there the verdict of History. For although it had some merits during its life, it was a pity for its good name that it could not have died with greater dignity."[22]

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[20] His son, Juan N. Almonte, was later to play an important part in Mexican politics.

[21] Cf. Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 88.

The painful ceremony of degradation from his priestly dignities and orders was followed by his civil trial. During this process, Morelos admitted that attempts had been made by Hidalgo to secure the aid and intervention of the United States, and that other individuals had tried the same. But he denied that either he or the Mexican Congress had entered into any agreement with the "Anglo-Americans" or any other foreign nation. So far as money and property which had been seized during the sack of various cities was concerned, he maintained that all had been paid out to his soldiers, who were in the greatest want, and that he had retained not a penny for himself.

The document of retraction which was officially presented as signed by Morelos has been shown to be a falsification. It has been asserted that he offered to indicate the most effective means of ending the whole movement if his life should be spared; but no definite proof can be offered for this. His answer to the charge of treachery to the King is strange in view of his large concepts of national independence. Before his judges, he maintained that the imprisonment of the legitimate King by the French had determined his first move, and that Ferdinand's connivance with persecution of the Church, at his restoration, had induced him to continue to fight for independence.[23]

The viceroy had already determined that his sentence should be death. Morelos prepared himself for the end by fulfilling his religious duties, making his confession and receiving Holy Communion. On his way to execution, December 22, 1815, he recited aloud with Father Salazar the prayers he knew by memory. The road led past the shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe, whom he had constantly invoked during his campaigns, and thence on to San Cristóbal Ecatépec. There he was visited by the pastor and assistant priest of the village near by, who joined him in praying the *Miserere.*

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[22] Quoted by Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 89, 90.
[23] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo IV, p. 318.

For a short time he talked of indifferent matters with Concha, who had been placed in charge of his execution, and embraced him. Then he was blindfolded. He knelt down and received the fusilade. Father Salazar covered the remains of the hero with his cape, and at four o'clock he was lowered into the grave at San Cristóbal. Thus expired "the most extraordinary man produced by the War of Independence," in the words of Orozco y Berra. Today his remains, transferred from the cathedral of Mexico City, are honored in the Monument of Independence in the capital; and on the island of Janítzio in his beloved Michoacán there rises his heroically sized statue, visible for miles around, with one arm upraised and fist clenched — a symbol of Mexican aspiration for freedom.[24]

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[24] It is interesting to note that this recent "Revolutionary" monument bears a striking resemblance to Bolshevik art of the same era, the clenched fist being interpreted by many as giving the impression that Morelos cherished communist ideals. The propagandist nature of the statue can hardly be doubted.

CHAPTER X

Agustín De Iturbide

LIBERATOR AND EMPEROR

i

"AMBITIOUS and designing," writes Hubert Howe Bancroft, Iturbide "possessed a winning influence most remarkable. Plausible and persuasive, he could cloak his aspirations with false patriotism, and while harboring designs the most selfish, put on a semblance of candor that carried conviction of honesty and purity of purpose. . . . Selfish ambition outran his craftiness and blinded his judgment."[1]

Like most of the great figures of Mexico, Iturbide has gone into history either excessively praised or blamed. "He was endowed with brilliant qualities," according to his contemporary and political adversary, Lorenzo de Zavala, "notably with valor and uncommon energy. It cannot be doubted that Iturbide possessed a superior soul and that his ambition was founded on that noble resolution which despises dangers and is not deterred by obstacles of any kind."[2]

Where is the true Iturbide?

Don Agustín first saw the light of day on September 27, 1783, in the city of Valladolid, the stamping ground of Hidalgo and Morelos and cradle of revolution. His father, Joaquín de Iturbide, was a native of Pamplona, Spain. His mother, Josefa de Aramburu, was born in Mexico. Both sides of the family were of distinguished stock and fairly prosperous. After his elementary studies, the boy attended the Latin course in the local seminary, but abandoned his studies at the age of fifteen to manage one of his father's haciendas. At the same time he became a second lieutenant in the regiment of provincial infantry at Valladolid. In 1805 he married Ana María Huarte, a local girl of an equally respected family.

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[1] H. H. Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1885), IV, p. 811.

[2] Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo Histórica de las Revoluciones de México* (Mexico, 1845), lib. I, pp. 87, 88.

When the insurrection of 1810 broke out, Iturbide was invited by his cousin Hidalgo to join the cause for national independence in the capacity of lieutenant general. "The proposal," he declared later, "was most attractive for an inexperienced youth, just at the age of ambition. Nevertheless, I refused it, for I was convinced that the plans of the priest were badly conceived. They could produce only disorder, bloodshed, and destruction without ever attaining the object they proposed. Time was to prove the truth of my contentions."[3]

There was nothing singular in this reaction. The middle class generally felt that the principles invoked in the revolution were out of harmony with the political character and needs of the country. In the subsequent disorder, with hate and extermination of the Spaniards and the anarchical destruction of property by Indian mobs, even those persons most ardently desirous of independence were filled with alarm and disgust. "Hidalgo and those who succeeded him, following his example," wrote Iturbide in the same memoir, which he published in London, in 1824, "desolated the country; they destroyed fortunes; they deepened the hate between Europeans and Americans; they sacrificed thousands of victims; they obstructed the sources of wealth; they disorganized the army; they annihilated industry; they made the lot of the Americans worse, arousing the vigilance of the Spaniards to a view of the danger which threatened them; they corrupted morals; and far from gaining independence, they increased the obstacles opposed to it."

The same point of view was shared by the Spaniards, many of whom realized the advantages of independence for the country. Even General Calleja, who led the armies of the viceroy into the field against the Insurgents, wrote in this vein to Venegas, from Guadalajara, on January 29, 1811. "I am going to speak to Your Excellency as a Spaniard," he declared, "with all the frankness of my character. This vast realm weighs too heavily upon a mother-country whose stability has been shaken. Its natives and even the Europeans themselves are convinced of the advantages that would result to them from an independent government, and if the absurd insurrection of Hidalgo had been founded on this basis, it seems to me, so far as I have observed, that it would have suffered very little opposition."[4]

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[3] Agustín Iturbide, *Manifiesto* (Written in Leghorn, 1823); cf. English translation in *The Pamphleteer* (London, 1827), Vol. XXVIII.

When Hidalgo saw that he could not draw Iturbide to his side, he tried to get him to remain neutral, and offered a safe conduct for his father and family besides promising to exempt his property from the sacking and incendiarism of the mobs. The young lieutenant refused to accept these guarantees. "I have always considered criminal," he said, "the lazy coward who in the time of political convulsions remains an apathetic spectator of the evils which afflict society, without taking a part to diminish at least those of his fellow citizens. Accordingly, I set out in the campaign to serve the Mexicans, the King of Spain, and the Spaniards."[5]

Iturbide's first opportunity for action was at the battle of Las Cruces. With thirty-four men, he joined Trujillo, on orders of the viceroy, and fought with such distinction as to receive a captaincy in a company of the provincial battalion of Tula. He then moved to the Southern front, where he served under the command of García Ríos, until poor health, engendered by the climate, compelled him to return to Mexico City. From there he proceeded to the province of Michoacán and thence to Guanajuato, showing such ability and zeal that he was shortly promoted to the rank of colonel in the regiment of Celaya. He has been accused of excessive cruelty during this period; but there is nothing to indicate that his manner of acting was disproportionate to the means used by the Insurgents themselves.

His crowning strategy came with the action at Valladolid, late in 1813, when with a force of 360 he dispersed the entire army of Morelos, which numbered close to 20,000 men. This almost unbelievable feat was what brought the second phase of the first insurrection to a close. So complete was the disaster that the Insurgent leaders were able to muster hardly more than 200 of the men that fled in disorder. "I have always been successful in war," he boasted with justifiable pride. "Victory was the inseparable companion of the troops that I commanded. I never lost an action, and I combatted as many enemies as presented themselves or I met, often with inferior forces, in the proportion of one to eighteen or twenty . . . I have not had other adversaries besides those who opposed the cause I defended, or other rivals than those whom envy brought for my good fortune."[6]

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[4] Quoted by Alfonso Junco, *Un Siglo de Méjico* (Mexico, 1934), pp. 34, 35.

[5] *Manifiesto cit.*

In 1816, he was given command of the provinces of Guanajuato and Valladolid and of the army of the North. Apparently his use of authority proved offensive here, for various influential persons of Guanajuato and Querétaro brought a number of serious charges against him to the viceroy. Iturbide was acquitted by the government, but deprived of his command. This judgment, José J. Pesado remarked, "gives an idea, on the one hand, of the character of the accusation, and on the other, of the fact that the viceregal government did not trust very much the Mexican chiefs who had distinguished themselves in the cause of the mother-country, but took the first opportunity that presented itself to nullify their influence in the army."[7] Other Spanish spokesmen, like Abad y Queypo, had already taken note of danger for Spain in the career of the young soldier-governor.[8]

Iturbide subsequently took up his residence in Mexico City. Now, as Lucas Alamán related, "in the flower of his manhood, of an engaging personality, cultured and agreeable manners, of pleasant and flattering speech, and well received in society, he entered without restraint into the pleasures of the capital."

ii

His restless spirit, however, was by no means satisfied with this quasi-retirement, nor did he feel his work done in having helped to suppress the campaigns of the Insurgents under Hidalgo and Morelos. There still burned in the hearts of thousands of Mexicans a desire for national independence: a thought that had animated Iturbide even while he labored to put down a movement of liberation which he thought hindered rather than helped the cause.

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[6] *Manifiesto cit.*

[7] *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1854), IV, p. 837.

[8] Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1852), tomo V, p. 56.

In 1820, events in Spain hastened the fulfillment of desire. Early in March that year, a military revolt under Masonic leadership in Spain restored the Constitution of 1812 and compelled Ferdinand VII to swear to its enactments. News of this even reached Mexico early the next month, causing considerable excitement and difference of opinion. The Constitution itself definitely limited the power of the monarch and declared that sovereignty was in the nation. The provinces like Mexico were granted an equality of representation with Spain in the Cortes. This very equality, however, opened the way toward the dissolution of bonds with the mother country; moreover, the cost and inconvenience of sending eighteen deputies to Madrid every two years constituted something of a problem.

The Constitution of 1812 had granted freedom of press and speech, but the advantage which advocates of independence had taken of this quickly led to suppression of these same rights, and indeed to the suspension of the Constitution itself, two months after its first publication in Mexico on October 5, 1812. In a dispatch to Rayón, January 15, the following year, Morelos declared that the Spanish authorities had granted liberty of press and called for elections simply to lay hand on those who dared express themselves or who were recognized as leaders by the Mexican people.

The Catholic Church was established to the exclusion of all others, but the conditions imposed upon it by the so-called liberal Cortes were so humiliating as to arouse the faithful in Mexico to the conviction that only in national independence lay the freedom and security of their religion. The new legislation included the suppression of the Jesuits, whom Morelos sought to restore in the Congress of Chilpancingo, and in general it decreed the closing of the institutions of the other religious orders while confiscating their properties and prohibiting further benefices and pious foundations. The effect of these mandates in Mexico was singularly distressing.

"In Puebla," declared Alamán, "the Jesuits had to leave secretly, since the people were disposed to retain them. . . . The religious of Belem, who had charge of various primary schools and sanitariums were likewise ordered to leave, as were the Hypolite Fathers, who took care of the insane, and the order of St. John, which conducted hospitals. All these establishments were turned over to the government. The properties belonging to their endowment and the support of the religious were confiscated by the public treasury and have since been allowed to be dispersed in the most scandalous manner."[9] The Religious in Spain were offered the inducement of cash gifts if they would enter other careers, while their confiscated properties were held out as an inducement to the people for the approval of these policies.

It was with considerable justification, therefore, that Padre Pimental wrote: "Impiety, irreligion, and the despotism of the Cortes are the reasons for the loss of the Americas and for their declaration of independence."[10]

With the idea of opposing the re-establishment of this Constitution in Mexico, a number of personages of high official and social standing began to hold conferences in the rooms of Doctor Matías Monteagudo, in the oratory of San Felipe Neri, in Mexico City. This Spanish priest was one of the prime movers of Mexican independence, together with two others, Dr. Manuel de la Bárcena and Fray Mariano López Bravo y Pimental, also clergy of Spanish birth. These men and others had resolved to prepare the country against the decrees that were certain to come with the new fundamental law. Intimately associated with this group was Agustín Iturbide.

The Constitution was proclaimed, on May 31, 1820, by the Viceroy Apodaca. The latter, who was rumored to be a Mason himself, realized the strength of Masonry in the Spanish expeditionary forces in the country and resolved to carry out orders from Madrid before a military uprising should compel him to do so. The election for the Spanish Cortes took place on September 18, and shortly thereafter the elected deputies departed for Madrid.

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[9] Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1852), tomo V, p. 40.

[10] Quoted in Cuevas, *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), tomo V, p. 108.

The new arrangement, if calculated to appease the Mexican people, made few changes in their national sentiments. Freedom of the press, now re-established, again gave rise to the discussion of political theories and to a spirit of independence. The revolt of a Spanish regiment, in protest against orders to proceed to South America against movements for independence, had the effect of further stimulating Mexican ambitions for autonomy. The Spaniards in Mexico who dreaded the thought of another bloody war like the one just past saw no other alternative than that of going along with a peaceful separation from Spain. The Church, for the reasons already presented, as well as property owners, government officials, and the troops, were no longer inclined to join in resisting revolt.

Meanwhile, plans for an independent Mexican government and for the means of obtaining it were discussed in secret meetings. Iturbide believed that an uprising might be staged in the capital itself. Then came his appointment by the viceroy to succeed Colonel Armijo as commandante general in the South, with orders to end the rebellion of Guerrero. Provided with the resources of the Celaya regiment, he started for his post on November 16, 1820, confident that plans already made for the coup d'état would work out shortly.

It was agreed that the deputies about to leave for Madrid should establish a national Congress at Vera Cruz, at the same time that Iturbide would proclaim independence in the South. The deputies, however, began to fear that the suspicions of the government were aroused, and accordingly embarked on February 13. In the meantime, Iturbide established his headquarters at Teloloapán, where he began to attract various other leaders and officials to his command. He continued to ask the viceroy for increased forces and financial aid, inasmuch as Guerrero still had a well-trained army of 2000 men. The Viceroy Apodaca responded generously to Iturbide's requests, since the latter declared his purpose was to bring peace to the whole country and, "if in the meantime the capital should demand attention (which God avert!)," he would hasten to its assistance.[11] The ease with which Apodaca was prevailed upon to cooperate gave grounds for the suspicion that he was in favor of Iturbide's secret plans; but there is no clear evidence to this effect.[12]

By December 21, Iturbide had gathered a force of 2479 men, stationed in various parts of his district, with which he felt ready to proclaim the independence of Mexico. To be perfectly secure, he had to pacify the revolutionists under Guerrero; but in his military engagements with that chief, he had not been eminently successful. Accordingly he sought to enter into negotiations with him. Guerrero finally consented to send as his emissary Colonel José Figueroa, and, being convinced that Iturbide was sincere in his project for independence, entered into an alliance with him. As a result, Iturbide, without disclosing the real nature of this capitulation, was able to report to Apodaca that Guerrero had delivered 1200 men to the viceregal government and had pledged himself to conciliate the other Insurgent divisions. At the same time, he sent confidential agents to a number of officers in the Spanish army, including Quintanar, Barragán, and Parras in Michoacán, and Bustamante and Cortazar in Guanajuato, to sound them out on their attitude toward independence. He was particularly anxious to win over the Brigadier Pedro Celestino Negrete, who was a Spaniard but a member of the Liberal Party and favorably inclined to the cause.

Iturbide now needed money to open his campaign. It so happened that a dispatch of 525,000 pesos destined for Manila by way of Acapulco had been detained in Mexico City because of unsettled conditions in the South. Now that the situation was well in hand, Iturbide offered to accompany it to the port. Apparently, the agents of the money were aware of his intention. At any event, he appropriated the entire amount, giving his solemn promise of restitution. On February 24 he wrote the agents, explaining his action, and declared that if the viceroy would agree to a proposal which he had made that very same day, he would forward the funds to their original destination.

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[11] Cf. Carlos María Bustamante, *Cuadro Histórico de la Revolucion Mexicana* (Mexico, 1843–46), tomo V, pp. 93, 94.

[12] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 61, 62.

This proposal was none other than the famous Plan of Iguala, issued from the village of that name, pointing to the necessity of independence and laying the foundations for a national government. "Americans!" he cried, "and under this name I include not only those born in America but also Europeans, Africans, and Asiatics who reside in this country: have the goodness to hear me. . . . For three hundred years North America has been under the tutelage of the most Catholic, pious, heroic, and magnanimous nation. Spain has educated and improved it, forming these rich cities and beautiful centers, these provinces and large realms which have come to occupy a most distinguished place in the history of the universe." Then proceeding to point out the equality of the nation with that of Spain and the difficulties of further political union with so distant a mother country, he proclaimed that "the public and general opinion of all the people, European as well as American, is that of absolute independence from Spain and from every other nation."[13]

Then after deploring the destruction wrought by the insurrection of Dolores, he assured that the movement had at least "fixed public opinion to the realization that a general union between Europeans and Americans, Indians and other natives, is the only solid foundation on which our common happiness can rest." This declaration represented indeed a vast difference from that of Hidalgo which was based on the exile or extermination of the European Spaniard and which, ignoring the historical evolution of the nation since the time of Cortés, had promised to return the land to the aborigines.

With incredible activity, not even availing himself of a secretary, Iturbide promulgated his Plan. In a confidential note he offered the presidency of the future governing body to Apodaca and enclosed a list of proposed members, at the same time as he communicated with the archbishop of Mexico and other leaders. The viceroy, whatever his personal sentiments may have been, immediately issued a proclamation against the Plan, declared Iturbide an outlaw, and prepared to marshal his military resources against him.

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[13] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, apénd., *doc. num.,* p. 6.

To draw the partisans of independence away from the cause, a general pardon was extended to all who would abandon the rebel chieftain. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, Iturbide's followers proved loyal to him and on February 25 took the oath of allegiance, which was drawn up in the following form:

"Do you swear to God and promise under the cross of your sword to observe the holy Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion? — I do.

"Do you swear to achieve the independence of this nation, preserving for it the peace and union of Europeans and Americans? — I do.

"Do you swear obedience to King Ferdinand VII if he adopts and swears to the Constitution which will be drawn up by the Cortes of this North America? — I do."[14]

The chiefs and officials who stood by him urged Iturbide to accept the post of lieutenant general. This he refused, but he finally agreed to take the title of "First Chief of the Army." "My mature age," he said, "my disinterestedness, and the very nature of the cause which we defend are in contradiction with the spirit of personal aggrandizement. . . . Far from me is any idea or sentiment not confined to the conservation of the adorable religion which we profess in baptism and to the consummation of independence for the country in which we are born. This is my entire ambition, and this is the only recompense to which it is permissable for me to aspire."[15]

iii

If the revolution initiated by Hidalgo owed its failure to a lack of political program, that of Iturbide had a far better chance for success from its beginning. The threefold oath administered to the army, which became known in consequence as the Army of the Three Guarantees, laid the basis for the entire movement. In his letter of February 14, 1821, to the viceroy, Iturbide made clear his motives. "I bring the Eternal Truth to witness," he wrote, "that what I express to your Excellency is conformed to my sentiments. I am moved only by the desire of preserving pure our Holy Religion and of avoiding the evils that threaten on every side this country so richly endowed by nature. Before the same Supreme Lord I pledge also that I am not concerned with ideas of ambition or of individual advancement." To his soldiers, he declared, "I swear not to abandon you in the enterprise which we have embraced, and my blood, if necessary, will seal my eternal fidelity."[16]

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[14] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 103, 104.

[15] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 102.

The Plan which was drawn up included a provisional government, but the final character of the new state was likewise well defined. According to Article 2, "New Spain is independent from the old regime and from every other power even though of our continent; its government will be a moderate monarchy, with a Constitution specially adapted to the realm." Iturbide did not believe that the country was ready for republicanism, and it is not too much to say that if his idea had been sustained, Mexico might have been spared a great deal of the bloody turmoil and anarchy of the nineteenth century. Article 4 sought to handle the matter of designating the monarch. "The Emperor of the country," according to this provision, "will be Ferdinand VII. If he does not present himself personally in Mexico within the time assigned by the Cortes to take his oath, there shall be called in turn the Infante Don Carlos, Don Francisco de Paulo, the Archduke Carlos, or another individual of the reigning house whom Congress may judge suitable."

The Constitutional character of the new regime was determined in Article 11: "The Cortes shall establish immediately the Constitution of the Mexican Empire." A realistic view of the citizenry of the country was taken in Article 12: "All the inhabitants of New Spain, without any distinction of Europeans, Africans, or Indians, are citizens of this monarchy with right to any employment, according to their merit and virtues." The clergy had every reason to feel satisfied, inasmuch as Article 13 guaranteed both the secular and regular branches the conservation of their rights and privileges. Article 1 had stated that "the religion of New Spain is and will be the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church, without toleration of any other." This same principle had been enunciated by both Hidalgo and Morelos before.

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[16] *Archivo General de Indias,* 91–2–14.

In other words, it was Iturbide's plan to effect a simple transition from a Mexico governed by Madrid to a Mexico governed with full sovereignty from Mexico City, and to effect this completion of independence without bloodshed, if possible. All the political, ecclesiastical, civil, and military employees within the state were to be retained in their positions unless they refused to accept the Plan. Criminal law was to follow the rules of the Spanish Constitution while plans were laid for the election of a Constituent Congress. A secret letter of Fedinand VII to Apodaca, dated December 24, 1820, expressing his intention of leaving Spain, where he felt his position insupportable, and of coming to rule Mexico had given considerable substance to Iturbide's hopes; and the viceroy was offered the presidency of the provisional junta until the monarch should arrive.

Concluding his appeal to Apodaca, Iturbide wrote: "I am neither a European nor an American. I am a Christian, a man, a partisan of reason. I realize the gravity of the evils which threaten us; I am certain that there is no other way of avoiding them than that which I have proposed to Your Excellency, and I see with dread that in your responsible hands is the pen which can write: religion, peace, and happiness, or confusion, blood, and the desolation of North America."[17]

Apodaca replied to Iturbide the same day as he received the latter's communications, deploring this "unconstitutional project of independence" and begging Iturbide to abandon his resolution. At the same time he issued a proclamation to the people warning them to take no part in the scheme and began to organize an army to extinguish the movement in its infancy. Pascual de Liñan was placed at the head of a corps of expeditionary troops from Spain, to hold the neighborhood of Mexico

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[17] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 123, 124.

City, and Armijo, a Mexican by birth but in entire sympathy with the Spanish cause, was named commandant of the army of the South.

iv

Public opinion was decidedly in favor of independence, but this did not suffice to win the cause. Every inducement was held out by the government to officers and men who would abandon Iturbide. Iturbide himself was urged by his family to give up his idea and was proclaimed an outlaw. Because of desertions, his "Army of the Three Guarantees" was soon reduced to less than one half its original number. The Masonic lodges, under the direction of Spanish Liberals, did everything in their power against Iturbide, in order to retain support for the Spanish Constitution in Mexico.[18] Finally, the port of Acapulco, upon which the Mexican patriot relied, reacted under Spanish influence and realigned itself with the government.

It is probable that, if Liñan's troops had marched against Iturbide at this time, as the viceroy had ordered, the movement could have been crushed. Iturbide, however, was allowed to leave Iguala on March 12. With a diminishing army, he proceeded to Teloloapán, where he joined forces with Guerrero. Recognizing that not much would be gained by this arrangement, he decided to leave Guerrero in the South and go on to Bajío. Before his departure he again addressed the viceroy, the King, and the Cortes. "Let a sovereign of the house of the great Ferdinand," he pleaded, "come to occupy here the happy throne which sensible Americans are preparing for him, and let there be established between the two august Monarchs, in union with the sovereign Congresses, the most intimate bonds of friendship, astonishing the entire world with such sweet separation."[19] Spain was not yet ready for such considerations, and no attention was paid to the offer.

Various centers now began to take up the Plan of Iguala, and, as he advanced, Iturbide found complete sympathy and considerable resources in Zitácuaro, Amoles, Salvatierra, and Celaya.

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[18] Cf. Zavala, *loc. cit.*, lib. I, p. 271 and *passim.*

[19] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 131.

Anastasio Bustamante pronounced for independence and on March 25 entered the city of Guanajuato in triumph, so that when Iturbide arrived, about a month later, he found himself in possession of 6000 additional troops, one of the richest provinces of New Spain, and the pledge of influential creole officers who had formerly staffed the royal army. As a pledge of faith, the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jiménez, which still remained hanging from the four corners of the Alhóndiga, were removed and given Christian burial.

The effect of these examples was spontaneous and widespread. The province of Michoacán soon joined the movement, under the leadership of Miguel Barragán and Juan Domínguez. Nicolás Bravo and Osorno, heroes of the insurrection under Morelos, now threw their strength to the cause. Santa Anna, whose colorful career was later to make many a chapter in Mexican history, openly declared himself for independence and occupied the coast of Vera Cruz, while Herrera and Bravo moved toward Puebla. Iturbide meanwhile had succeeded in completely winning over the Royalist General Negrete and in arranging for the inactivity of General Cruz in Nueva Galicia. Then with a force of 10,000 men he arrived at his native city of Valladolid, May 12, and ten days later secured its surrender through the desertion of the commandant Quintanar to his cause.

On June 13, the garrison at Guadalajara took the oath to the Plan of Iguala and placed the city under Negrete. The Spanish general, José de la Cruz, was accordingly compelled to abandon the province of Nueva Galicia, and fled to Durango, where he put up a show of resistance for three weeks. Upon his surrender, he and his troops were honored and allowed to embark for Spain from Vera Cruz. During this campaign Zacatecas also declared for independence.

From Valladolid, Iturbide marched to Querétaro which the viceroy was preparing to defend. During a skirmish on June 7, the leader for independence was nearly overcome by an attack upon his personal guard; but by the twenty-eighth of the month the city was obliged to surrender, and the Commandant Luaces joined hands with Iturbide. Similar transfers of allegiance took place at the same time at Saltillo and Monterrey. While sickness, defeat, and desertion daily diminished the government forces, those of Iturbide rapidly increased, with experienced chieftains strengthening his staff, new supplies being rushed to his aid, and universal opinion in his favor. Accordingly, he now planned to direct the greater part of his army against the capital itself. But first there was the matter of the siege of Puebla, begun by Bravo and Herrera; and to bring this to a successful climax, he moved toward that city by way of Cuernavaca.

His practically unrestrained advance had now brought about the greatest confusion in Mexico City. Apodaca decreed a new enlistment of troops and began to place the city in a state of defense with the remains of the Spanish expeditionary forces at his disposal. The latter, however, were dissatisfied with the way things had been going and distrusted the viceroy's sincerity. The center of discontent was found again in the Masonic Lodges, which conspired under the leadership of Colonel Francisco Buceli to take Apodaca prisoner and demand his resignation. This plot was actually carried out on the night of July 5, while the viceroy was holding a council of war with the major generals, Liñan and Novella.

Apodaca indignantly denied the charges of disloyalty made against him. He placed the blame for his reverses largely upon the inactivity or vacillation of his officers and their distrust of the troops under their command. Nevertheless, he was obliged to surrender his office to Novella, whom the mutinous troops insisted should take the place, and thus gave, unwillingly, a last blow to the viceregal office which had been so respected in New Spain for three centuries. The deposed viceroy took refuge in the Franciscan convent of San Fernando, and waited the first opportunity to return to Spain, "leaving in Mexico," as José J. Pesado declared, "grateful memories of the temperance and justice with which he governed."[20]

By August 2, the city of Puebla was ready to receive Iturbide, and the conqueror entered the city in triumph amid the unrestrained jubilation of the populace. Three days later, national independence was solemnly declared, as Bishop Pérez gave the discourse glorifying the cause and the chief who had brought it so close to completion. The city of Oaxaca was taken, on July 30; and practically the entire Southern coast, with the exception of Acapulco, came into the cause of independence. The next move was to lay siege to Mexico City.

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[20] Cf. José J. Pesado, *El Libertador de México D. Agustín de Iturbide* (Mexico, 1872).

At this juncture, there arrived in Vera Cruz, on July 30, Lieutenant-general Juan O'Donojú, Knight Grand Cross of the orders of Carlos III and San Hermenegildo, a gentleman of Irish descent, who had been appointed by the Spanish Government to the viceroyalty in place of Apodaca. A high Mason, he secured his appointment, it is said, largely through the influence of Arizpe[21] and other Mexican deputies. He immediately recognized, however, that it would be impossible to sustain his position. The entire coast of Vera Cruz was menaced by Santa Anna, and Mexico City could not long hold out, with its meager and untrustworthy forces, against the power of its besiegers.

Under these circumstances there was nothing left for him to do but issue a proclamation, to save what he could for Spain. His views, he declared, were liberal and his intentions, sympathetic. If the Mexican people would only listen, the Spanish Cortes was already drawing up a plan that would honor Mexico's needs, and if his government did not meet the mutual requirements of the two countries, he would resign his post at the first sign of dissatisfaction. But his letter to the defenders of Mexico City carried an altogether different sentiment.

Meanwhile, his personal position had become extremely difficult. Yellow fever was raging at the port of Vera Cruz and carried off more than 100 of his crew and suite, including a nephew and niece. It was impossible for him to advance beyond the walls of the port city without falling into the hands of the independents. Accordingly, he decided to contact Santa Anna and communicate with Iturbide, asking for an interview and a safe conduct to the capital "to decide upon the means necessary to avoid every misfortune, disturbance, and hostility until the King and the Cortes should approve the treaty which they would accept and which Iturbide himself had so ardently desired."

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[21] Ramos Arizpe, a Mexican priest of Liberal principles, served as a delegate of New Spain to the Spanish Cortes. When Mexico achieved its independence, he became a leader in the fight for federalism, and, strongly influenced by the ideas of Stephen Austin, was one of the prime movers in establishing the federalist principle in the Constitution of 1824, in imitation of the system of the United States of America.

Iturbide agreed to the proposal and named Córdoba as the place for the conference. Novella had been acquainted with O'Donojú's arrival in the country, but determined to hold his office until the latter made his appearance in the capital. Having put his military affairs in order for the siege of Mexico City, Iturbide immediately proceeded to Córdoba, where he arrived, August 23. O'Donojú had been escorted as far as Jalapa by Santa Anna and was given a cordial welcome at Córdoba by the Insurgent chieftain himself. Within a few hours the two men had agreed upon a plan substantially the same as that of Iguala. O'Donojú recognized that in this lay the only hope of safeguarding the lives and property of Spaniards residing in Mexico and of saving the Mexican throne for the Bourbons. Accordingly he agreed, in the King's name, to recognize the independence of Mexico. In return for the promise of a safe conduct for Spaniards who wished to leave the country, he promised to use his authority to remove the Spanish troops from Mexico, without shedding blood, and to surrender the capital to the Army of the Three Guarantees.

In one important respect the Plan of Iguala was modified, to meet the contingency of a refusal from the reigning family of Spain. Thus, in case of renunciation or nonadmission by Ferdinand VII or the other members of the royal house mentioned in the treaty, the throne would be presented to another person designated by the imperial Cortes of Mexico. This opened the possibility of a native Mexican dynasty. The character of the provisional government was determined upon; and with these arrangements both Iturbide and O'Donojú advanced toward the capital.

At Vera Cruz, Governor García Dávila refused to accede to the treaty or to recognize the authority of the viceroy, and withdrew with his garrison to the stronghold of San Juan de Ulúa. Novella, meanwhile, stubbornly continued to prepare for the defense of Mexico City, although the Independents steadily moved in on him. Not until O'Donojú issued threatening letters from his new headquarters at Puebla did he finally acknowledge the superior authority of the latter and surrender his command.

On September 15, 1821, Iturbide issued an eloquent address to the people of the capital urging them to welcome the Army of the Three Guarantees and thus complete the work of independence, which had been recognized even by the official representative of Spain. O'Donojú accompanied Iturbide to Tacubaya, where he received the felicitations of the principal civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities. The Spanish troops were marched out, in the form of a simple transfer, to Texcoco and Toluca, on the morning of September 23, and the same day the Mexican grenadiers of Colonel José Joaquín de Herrera were established in the fortress and palace of Chapultepec.

Four days later, on September 27, Iturbide made his solemn entrance into the city, mounted on his black horse, surrounded by his staff, chief citizens, and representatives of the Indian towns, and followed by the Army of the Three Guarantees, consisting of 16,000 men, half of them cavalry. At the convent of San Francisco, he was met by the city council, which offered its congratulations.

The wildest enthusiasm accompanied the entire demonstration. Streets were lavishly decorated and packed with cheering multitudes. A triumphal arch had been erected at the juncture of the streets known as Chapultepec, Bucareli, and San Francisco. Here the Mayor Ormaechea delivered the keys of the city to the Liberator, who accepted and returned them with the words: "These are the keys of the doors which should be locked only against irreligion, disunion, and despotism, as they be open to everything that can make for common happiness. I return them to Your Excellency, trusting in your zeal to procure the welfare of the public whom you represent."[22] These ceremonies were completed with a reception by O'Donojú at the palace, and a solemn religious service by the Archbishop with the singing of the *Te Deum* in the cathedral.

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[22] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 332.

Whatever may have been the secret ambitions of Iturbide amid all this glorification, he outwardly showed only the spirit of patriotism and modesty. "Mexicans," he cried, in his address of the same day, "you are now in the act of saluting an independent nation, as I proclaimed to you in Iguala. . . . You know how to be free; it is yours now to experience the law of happiness. The Junta will be installed. The Cortes will be assembled. The regime which should make you prosperous will be sanctioned. I exhort you now to put aside expressions of alarm and hate and pronounce only those of union and close friendship. . . . Docile to the power of him who will reign, bring to completion with the august sovereign the great work which I have begun . . . and if you consider my deeds worthy of recompense, grant me only your obedience to the laws. Permit me to return to the bosom of my beloved family, and from time to time recall the memory of your friend Iturbide."[23]

The next morning, the provisional governing Junta, composed of 38 members selected by Iturbide and including O'Donojú, met in the palace. Then they proceeded to the cathedral to take the oath to the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Córdoba. In the council which followed, Iturbide was unanimously elected president. That same evening a special session was called to issue the Declaration of Independence. Iturbide was the first to sign the document, which referred to him as "a genius superior to all admiration and praise, love and glory of his country." The next to sign was the bishop of Puebla, and then Juan O'Donojú, who apparently was not unduly offended by the sentiments expressed in the document. "The Mexican Nation," the Declaration began, "which for 300 years has had neither its own will nor freedom of speech, today rises from the oppression in which it has lived."[24] Friendship with Spain, however, was to be the rule. The Act was signed by 36 members of the Council.

A Regency to act in the name of the monarch-to-be, was then elected, consisting of Iturbide again as president, O'Donojú, Manuel de la Bárcena, who was governor of the bishopric of

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[23] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 334.

[24] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 336, 337.

Michoacán, the Auditor José Isidro Yañez, and Manuel Velázquez de León, former secretary of the viceregal government. The bishop of Puebla was thereupon designated to take Iturbide's place as head of the provisional Junta; but with the death of O'Donojú, on October 7, that prelate was transferred to this vacancy on the Regency. The last of the viceroys, of grateful memory to the Mexican people, was buried with full honors in the cathedral, and the Junta decreed an annual pension of 12,000 pesos to his widow, so long as she should remain in the country.

If Iturbide was sincere in his desire to be allowed to retire from public life and return to the bosom of his family, he was soon obliged to change his plans. The Junta began its labors by proclaiming him "Generalissimo of the Armies of the Empire on sea and land," and insisted that he retain his place at the head of the Regency. He was assigned a yearly salary of 120,000 pesos, to date from the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala, but he turned over the income of this period, from February 24 to September 28, amounting to 71,000 pesos, to the army. He was later granted the sum of 1,000,000 pesos and 20 square leagues of government land in Texas, but these gifts never materialized. In addition, he received the title of "His Most Serene Highness," while corresponding honors and benefices were bestowed upon his aged father.

To place the country on a basis of security, he now divided Mexico into five captain generalcies. Those places which had been held by Spanish garrisons began to submit shortly after the entry of the Army of the Three Guarantees into the capital. Yucatán, Chiapas, and Guatemala declared themselves independent from Spain and shortly thereafter, with some persuasion by Iturbide, joined the Mexican Empire.

v

Beneath this outward display and assurance, there still seethed a number of disruptive influences which boded ill for the future of Iturbide's Plan. The Spaniards who remained in the country became increasingly apprehensive, particularly after the murder of the Spanish general Concha. These fears were further increased by an inflammatory Press which attacked Spaniards and the Plan of Iguala alike. Iturbide was desirous of retaining in the country influential Spaniards who should be loyal to the regime, and he beheld their departure with considerable alarm. When Bataller, ex-regent of the *Audiencia,* refused to remain any longer, Iturbide replied that he would guarantee his security with his own head. "Sad security!" replied the Spaniard. "Yours will be the first to be cut off in this country."

The Liberals and Masonic forces, meanwhile, were using every means to get hold of the revolution and change its direction to fit their own philosophy, which was quite the opposite of that of Iturbide. A number of persons who were in O'Donojú's entourage were already of Masonic membership and proceeded to join the lodges already existing or to form new ones. From this time the Masonic orders became an outstanding political power in Mexico. One of the most influential organs of the period was the *Gaceta del Sol,* established by a Masonic lodge, with the idea of excluding the Church from the education of youth and of spreading the Liberal ideas then in vogue in Spain. Iturbide was bitterly opposed by the body, and was even marked for assassination.[25]

Rumblings of the same hostility were heard also among the leaders of the first insurrection. They had joined hands with Iturbide in his achievement of independence and began to feel that they were being neglected. This group, combined with Masonic sentiment, now plotted for the rejection of the Plan of Iguala and the establishment of a republic. Secret meetings were held in the house of Miguel Domínguez, former *Corregidor* of Querétaro, with the idea of seizing the person of Iturbide himself, in case he resisted their plans. General Negrete, however, had been confidentially informed, and he warned Iturbide of the affair. As a result, the principal conspirators, including Guadalupe Victoria and Nicolás Bravo, were arrested on November 26, and the movement was halted.

Part of this growing dissatisfaction and the development of a republican party have been ascribed to the plan which Iturbide advanced for the election of Congress. His proposal, which had the approval of the Junta, was to create a Cortes of two chambers. The upper house was to be composed of a representative for the council of each city, an attorney for each city, and deputies elected by the ecclesiastics and the military. The lower chamber was to be made up of representatives, one for every 50,000 inhabitants, elected by the people so that each profession and class would be represented by its own deputies, somewhat in the manner of the modern corporative state. The group aligned under republican ideals believed that this arrangement, as Bancroft states, "struck at the liberty of the people in their sovereign right to select their representatives without restriction."[26]

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[25] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 409; also Lorenzo de Zavala, *loc. cit.*, lib. I, p. 111.

From a realistic standpoint, particularly in view of the sociological structure of the country, Iturbide's plan was undoubtedly the method of election and representation best adapted to the country. But, unfortunately, the new legislators were not generally equipped to handle the important tasks before them. "A few men," Iturbide wrote later in characterizing the congress, "truly worthy, wise, virtuous, of high patriotism, were mingled with a multitude of intriguers, up-starts, and persons of sinister intentions. . . . It was sufficient that the man elected should be my enemy or so ignorant that he could easily be influenced."[27] This was the body upon which devolved the problems of a country that had gone through eleven years of internal strife and warfare.

Congress met on February 24, amid the greatest civic rejoicing and ebullience, and accompanied by the Regency and the Junta, took the oath "to defend and maintain the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Religion; to guard religiously the independence of the Mexican nation; and to form a Constitution based on the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Córdoba, establishing the absolute separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, so that they could never be united in one person or corporation."[28] Having elected its officers, it declared that sovereignty resided in itself. Until the three branches of government should be established, the executive power was confided in the persons composing the Regency under the presidency of Iturbide. Judicial power was vested in the various courts.

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[26] H. H. Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, IV, p. 747. The Junta, however, modified the plan and proportioned the representatives to the number of parties, not to the population. Cf. Francisco Banegas Galván, *Historia deMéjico* (Morelia, 1923), lib. II, pp. 43–54.

[27] *Memorias cit.*

The outstanding problem facing the assembly was that of the public treasury, which was in a most precarious condition. Revenues were drastically lowered since taxes and import duties had been reduced to make independence more popular. On the other hand, costs of administration through large salaries and public displays were constantly mounting. The government entered the year 1822 with a balance of 2237 pesos; but Iturbide demanded new appropriations for the troops, in view of the dangers which still threatened independence.

At the time of its assembly, Congress was divided into three parties. The Bourbonists stood for the Plan of Iguala. The Iturbidists were likewise pledged to the Plan, but, instead of a prince of the house of Bourbon, wished to have Iturbide placed on the throne. The Republicans, who took their oath of office with definite mental restrictions, were opposed to the idea of a Constitutional monarchy. They desired to set aside the Plan of Iguala and establish a federal republic. On February 13, the Spanish Cortes rejected the treaty of Córdoba, automatically closing the throne of Mexico to a European prince; and the Bourbonist faction merged with the Iturbidists, on the one hand, or the Republican element, on the other.

More important was the division of sentiment between Iturbide, who remained president of the Regency, and Congress itself. The agitation of the Masons and Republicans, resentment of the old Insurgents, and the impasse of a bad financial situation, became so serious that José Dávila, still entrenched as Spanish governor of Ulúa, believed it possible, with the aid of the capitulated troops remaining in Mexico, to win the country back to Spain. He even addressed a letter to Iturbide, insisting that the situation was hopeless and soliciting his cooperation.

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[28] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 490.

Iturbide promptly dispatched his troops to crush the movement.

Dávila, however, had been correctly apprised of the situation. Because of growing republican sentiment in the Congress, the Plan of Iguala was in greater danger than before. The hostility of this element toward Iturbide, with mutual recriminations, indicated that rapid measures would have to be taken if one or the other was to prevail. Congress took the initiative by proceeding to reduce the standing army to 20,000 and to remove from executive members of the Regency any military command. Iturbide still held the loyalty of the greater part of the army; and Church elements, who feared the program of Masonic Liberalism in Mexico as they had feared it through adherence to Spanish rule, were likewise devoted to his cause. With regard to the country at large, there is no doubt that Iturbide was easily the favorite for candidacy to the throne.

The Iturbidists accordingly arranged for a massive demonstration of military and popular elements on the night of May 18. The first signal was raised by the First Infantry Regiment, under Sergeant Pio Marcha, with the cry "Viva Agustín I." The city was shortly in an uproar of approval, with the multitudes moving toward Iturbide's residence, demanding that he accept the throne as emperor. "Viva Agustín I," he afterward declared, "was the universal cry that astonished me, for it was the first time in my life that I experienced this kind of sensation."[29]

It is too much to suppose that this eventuality never entered into the head of the Generalissimo, but that he actually laid the plans for this demonstration and conceived this design upon the throne is more than can be proved. The probability is that he remained stubborn in his desire to see the Plan of Iguala, which was the basis of Mexican independence, carried through, and that, as events developed, he was not adverse to accepting, by an expression of popular will, the place left vacant by Spain's rejection of the Treaty of Córdoba. He was engaged in conversation with the minister Herrera, General Negrete, and other friends, when the huge crowds appeared under his balcony, and he repeatedly addressed the populace with a confusion of spirit and apparent reluctance to accede to their demands. Upon the advice of his counselors, however, he returned to express his gratitude for this demonstration, but insisted then, and later by proclamation, that the matter would have to be presented to Congress.

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[29] Cf. *Manifiesto cit.*

The next morning at seven o'clock, Congress assembled, to receive through the Regency a petition of the army, subscribed to by the principal generals, and reinforced by the insistent throngs outside the palace, to offer him the crown. Congress appealed to the Regency to establish discipline, so that it might deliberate in freedom; and when this body acknowledged its helplessness in view of the situation, Iturbide was sent for to restore order. Upon his entry into the assembly hall, large numbers of the people burst in and occupied every available place, crying: "Coronation or death!"

Under the circumstances, the freedom and decision of Congress was bound to be impugned later. A number of the deputies, including Odoardo and Tagle, president and vice-president respectively, were absent, and only 82 of the 162 representatives voted. Nevertheless, the various groups sustained their opinions, and 15 members voted against the proposal.[30] Considerable discrepancy exists over the number of representatives actually present at the session, although Bustamante, Congressional secretary, considered that a legal quorum was constituted. No one disputed the validity of the election at the time, and the entire nation applauded the choice.[31] Congress had shown itself unable to handle the great pressing problems before it, without a strong executive; and Spain had eliminated itself from the throne.

"The great and memorable event which has been communicated to us today," wrote Gómez Farías, precursor of the Liberal Party, which later succeeded in deposing the Emperor, "had been prepared by the singular merit of the hero of Iguala. His valor and his virtues called him to the throne; only his modesty, disinterestedness and good faith in his dealings had kept him from it. . . .

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[30] Iturbide maintained that 77 votes were cast in his favor.

[31] Many of the monarchists who had still entertained hopes for a Spanish monarch left the country in indignation, among them the archbishop of Mexico, Pedro Fonte. The action of this prelate, at a critical moment, naturally produced a series of unfortunate effects upon the Church.

"We confirm with our votes the acclamations of the Mexican people, of the brave generals, officials, and worthy soldiers of the Army of the Three Guarantees; and thus we reward the extraordinary merits and services of the Liberator of Anáhuac, while attaining peace, union, and tranquility which, otherwise, might have disappeared from us forever."[32]

Congress at once proceeded to the formal proclamation of Iturbide's elevation, amid national rejoicing, and on May 21 the Emperor took his oath to defend the Catholic Religion, to observe the Constitution which Congress would draw up, never to alienate any territory of the empire, and to respect the political liberty of the nation as well as the personal liberty of every individual.

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Iturbide was consecrated and crowned on July 21 amid public display that put the pageantry of the viceroys to shame. In the absence of Archbishop Fonte, he and his Empress were anointed in the great cathedral by the bishop of Guadalajara, assisted by the bishops of Puebla, Oaxaca, and Durango. The crown was placed by the president of Congress upon the head of Iturbide, who then repeated the ceremony for the Empress. Following the solemn Mass and the sermon of the bishop of Puebla, the sergeant of arms proclaimed: "The most pious and most august first Constitutional Emperor of the Mexicans, Agustín, has been crowned and enthroned." And amid the cries of *Viva el emperador,* with the ringing of church bells and salvos of the artillery, the Emperor began his reign.

To declare Iturbide Emperor of Mexico was easy enough. To invest a man, suddenly drawn up from the ranks, with all the prerogatives of royalty and surround him with the mythical glamour of a king, was another thing. Nevertheless, for a while Congress did everything in its power to establish both the symbols and the reality of a throne. Royal succession was declared hereditary. The mint struck the bust of the new Emperor on the coin of the realm. The father of Agustín I was granted the title of Prince of the Union, to be addressed as "His Highness," the same as the Emperor's sons; his sister Nicolasa was recognized as a princess; and an elaborate court was brought together with all the appanage and complexity of imperial glory. The expenses of maintaining such an establishment and the inexperience of the courtiers, however, were largely responsible for the rumblings of discontent and ridicule soon to fall upon the throne.

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[32] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, p. 597.

Congress had already, on June 11, authorized a forced loan of 600,000 pesos to be raised from ecclesiastical and secular corporations and wealthy citizens, but no adequate or regular method of financing the government was drawn up. Later, the national Junta, on November 5, decreed another forced contribution of 2,800,000 pesos; and nearly 1,300,000 pesos at Perote and Jalapa, belonging to Spaniards who had left or were about to leave the country, was seized and applied to government expenses. Iturbide himself contributed one third of his own income to subsidize the mining industry. Unfortunately, the inflationary policies, the forced loans, and the unethical seizure of funds already mentioned had only a distressing national effect.

The principal cause of Iturbide's downfall, however, was the opposition and increasing organization of active minorities in the Congress, namely the Republicans, imbued with the principles of Rousseau and Benjamin Constant, the Masons and Spanish Liberals, who were at first bitterly opposed to Mexican independence, and the earlier Insurgents who conceived an increasing resentment against their apparent neglect by the new Emperor. Widely divergent in views, as later civil wars were to show, these groups were able to unite on one thing – the overthrow of the man they had placed on the throne. In this aim they were ably seconded by opinion in the United States and the activity of the American agent, Joel Poinsett. Monroe wrote to Jefferson, August 25, 1822, that "Iturbide would have to abandon shortly the aspiration to hereditary power, and that if he failed to do so, he would be dethroned and destroyed."

Padre Servando Mier, ex-deputy from Mexico to the Spanish Cortes, who contributed so much to the discomfiture and downfall of Agustín I, openly admitted in the second Constituent

Congress that "if until now we have forestalled the forming of a Constitution, although Iturbide commanded it of us, it was to resist the consolidation of his throne." Meanwhile the journal *El Sol* of the Masons, still agitating for a European prince on the throne, and *El Hombre Libre,* advocating a republic, were suppressed.[33] In early August a republican conspiracy, suppressed in Valladolid, reappeared in Puebla. The government promptly arrested the leading conspirators, including fifteen deputies with Padre Mier and the Minister of Colombia, who was ordered out of the country.

The vigorous action of the government in this matter aroused the greatest indignation of Congress as an act against the sovereignty of the nation, and Gómez Farías even suggested that the national assembly should protest to the nation and dissolve itself. Every move of the Emperor to establish regional courts, to diminish the number of deputies, with representation more in accordance with population, and to divide the assembly into two chambers as provided by the act of convocation, was promptly rejected. When finally Congress resisted his claims to the power of veto, an impasse had been reached on all points. Iturbide called for a meeting of the counselors of state, the ministers, over 70 deputies, and a number of prominent generals, and on their advice decreed dissolution of this body, October 31, 1821.

The official statement of the government relative to this act pointed out that in the eight months of its existence, Congress had not even begun to write the Constitution, although this was the principal reason for its convocation, that it had neglected the matter of public finance, and failed to establish judicial tribunals. In a word, diverted by the intrigues of those opposed to independence, it had frittered away its time in useless debate and opposition to the Emperor, reducing the government to a precarious condition.

To re-establish legislative power and make progress in the pressing business of national organization particularly in the judiciary and treasury, Iturbide at once created a committee known as the *Junta Instituyente.* In addition, this body was to proceed at once to lay plans for the meeting of a new congress. At this moment Iturbide might have proceeded to establish himself as a dictator. That he did not, but on the contrary, expressed himself as opposed to despotism, seems a clear evidence of his sincerity and confidence in the possibilities of a moderate government. In vacillation between strong measures and fidelity to the pledge of a Constitutional monarchy, however, he lost his leadership; and with conspiracy growing apace, his appeal to national popularity was no longer an ample guarantee of his security or that of the throne.

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[33] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, p. 646.

The first signal of dissolution began with the inexplicable conduct of Santa Anna in Vera Cruz. Under pretense of surrendering that city to the Spaniards still in command at San Juan de Ulúa, this soldier conceived the plan of trapping the enemy and then seizing their fort at San Juan Ulúa. For this purpose he enlisted his superior, General Echávarri, without, however, providing sufficient troops. The Spaniards were actually repulsed; but Echávarri barely escaped with his life, and the scheme for seizing Ulúa failed. Echávarri became convinced that Santa Anna was acting treacherously, and conveyed this charge to Iturbide, with the effect that the latter decided to remove Santa Anna from command.

With this in mind the Emperor proceeded to Jalapa, where he was coolly received by the Spanish element now smarting under governmental expropriations, and he gave instructions to Santa Anna to relinquish his command. Dissembling his real purpose, from fear of the man, he said: "I await you in Mexico, Santa Anna, to make your fortune for you." Upon confidential advice from an informer, the latter learned what was actually in the mind of Iturbide, and with the bitterest resentment he disobeyed orders and hurried back to Vera Cruz. There he took charge of the Eighth Infantry Regiment, pronounced the nation a republic, and pledged himself to the three guarantees of the Plan of Iguala. This was on December 2. Vera Cruz at once joined the movement, seconded by other towns along the coast.

News of what had happened reached Iturbide at Puebla. Although great preparations for the celebration of the birth of his son were being made in Mexico City, he returned to the capital at night, on December 13, and immediately laid plans to suppress this serious threat of revolt. Santa Anna was declared a traitor, and the Church was asked to excommunicate those who subscribed to republicanism. By this time Santa Anna had been joined by Guadalupe Victoria and began to organize troops under the name of the Liberating Army. At Jalapa, however, he was badly beaten by government troops and would have fled to the United States, were it not for the encouragement of Victoria, who insisted that he organize Vera Cruz for defense.

Meanwhile, Bravo and Guerrero, who, like Santa Anna, had but a short time before declared themselves enthusiastically for Augustín I, secretly left the capital to organize revolt in the South, and on January 13, 1823, declared: "We have today the noble audacity to deny obedience to the man named Emperor; since the act and form of his proclamation is null, we are not bound to uphold it." At the same time they declared themselves opposed to the idea of a republic and interested only in the restoration of "our Constituent Congress." This uprising likewise failed because of prompt action by the government, and the whole movement seemed reduced to its last extremities.

The enemies of Iturbide, nevertheless, had now consolidated themselves within the ranks of the Masonic order which spread its influence throughout the army and secretly intrigued with the generals. Cortazar and Lobato, who had remained faithful to the Emperor until this time, as well as Moran, the comandante of Puebla, and General Negrete, were either members of the lodge or in agreement with its leaders, and even Echávarri, in whom Iturbide had reposed the greatest confidence, was admitted into the order.[34] The latter had been supplied with troops and artillery for the siege of Vera Cruz, but whether from the inadequacy of his resources or the designs of his fraternal associates, he made no headway against Santa Anna.

Out of these machinations came the Plan of Casa Mata, drawn up outside the walls of Vera Cruz, on February 1, 1823, and shortly accepted by Santa Anna and Victoria, although Santa Anna was not himself a Mason and was greatly distrusted by that body. Briefly, the army was pledged to re-establish national representation and convoke a new Congress. At the same time, it offered to respect the person of the Emperor, although this was far from its real intention. Supported by the army and dominated by republican members, many of whom had been converted from their former demands for a European prince, the new Congress would proceed to make short shrift of the monarch.

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[34] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 706–708.

A military body, with Echávarri at its head, was immediately formed, and the siege was turned from Vera Cruz to Orizaba, Córdoba, and Jalapa. Nicolás Bravo joined the movement at Oaxaca. On February 14, the revolution was declared at Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Guadalajara, Querétaro, and Guanajuato. Governmental commissions to treat with the uprising met with failure. The commissioners themselves were won over to the revolution; and by the end of February the government was able to count only on the fidelity of the capital. Even there the desertion of troops took place on a large scale. On the night of February 23, those remaining of the Ninth and Eleventh Infantry Regiments left their barracks, released the political prisoners from prison, and with the cry of *"Viva la libertad and la republica"* marched to Toluca. Others followed, including even the mounted grenadiers of the imperial guard.

In a last effort to stem the tide, Iturbide agreed to call the new Congress immediately; and a truce was agreed upon, which the revolutionists utilized to win more adherents to their cause. He repeatedly sought an interview with the leaders, but to no avail, for they feared the influence of his personality and were ashamed, as he alleged, to meet the monarch whom they had proclaimed and later abandoned. He had been invited to resign his throne and lead the revolution under the Plan of Casa Mata, but this he indignantly rejected. Finally in desperation, fully aware that delay was playing directly into the hands of his enemies, he ordered the dissolved Congress to reassemble. Only 58 deputies reappeared, on March 7.

The revolutionary Junta at Puebla now declared that it would recognize the old Congress as legitimate only when the number of legitimate deputies was complete and Congress was given absolute freedom. Iturbide recognized that this was simply to re-enact the old farce. The menacing attitude of the army and its rejection of every proposal made by him were clear indication of its intentions. He took the only step left, if useless bloodshed was to be avoided, and on the night of March 19, presented his abdication to Congress. To prevent trouble, he expressed himself as willing to leave the country and asked only that the nation pay the private debts he had incurred in the public service. He then retired to Tulancingo, escorted by Bravo, and there awaited the final action of Congress.

The republican army entered Mexico City on the twenty-sixth. Three days later, with a quorum re-established, Congress proceeded to reorganize the government. Bravo, Victoria, and Negrete were elected to form a provisional government; and on April 7, the national assembly proceeded to pass on Iturbide's abdication. The conclusion was reached to the effect that his elevation to the throne had been secured by violence and was illegal. Hence there could be no question of an abdication. It was decided to exile him to Italy with an annual allowance of 25,000 pesos and the generous title of *Excellency*. At the same time the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Córdoba, under which the nation had been united for independence, were rejected as null.

vii

On March 30, accompanied by a small troop of his soldiers, Iturbide had left, under the escort of Bravo, for Tulancingo. A marked hostility between his followers and the soldiers under Bravo soon brought orders from the government for greater severity, and Iturbide was reduced to the humiliating condition of a prisoner. He reached Vera Cruz on May 9. He was not allowed to enter the city, but remained in a camp under guard. Two days later, the English ship *Rawlins* took him on board, accompanied by his wife and eight children, his nephew, José Ramon Malo, two priests, his secretary, Francisco de Paula Álvarez, and his valet. At Tulancingo, he left his father, now eighty-five years of age and his invalid sister Nicolasa. But his life was not yet secure. His steps had been dogged by Masonic spies who plotted his assassination and probably would have succeeded, had it not been for the timely precautions of Bravo. Even on board ship and later in Europe he was menaced by these agents, in particular one Padre Marchena, an ex-priest of the Dominican Order who had sold himself to the Lodge.[35]

The frigate reached Leghorn, Italy, on August 2, but was immediately placed under quarantine, so that the former monarch was unable to put foot on land until September 2. Then he was permitted to stay only a month and moved to Florence, where he was shown every consideration by the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Because of the opposition of the Spanish minister in Rome, he was unable to visit that city and had to return to Leghorn. No more welcome than before, he decided to embark for London. A heavy storm drove the boat back to port; and he finally left, on December 10, by overland route as far as Ostende, and thence to London, which he reached on January 1, 1824. There he was joined by his family in April.

In Italy, Iturbide had written his *Manifiesto a la Nacion Mexicana,* a statement of his part in the events that led up to and followed the liberation of Mexico and a vindication of his conduct. He was obliged to defer its publication, and the important document was first published in London. It was subsequently translated into English, French, and German, and appeared in several editions in Mexico, copiously annotated by various editors.

The news which Iturbide had received from his friends in Mexico, while he was in London and even before that time, represented the Republic as being in a very bad way. Civil war between the Federalists and the Centralists was asserted to have brought the country to the brink of destruction. Apparently, like President Monroe of the United States, he gave considerable credence also to reports of an intrigue of the Latin powers within the Holy Alliance to regain the Spanish colonies. Moved, as he maintained, sheerly by patriotism, he directed a letter to the

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[35] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 790.

Mexican Congress, dated February 13, offering himself, munitions and money for the defense of the nation against the enemy.

The answer of Congress was an immediate decree, declaring Iturbide "a traitor and outlaw, whenever he should, under *any title* put foot on any point of Mexican territory, in which case and *for this fact alone,* he shall remain a declared public enemy of the State."[36] At the same time the death penalty was invoked against his partisans and anyone who would dare to publish articles praising him or advocating his return to the Republic.

Badly informed by his friends, from whom he had received the most encouraging dispatches, and unaware of the action of a vindictive Congress, he decided to return to Mexico without waiting for a reply to his first note. "I have been repeatedly summoned from various sources," he wrote to the English Minister Canning, "and can remain deaf to these appeals no longer." On May 11, he left Southhampton with his wife and two younger sons, the two priests who had accompanied him in exile, Malo, and Beneski, a Pole who had served him as an aide-de-camp in Mexico. The brig first landed in the bay of San Bernardo, Texas, on June 27, in search of Colonel Tres Palacios; but not finding him, Iturbide directly re-embarked for Tampico and anchored at Soto la Marina on July 14. Congress had been kept informed of his movements and intentions by government and Masonic spies.

Beneski was sent ashore for an interview with the Commandant Garza, and, provided with a letter from Padre Treviño, represented himself as having come with a companion, with a proposal to establish an Irish colony. Undoubtedly, Garza was aware of the meaning of all this, but, without betraying any such knowledge, showed himself favorably disposed and provided the envoy with a permit for his companion to land. Shortly before dark the following day, Iturbide landed with Beneski, intending to visit Garza, and took lodging for the night at the Rancho de los Arroyos, about six leagues from sea. His disguise and his characteristic manner of mounting the horse, however, rendered him suspect to a merchant who happened to be at the place. A troop of soldiers was dispatched to pursue him. Shortly after midnight he and his companion were aroused from their sleep and placed under arrest.

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[36] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, p. 791.

The next morning he was presented to Garza, who greeted him cordially; and he informed the officer quite frankly why he had returned to Mexico. In fulfillment of his duty, Garza should have informed Iturbide immediately of the decree of Congress and warned him to return to his ship under pain of incurring the condemnation. Instead, he led the former Emperor as far as the city of Soto la Marina, and casually pointed out to his defenseless prisoner for the first time that he had been proscribed by Congress and would be put to death. Iturbide heard the awful news quietly, and asked only that he might have the comfort of his chaplain, his wife, and companions.

The conduct of Garza throughout this last tragic episode is inexplicable except as the vacillating and cowardly reflection of a guilty government. The following day, Garza sent word to Iturbide and Beneski that they would be shot at three o'clock in the afternoon. Iturbide requested that Beneski's life might be spared and said, "Tell General Garza that I am ready to die, and only request three days to prepare to leave this world as a Christian." Garza then decided to refer the case to the state Congress of Tamaulipas, meeting in Padilla, and formed the strange resolution of placing the entire military escort under the command of Iturbide with orders to proceed to Padilla. Iturbide assumed this command, in the spirit of a man of honor, arrived at his destination about sunrise on July 19, and asked permission of the Congress to present himself. That body had already assumed a judicial rôle and, on receiving notice of his approach, decreed his execution, without any right of appeal or recourse. Garza suddenly reappeared, while Iturbide was awaiting a response, and again put him under arrest.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Iturbide was informed by Garza that he had but three hours to live. His last request for delay that he might prepare himself spiritually was refused. "I did not ask," he said, "for the preservation of my life, which I offered many times for my country. I begged that three days might be given me to dispose my conscience, which unfortunately is not as free in my private life as in my public career." He confessed himself and proceeded to the place of execution without the slightest evidence of fear or confusion.[37]

There he gave his watch and rosary to the chaplain, to be delivered to his eldest son, and a letter for his wife. To the soldiers assigned for his execution he distributed three and one-half ounces of gold which he carried in his pocket, and having asked permission to speak, declared in a loud, clear voice: "Mexicans! At the very moment of death, I recommend to you the love of our country and the observance of our holy religion: this is what must lead you to glory. I die for having come to aid you, and I die gladly because I die among you. I die with honor, not as a traitor. That stain will not attach to my children and their descendants. I am not a traitor, no. Preserve order, and offer obedience to your leaders, for to do what they command is to discharge your duty with God. I do not say this from vanity, for that is farthest from my heart."[38]

Then, having made his last act of contrition and kissed the crucifix, he bound his own eyes, and as the darkness of evening fell, received the final volley. His remains were clothed in the robes of the Franciscans, of which he was a Third Order lay member, and were placed in the state Congress for vigil. The following morning he was given burial at the expense of General Garza, and was interred in an old roofless church of Padilla. Beneski was exiled forever; and Iturbide's family, awarded a pension of 8000 pesos annually, was ordered to the United States.

It was not until 1833 under the presidency of Santa Anna that a decree was made to transfer the ashes of the Liberator to the capital for "the urn destined for the first heroes of independence." This decree itself was ignored until five years later, when Anastasio Bustamante secured a new ordinance from Congress, and amid great pomp placed the remains in a sepulcher erected in the chapel of San Felipe de Jesús in the Cathedral of Mexico City.

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[37] Cf. C. de Beneski, *A Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don A. de Iturbide* (New York, 1825).

[38] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 797.

With the progressive triumph of Masonry as a political force in Mexico and the anticlerical Liberal reforms of 1857, the bitterness of the first Congress against Iturbide became enshrined in later history, almost one might say, as a matter of national policy; and his name has been neglected or impugned, to the exclusive glorification of Hidalgo and the leaders of the earlier insurrection. With all due credit to the patriotism of these men, it was Iturbide who brought the movement for independence to its completion, and that with comparatively little bloodshed.

His lack of leadership in civil life may have been due in part to his youth. He was not yet forty-one when he was executed. In the first uncertain steps of nationhood, it is probable that he was torn between personal ambition and the fear of establishing a dictatorship. This vacillation was his undoing in the face of strongly organized minorities and treacherous generals.[39] Unfortunately, for him, and possibly also for the nation, he was confronted by a hostile and in many ways incompetent Congress, vitiated by impatient elements that were later to tear the nation asunder with their intramural and unpatriotic struggles. Had he been offered a greater spirit of cooperation by that body and of loyalty in the army, in accordance with the original Three Guarantees as modified and confirmed at Córdoba, the story would have been different.

Instead of this, the first insurrection, which failed to secure independence, has been glorified; and the second, which achieved it, has been largely despised or ignored. The guarantee which largely motivated both the first and the second movements for independence, namely freedom of the Catholic Church, was then progressively pushed underfoot. Peace and harmony between the races which, as a program, should have developed territorial Mexico into a unified political and economic body, gave way to unprogressive feudalism under the rule of the Liberals. And reform has followed the way of civil strife and violence.

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[39] Cf. Lorenzo de Zavala, *loc. cit.*, lib. I, p. 187.

CHAPTER XI

Antonio López De Santa Anna

CHAMELEON AND DESPOT

i

"GUILTLESS of loyalty or shame, incoherent and dynamic, pompous and irresponsible, nationalistic and legendary, a profiteer and romancer, intolerable and indispensable," writes Alfonso Junco, "Don Antonio López de Santa Anna well deserves a book, which would indeed be spicy, picturesque, and most Mexican, for all four races."[1] Santa Anna was born at Jalapa, Mexico, on February 21, 1795. His family name has been traced to Portugal, with some indications of Gypsy origin. In Mexico, the Santa Annas lived on the coast of Vera Cruz from the early part of the eighteenth century. Both his father, Don Antonio López de Santa Anna, and his mother, Doña Manuela María Severino, were in comfortable circumstances and held distinguished places in the society of Jalapa. His father was a lawyer and served as chief notary of Alcolea in the port of Vera Cruz. Here the younger Antonio spent his early years.

Vera Cruz at this time was a city of considerable commercial activity and rivalry between the Spanish factions as well as a center of slave trade for the English merchants. To guard the port against the enemies of Spain, the Viceroy Iturrigaray established a cantonment at Jalapa, in 1802. This garrison soon became distinguished for its brilliant maneuvers, and Don Antonio, like other boys of his age, conceived the ambition of entering the army. His father had decided upon a commercial career for the lad; but, enlisting the sympathy of his mother, Don Antonio applied to the commander of the garrison and was enrolled as a cadet. Years later, in his memoirs, he proudly declared, "From my first years, I was inclined towards the glorious career of arms and felt a true vocation for it. Securing the consent of my parents, I enlisted as a gentleman cadet in Vera Cruz, June 9, 1810, after giving the required proofs of nobility. At the age of fourteen I belonged to the royal army of New Spain!"[2]

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[1] Alfonso Junco, *Un Siglo de Méjico*, 2nd ed. (Mexico, 1937), p. 153.

Spirited and ingratiating, the young Don Antonio soon gave evidences of the ambition that was to characterize his career. Toward his fellow students he was quarrelsome but of recognized courage, and although he showed but little inclination to study, he had ample talent. The first test of his military qualities came but a few months after his enlistment. With the news of Hidalgo's first successes, he received marching orders to crush the rebellion; and on March 13, 1811, his regiment, The Regulars of Vera Cruz, comprising 500 men under Colonel Joaquín Arredondo, left by boat for Tampico and the province of Nuevo Santander. After the accession of Félix María Calleja to the viceroyalty, Arredondo received orders to proceed to Texas, where Insurgent bands had been joined by colonists and adventurers from the United States.

From these fields, Santa Anna was ordered back to Mexico City as an adjutant to the viceroy, and on September 8, 1816, he returned to Vera Cruz. Back in his native region, he acted as instructor to the soldiers recruited from the province and as adjutant to Don José Dávila, the Spanish governor. During this time, he found considerable freedom, which he devoted in part to reading the Greek and Latin classics in the library of his commander, studying the exploits of Caesar, and following the contemporary successes of Napoleon.

As soon as repercussions of Iturbide's revolt reached the coast, in 1821, Dávila dispatched his loyal adjutant with 200 men to pursue the rebel garrisons from Jalapa to Orizaba. On March 29, Santa Anna surprised an advance post of the rebels and returned to the Carmelite convent where he had been billeted, with the announcement that he had won a great victory.

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[2] Antonio López de Santa Anna, *Mi Historia Militar y Politica*, 1810–1874, in *Documentos Inéditos*, Genaro García y Carlos Pereyra (Mexico, 1905), tomo II, p. 1. There is some doubt about the year of Santa Anna's birth.

He at once dictated a report of his success to the viceroy and urged the Carmelites to draw up a petition for his promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. While this was being prepared, a messenger arrived with information that the rebel chieftain José Joaquín de Herrera had arrived at the plaza with a force of 2000 men. In the greatest consternation, Don Antonio left the banquet which the monks were tendering him and rushed off to parley with the enemy.

It appears that he had pledged himself the year before to proclaim independence in Vera Cruz as soon as the national conspirators should strike. Herrera now explained the significance of the Plan of Iguala and offered to maintain Santa Anna in his military rank if he would join the movement. The latter replied that he was expecting a promotion from the Spaniards. Not to be outdone, Herrera answered that he would be made a colonel immediately by Iturbide and promised him the command of the province of Vera Cruz. If any lingering doubts remained in the mind of the ambitious young soldier, they were dispelled by this offer. Without further ado he proclaimed his allegiance to Iturbide and the Plan he advocated.

The convert to national Independence showed himself a brilliant and fearless campaigner. Alvarado, Córdoba, and Jalapa fell successively under his attack. For his capture of the last-named stronghold and the organization of his military elements, Iturbide awarded him the title "Chief of the Eleventh Division of the Army of the Three Guarantees." He next undertook the siege of Vera Cruz, which was being held for Spain by his former chief, José Dávila. Not until the arrival of Juan O'Donojú from Spain, on July 30, however, was he allowed the freedom of the city. He succeeded in placing O'Donojú in contact with Iturbide and showed himself so constant and pressing in his courtesies, that the Spanish envoy began to regard him with suspicion.

When the Army of the Three Guarantees entered Mexico City in triumph, Santa Anna took command of Vera Cruz. "Let us close the doors of the ominous temple of Mars," he exclaimed, "and allow to remain open only those of Mercury, Minerva, and Flora." With these auspicious sentiments, he beheld the inauguration of an independent Mexico and awaited for himself, as liberator of the province of Vera Cruz, the title of brigadier.

The coveted honor was not immediately forthcoming. Instead, he saw himself passed up on the lists by men who had assented to the Plan of Iguala after him. The truth is that the Regency was unconvinced of Santa Anna's loyalty. Rincon had described him as a "man drunk with an ambition, which did not end in his brain," and declared that his brother and others were going among the natives and in the taverns, with the cry: "Hail to Santa Anna and death to all others!"

Shortly before his election to the throne, however, Iturbide fulfilled his promises and named Santa Anna a "Brigadier with Letters," an honor which allowed him to wear gold instead of silver braid on his coat, and at the same time appointed him Commanding General of the province of Vera Cruz. The gratitude of the new brigadier knew no bounds. After a letter of fulsome praise to Iturbide, he turned to proclaim his sentiments to the people of Vera Cruz. "It is impossible," he said, "to contain the excess of my joy. . . . Let us anticipate, then, and speed to proclaim the immortal Iturbide as Emperor, pledging ourselves as his most constant defenders even to laying down our lives; may the regiment which I command be the first to offer this irrefragable proof. . . . Let us multiply our voices full of jubilation, and let us cry out without ceasing, congratulating ourselves in repeating: '*Viva* Augustín the First, Emperor of Mexico!' "[3]

ii

In the autumn of 1822, the Emperor Iturbide decided to inspect the province of Vera Cruz, which had remained in a condition of hostility and economic paralysis since the beginning of the wars for independence. In view of later developments, the primary reason for this journey was his distrust of Santa Anna, for whom he had already conceived a distaste as a result of the latter's flattering attentions to his sister in Mexico City. Subsequent developments in Vera Cruz made it appear that the young brigadier was intriguing on his own account; and General José Antonio Echávarri hinted that Santa Anna had maneuvered a treacherous attack upon his life in the hope of succeeding to his post.

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[3] Cf. Rafael F. Muñoz, *Santa Anna* (Madrid, 1936), pp. 33, 34.

Iturbide arrived at Jalapa in the middle of November. Santa Anna presented himself as an obsequious servant until he learned from the Emperor that he was to be transferred to Mexico City. Still dissembling his bitter resentment, he accompanied Iturbide for a few leagues as the latter returned to Mexico City. Then, begging a few days of grace to put his affairs in order, he galloped back as fast as he could to Vera Cruz.

There he quickly put himself at the head of the Eighth Regiment of Infantry and, on December 2, paraded through the streets with a proclamation denouncing the Emperor. Only a few months previously, he had insisted that the dismissal of Congress was "the means demanded by circumstances for the happiness of the nation." He now maintained that Iturbide had forced Congress to name him Emperor, so that his elevation was null, while the dissolution of Congress was "scandalous, criminal, and presumptuous."

It is too much to suppose that this rapid volte-face represented any intellectual change in Santa Anna or that he had an adequate concept of republicanism or program of action. The brains of the movement were to be found rather in Miguel Santa María, the Minister from Colombia, whom Iturbide had ordered to leave the country, and in the group of political theorists around him.[4] Santa María happened to be in Vera Cruz awaiting the departure of his boat, and was able under these circumstances to promote his own ideals.

When news of the uprising reached the capital, the Emperor's rage knew no bounds. He at once instructed his Minister of Justice to have the rebellious brigadier brought to Mexico City and shot as a traitor, and ordered General Echávarri to crush the movement. "When morality becomes corrupted," he declared, "there is no other remedy than to erect a gallows on every street for the villains. Compassion is a crime. Strive to crush this infamous gang."[5]

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[4] Cf. Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1852), tomo V, pp. 648, 690.

Santa Anna now confided the supreme direction of the revolution to the veteran Insurgent, Guadalupe Victoria, and extended his campaign as far as Alvarado and Córdoba. The Imperial commandant at Jalapa, however, not only resisted his attack on December 21, but routed him so thoroughly that when, with the remnants of his troops, he rejoined Guadalupe Victoria, he was ready to abandon the enterprise and flee the country.

"You can set sail when they show you the head of Victoria," replied the latter. Santa Anna returned to Vera Cruz to reorganize the defense of the city and prepare for the siege of Echávarri.

By this time, principally through Masonic intrigue, the army could no longer be depended on to support the throne, and after two months of indecisive bombardment, Echávarri decided that the expedient thing to do was to join hands with the brigadier whom he had once accused of treachery against himself. From this union came the Plan of Casa Mata.[6]

Then followed, in rapid succession, the frantic overtures of the Emperor, the reconvocation of the Congress, under pressure of the very generals who had applauded its dissolution, the exile of Iturbide and the revocation of those sections of the Plan of Iguala and of the Treaty of Córdoba which tendered an invitation to the Bourbons to the throne of Mexico. The Republic was well under way.

As soon as Iturbide had been disposed of, the Bourbonists and the Republicans, who had united against him, again assumed their separate identities. The former declared for a Centralist republic and placed themselves under the leadership of Generals Bravo and Negrete. Victoria and Santa María, however, were now determined not to lose control of the revolution and demanded a Federal system of free and sovereign states. As a precautionary measure, Santa Anna was dispatched to San Luis Potosí, on March 19, 1823, the very day that Augustín I resigned his throne.

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[5] Cf. Muñoz, *loc. cit.*, p. 54.

[6] Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 709–711.

Unaware of the abdication, the brigadier set out; but as soon as he became aware of developments in the capital, he decided to head a third movement. On June 5, he drew up his troops in battle array in the central plaza of San Luis Potosí and proclaimed himself "Protector of Liberty" with a new Plan and a demand for the convocation of a Constituent Congress.

His movements had already been under observation; and, on July 10, he proceeded to the capital to give an account of himself to the Executive Council. No sooner had he arrived, than he was placed under arrest, charged with ambitions to succeed Iturbide. Absolved from these charges, he became involved in a plot against resident Spaniards, but maintained that he had nothing to do with the movement, and placed "his sword and his existence" at the disposal of Congress to remedy the situation.

The Constituent Congress opened its sessions on October 31, 1823, and began to lay plans for a Constitution practically copied from that of the United States.[7] So far as Santa Anna was concerned, the atmosphere now seemed clear, but the Republicans were still uneasy over his presence in the national capital. In order to make sure that he would cause no further disorders, it was decided to ship him off as Military Commander of the state of Yucatán. Aboard the ship *Iguala,* he read his commission: The government "hoped that with his presence the conflicts in that state would cease" and added significantly that "The Military Commander shall not leave the province without its written permission."

He soon became restive so far from the center of things, and began to storm Mexico City with various excuses to return. Guadalupe Victoria, who was elected first President of the Republic, on October 10, 1824, finally accepted his resignation and allowed him to return. In June, the following year, he was appointed Director General of Engineers. This post was not to the liking of his unquiet spirit, and he soon resigned.

He had now taken to wife the Doña María Inés de la Paz, who was fifteen years old and just fifteen years his junior; and in the spirit of a young Cincinnatus he proceeded to the lovely Hacienda of Manga de Clavo (Clove-Spike) between Vera Cruz and Jalapa. It was a delightful place, where distinguished visitors as well as adventurers and commercial travelers of Mexico came to pay their respects and exchange news. In these peaceful, semitropical surroundings he remained until July, 1827.

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[7] *Primer Centenario de la Constitucion de 1824* (published by the Camara de Senadores, Mexico, 1924), pp. 251 sq.

iii

At this time three outstanding intellectual leaders appeared, to leave the impression of their thought upon the conflicts which were to tear Mexico asunder during the nineteenth century. Lucas Alamán, the distinguished historian, Centralist, and Conservative leader; Lorenzo de Zavala, a Federalist who was later to lead the revolt of Texas against Mexico; and Dr. José María Luis Mora, an ex-cleric of Liberal and Socialist principles. The intellectual formation of Valentin Gómez Farías, "leader and patriarch of Liberalism," was largely due to the ideas of Mora and de Zavala.[8]

While Mora was inclined to believe that a self-sufficient Mexico could be created from the mines and the wealth of the Church, Alamán turned to Europe, and Zavala, to the United States, for capital and trade. England was not slow to recognize the possibilities of commerce with the country, and sent diplomatic agents to develop commercial exchange. To offset the growing influence of Britain, the American Minister, Joel R. Poinsett, who had been principal intriguer against the rule of Iturbide, wrote to Henry Clay, October 12, 1825, that he believed it necessary to organize a popular American Party in Mexico.

Acting on the principle of "divide and rule," Poinsett realized the possibilities of operating through the Masonic lodges, which had now become a leading factor in political intrigue. The Scottish Rite Masons or *Escoceses* had been brought to the country from Spain, largely through the army, and from a political standpoint represented Centralism. Some of the elements of this group favored a monarchy, even the restoration of Spanish authority with a moderate Constitution. To counteract this tendency, two clergymen long active in politics, but of doubtful standing in the Church, José María Alpuche and Ramos Arizpe, conceived the idea of organizing the York Rite Lodge or *Yorkinos.*[9] Poinsett, for whom Federalism and Republicanism were identical, seized upon this opportunity and applied to the Grand Master in New York to install the York Rite Lodge in Mexico. It was from the latter group that the Catholic Church was later to receive its most bitter assaults.

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[8] Cf. José C. Valadés, *Santa Anna y la Guerra de Texas* (Mexico, 1936), p. 78.

At the outset Masonry in Mexico appeared to have only a fraternal and political aspect. Although a papal Encyclical was launched against Masonic and secret societies in 1825, the Mexican Church itself was incapable of concerted understanding or strong action. Its hierarchy had either fled during the disorders that separated Mexico from the jurisdiction of the Spanish King, to whom they originally owed their patronage, or had died without being replaced, or had been exiled during the waves of anti-Spanish feeling. At the end of 1821, there were only five bishops in Mexico. By 1827, not one remained. By 1830 the total number of clerics had been reduced by one third, and the demands of the Republican Congress for jurisdiction over the Church seemed to prevent any remedy.[10]

Poinsett began by throwing the weight of his influence toward a Federal organization of the country, although the historical traditions and genius of Mexico had hitherto indicated a centralized political system. At the same time he encouraged leaders like Zavala and Gómez Farías to carry on the development of a strong pro-American sentiment, with the idea of detaching Texas from the Mexican Federation and strengthening the power of the slave states in the American Union. One of his greatest triumphs, before his removal was ordered at the request of the Mexican Government in 1829, was the coup d'état that placed Vicente

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[9] Cf. Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo Politico de las Revoluciones de México* (Mexico, 1845), lib. I, pp. 257, 258.

[10] J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 405.

Guerrero in the chair of chief executive under the intellectual tutelage of Lorenzo de Zavala.

As early as October 21, 1826, he had written to his government: "Guerrero is a man without instruction. . . . I consider the presence of Zavala necessary here, because he exercises great influence over the General. Zavala is one of the leaders of the faction favorable to the United States, that is of the *Yorkinos*, and is more useful here than he would be in Washington."[11] How Guerrero's installation was achieved and how Santa Anna was involved in the intrigue is an interesting, if involved, story.

The Constitution of 1824 inaugurated a dangerous provision, the same as originally followed in the United States, of giving the Vice-Presidency to the Presidential candidate receiving the second largest number of votes. Thus, when Guadalupe Victoria was elected President, he found himself mated with his political adversary, Nicolás Bravo who soon became involved as an enemy of his government.

This division was further accentuated when, at the end of Victoria's four-year term of office, Nicolás Bravo decided to risk his case in open civil war and set up his headquarters at Tulancingo, about 100 leagues from the capital. The minister of War, General Manuel Gómez Pedraza, had announced his candidacy to succeed Victoria. To get him out of the way, therefore, the *Escoceses,* acting for Bravo, issued a Plan, on December 30, 1827, demanding a complete change of Cabinet. In addition, it called for the dismissal of Joel Poinsett from Mexico. Poinsett retaliated by backing Vicente Guerrero as the logical man to crush the rebellion.

During this time, Santa Anna had managed to get himself appointed to the post of vice-governor of the state of Vera Cruz. While currying the favor of both factions, he believed that the country would rise to the cause of Bravo. Apparently on his way to aid the latter, he was encountered by Guerrero, not far from Tulancingo, at the head of 150 men. There was nothing for him to do but dissemble, change his plans, and join forces with Guerrero. Only Governor Barragán of Vera Cruz came to the defense of Bravo; and, as a result, the latter and his champion were obliged to flee before the advance of Guerrero's troops. "In reward for his loyalty and courage," Santa Anna was named governor of Vera Cruz.

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[11] Cf. W. R. Manning, *La Misión de Poinsett a México* (Austin, 1913), pp. 21–42.

With Bravo out of the way, the Presidential elections of September 1, 1828, brought the rival candidacies of Vicente Guerrero, grizzled warrior for independence, and Gómez Pedraza, city bred in the traditions of the higher creoles. Santa Anna again threw his support to Guerrero, but Pedraza secured the plurality. The vanquished elements, however, were not prepared to abide by these results. Pedraza's victory, it was said, had been achieved by intimidation; and Don Antonio, now ousted from office, was ready to right the wrongs of the ballot.

On the night of September 11, he secretly left Jalapa with a small force to take possession of the fort of San Carlos de Perote. There, on the anniversary of Hidalgo's *grito,* he denounced Pedraza to the world as a hypocrite aligned with the privileged classes and ready for despotism, and announced that "the army and the people annul the election of Manuel Gómez Pedraza, who shall not be admitted as President or Vice-President." Congress replied by declaring Santa Anna an outlaw and ordered Generals Rincon and Calderon to lay siege to his fort.

With only 800 men against the combined forces of the government, the position of Don Antonio was indeed difficult. After thirty-six days of hardship, he found a way out, and fled with his retainers toward Oaxaca. The city of Oaxaca, studded with ancient, thick-walled churches and convents, was admirably adapted for withstanding an enemy; and here he determined to await his pursuers.

A rather sluggish siege was followed by guerrilla warfare within the city, the opposing forces firing on each other from the convents and churches. Santa Anna installed himself in the monastery of Santo Domingo, whence he made his famous sally to that of San Francisco in a section held by the government troops. On October 29, under cover of night, he took a select body of troops dressed as monks and with ladders scaled the walls of the monastery.

This type of escapade simply demonstrated the desperate character of his plight; and he began to communicate with Calderon, claiming to have knowledge of plans for a Spanish invasion and suggesting that they join forces, as fellow Mexicans, to repel the invader.

Finally came relief. Juan Alvarez revolted on the western coast and seized the port of Acapulco. The troops in the capital "pronounced" under the leadership of Zavala. On December 4, Pedraza, realizing that his was a lost cause, relinquished the Presidency and retired. Guerrero was named President in his place, with Anastasio Bustamante as Vice-President. Poinsett was satisfied.

If Santa Anna did not have all his hopes realized, he had the satisfaction at least of seeing Pedraza disposed of. For his "patriotism" he was restored to his post as governor of Vera Cruz and named military commander of the province.

iv

As it turned out, Santa Anna's information relative to a Spanish invasion was authentic. Taking stock of the sentiment of the Spaniards still remaining in Mexico as well as of the petitions of the Bourbonist creoles, the King arranged for a fleet to proceed from Cuba under the command of Brigadier Isidro Barradas and lead the way for a recovery of the former colony. President Guerrero, who had also received notice of these plans, commissioned Santa Anna to prepare secretly to meet the invaders.

The Spanish flotilla left Havana on July 5, 1829, but, like the "Invincible Armada," it fell afoul of storms, off the coast of Campeche. The remnants of the fleet disembarked near the mouth of the Pánuco River, not far from Tampico. As soon as Santa Anna received news of this, he forced a loan of 20,000 pesos, principally from the Spanish merchants of Vera Cruz, and placed his troops on board a motley fleet to reach the enemy. He succeeded in landing his forces near Tampico, where the Spaniards were already in control. The position of the invaders was far from favorable. In this low, tropical region, over 500 of their men soon fell victims to fever.

After a preliminary skirmish with the Spaniards, Santa Anna withdrew to the main body of his troops. Now reinforced with new detachments, he was in a position to assume a bolder attitude toward the enemy. "A handful of adventurers," he wrote Barradas, "has placed in a state of agitation and alarm 18,000,000 free men, who have sworn a thousand times to die before becoming slaves. . . . Either surrender yourself to Mexican generosity, so that the unfortunates you command may return to their native land, or prepare Your Excellency for imminent disaster."

In the midst of these parlies, the region was swept by a hurricane. This appeared sufficient to end all hopes of success for the Spaniards; but Santa Anna was eager to push his advantage and triumph personally by force of arms. Against better advice, he set out under cover of darkness for the attack, and it was only with the timely reinforcements of Mier y Terán that the movement succeeded. The Spaniards were forced to capitulate, September 11; but the Mexican losses were so large that Barradas was able to demand more favorable terms than Santa Anna had been willing to grant. The invaders surrendered their arms except the swords of the officers, and all were transferred back to Havana at Spanish expense, "solemnly promising not to return to take up arms against the Mexican Republic." Bullets and fever had joined to end Spain's hopes of recovering her richest colony.

Notice of the Mexican victory reached President Guerrero on the night of September 20 as he was at the theater. He immediately paused to announce the defeat of the Spaniards, and the city was shortly in an uproar of jubilation. Santa Anna found himself elevated to the character of a mythical hero. Various cities hastened to present him with jeweled swords and create him first citizen of honor. The National Congress itself named him *Benemerito* and gave him a cross with the inscription: "At Tampico he crushed the Spanish pride." His name was engraved on a pyramid erected on the spot of the Spanish surrender; and when he returned to Vera Cruz, on September 25, popular hysteria in his glorification knew no bounds.

v

Deliverance from this threat to Mexican independence had been effected, but even greater dangers to national peace and security still lay ahead. Whatever may have been the qualifications of Guerrero as a warrior, he soon proved to be no match for the political discords of the country. His pardon of Bravo and of the other conspirators of Tulancingo was viewed by many as a certain proof of his weakness, and various governors placed themselves in open hostility to the Federal authority. Revolt centered again in the ambitions of the Vice-President, Anastasio Bustamante, who had formed a reserve army at Vera Cruz during the Spanish invasion.

On October 29, Bustamante and Santa Anna signed an ambiguous manifesto declaring the need of certain reforms for the betterment of the nation. In reality, the former had decided to declare himself for a Centralist system of government as opposed to the Federalist. The constant struggle between the partisans of the two systems was destined to split the country wide open and indeed was responsible for the state of national exhaustion and disgust which made possible the American invasion and later still the introduction of Maximilian into Mexico.

Inasmuch as President Guerrero felt that he could trust none of his generals, he decided to attack the rebellious Vice-President himself; and, naming José María Bocanegra as President, he set out in military campaign. As soon as he departed, Luis Quintanar declared himself against Bocanegra, proclaimed the program of Bustamante, and named a regency composed of himself, Lucas Alamán, and Pedro Vélez. With the exception of the state of Vera Cruz and its governor, the entire country accepted this pronouncement. Santa Anna, however, who was now pledged to Guerrero, declared the regency unconstitutional and proclaimed himself "Protector of the Sovereign States of the Federation."

Taking a more realistic view of the situation, Guerrero decided that his own cause was lost, and he retired to Tixtla, his birthplace. Santa Anna found himself deserted by most of his troops; and declaring himself a sick man, he withdrew to his estate at Manga de Clavo. With the field thus cleared, Bustamante returned to Mexico, to be installed as President and to form a cabinet around Lucas Alamán.

The frankly Centralist character of this government, based largely on the political economy of Alamán, was bound to stir resentment among the dispossessed Federalists; and its dismissal of unsympathetic governors and legislators soon resulted in a wave of conspiracies and uprisings, Juan Alvarez again seized the port of Acapulco. Guerrero emerged from his retreat to join the movement, but, attacked by Nicolás Bravo, he was soon captured by ruse, and after a summary trial was shot. On January 2, 1832, the garrison of Vera Cruz staged an uprising against Bustamante's government and sent a commission inviting Santa Anna to lead the revolt.

By this time the Bustamante government was in an extremely shaky condition. The army was restless; and the cabinet was willing to resign. Bustamante realized that Santa Anna was ready to head an insurrection and offered to parley with him. Upon this admission of weakness, Santa Anna immediately assumed a haughty attitude and announced to the peace commissioners that unless all the points in his Plan were conceded, he would march on the capital itself. General Calderon was assigned to take up the challenge and proceeded to lay formal siege to Vera Cruz; but his troops from the highlands began to fall prey, like the Spaniards at Tampico, to the malarial fevers of the regions. On May 13, the unsuccessful siege was lifted, and Santa Anna was left secure in his stronghold.

It must be remembered that, amid the succession of violent changes and coups d'état in the government, there still remained the claims of Gómez Pedraza, who had been *elected* to the Presidency in 1828. While Santa Anna was holding out against Bustamante, uprisings in Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, and Jalisco, possibly inspired with funds from Vera Cruz, were spreading the revolt. More important than these, came the Plan of Zacatecas, engineered by Don Valentin Gómez Farías, in favor of the deposed and almost forgotten Pedraza. Gómez Farías was himself to play a leading rôle in politics from this time.

Santa Anna still nursed his hatred for Pedraza, but he saw in the Plan of Zacatecas certain personal advantages, and consented to the movement as a means of getting out of a stalemate. By the end of September, he had entered an armistice with Calderon and Rincon, reorganized his army, seized Puebla and moved on to lay siege to Mexico City. Bustamante, who fled to San Luis Potosí, returned to resist the siege, but it was too late. After a furious but indecisive battle, an armistice was arranged, resulting in the Treaty of Lavaleta, by which Pedraza was to assume the Presidency of the Republic until April 1, 1833.

In anticipation of this understanding, the latter returned to Vera Cruz, October 5. Congress refused to ratify the Treaty, but Congress did not count; and on January 3, 1833, the two erstwhile mortal enemies, Santa Anna and Gómez Pedraza, entered the capital together in triumph. After the glory of this military triumph, Don Antonio turned modestly back to his estate at Manga de Clavo to exchange the sword for the plow. "If any hand ever turns again to disturb the public peace and the Constitutional order," he cried, "the nation will not forget the man who stands ready to shed the last drop of his blood." The stage for greater things was now set.

Upon the expiration of Pedraza's term, in April, 1833, the coveted office of Chief Executive went to Santa Anna as a reward for his cooperation in the Plan of Zacatecas.[12] He had not yet completed his thirty-seventh year. At his side, as Vice-President and intellectual power, was Gómez Farías.

What interested Santa Anna was the surface glory and the external power of the Presidency, but not its grinding responsibilities. He was never a man to govern or to inaugurate a program of ideas, but to shuffle rulers, to seat and unseat by force of arms, to encourage rivals and then cut them down. Conveniently pleading the poor health that frequently leads to old age, he agreed to turn his office over to Gómez Farías and retire to Manga de Clavo. The moment had come for Gómez Farías to inaugurate the era of Liberal reform that was to bring the so-called conflict of Church and State to a head and culminate in the Constitution of 1857.

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[12] "By free and unanimous election," as Santa Anna declared . . . "not withstanding that I lacked the age required by law." Cf. *Mi Historia cit.*, p. 29.

vi

That the Vatican was hostile to the Mexican Republic from the beginning has been alleged from a paragraph in the Encyclical *Etsi iam diu,* which Pope Leo XII sent to the Mexican clergy, urging them to give their allegiance to Ferdinand VII of Spain. Every circumstance surrounding this document, however, proves that the paragraph in question is an interpolation, possibly of the Spanish Embassy in Rome. Moreover, the same Pope wrote to Guadalupe Victoria, on June 29, 1825, in terms which must dispel all doubts. "Our particular character and the dignity to which without merit We have been elevated," he declared, "require that We do not interpose Ourselves in that which in no manner pertains to the government of the Church, and We content Ourselves in giving due thanks for the consideration which We have merited from you and congratulate Ourselves for the peace and harmony which you assure Us the Mexican Nation enjoys by God's favor."[13]

Nevertheless, in an attempt to reduce the Church to a civic department under their control, the Republican leaders were determined to retain the *patronato,* conceded by papal privilege to the Spanish kings, and thus continue governmental appointment to ecclesiastical offices. Freedom of the Church from precisely this kind of thing had been postulated as a cardinal principle not only by the earlier Insurgents, like Hidalgo and Morelos, but also by Iturbide and those who originally followed him in the achievement of Mexican national independence. But this principle was now in the discard. In spite of every effort made by the clergy to free themselves and the Church from this yoke, the Constitution of 1824 declared this patronage to belong to the Republic and delayed the needed filling of Church vacancies until the Pope should accede to its demands.

Under the Conservative administration of Bustamante, this demand was abandoned; and Pope Leo XII was asked, with Congressional authorization, to confirm as bishops those whose names had been submitted by ecclesiastical bodies. This he refused to do. In the Consistory of 1831, however, his successor, Pope Gregory XVI appointed *motu proprio,* or by his own decision, bishops for the dioceses of Puebla, Chiapas, Linares, Guadalajara, Durango, and Michoacán. On May 16, the same year, the government of Bustamante recognized the right of the clergy to the free election of canons.

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[13] Cf. Mariano Cuevas, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, p. 168.

The Liberal faction was far from satisfied. "The ecclesiastical hierarchy, with its rents, its *fueros,* and its power," wrote Zavala, at a time when the Church was practically without leadership in Mexico, "is of such a nature that it is not possible to preserve it in a popular government without destroying at the same time the public peace and the principle of equality. He who sanctions its existence sanctions perpetual discord."[14] In this spirit, Gómez Farías and a vindictive Congress met in secret session to declare that ecclesiastical patronage should return to the government and passed a law to this effect. When the clergy preached against it, they were warned that this was a political matter, in which they should not intervene.

In 1828 and 1829 various properties of the religious orders, including the buildings of the college of the Jesuits in Chihuahua, were declared the property of the nation and sold with the ostensible purpose of replenishing an empty public treasury. With feverish haste, Gómez Farías now renewed the assault. The missions of both Californias, which dated from the days of Junípero Serra, were secularized, and the greater part of the lands administered by the religious orders, including those which belonged to the Indians, fell into the hands of politicians. The pious fund of the missions was likewise confiscated, as well as various hospitals and educational institutions. All sales of monastic properties made without consent of the government were annulled.

At the same time a law was passed, completely secularizing education, although nothing was done to substitute for the schools which the Church had established throughout the country from the earliest days of colonization. The Colegio de Santos, and even the ancient University of Mexico was suppressed because its faculty was composed of priests. This Liberal measure was published to the effect: "The public is notified that this aristocratic institution, purely a glittering ornament which performs no public educational service, has been abolished." Better no education at all, was the argument, than Catholic education.[15]

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[14] Lorenzo de Zavala, *Ensayo Histórica de las Revoluciones de México* (Mexico, 1845), lib. II.

In dismay, the Conservatives and Catholics in general appealed to Santa Anna to come out from his retirement. Within a month and one half, he was back in office repealing the acts of his Vice-President. But this was not enough to calm revolt, which had spread to the army, in consequence of Gómez Farías' attacks upon that body. With characteristic duplicity he again confided his office to the Vice-President and set out to "quell" the uprisings.

The soldiers at once declared him their "prisoner" and demanded, under General Mariano Arista, that he assume command as "Supreme Dictator and Redeemer of Mexico." The troops of the garrison in Mexico City responded to their part in this play, pronounced against the Vice-President, and sent for Santa Anna.

Gómez Farías, however, succeeded in crushing the revolt in the capital; and Santa Anna, checked in his original scheme, hastened back to install himself in the Presidential chair. To gain the good graces of the Liberals, who now seemed fairly well consolidated in power, he exiled Bustamante, Nicolás Bravo, and his old counselor, Miguel Santa María, together with about fifty other leaders of the Conservative Party.

General Arista, with natural resentment, proceeded to expose the whole affair involving Santa Anna's secret ambitions; and practically the entire army stood by him, so that Don Antonio had to fall back on Gómez Farías' civil guards to put down the indignant garrisons. Arista was defeated at Guanajuato and sent into exile; and Santa Anna, after a short stay in the capital to justify himself, returned in peace to Manga de Clavo.

Farías and his Congress again proceeded, after this absurd interlude, to carry on the program of legislation already outlined, and with such thoroughness, that popular reaction forced another return of Santa Anna. For a man whose principles were determined by popular feeling, the cry of the masses of the people, "Long live Religion and the illustrious Santa Anna," meant that the time had come to put a halt to the Liberal Reform. This time he dissolved Congress, suspended the antireligious laws, and sent Gómez Farías into exile.

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[15] J. Lloyd Mecham, *loc. cit.*, p. 413; also Lucas Alamán, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 861–865.

The new Congress was elected in December, 1834, and assembled on January 4. After shuffling the political cards, Santa Anna appointed General Miguel Barragán as President *ad interim,* January 28, 1835, and, with the satisfaction of political and military power, returned to his favorite estate.

Congress now declared the office of the Vice-President legally vacant and restored the rights of the California missions and of the religious orders to dispose freely of their properties. The University of Mexico was re-established, and a commission was appointed to draw up a plan of public instruction. By decree of October 3, 1835, in accordance with the Plan of Cuernavaca, Centralism was proclaimed as opposed to the Federalism which Santa Anna had formerly espoused. The following year, these changes were consecrated in the Constitution known as *Las Siete Leyes* (The Seven Laws). This charter renewed governmental patronage over the Church, assumed by the Constitution of 1824; but the clergy, recognizing the guarantees which various provisions offered against the wholesale suppression contemplated by Gómez Farías and his group, willingly took the oath of allegiance to it.

vii

On October 3, 1834, President Santa Anna called a meeting of his secretaries of state, three generals, and three deputies, together with Stephen F. Austin and Lorenzo de Zavala, to discuss the important question of Texas. After 1819, when the United States concluded a treaty with Spain, the dominion of the Spanish King had been recognized over the territory; but a new situation developed in 1832, when General José Antonio Mejía, an adventurer from Cuba, had invited American colonists in the region to disavow the administration of Bustamante. The Americans were in favor of the independence of Texas; and the Mexican Government began to realize that it had made a mistake in allowing the entire state to be settled with foreigners. Austin insisted on granting the demands of the colonists, and Santa Anna had him imprisoned for three months.

The following year, in protest against the inauguration of a Centralist government, the Americans in Texas, under the leadership of David G. Burnett and Sam Houston, raised the banner of revolt for independence. Bands of colonists and American adventurers began to attack the small Mexican garrisons. General Cos was compelled to surrender in San Antonio de Béjar, and the situation appeared serious enough to demand the personal attention of Santa Anna himself.

Well might he be concerned, for when Austin returned from his sentence in jail, he proceeded to found the Republic of Texas. The first Vice-President of the new Republic, under Burnett, was to be no other than the Federalist, Lorenzo de Zavala, close associate of Gómez Farías. There can be no doubt but that the Texas war for independence developed largely from the intrigues of Mexican Federalists, who were willing to dismember their own country, with representatives of the Southern slave states, who were working for a consolidated republic of the South.

On the night of September 3, 1835, the Amphictyonic Council of New Orleans held a secret session to discuss the plan of Mejía "to procure and superinduce the sale at a reasonable price to the State of Louisiana or its rich neighbors of all the territory which in the time of the Spanish Government had been called the province of Texas, excepting the property of the colonists, of Mr. Zavala and others who owned land there, and that it be erected into a free, sovereign, and independent state, which for the time being would acknowledge the central government of the Union of the United States of the North, until the great project of the new republic of the South could be realized, when it would become a part of the same State of Louisiana."[16]

Mejía was to lead an expedition, financed by various Southern capitalists, by way of the port of Santa Anna of Tamaulipas with the purpose of seating Gómez Farías as President of Mexico. The latter was then to cede the State of Texas, as outlined, and, by executing all who had counseled and assisted Santa Anna in connection with the Plan of Cuernavaca, "politically regenerate the Mexican nation and guarantee its liberty forever." Farías warned the Council that the nucleus of resistance to the Plan would be the Mexican clergy.

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[16] Quoted from Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 214 sq.

On the following night, the Council reconvened to approve the Plan which was "to give true liberty to the United States of Mexico." Gómez Farías was to be considered as chief of the Republic "on account of the treason of Santa Anna." Zavala was appointed director of the colonists of Texas "to fix the attention of the Mexican Government there until Mr. Mejía occupies that port of Tampico, Tamaulipas."[17]

The legislatures and governors who worked hand and glove with Gómez Farías in 1834 were to be reinstated, the standing army was to be dispersed, and Mejía was to stand by with his new Federal army and present Congress with certain designated petitions, in reformation of the Constitution of 1824. Thus it was to be stipulated "that all bishops and ecclesiastical or secular persons, of whom it might be suspected with good foundation that they might oppose reform, must leave the Republic immediately."

It was declared, moreover, that "all convents of friars and nuns be secularized and suppressed, and their real estate and fixtures, silver and jewels placed at the disposal of the government, with the exception of those vestments and sacred vessels which shall be distributed amongst the humbler churches; the buildings and chapels of the convents shall be utilized for asylums, houses of beneficence, hospitals, barracks, shops, and some shall be sold for synagogues and temples of other sects." All Mexicans were to be proclaimed free to worship God as they might elect. All correspondence between the government and Rome was to be suspended, "but private individuals who may wish to continue as Catholics will be permitted to do so, providing they do not disturb public order or gain proselytes."

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[17] Gómez Farías, José Antonio Mejía, and Lorenzo de Zavala were named the supreme directors of the undertaking.

All lands, rural and urban estates were to be "equally divided, whatever may be the title by which they are held, but always a third should be left to the proprietors, and the rest given to indigent inhabitants, preferably to the military, to whom will be destined a portion of lands and houses sufficient to recompense their services."

The expedition of Mejía subsequently failed, and, as a result, these petitions were not submitted to Congress or to the Mexican people in the form contemplated. Nevertheless, they serve clearly to outline the objectives of the Liberals who progressively followed in the footsteps of Gómez Farías. The forces that worked for the secession of Texas under the direction of the traitor Zavala were pressed into immediate action.

Beside these enemies within and outside the fold, Santa Anna was further confronted with the greatest obstacles in the matter of finance and military organization. Nevertheless, he managed to put together an army of 6000 recruits by the end of 1835, and started on the long march of 1700 kilometers to Texas. On February 26, 1836, after two months of almost insuperable difficulties, his troops entered San Antonio de Béjar.

The American rebels took refuge in the ancient Franciscan monastery of the Alamo, which had long since been converted into a fort. The rebels within the fort offered to enter negotiations, but when Santa Anna demanded an immediate surrender, they raised the red flag of defiance; and he prepared to make an assault, early in the morning of March 6, 1836. Only a few women and Negro slaves remained to tell the tale. It was a costly victory, however, as 400 Mexicans paid with their lives; and Don Antonio was henceforth to be known throughout Texas and the United States as the Villain of the Alamo.

Near New Washington, word was brought that the troops of Houston were in the vicinity. Santa Anna immediately ordered an advance upon the "Raven," as the American General was called, and the two forces came together near the mouth of the San Jacinto River. Houston commanded 800 men and two cannon, called the Twin Sisters. The Mexicans numbered 700 and had only one cannon, of unreliable character. After an unsuccessful attempt to capture the Twin Sisters, Santa Anna decided to wait for reinforcements. Meanwhile, he foolishly allowed the discipline of the camp to relax.

Apparently Houston had been informed of the disorganized status of his enemy. At half past three in the afternoon of April 21, 1836, he drew up his troops for attack. So complete was the surprise, that the field shortly took on the appearance of a general massacre. In less than an hour, the entire Texas campaign was brought to an end. Santa Anna wandered about in a half-dazed condition, dressed in an old garment which he found in an abandoned house. When he was picked up by Texan scouts, his identity was not recognized, until the Mexican prisoners in the stockade saluted him.

On May 5, the entire Texan Government together with its distinguished prisoner and his aides, including Juan N. Almonte, embarked for Galveston Island. No sooner had he been placed on the warship engaged to return him to Vera Cruz, than a troop of American adventurers under one Thomas J. Green demanded that he be handed back to them as prisoner; and the Texan President, in violation of his treaty, allowed him to be forced off the boat and thrown into prison. When Don Antonio issued a protest to the civilized world "for having been treated, although the head of a respectable nation, as one guilty of common crimes rather than as a prisoner of war," he found his life in immediate danger.

At the suggestion of Austin, he now dispatched a plea to President Andrew Jackson, and orders were issued to stay his execution. To prevent escape, both he and his companion Almonte were placed in ball and chain for fifty-two days.

Jackson's reply, which finally arrived, declared that the Mexican Government ruled out any treaty which Santa Anna might sign while he remained a prisoner. The latter, with his ankles worn to the bone by his captive chains, then begged for release so that he might present his case at Washington. On November 25, after more than six months of captivity, he was permitted to set out for the American capital.

From Texas, he proceeded to Louisiana and thence by boat to Louisville, everywhere received as a celebrity. Northern commentaries viewed the Texas affair as an attempt of the slave states to strengthen their position, and hailed him as a hero of human liberty. At Louisville, he boarded a train for the first time in his life, and arrived at Washington, January 18, 1837. President Jackson received him in a private audience and suggested that, in return for an indemnity, Mexico should recognize the independence of Texas. Santa Anna refused to sign any agreement and declared that the matter should be referred to the Mexican Congress. He was successful at least in securing his freedom, and returned on the war vessel *Pioneer* to Vera Cruz.

Whatever may be the verdict of history on Santa Anna personally, the fact remains that he was President of Mexico. His abominable treatment at the hands of American filibusterers in Mexican territory and the humiliating terms offered him by the President of the United States present a sorry episode, which must be remembered together with later evidences of American policy, if the attitude of Mexican patriots toward their Northern neighbor is to be properly appreciated.

viii

To say that Don Antonio was now politically dead would not be entirely true. His friends, who had induced the country to go into mourning for his disaster, were ready to receive him amid great rejoicing when he landed at Vera Cruz and indeed to place him at once in the Presidential chair. But he was too shrewd a politician not to realize that the temper of the times suggested patience. More urgent now was a return to the quietude of Manga de Clavo, where he might recover his health and write his memoirs of the Texas campaign, absolving himself from the responsibility of its failure. Before departing from Vera Cruz, he was eager to give a new proof of his patriotism; and in the presence of the chief functionaries of the city he took the oath to the new Centralist Constitution of the Seven Laws, which was inaugurated in his absence.

On April 19, 1837, Anastasio Bustamante won in the elections and assumed the office of President, which was now to last for eight years. The Federalists, of course, were far from satisfied and, simultaneously with uprisings throughout the provincial capitals, sent a call for the return of Gómez Farías, who arrived at Vera Cruz after his intrigues in New Orleans, in February, 1838. Bustamante was unable to prevent his landing, but he gave orders to have him placed under arrest. Santa Anna held his peace.

ix

As if internal strife were never enough, Mexico faced a new peril, from the blockade of her ports by a French fleet, April 16, 1838. A number of items had been charged against Mexico by France, involving the lives and property of French nationals in the country and including the assault upon a supply of pastry in the restaurant of one Monsieur Remontel in Tacubaya by a group of boisterous Mexican officials. The total indemnity demanded by France was 600,000 pesos. Inasmuch as Mexico refused to deal with the demands until the French vessels should be removed from the coast line, there began the famous "Pastry War."

The blockade continued for six months. Since customs duties constituted the chief source of income for the government, the results for the country were tragic. To meet the situation, the government decreed an addition to the army and appointed General Rincon to put Vera Cruz in a state of defense. It neglected, however, to provide funds for this undertaking, and there was nothing to do but enter negotiations. When these failed, the French began to bombard San Juan de Ulúa.

Santa Anna was at his hacienda, when he first heard the distant thunder of the cannon. Abandoning a cockfight, and mounting his white horse, he galloped to Vera Cruz, and placed himself at the disposition of Rincon, his former adversary, who received him affectionately. Upon his recommendation, the Fort of San Juan de Ulúa was abandoned, and an armistice was proposed to renew negotiations. When news of this agreement reached Bustamante, he condemned the whole procedure and officially declared war on France. At the same time he ordered Santa Anna to place himself in command of the Mexican troops and assume the offensive.

Don Antonio lost no time in communicating the declaration of war. His next act was to receive his old friend and enemy, General Mariano Arista, whom he embraced and ordered to bring his force of 1000 men to the city. Arista, with his memory still smarting, failed to carry out the command.

The French now landed a force with the object of dismantling the bulwarks and taking Santa Anna prisoner. When news of the attack reached the latter, early in the morning, he barely had time to dress. The French soon had General Arista in their hands, but Santa Anna ran from quarter to quarter mobilizing the soldiers and placing them at various strategic points. By ten o'clock in the morning he had blocked the invaders in the streets of the city. Flushed with victory, he determined to cut off their retreat if possible; and, exposing himself and his men to the enemy's fire, he directed his troops toward the wharf where the French were disembarking. This hazardous maneuver was greeted by a volley of cannon, and Santa Anna fell in the midst of the dead and wounded, with his left leg and a finger torn away by the ball.

In reprisal for Mexican resistance, the French bombarded the city for two hours, and Santa Anna ordered evacuation to Pocitas, one league distant. There from his bed, surrounded by his faithful officers, he dictated the facts of his victory in tragic-heroic style to the President. "On coming to my end," he declared, "I cannot but manifest the satisfaction which accompanies me, of having seen the beginnings of reconciliation among the Mexicans . . . I beg also from the government of my country that my body may be buried in these very dunes, so that all my companions in arms may know that this is the battle line I marked for them . . ." From all his compatriots, he asked but one boon, the title which he might pass on to his sons, "The Good Mexican."

Through English mediation the French agreed to settle for 600,000 pesos which Mexico consented to pay in installments, and thus the "Pastry War" came to an end. But the resourceful General was far from dead or dying. He had lost a leg in the service of his country, but he won a general absolution for his past political and military sins.

It was not long before opportunity knocked again. The war against the French had by no means united the nation; and amid the numerous pronunciamentos against his government, President Bustamante deemed it advisable to go out personally against the rebellion started in Tampico by General José Antonio Mejía acting as a front for Gómez Farías in conformity with the Pact of New Orleans. The government named Santa Anna to occupy the Presidency in the meantime; and the popular hero of Vera Cruz, now minus one leg, rode into the capital triumphantly, on February 17, 1839.

In spite of his affectation of delicate health, he soon showed himself quite capable of acting with an iron hand, amid the confusion and disquiet of the era, and imposed the most rigorous censorship upon speech and publication. Mejía and his associate, General Urrea, meanwhile departed from Tampico and suddenly appeared with their forces at Puebla. With lightning speed, the sick man leaped from his bed, organized troops without waiting for Congressional authorization, and hastened to Puebla just in time to turn the tide of sentiment in his favor and launch an attack that quickly brought the rebels to their knees. He gave orders to execute all the officers who should be captured. Mejía and the Americans with him were among the first to pay the penalty.

When Santa Anna returned to the capital, he was again accorded a triumph; and a commission from Congress met him, with complete pardon for his disregard of Constitutional procedure in this emergency. He now pleaded the necessity of a change of climate. Without awaiting the return of Bustamante, he entrusted the Presidency to Nicolás Bravo and again set out for his estate at Manga de Clavo.

Bravo held office for one week only, when Bustamante returned to claim his office. The entire country was still in a turmoil of Federalist plots. Yucatán and Campeche declared themselves independent of Mexico and announced an alliance with Texas. Before long three armies were laying siege to the city, under Generals Valencia, Juan Almonte, and Santa Anna, each with a distinct rival Plan.

Bustamante realized the danger he was in. He had lost the confidence of the Conservatives, and his financial demands upon the Church had alienated that body.[18] To save himself, he suddenly decided to become a Federalist, declared the Constitution of 1824 again official, and named the head of the Conservative Party, Melchor Muzquiz, President of Mexico.

Since the entire question was now reduced to nothing more than political expediency, a compromise was inevitable; and Bustamante decided to leave affairs in the hands of Santa Anna. The latter named the members of his Junta; and this body proceeded to elect him to the Presidency. Then, with the army to sanction his deeds, he established a military dictatorship, not only to the dismay of the Federalists who had begun to place their hopes in him, but to the destruction of all principles of legality and Constitutional government.

No government or series of governments can hope to carry on through such prolonged disorders and destruction without finally reaching the bottom of bankruptcy. It was time to begin again a wholesale confiscation of the assets of the Church, if not as a matter of principle, like Gómez Farías and the Liberal Congress, at least as one of urgent expediency. The generals and the army had to be paid, and diversions had to be afforded to a demoralized people. Accordingly, Santa Anna put pressure upon that source to obtain a monthly income of 50,000 pesos. Next he tried to force from it a loan of 1,000,000 pesos, but succeeded in getting only 200,000. To make up the deficit, he began selling lands attached to Church institutions and confiscated the silver plate of the churches. The pious foundations of California, he again removed from the archbishop and confided to General Valencia. When money failed for the expenses of his palace, he simply ordered a troop of soldiers to loot what funds they could from the nearest convent of nuns.

Meanwhile, he surrounded himself with symbols of regal glory, hussars in brilliant uniforms, white horses, public works to enhance his name, a theater, new pavements. . . . On his name's day, June 13, he gave orders for processions and a balloon flight. In the chair designed for Agustín I, he received the homage of the city. Feast followed upon feast as national holidays rolled around. More plans were drawn up for public instruction. The first railroad was begun. The venerable leg which was blown off at Vera Cruz was disinterred at Manga de Clavo and amid pomp and official solemnity was transferred to a magnificent cenotaph in the cemetery of Santa Paula. Poetry and music recalled his mighty deeds, as he substituted a wooden member for the missing limb. And taxes on practically everything in sight, including 75 per cent of the value of the crops, were levied to pay for mounting expenses.

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[18] In general, however, Anastasio Bustamante seems to have been one of the best and most honorable public men of this entire troubled era.

During this time, much against his wishes, a Federalist Constitution was being drawn up by Congress. Under the circumstances, health and strategy seemed to demand another return to Manga de Clavo. His ministers argued against departure at this critical moment; but his will held through, and he designated Nicolás Bravo again as the substitute President.

x

Of course, it was hardly to be expected that Santa Anna should lie idle, while Congress sought to undo his power; and he sent messengers throughout the country to urge uprisings against this body and the new Constitution it was laboring feebly to complete. As a result of this agitation, Bravo found himself constrained to dissolve Congress and call a Junta of Notables to prepare a new constitution on the basis of the Plan of Tacubaya. This document, the *Bases Organicas*, the third of Mexico's national constitutions, was adopted on June 13, 1843. In theory it was perhaps the best that Mexico had known. From Manga de Clavo, nevertheless, came a succession of orders, restricting civil liberties. Unable to stem the tide of opposition, Bravo refused to be Santa Anna's tool any longer. The latter entrusted the Presidency to Valentin Canalizo, after a brief interim, and retired to his new estate, El Encero, which was more magnificent than Manga de Clavo.

Death now took his wife, the Doña Inés; but within a month, he had selected another mate, the Doña Dolores de Tosta, a girl only fifteen years old, who shocked the society of the capital by contracting marriage with a proxy in the National Palace and then joining her husband in his country retreat.

The matrimonial bliss was shortly to be disturbed, for General Paredes Arillaga staged an armed uprising late in October, 1844, at Guadalajara. Without asking permission of Congress, Santa Anna set out to crush the rebellion. Congress was now indignant with such unconstitutional procedure and prepared to take action; but Don Antonio was already on his way to Jalisco, and the substitute President Canalizo decided to take the alternative of dissolving Congress. Immediately the floodgates of discontent broke loose. The garrison in the capital rebelled; and the people in an uproar pulled down the statue of the Dictator, overthrew his cenotaph, and even made away with the heroic leg.

As soon as Santa Anna learned of this disastrous turn of events, he seized whatever funds he could lay his hands on and hastened back toward the capital. But now his troops began to desert him; and he was obliged to make a detour by way of Puebla. On December 6, 1844, José Joaquín de Herrera was seated in the Presidency, and the new minister of war demanded that Santa Anna relinquish his command of the army. By this time, he had no army. All had fled. Even his guide disappeared, leaving him to wander alone in the wooded mountains.

Overtaken by a hostile band of Indians, he was escorted to Jalapa, and clapped into jail by Rincon. From there he was transferred to Perote. As his trial dragged on and passions were quieted, his services to the country were related in great detail. In the end, Congress softened the proposed penalties, and decreed his banishment for the period of ten years. He was placed under an armed guard of 800, and escorted from Perote to Antigua, whence he embarked on June 3, 1845, for Cuba. Even in reverses, Santa Anna moved quickly.

In the cathedral of Mexico City, his former friends and all who, as someone has said, "purchased from him the fifth part of his valor, namely, the properties of the Church," gathered together in a function that lasted from nine o'clock in the morning to two o'clock in the afternoon, to give thanks for his fall and departure. A desperate country had given him every opportunity and had found him wanting.

xi

While Mexico was being ruined by internal dissentions, the question of Texas and of relationship with the United States was assuming larger proportions of importance and alarm. Prior to Santa Anna's exile, reports from the North indicated that American or Texan troops were moving in upon national territory. Santa Anna had rejected the proposal of the American Minister Gilbert Thompson to fix the boundary line with a money settlement. Later projects to recognize the independence of Texas, provided it would not be annexed by the United States, were turned down by all parties in Mexico.

On March 1, 1845, the American Congress declared the annexation of Texas a fact. Juan N. Almonte, now Mexican Minister at Washington, acting for President Herrera, declared this to be a case of war and returned to Mexico. The conviction with which he acted, however, was hardly reflected in the security of the government at home. On the contrary, the immediate result was a series of uprisings all over the country against President Herrera. Amid the general confusion and rival ambitions of the various parties and the dissipation of funds raised for national defense, Herrera was forced out of office; and General Paredes y Arrillaga was installed as President of the Republic, January 4, 1846, by a Junta of Notables.

While Santa Anna, in exile, was enjoying himself at the gambling tables and receptions of Cuba, the American troops under Zachary Taylor began to advance toward the Mexican frontiers, and American ships began a blockade of Mexican ports. Disaster for the Mexican forces at Palo Alto was followed by the evacuation of Matamoros.

In the face of such disaster, Paredes y Arrillaga found himself unable to maintain leadership. The army and the nation once more appealed to Santa Anna to return and assume the command of national defense, in accord with the Constitution of 1824. Arrillaga was sent off to prison at Perote, and General

Mariano Salas was assigned the Presidency until Don Antonio could get matters under control.

On August 16, Santa Anna again appeared at the port of Vera Cruz on board an English merchant ship, which the American fleet strangely allowed to pass through the blockade. Representations had been made to President Polk by Alejandro Atocha, a Spaniard claiming American citizenship, that he was in touch with Santa Anna and that the latter was willing to facilitate the sale of the Northern provinces of Mexico providing the American troops would stand by to sanction his proposals. Polk, while distrusting Atocha, was intrigued by his allegation and later dispatched a naval officer, Commander Mackinzie, to interview Santa Anna at Havana.[19] It is not improbable that Don Antonio was willing to sound out his emissary to the full and make the vague advances of which he was so capable; but there is nothing to show either that he was in contact with Atocha or that he entered into any deal with the United States. On the contrary, it has been suggested that all this represented the intrigues of Gómez Farías, who was chief of the Salas cabinet and for whom Atocha later served as messenger to the White House.

At any event, the Federalists were once more in power, and Gómez Farías was again leading the party. The government and the Federalists insisted that Santa Anna should enter the capital. Salas was ready to hand over the Presidency to him. Finally, upon the invitation of Farías, he consented to appear, this time in simple, democratic dress, in open coach with the Liberal leader.

He refused to accept the Presidency, but set himself immediately to organize war. The national treasury had less than 2000 pesos to offer; so Salas ordered letters of credit up to 2,000,000 pesos to be issued against Church properties.[20] Santa Anna waited a month to raise 90,000 pesos, and then, after receiving a blessing in the Basilica of Guadalupe, departed for San Luis Potosí to recruit his army.

At San Luis, he was given every possible cooperation, and

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[19] Cf. Frank C. Hanighen, *Santa Anna* (New York, 1934), pp. 197 sq.

[20] Cf. Juárez' part in these proceedings.

15,000 men leaped to arms. Meanwhile, American troops advanced toward Monterrey, which the civilians and the soldiers fought desperately to defend, in spite of the apparent apathy of their generals. When the city was no longer tenable, its inhabitants evacuated their homes and followed the retreating army on foot as far as Saltillo. In Mexico City, the political factions were at each other's throats, but when the moment came for Congress to elect the national executives, Santa Anna was again designated as President. After some dispute, the Vice-Presidency was awarded to Gómez Farías.

There still remained the business of providing funds to support the army. Instead of making any serious effort to tax the general public or industrial corporations, Farías, with the connivance of Santa Anna, again decreed the sale of Church properties. From the cathedral chapter of Mexico City, he demanded an annual contribution of 2,400,000 pesos. Inasmuch as the gross income of that body was less than half this amount, the levy could not be met; but the chapter was eager to offer its resources for national defense and pledged 720,000 pesos to be paid in monthly installments. This was not what the Liberals wanted, and Farías proceeded to secure authorization from the Congress, January 10, 1847, to seize and mortgage properties vested in Catholic foundations, with the object of raising 15,000,000 pesos.

Nevertheless, the proceeds never reached Santa Anna. Unable to wait any longer, he raised funds on his own personal credit and marched forth to meet the enemy, January 28. Zachary Taylor had already captured Saltillo. Heat, cold, lack of water and supplies in the 200-mile march across the desert were to take a frightful toll of the Mexican forces. More than 4000 men perished on the way. Taylor's troops, meanwhile, had enjoyed six months of rest, and their morale was good.

On February 22, the two armies clashed at La Angostura. The fight continued the following day, but the odds were too great. Santa Anna ordered a covered retreat, to avoid pursuit. General Taylor proposed truce so that terms might be discussed by the two governments. Don Antonio realized that this would subject him to the accusation of treachery, and replied that he could accept no truce so long as American troops remained on Mexican soil. He was ready, he said, for another battle; but, in reality, he had determined to retire secretly and return with the remnants of his forces to San Luis Potosí.

The clue to this amazing flight of Santa Anna may possibly be found in a communication which fell into his hands. It was dated October 29, 1846, and addressed to the ex-Cabinet Minister, Manuel Crescensio Rejón: "My esteemed and fine friend: The time lost in the realization of our plans during the epoch in which you held important office is to be regretted, but not on this account should we lose courage, because you may rest assured that with constancy and tenacity we will obtain the triumph for our cause. . . . According to sure information I have in my mail, it will be very difficult for the lame general [Santa Anna] to accomplish more with his cowardly army than Taylor with his strategy, valor, and intelligence. This individual has money; he is in agreement with me, and you may count on the defeat of the cripple." The letter was signed by Gómez Farías![21]

Upon reaching San Luis Potosí, about March 9, he learned that popular feeling against Farías was at its height in Mexico City. Two rival parties had been formed, the Ultraradicals, or *Puros,* and the Moderates. When Farías learned that the Americans were threatening Vera Cruz, he ordered a battalion to proceed at once to the coast. The soldiers, convinced of his treachery, balked at the command and rebelled, with the cry "Down with the *Puros* and Gómez Farías."

On his return from the disastrous campaign, Santa Anna was greeted with invitations from both factions to join their cause, and he responded favorably in turn to each. At Querétaro, he was met by the ex-President Salas, who induced him to side with the Moderates; and by the time he reached Guadalupe, Congress decided to swear him in as President. Now definitely estranged from Farías, he decided to suppress the Vice-Presidency so that Farías could not return to power. Desperate preparations were now made for national defense. The churches melted down their silver and placed 2,500,000 pesos at the disposal of the government, when they were assured that this would be used for the national cause and not for factional intrigues.

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[21] *Archivo Farías,* University of Texas, quoted from Cuevas, *loc. cit.,* V, p. 254.

Thanks to Mexican dissentions, General Winfield Scott was able to land without difficulty and lay siege to Vera Cruz. Leaving Pedro María Anaya in charge of the Presidency, Santa Anna marched out in an attempt to keep the Americans from entering Mexico City. In the first encounter near Jalapa, on April 17, he succeeded in repelling the attack of the invader. Then began a general demoralization of the troops. Such was the depth to which the confidence of the Mexicans in their own government and military forces had sunk, that he was obliged to withdraw from Puebla as General Worth advanced with his entire division, leaving the curious Mexican populace to gaze on the Americans who bivouacked in the streets. The sentiment of the nation began to turn toward peace at any price.

Despite appeals that he should relinquish the Presidency and give his attentions exclusively to the army, he returned to the capital, and for the tenth time took possession of the office, without even notifying General Anaya. Congress decreed the transfer of the national government to Querétaro, but Santa Anna had already made up his mind to disregard such decrees and to put Mexico City in a state of defense. Defeat followed upon defeat, until the Americans seized even the fortified convent of Churubusco on the outskirts of the capital itself.

Santa Anna retired to the Palace in deep desperation. When he decided to call for an armistice and deal with General Scott, he could not assemble more than 26 members of the cowardly Congress to ratify the terms of the proposals. During these parlies, the enemies of Don Antonio blamed him for all the disasters that had befallen the country and even sought to have him hailed before the grand jury. To his credit, however, he was unwilling to mutilate the national territory for the sake of peace; and the armistice came to an end.

On September 12, General Scott began to bombard the heights of Chapultepec, as Santa Anna retreated with a force of 5000 men. Nicolás Bravo, defender of the position, begged for reinforcements. Santa Anna replied that it was folly to expose men to such a cannonading, but promised that his own forces would go into action as soon as the actual assault began. When the Americans began their terrific advance, Bravo made a final stand with the heroic youths of the Military College, among them Miguel Miramón, who was later to die with Maximilian. Against hopeless odds, while General Juan Alvarez treacherously held back reinforcements, his ranks were decimated. Bravo himself was taken prisoner; and the flag of the United States was raised over the citadel that had served as a symbol of Mexican sovereignty from the time of Moctezuma.

When the Americans began to penetrate the city, Santa Anna sanctioned the decision of the officials to withdraw the national forces. The populace attempted the most bitter resistance, convinced that they had been betrayed by their own leaders; but in vain.

At Guadalupe, Don Antonio realized that all was lost. By the time he had retreated as far as Puebla, his forces had broken into guerrilla groups or deserted. From Puebla, he retired to Tehuacán. Escape through Vera Cruz was closed by the American blockade. A possible retreat through Guatemala was cut off, since Benito Juárez, who was now his bitter enemy, refused him entrance to the state of Oaxaca.

Suddenly came warning that a group of Texans, inflamed with vengeance for the massacre of the Alamo, were on their way from Puebla; and Santa Anna, with his young wife, a few chosen officials, and servants, again took the road. The Texans contented themselves with sacking his house, and forwarded to American officials, including President Polk, the prizes which they did not keep for themselves.

Meanwhile, the national government departed for Querétaro, where a junta of Liberals under Suárez Iriate, a former minister in Gómez Farías' Cabinet, assumed the municipal government with the approval of the American military authorities. On January 30, 1847, Iriate and the partisans of Farías gave a banquet to General Scott and his staff at the Desierto de los leones and hailed the victory of the Americans and annexation of Mexico to the United States. While Scott was still in Puebla, efforts were made by the Mexican Liberal annexionists to effect a coalition with the United States, and in November of the same year, a delegation of Liberals offered him the dictatorship of the country.[22]

President Polk, in spite of these overtures and high feeling in the United States, disclaimed any intention of permanent conquest, and, fearing both antislavery agitation and European troubles, refused to ratify a treaty that would take over all of Mexico. Even so, that war of conquest netted the United States more than half of Mexico's original area — "magnanimous forbearance," in the words of President Polk, "exhibited toward Mexico."[23]

When the treaty of peace was signed, a small escort of Americans under Major Kenly conducted Santa Anna across the lines, and Colonel Hughes of Maryland offered him and his party a banquet. This time, the Texans caught up with their intended victim, and it was only with the greatest efforts of their more moderate compatriots that he was allowed to depart in peace. At El Encero, he returned the courtesy of the conquerors with another dinner, and left Mexico for the second time, at Antigua, on April 9, 1848.

xii

The exile chose a residence in Jamaica, where he remained two years. From there, he moved to Colombia and bought the house at Turbaco in which Simón Bolívar had lived. Once more the country gentleman, he rebuilt the local church and began the cultivation of sugar cane and tobacco and the breeding of cattle, to give employment, as he averred, to the poverty-stricken natives of the place.

Upon his departure, Manuel de la Peña y Peña, to whom he had entrusted the Presidency, shuffled two brief administrations with General Pedro María Anaya. Then came José Joaquín de Herrera (1848–1851), who had the distinction of being the first President since Guadalupe Victoria to remain in office for a full term. A mild and conservative ruler, he was, nevertheless, strong enough to put down a number of revolts and to allow the Church a large measure of peace and prestige. He was followed by a weak and corrupt Liberal regime, during which the funds of indemnity paid by the United States for Mexican territories were dissipated, and the nation was again in a state of general agitation.

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[22] Niceto Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1880), tomo XIII, pp. 100–103.

[23] Treaty of Guadalupe, February 2, 1848. Cf. Zamacois, *loc. cit.*, tomo XIII, apénd. 1.

It was but natural to think again of the stabilizing hand of the exiled hero; and a commission was dispatched to Turbaco to beg for his return. "In the conferences with the commission," he declared, "I explained sincerely the fears which restrained me from accepting the honor which was offered me. . . . Finally, so great was the insistence of the commission, that I resigned myself to accede to the will of the nation, leaving behind my agreeable retreat and setting out, for the port with the commission and my family."[24] On April 1, 1853, the port of Vera Cruz was opened to welcome back the man who had lost a limb in its defense. At El Encero he paused to receive the accolades of his countrymen and to tender a reception to the leaders who crowded around to vie in showing him honor. The Plan de Hospicio, which was responsible for Santa Anna's return had been drawn up by Conservatives; but the Liberals, recalling that he had once espoused the cause of Federalism, were eager to believe that he might again promote their program. Accordingly, they gave him their vote; and for the eleventh and last time he came into the Presidency, on April 20.

Once installed in power, he proceeded to re-establish order in the one way he knew so well. Interstate conflicts, he handled by appointing political chieftains for each department. Centralizing all power in the Presidency, he developed a Cabinet composed exclusively of Conservatives who were willing to cooperate with him. To protect the regime against the threat of a revolution by the Progressive Party, he began to recruit an army of 90,000 men. Liberals like Melchor Ocampo, Benito Juárez, and Santos Degollado, who were later to lead the Reform, were proscribed.

With the death of Lucas Alamán, who was easily the most intelligent, sincere, and scholarly man in politics, and the death or departure of other powerful members of his Cabinet, however, hope for a sane and orderly reconstruction of the country began to disappear.[25] Santa Anna was no longer a young man. Practically all his associates in the War for Independence were gone, and those who took their place simply increased the general discontent with their arbitrary modes of action, their meticulous and silly regulations of official display, and new forms of tyranny. Everything possible was done to create a tinsled atmosphere of royalty and favoritism about His Excellency the President.

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[24] *Mi Historia cit.*, p. 97.

Santa Anna had been recalled to power upon the understanding that within a year he would convoke Congress to draw up a new Constitution. But power was sweet after exile, and he had another plan in mind. The garrison at Guadalajara initiated the movement. This was quickly taken up with proposals to grant him the titles of "Grand Elector," "Grand Admiral and Marshall," "Most Serene Highness," and the power to rule according to his own inspiration and will. He shrank gracefully from these overwhelming gestures of confidence, but finally consented to accept the title of "Most Serene Highness," "not from personal complacence, but to give greater character to the President of the Republic."[26] His ambitions, on the point of realization, had come around curiously to a position certainly more despotic than that of Iturbide whom he had once denounced by force of arms.

The obvious implications of this move, combined with popular resentment against the Gadsden Purchase, which alienated more national territory, were enough to play into the hands of the Liberals and give their movement a popular appearance. On March 1, 1854, Colonel Florencio Villareal, backed by Ignacio Comonfort and Juan Álvarez, launched the Plan of Ayutla, denouncing Santa Anna's permanency in office and refusing to acknowledge his authority.[27] Mexico was again ripe for civil war, the bloodiest of a long line, that was to eventuate in a definitive triumph of Federalism and the Liberal Reform.

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[25] Cf. José C. Valadés, *Alamán, Estadista e Historiador* (Mexico, 1938).
[26] *Mi Historia cit.*, p. 116.
[27] Cf. Zamacois, *loc. cit.*, tomo XIII, apénd. 2, 3.

The news of this *pronunciamento* reached the Dictator as he was presiding at a grand ball in the capital. His first reactions were those of contempt for two ungrateful subalterns. One, Juan Alvarez, had stood idly by during the defense of Mexico City against the Americans. The other, Ignacio Comonfort, had enriched himself too openly as collector of customs at Acapulco and had been separated from his lucrative post. Although his age seemed to advise against such risk, he decided to proceed personally, amid great pageantry and splendor, at the head of 6000 men to deal justice.

One month on the march, without news of events in the capital or of the whereabouts of the enemy, convinced Santa Anna that the thing to do was to return to Mexico City. He was by no means convinced of his security in popular feeling, however, and he became increasingly annoyed with the picture of affairs presented by his advisers. To obtain a more reliable mandate, recourse was had to a plebiscite. The voting took place on December 1, and 400,000 ballots assured His Most Serene Highness that all was well.

As a matter of fact, the rebellion of Ayutla lacked arms and men to bring it out into the open. In the beginning it represented a combination of political grudges quite as much as ideological reactions. The only show of force it had been able to make consisted of little sallies of small groups which were stirred up by the Liberal politicians. When Comonfort returned from the United States with money, arms, and moral support for the Liberal faction, in 1855, the scene changed. In the spring, Santa Anna decided to pursue the enemy again; but, although their activities were everywhere in evidence, it was impossible to lay hands on them, and he returned to the capital in exasperation.

He now saw two alternatives out of a bad situation: either to call a Congress and draw up a Constitution, or resign. More pressing, according to Conservative spokesmen, was the suppression of the Ayutla rebellion before it should break into open civil war. Santa Anna seemed to be the only man capable of stemming the tide, and there was no release for him now.

But Santa Anna was not the man to be dominated by any party; nor was he, now in his sixtieth year, prepared to face the rigor of a conflict that was taking shape on every hand. From Guerrero, revolt spread to Michoacán and along the East. In Oaxaca, Benito Juárez was stirring the natives to revolt. In Lower California, Willie Walker and his filibusterers were causing trouble. The financier Escandon, whom His Supreme Highness had favored so liberally, began to advance money to the Liberal faction under Comonfort at the same time that he was pretending to support the Conservative regime.

xiii

It was time to depart again. Leaving a sealed envelope with his Ministers, giving instructions to appoint a triumvirate as his successor, Santa Anna quietly and quickly left for Vera Cruz, on August 9, 1855. A week later he sailed on the *Iturbide* for Havana.

After a short stay in Havana, he retired to Turbaco and continued the task of writing his memoirs while news trickled in of the triumph and decline of Comonfort, Juárez' rise to power, and all that has subsequently gone by the name of Reform. Comonfort's fall inclined him to think that he might have yet another fling at affairs in Mexico; and he moved his residence a little closer, to the island of St. Thomas. From there he carried on an exciting correspondence with Miramar, for he was now convinced that what Mexico needed was a monarchy.[28]

When Juan Almonte appeared with the French expeditionary forces at Vera Cruz in 1862, he believed the time ripe for his return. He was allowed to land, but his issuance of an incautious proclamation led to his arrest and expulsion. This was enough to turn his sympathies back to the idea of a republic, and he even undertook a trip to the United States, falsely advised by a group of swindlers that Secretary Seward of the American Government was ready to conspire with him against Maximilian. He was now completely discredited in Mexico. During his absence he was tried and condemned. Juárez confiscated his estates in Vera Cruz, to which the Maximilian government later took title.

On June 3, 1867, he returned to Vera Cruz with a group of filibusterers and demanded an audience for his plan to form a republic. Inasmuch as he claimed the protection of the United States, he was turned back by American officials, who refused to allow him to land from the American boat. From there he was transported to Sisal, a port near Campeche, Yucatán. The Mexican officials here discovered the plans of his group to seize the port of Vera Cruz. He was forcibly removed from the American vessel and thrown into prison, to languish for two months. In the autumn, Juárez had him transferred to the dungeons of San Juan Ulúa, recalling, no doubt, with sardonic humor, that he himself had spent some time in this place as the guest of Santa Anna.

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[28] *Mi Historia cit.*, pp. 132 sq.

He was tried for conspiracy and again expelled from the country. In 1874, after the death of Juárez, he was permitted to return for the last time, a broken old man of no consequence. His private fortune had been completely dissipated. The government refused him a pension, and he was obliged to depend for support upon his son-in-law. Escandon left him a bequest of 14,000 pesos, but this soon disappeared. With failing eyesight, partly deaf, complaining of men's ingratitude, ridiculed by the newspapers, Santa Anna died quietly and alone, at the age of eighty-one, June 20, 1876.

Drawn to power by ambition, he had never more than partially triumphed over his enemies, and few remained to call him friend. A cortege of twenty carriages followed in the procession of his burial in the pantheon of Guadalupe.

To this day Mexico has failed to provide his memory with a national monument. Any number of reasons may be assigned for this neglect. Other men of far greater intrinsic merit have been allowed to rest without this form of posthumous glory. But the case of Santa Anna is unique. Eleven times active head of the nation, popularly recognized by a fickle people as the surest and last resource of civic stability at a time when Constitutions failed to serve this sacred function, he easily stood out as the glittering figure of Mexico during the era of Independence, from the fall of Iturbide, for which he was largely responsible, to the inauguration of the Liberal Reform under Juárez and Comonfort, which he could not prevent.

The pre-eminence of the man, apart from his military daring, must be attributed primarily to the popular appeal of his dramatic personality, an asset which Iturbide unfortunately seemed to lack. In the ordinary course of events, he should have remained, like others, simply a military spearhead for the intellectual plotters of political systems. Such he was for the Republicans who continued to ruin Iturbide and the First Empire; and such Gómez Farías and the other Liberals hoped he might be for their Federal and cultural program. But content with nothing less than the applause of the general public, his theatrical nature was incapable of inner convictions of the principles he appeared to espouse or of sincere allegiance to the political factions which sought his aid.

If he abandoned Iturbide, it was because of injured feelings and personal ambitions. If he abandoned Gómez Farías, it was because he sensed a popular hostility to the designs of the latter. If he rifled the Church, it was simply because of financial distress and of demands of grafting associates; Santa Anna himself always professed the Catholic faith and a special devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe. If he espoused the Centralizing system of national organization, it was largely because this eliminated a too dangerous rivalry of Federal chieftains and finally contributed to the trappings of external glory and display which he was content to substitute for the military glamour of his youth.

What led to temporary and later permanent exasperation on the part of the people was his superficiality. Successively confiding their national fortunes into his hands, because of his brilliant strategy and promise, they were successively betrayed and enraged by his civic ineptitude. Even in critical moments on the battlefield, when national honor and integrity were at stake, as in the Texas campaign and during the American invasion, he failed and failed miserably. It was this failure to justify the confidence of a distracted nation, which sadly needed genuine leadership, that has allowed his soul to remain interred with his body.

To a large extent, the silly treatment he has been accorded by his biographers is the result of his own gestures. His love affairs, his alleged use of opium, his temperament and tantrums have all been given ample attention. But, granted the unhappy limitations of the man, he can hardly be accused of treachery to his country. One thing he seemed to possess, namely, a strong national feeling, which served as a guide for his personal ambitions. Even when at the service of the extreme Federalists, he had no idea that they were plotting the dismemberment of his country for an alliance north of the Rio Grande. And it is probably in large part due to the traditions of this group that the remnants of his honor, his name, and the good name of the Mexicans who looked desperately for stable government under his regime have been held up to the unqualified ridicule and contempt of later generations.

CHAPTER XII

Benito Juárez

LIBERAL REFORMER

i

"THE world," declared the Assembly of Notables on July 10, 1862, "already knows of the attempts made by the government of Juárez in Vera Cruz and later in Mexico which would have killed our independence, and with it our race and our religion . . . Juárez, mutilating the country in favor of the annexionist policy of a government which, under the cloak of fraternity, has been our masked executioner, flatters himself, nevertheless, that he symbolizes the most perfect type of patriotism. The rest of the Mexicans, that is to say, the great majority of men of landed property, and those who represent the legitimate interests of society, are, in his concept, traitors to their country. For they have implored western Europe to put an end to the deplorable anarchy that has been devouring our vitals. . . ."[1]

Such was the Conservative view of Juárez during the dark days of intervention that preceded and accompanied the short-lived rule of Maximilian. Pursued across the length and breadth of Mexico and accepting the hospitality of the United States, to which he had made overtures in line with its "annexionist policy," he was to triumph over his enemies and live to see established a tradition that has made him an approved national hero, with his adversaries branded as traitors and ground into the dust.

Few men of Mexico can claim so rapid a rise or so distinguished a career as this taciturn but ambitious native of Oaxaca. Benito Juárez was born of pure Zapotecan Indian parents, on March 21, 1806, in the village of San Pablo Guelatao. He was hardly four years old when both parents died, leaving two sisters besides himself to the care of the paternal grandparents, while the baby girl born at the death of his mother was confided to an aunt. When the grandparents passed away, a few years later, the little family was again dispersed, and the boy was taken by his uncle, Bernardino Juárez. "Since my parents," as he afterward wrote, "left me no patrimony and my uncle lived by his own labor. I had to work in the fields as soon as I reached the use of reason." He pastured sheep and cows on the mountain slopes about the "Enchanted Lake" of the beautiful region around his village, and here in this occupation he remained until he was twelve.

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[1] Cf. Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz, *Méjico Desde 1808 Hasta 1867* (Madrid, 1872), tomo III, pp. 125, 126.

His sister Josefa, meanwhile, had gone to the city of Oaxaca, where she secured work as cook in the household of an Italian merchant named Antonio Mazza. Other news of the city reached the boy through his playmates, and he conceived the ambition of seeing it for himself. "It was Wednesday, September 16, 1818," he said. "I was in the pasture, as usual, with my flock, when at about eleven o'clock a number of muleteers came along leading their animals to the mountains. I asked them whether they came from Oaxaca; they replied in the affirmative, and at my request described some of the things they saw there, then continued on their way. When I came to count my sheep, I found that one was missing. I was sad and downcast, when another and larger lad by the name of Apolonio Conde came along. When he learned the reason for my grief, he told me that he had seen one of the muleteers stealing the sheep." Benito was afraid of his uncle's wrath, and "this fear," he added, "and my natural ambition to make something of myself determined me to go away to Oaxaca."[2]

With no extra covering more than his rain cape made of palm leaves, he set out on foot to cover the fourteen leagues to the capital, and presented himself at the kitchen door of Josefa. The Mazza family took him in, and soon placed him under the protection of a Franciscan friar, Don Antonio Salanueva. Don

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[2] Benito Juárez, *Apuntes para mis hijos.*

Antonio supported himself by binding books, and while the lad served as an apprentice in the trade, he taught the boy to read and write and gave him the elements of arithmetic and Spanish grammar. Under the mild rule and guidance of the priest, Juárez made remarkable progress, showing himself both docile and disciplined and piously accompanying the Franciscan on his daily devotion of the Way of the Cross.

Salanueva realized the boy's talents, and, after consulting Josefa and Antonio Mazza, decided to continue his education in a private school. Here among the children of the genteel, the little Indian found himself the butt of many a joke; but with the encouragement of his guardian, he managed to stay on, until the latter, who seemed to find the promise of a priestly career in his ward, enrolled him in the Seminary of Oaxaca, October 18, 1821.

These were transcendental days in Mexico. But during the violent upheavals within the nation, the student remained quietly within the walls of the seminary. Among the records of 1824 there appears this statement: "Course of middle students.—The day student D. Pablo Juárez was rated as Excellent. He is of exceptional diligence and particular application." In 1825 he began his first course of philosophy, and by 1828 he was ready to enter theology. Then he began to assert his own inclinations in a way not originally foreseen by the good Salanueva.

"As soon as I finished my study of Latin grammar," he declared, "my guardian showed a great interest that I should proceed to study moral theology, so that the following year I might begin to receive sacred orders. This suggestion was very painful for me, quite as much from the distaste which I felt for the ecclesiastical career as for the low estimation I had of the priests who studied only Latin grammar and moral theology and who, for this reason, were held in ridicule, being called 'Padres of the Mass and Kettle,' or 'Larragos,' because they studied only moral theology from the book of Father Larraga. Insofar as I could, I presented my point of view frankly to my guardian, and added that since I was not yet old enough to be ordained, I should lose nothing by taking a course in the liberal arts. Fortunately, my arguments convinced him and he allowed me to follow my career as I desired."[3]

Some of the biographers of Juárez maintain that even during this time he was a freethinker. There is no certain indication, however, that the youth resented his Catholic training or that his decision to leave the seminary was founded on anything more than an inclination toward a secular career. His religious and philosophical changes developed rather as he came more into contact with the Liberal ideas of the age and found himself influenced by the spirit of laicism and rationalism dominant in his later cultural mentors — Rousseau, Voltaire, Constant, Marchena — and finally in his Masonic affiliations.[4]

ii

In 1828, Juárez entered the Institute of Sciences and Arts to study jurisprudence. This was a recent foundation, "independent," as he remarked, "from the direction of the clergy and destined for the teaching of the youth in various branches of human knowledge, which was very difficult to get in that state where there was no other literary establishment than the Conciliar College Seminary. In the seminary only Latin grammar, philosophy, elemental physics, and theology were taught. As a result, to pursue another career besides that of the Church, or to perfect oneself in an art or profession, it was necessary to have an income sufficient to go to the capital of the nation. For the poor, like me, there had been no hope." The director and staff of the institute belonged to the Liberal group, abhorred by the clergy and the conservative elements for its positivistic philosophy of religion and society, so that this change, from the seminary, represented a radical break in the cultural formation of the youth.

Here Juárez began to read the works of Benjamin Constant and became enamored with the book of the Venezuelan S. G. Roscio, entitled "The Triumph of Liberty over Despotism, in the Confession of a Sinner Snatched from His Political Errors, and

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[3] *Apuntes cit.*

[4] After the fall of the Empire, Juárez decided to base free secular education in Mexico on Comte's positivism as taught by Gabino Barreda.

Dedicated to Make Reparation here for Religion Offended with the System of Tyranny." Quickly espousing the Liberal Party in politics, he threw himself into the local repercussions between the Masons of the York rite, or the "vinegars," and those of the Scottish rite, or the "oils." Violence attended the rallies for the presidential candidates, Gómez Pedraza and Vicente Guerrero, and one student was shot.

At the age of twenty-three, the young student of jurisprudence made his first public appearance before a local board of lawyers to defend a thesis of three points: (1) the public constitutional powers should not be mixed in their functions; (2) there should be a force to maintain the independence and balance of these powers; (3) this force should reside in the tribunal of public opinion. The following year, October, 1830, he appeared again, to defend two doctrines: (1) direct election is the most suitable in a republican system; (2) this election becomes more necessary in proportion with the intelligence of the people.[5]

Shortly after this account of himself, while remaining a student, he was appointed to act as assistant instructor in physics. In this double capacity he continued until 1831, when he finished his course in jurisprudence and entered the law office of Tiburcio Cañas. His legal practice, however, was of a meager character, because of the poverty of most of the clients involved with the law; and he found himself obliged to turn to other occupations for a living. His Liberal affiliations, however, were destined to serve him in good stead, for, with the triumph of Vicente Guerrero, his party came into control of the political offices, and he suddenly found himself in improved circumstances.

In 1831 the government appointed him as secretary of the institute, which had definitely assumed the character of a philosophical antagonist of the seminary, and the following year, at the end of the session of the local legislature, he was made a deputy. The good Salanueva bravely still entertained a hope that his former student and apprentice might be destined for the priesthood; but, even if the intellectual formation of the youth had not drifted far from any such possibility, the political events of the province and the nation were moving too rapidly to let him escape from their toils. The government of Anastasio Bustamante had fallen; in Oaxaca a law was enacted for the expulsion of all Spaniards, and, as a result, the bishop of the diocese left for Havana.

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[5] Héctor Pérez Martínez, *Juárez El Impasible* (Madrid, 1934), pp. 53, 54.

The first act of Juárez as a deputy in the chamber followed the assassination of President Guerrero. The body of the dead leader, he declared, belonged to the state of Oaxaca, and Cuilapan, where Guerrero had been shot, should have its name changed to Guerrerotilán. He proposed, moreover, that a national monument should be erected over the tomb of the hero and that his widow should be invited to visit it. As a confirmed Federalist, he now launched a more direct attack upon the Centralist government.

On December 17, 1833, he applied for his final professional examination before the Court of Justice of the state. "My education both political and civil," he declared in closing his thesis, "I owe to the state, precious fruit of independence and liberty; today I enjoy the satisfaction of ending my literary career before Your Excellencies, who have condescended to admit me to this examination in the presence of my compatriots, to whom I aspire to be useful for all time."[6] He was approved by vote of the Court of Justice, January 13, 1834, and was admitted to the bar.

Almost immediately, the government appointed him a magistrate of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, but this office was of short duration. With the fall of the Federalists represented by Gómez Farías, Juárez was obliged to leave Oaxaca. He later returned, however, to take up his legal practice and work for the reorganization of the Liberal Party. For the most part, his practice at this time consisted in the defense of the Indians against what he alleged were unjust exactions of the clergy and land proprietors. His activities in the city of Loricha cost him a jail sentence, under charge of having aroused the Indians against the local authorities.

"These blows which I have suffered," said he, "and which I saw inflicted almost daily upon unprotected persons who complained against the arbitrary action of the privileged classes consorting with civil authority, proved to me beyond doubt that society would never be happy so long as the latter groups continued to exist and to be in alliance with the civil powers. I was confirmed in my proposition of working constantly to destroy the doleful power of the privileged classes." Time was to tell in no uncertain terms what he had on his mind.

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[6] Cf. Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.*, p. 59.

Now on the threshold of his public career, he asked for the hand of Margarita Mazza, daughter of the merchant who had befriended him; and dressed in the severe clerical black which was henceforth to be his preference, he led his young bride to the altar. Something of the piety or religious sentiment of the occasion must have left a lasting impression in his mind, for later, when a civil marriage was proposed for his daughter, he replied that "his daughter was decent and civil marriage was a contract of concubinage."[7]

iii

Behind the gravity and almost stoical character of his face and bearing, the fires of political ambition and Liberal reform never ceased to burn in this Zapotecan Indian, although in his rise to power he was not inclined to make too much of factional lines. Aquiles Moctezuma lists six changes in his political affiliations.[8]

With the re-establishment of the Conservative government, Juárez fell from the limelight, until suddenly the Conservative governor, General León, appointed him general secretary of the state government. Upon relinquishing this post, because of a difference of outlook between himself and his chief, notably over the question of Church tithes, he was named a fiscal of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. Nevertheless, these affiliations with the Conservative power were clearly no indication of Juárez' personal convictions.

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[7] Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), tomo V, p. 382.

[8] Aquiles P. Moctezuma, *El Conflicto Religioso de 1926* (Mexico, 1929), p. 149: "In 1844, Juárez was a partisan of Santa Anna; the next year, a Moderate; in 1846, a Liberal; in 1852, a Juárist; in 1856, a Moderate; in 1858, a 'Red.' "

The Liberal Party which had begun to show its face again in 1845, found its opportunity in August the following year, and Juárez immediately assumed a leading rôle in the movement. These were the bitter days of the annexation of Texas to the United States, and Mexico found itself in the position of girding for war with its northern neighbor. The guard of Oaxaca rebelled against the federal and local governments, overthrew General León and appointed a government junta. It then extended an invitation to citizen Antonio López de Santa Anna to head the national forces pledged to fight, "that the nation might recover its rights and make certain of its liberty."[9]

A junta consisting of Juárez, D. Luis Fernández del Campo, and D. José Simon Arteaga was appointed by the signers of this Plan to act in an executive capacity. Arteaga then succeeded the junta as governor; and Juárez was elected Oaxacan deputy to the Constituent Congress meeting in the capital of the republic. The moment had come for the latter to strike his first blow against the Church — in the name of patriotism — and he presented his bill to confiscate Church properties for the expenses of the conflict.

Inasmuch as the Conservative deputies were opposed to this radical type of procedure, which was destined to split the country wide open, Juárez prepared a manifesto for the deputies from Oaxaca, which he read in Congress. "Firm in the proposal that we have formed," he declared in solemn tones, "to save the republic whose sovereign will we are authorized to believe that we represent, small though our number may be, we shall never consent to concur in the obsequies of its independence and liberty. Neither the false cry nor the insidious plots of its cunning enemies can ever separate us from our sacred purpose."[10]

Santa Anna arrived at Vera Cruz on August 18, 1846, with permission of the American fleet. At Puebla he was met by Gómez Farías. Because of the national terror produced by the advance of the American troops under Taylor, the two proceeded to have themselves installed as President and Vice-President respectively of the republic.[11] In the inevitable shuffle of power which followed, Gómez Farías succeeded to the presidency, while Santa Anna went off to meet the foe. This arrangement continued until 1847, when strife in the capital and distrust of Gómez Farías brought Santa Anna back to assume authority.

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[9] Santa Anna at this time was in exile in Havana.

[10] Cf. Justo Sierra, *Juárez, Su Obra y Su Tiempo* (Mexico, 1905, 1906), p. 62.

Juárez, disgusted with this turn of events and disillusioned in what he regarded as the reactionary policies of Santa Anna, returned to Oaxaca in August the same year, to arouse the Liberal faction and drive the Conservatives from office. "I did not hesitate," he declared, "to aid as best I could those who worked for the fulfillment of the law, which has always been my sword and my shield. On November 23, we succeeded in our movement against the intruded authorities. The president of the Superior Tribunal of Justice of the state, Don Marcos Pérez was given charge of the government. The legislature met and named me temporary governor of the state." At the end of his temporary governorship, he was re-elected to office, and during this period, 1847–1852, labored with success to put the affairs of state in order. During these days, young Porfirio Díaz was to be a valuable adjutant in providing military persuasion on behalf of the Liberals in Oaxaca.

Meanwhile, national affairs went from bad to worse. Santa Anna showed himself incapable of stemming the American invasion, and he could look for precious little help in this hour of anguish from the Liberals who had called him to the task. "From the moment that this personage had deserted the Reformist cause," wrote the anticlerical Justo Sierra, "he had no value for the men of progress. From the moment in which his inexpertness had been the principal element of the humiliating triumphs of the invader in the valley of Mexico, he had no value as a leader or general. From the moment in which, after his resignation, the Supreme Government established in Querétaro had taken from him, as he said, the sword which he had wielded so stupidly against the foreigner, his presidential status was nullified; and there remained only the ambitious figure filled with despair and the seditious creature who, impotent against the triumphant invader, was nevertheless capable of doing much against that peace so necessary for the successful pursuit of the war."[12]

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[11] Cf. Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1885), V, pp. 302 sq.

Better the nation go down in defeat, than that their political and cultural principles be held in abeyance, seems to have been the argument of the Liberals. So bitter was Juárez against Santa Anna that when, at the conclusion of the war the latter was fleeing from the country, he gave orders to the authorities of Tehauntepec to pursue that general if he presented himself within the limits of the state.

Juárez' period of secure possession in Oaxaca, however, was destined to come to a sudden end. With the success of the Plan de Hospicio and the return of Santa Anna from exile, on April 1, 1853, the tables were again turned. Santa Anna, who had espoused the cause of the Conservatives and given himself the title of Most Serene Highness, put Don Benito under custody, on May 27, 1853, and ordered him to be removed to the city of Jalapa, in the state of Vera Cruz. There was nothing for Juárez to do but submit. At Tehuacán, he addressed a representation to the government, which was never answered; and he proceeded by horseback and foot to Jalapa, where he arrived on June 25. After seventy-five days of inactivity there, he received another order to proceed to Jonacatepeque, in the state of Mexico. This was countermanded by another command to go to Huamantla, in Puebla; but at Puebla, where he solicited a loan for his living expenses, he was placed under arrest, on September 16, by D. José Santa Anna, the son of the dictator. There he was held incommunicado and sent off to the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa.

On October 9, his warden presented him with orders to leave for Europe. "I was sick at the time," he recorded, "and I told the governor that I would carry out the command as soon as I was able. But he was inexorable, declaring that he had instructions to put me on board the English packet ship *Avon,* which was going to sail at two o'clock in the afternoon the same day." The *Avon* reached Havana, on November 9, and Juárez found himself on the wharf without a single centavo. He was met, however, by a messenger with funds from the Liberal Party and managed to lose himself in the city. Spies of Santa Anna again caught up with him, but the captain general of the island gave him hospitality; and on December 18, he set sail for New Orleans.

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[12] Justo Sierra, *loc. cit.,* p. 65.

Here he was joined by Melchor Ocampo, Zepeda, Peraza, Mata, and Montenegro. Ocampo supported himself as a potter. Mata was a waiter in a restaurant. Juárez made cigars. Ocampo, who had shared the same cot with Juárez, intended to go to Europe, but the confiscation of his properties by Santa Anna made this impossible; and he gave his last 700 pesos to General José María de J. Carvajal to join forces with Vidaurri against the dictatorship. Then, while Juárez remained at his adopted profession in New Orleans, Ocampo, Mata, Arriaga, and Montenegro went to Brownsville, near the Mexican border, to obtain funds and edit a newspaper of the Revolutionary Junta.

iv

Juárez kept in close contact with this group by correspondence and carefully followed the trend of events in Mexico. Under Santa Anna, the country appeared to be moving toward a monarchy, while groaning under a debt of 20,000,000 pesos, with an army of 90,000 men. Then suddenly came the Plan of Ayutla proclaiming revolt on March 1, 1854. It had been conceived by Ignacio Comonfort, former administrator of customs at the port of Acapulco, who submitted his ideas to D. Juan Álvarez, who was living at Texca.[13] The movement spread rapidly; and on August 9, Santa Anna fled from the capital. On the twelfth, he resigned the presidency, and six days later left the country.

The incident which had given the Liberals their opportunity was the Gadsden Purchase, by which the United States acquired southern Arizona. Álvarez, a bloody figure of African descent, who headed the revolt, also had personal reasons inasmuch as Santa Anna had stopped his subvention and demanded an accounting of the revenue of the customhouse at Acapulco. This was the Alvarez, the "Panther of the South," who had blocked assistance to the defense of Chapultepec and whose political career had been a constant changing between the ranks of the Conservatives and those of the Liberals, according as expediency seemed to dictate.

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[13] Cf. Anselmo de la Portilla, *México en 1856 y 1857. Gobierno del General Comonfort* (New York, 1858), pp. 3 sq.

As soon as news of the revolt reached Juárez, he communicated with the Revolutionary Junta at Brownsville, and determined to return to Mexico. On June 20, 1854, he left New Orleans for Havana and Panama, crossed the Isthmus, and took another boat for Acapulco. On his presenting himself to Álvarez and offering his services, the latter, not realizing who the volunteer was, suggested that he put himself into the uniform of a private soldier.

Juárez remained as private secretary to Álvarez and threw all his energy into the movement. From Mexico City came the news that the proclamation of Ayutla had been approved by a plan which proclaimed D. Martin Carrera as president. Juárez, however, was dissatisfied with what had taken place. "I called the attention of D. Diego Álvarez," as he wrote, "pointing out that if the flight of Santa Anna should be celebrated as an event which disconcerted oppressors, thus hastening the triumph of the revolution, in no way should the plan proclaimed in Mexico be approved nor should the president which had been named be recognized. The Plan of Ayutla did not authorize the junta which was formed in the capital to name the president of the republic. Moreover, the authors of the movement were the very same generals and persons who, a few hours before, were the followers of Santa Anna and persecuted the upholders of the Plan of Ayutla.[14] It was clear, therefore, that, seeing themselves lost by the flight of their chief, they had resolved to enter the revolution to falsify it, to save their positions and secure impunity from their crimes."

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[14] Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.*, p. 94. "The permanency of D. Antonio López de Santa Anna in power," the Plan asserted, "is a constant threat to public liberties." Cf. Niceto Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1880), tomo XIII, apénd. 2.

In his office as private secretary, Juárez remained, until the revolutionary forces arrived at Cuernavaca. There Juan Alvarez organized a council composed of Liberal rebels of all the states of the republic, presided over by Gómez Farías. Don Benito acted as deputy for Oaxaca. The purpose of this body was to elect a president, and the choice fell quite naturally upon Juan Alvarez himself. On October 4, the latter appointed his cabinet, with Juárez as minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Amid the national confusion and disorganization of the Conservative Party, the Liberals entered Mexico City, on November 14, 1855. Juárez' moment of power had come for him to strike out against the position of the Church and of the army and to inaugurate the era of the Reform of which he had so long dreamed.

With the Liberal Melchor Ocampo, his companion of New Orleans, he first drew up the "Juárez Law," to abolish ecclesiastical courts. Up to this time, in conformity with canon law, the clergy accused of civil crime, with certain exceptions, were exempted from civil trial and were tried and sentenced by special courts of their peers appointed by the bishops. As soon as the law was promulgated by Álvarez, a storm of protest arose all over the country. The archbishop of Mexico, Don Lázaro de la Garza y Ballesteros, issued an edict from his cathedral pulpit to the effect: "I declare that the law is contrary to that enacted by the Church. The waiver which any individual may make of the exemption, whether in the civil or the criminal order, is null and void, even though he swears to it; and whether the renunciation is voluntary or compulsory, not only is it valueless but he who makes it will be subject to the penalties which the Church imposes upon violators." This was but the beginning.

Observers in the civil order realized the motives behind the law. "Before I consent, under pretext of liberty, that the religious tie, sole bond that unites all Mexicans, be broken," declared Don Manuel Doblado, Liberal governor of Guanajuato, "I am resolved to offer resistance and to oppose with all the resources of this state that authority which today finds itself in conflict with all the principal classes of society. Under the pretense of reforming the clergy, it is intended to introduce into the Republic a Protestantism more to be feared because of the disguise under which it is presented, and to sever the religious tie, the only binding force that neutralizes the elements of dissolution and anarchy that swarm on every side."[15]

Juárez' project to dissolve the army met with more effective opposition. In the first place, Ignacio Comonfort, as Secretary of War, in view of his "responsibilities of government" refused to approve it. "If you would let me be general-in-chief," he said to Juárez and Ocampo, "and appoint a minister of war in sympathy with me, I should do what you wished." To the popular resentment against the "Juárez Law" were added various military uprisings. Generals Manuel Doblado and Miguel Echeagaray headed a movement to depose Álvarez in favor of Comonfort; and Juárez was dropped from the cabinet.

This shift of authority was not, however, to bring an end to the warfare against the Church. No sooner was Comonfort installed as President than he promulgated the "Lerdo Law," which expropriated all property and capital held in trust by the Church.[16] According to the hopes of those who planned to figure in the spoils, the total value of these resources would mount from one hundred million to one billion pesos. The actual value of Church properties was far from these ciphers, although subsequent writers have repeatedly asserted with Lucas Alamán that "the total amount of the properties of the clergy, secular and regular, in real estate and credits, certainly did not go under one half the total value of the real estate of the country." This statement of Alamán, although inconsistent with his own figures and with other facts, covered both real estate holdings and capital, which he declared was used in charitable and educational works or was kept in circulation, and hence did not signify that the

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[15] Quoted in Cuevas, tomo V, pp. 285, 286.

[16] This law, primarily aimed at religious corporations, had the simultaneous effect of breaking up the *ejidos* or Indian communal lands, which had been protected up to this time, thus inaugurating the peonage and agrarian evils of the Liberal era.

Church owned one half of the national territory.[17] According to Humboldt, "the real estate of the Mexican clergy did not exceed the sum of 12 to 15 millions," while the total value of Church properties and goods, "in view of many official documents," he estimated at 44,500,000 pesos in round figures.

Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, who was responsible for the bill of expropriation, declared in his "Official Memorial" presented to Comonfort on February 10, 1857, that "the desamortization is completed in large part," and assigned a total value to the expropriated property of 23,019,280 pesos. In review of all the facts, it may be concluded safely that the value of the productive goods of the Church in Mexico never exceeded 20,000,000 pesos, while the gross value of Church properties did not reach 50,000,000 pesos.

To say that this represented a dead asset, of little or no value to the nation, is, of course, to ignore the facts. The capital which the Church did not use for defraying the expenses of the clergy and of its benevolent institutions, it loaned out to various enterprises and individuals at the rate of 5 per cent interest. During the war for independence and later during the invasion of the United States, the Church gave liberally of its resources when the national treasury was drained by costly factional strife and corrupt administration. The houses owned by the Church had been rented out to the poor and middle classes at modest rates, and its farms were placed in the hands of planters and peasants under terms that practically made them the proprietors.

As late as 1893, in a discourse before the chamber of deputies, D. Juan A. Matéos, a Freemason, declared: "In the days of the old regime, when the clergy possessed many urban and rural estates, year after year passed without the shameful auctions of which today so many families are victims. The deaf avarice of the present proprietors knows no compassion, whereas the clergy, animated by a typically Christian spirit, tolerated and condoned. The Church loaned its capital at the moderate rate of 4, 5, and 6 per cent, the rate that was legal then, but is unknown now. Decrees of attachment against property for loans from these funds were most unusual."[18]

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[17] Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (Mexico, 1849), tomo I, p. 89; Moctezuma, *loc. cit.*, p. 127. It is important to note that much so-called property of the Church belonged to Indian communities and was merely protected and administered by religious corporations.

Whether the properties and endowments of the Church were in excess of its needs, or whether there were abuses and sins of omission within the Church that called for remedy, are questions hardly related to the wholesale and sweeping provisions of the law that was calculated, not only to ruin the economic security of ecclesiastical projects, but also to remove the Church definitely from a position of religious and cultural dominance. This objective, even more than the dissipation of its properties and investments, was what caused an outcry of indignation throughout the country.

Notwithstanding the unpopularity of the act, the Liberal administration of Comonfort suppressed all opposition; and Juan José Baz, governor of the Federal District, issued an edict strangely inconsistent with promises of liberty of thought and expression. "The owner of any printing shop," declared Baz, "who may clandestinely print a subversive article, or any other whose purpose may be to impede the execution of the dispositions dictated by the supreme government, will be punished by a fine of 500 pesos, or one year at forced labor, and his shop will be closed."[19]

v

When Juárez left the cabinet, upon Comonfort's accession to the Presidency, the feeling between the two men was none too cordial. Nevertheless, he was induced to take a prominent post in the party organization, namely, as governor and "pacifier" of his native state of Oaxaca, which had strongly protested against the anticlerical laws and had drawn up a resolution to this same effect. Ignoring all opposition, he managed to dissolve the regular armed forces of the state, organized a national guard, and proceeded to work with all his vigor for the enactment of reform.

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[18] *Voz,* October 21, 1893.

[19] Cf. Regis Planchet, *La Cuestion Religiosa* (El Paso, 1927), p. 38.

When the Lerdo Law was passed he lost no time in giving an example of its fulfillment. "Then," he wrote, "I believed it my duty to enforce the law, not only with the pressure of authority, but also with example, to encourage those who, because of an unfounded scruple, hesitated to avail themselves of the benefit granted by the law." This benefit was the privilege of denouncing and buying up the expropriated properties of the Church. "I secured the appropriation of a capital of 3000 pesos," he declared, "which purchased a house on Coronel Street in the city of Oaxaca. In this operation I was guided by the desire of making this reform effective, and not of creating a sensation. There were estates of greater importance in which I could have invested; but that was not my object."[20] Lerdo de Tejada himself succeeded in favoring about 9000 persons, already rich or in good circumstances, who were thus able to purchase Church properties at ridiculously low prices.

The Constitution of 1857 was drawn up by a strictly factional Congress, from which Conservatives and, of course, clerical elements, were excluded. Fearing that the Centralists might rebel, Juárez lost no time in organizing his forces to meet the threat. At the same time he set himself to crush all resistance of the clergy and of Catholic sentiment against those disabling provisions of the Reform which he had so ardently and so long labored to make a fundamental Law of the nation.

Liberty of conscience, religious tolerance, and freedom of worship were all professed by the Liberal group that drew up the document; but the real intention and the actual results were far from the theory. "The commission hopes to make the people happy by freedom of worship," cynically declared the deputy, Marcelino Castañeda to the session that framed the Constitution. "But if the people do not want it . . . how can they be made to benefit against their will?"[21] In a country which had been civilized and unified largely under the direction of Catholic Christianity, the attitude of Masonic Liberalism as finally concentrated in the Constitution of 1857 was full of tragedy and exasperation.

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[20] Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.*, pp. 103, 104.

[21] Francisco Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario Constituyente* (Mexico, 1857), tomo I, p. 772.

This "freedom of worship" decreed not only the expropriation of Church properties as outlined in the Lerdo Law but also the suppression of religious orders, by whom, for the most part, the Church had been able to staff and maintain its schools. Thus article 27 declared: "Religious corporations and institutions, whatever may be their character, denomination, duration, or object, and civil bodies under their patronage, direction or administration, or ministers of any cult, will have no legal capacity to acquire property or to administer other real estate than the edifices destined immediately and directly to the service and object of these corporations and institutions. Nor will they have legal power to acquire or administer capital sums imposed on real estate." In article 3, religious vows were declared illegal. Deprived of endowments and teaching orders, the Church could then be easily and truthfully accused of contributing little to the education of the Mexican people.[22]

In the process of expropriation which followed, Catholic universities, hospitals, convents and monasteries, asylums and orphanages were turned into barracks, political headquarters, and other purposes; or stripped of their works of art, they were allowed to fall into desuetude, while the religious orders, which had brought civilization and humane protection to the Indian, were dissolved or sent into exile.

On the other hand, article 3 of the Constitution declared that education was to be free, and article 35 established universal suffrage. As a matter of fact, education was to lapse into a long period of decadence. It had been established on a free basis by the missionaries; but the Liberal government, burdened with military establishments and other preoccupations, was in no position to carry on the work from which it had excluded the Church. And while the principle of universal suffrage was good to contemplate, it gave rise to an easy and unscrupulous manipulation of Indian votes that remains one of Mexico's greatest political liabilities.

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[22] Zarco, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, apénd.

In virtue of article 77, priests were excluded from holding civil office. On the other hand, in spite of professed separation of Church and State, article 123 gave to the federal powers the right to intervene in matters involving religious worship and external discipline. The law of Juárez had already been incorporated in article 13 to bring clergymen accused of delinquency and crime under the arm of the civil courts. Later amendments, by decree of September 25, 1873, were to complete the work of secularization. Article 2 of this decree declared: "Matrimony is a civil contract. This and other civil acts of persons are within the exclusive competency of officers and authorities of the civil order." Article 3 stated that "No religious institution could acquire real estate or capital sums imposed on them, with the single exception established in article 27 of the constitution." Article 4 substituted the simple promise of telling the truth for the religious oath. Other provisions secularized cemeteries and forbade the clergy and religious to appear in public with an apparel indicative of their calling.

In February, 1857, the new Constitution was completed, and Gómez Farías, now in his seventy-sixth year, was dramatically brought into the hall on a litter, that he might be the first to take the oath to it.

To comply with the new prescriptions of the Constitution, Juárez presented his candidacy for the governor of Oaxaca, in 1857, and in the "election" which followed was awarded a plurality of 120,000 votes. "It was the custom authorized by the state law, the same as in the republic," he declared, "that when the governor took possession, he would join with all the other authorities at the *Te Deum* which was sung in the cathedral, where the canons would stand to receive him. But in this instance the clergy were already in open war upon civil authority, especially against me because of the law of administration of justice which I had passed in November 23, 1855, and they considered the governors as heretics and excommunicated. The canons of Oaxaca took advantage of the incident to provoke a scandal.

"They decided to close the doors of the church so as not to receive me, in the sinister hope of compelling me to use force in ordering the doors opened by armed police and seizing the canons, that my administration might open with an act of violence or with an uprising, if the people, to whom they would present themselves as martyrs, took part in their defense. . . .

"Although I had sufficient forces to proceed against these seditious fellows and the law still in vigor concerning the ceremonial of inauguration authorized me to do it, I determined to omit the *Te Deum,* not for fear of the canons, but because of my conviction that civil governors should not assist, as such, at any ecclesiastical ceremony, even though, as men, they can go to the churches to practice the acts of devotion which their religion dictates. . . . This event was for me a good occasion to reform the bad habit of governors in assisting even at processions and the professions of nuns, losing time which they should use in useful work for society. Moreover, I considered that not having to exercise any ecclesiastical function or to govern in the name of the Church, but of the people who had elected me, my authority remained entire and perfect with merely the protest, which I made to the representatives of the state, of faithfully complying with my duty."[23a]

vi

Juárez' personal example, however, was not enough to ease the tremendous strain that had been put on the country by the provocative measures of the Constitution. The promulgation of this document, instead of increasing the executive sanction of the President, destroyed the small power still remaining to the administration of Comonfort. The latter admitted that "the project had been debated by Congress in the midst of public agitation and alarm, which would have been manifested with even greater emphasis except for fear of the repressive faculties invested in the government, which it did not neglect to employ." Later, in exile, the same leader declared: "After two years of furious military struggle between armies, at the cost of great sums and of warfare on all sides, the government could no longer doubt the nature of the resistance, whose strength it had been unable to weaken either by money or by force of arms. At last the time came when the Constitution was sustained solely by the coercion of the authorities; and, convinced that I could not succeed with the plan of enforcing it without openly violating the will of the nation, I resolved to put it into other hands. . . . The perspective I saw before my eyes, and which all could perceive, was not civil war, but something worse, the complete dissolution of society. . . . The war cry of the troops who began the movement against the Constitution was not the echo of a faction or the arrogant challenge of one exclusive party: the nation repudiated the new Constitution and the troops simply sustained the nation's will."[23b]

[23a] Quoted by Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.,* pp. 105, 106.

Under the pressure of the Liberal press, Comonfort appointed Juárez minister of the Interior. General elections followed shortly, under Liberal direction. Comonfort was re-elected president, with Juárez as president of the Supreme Court of Justice, which designated him at the same time Vice-President of the nation.

National peace, however, was far from having been achieved, and the government proceeded only under the most difficult conditions. Thus, while all public officials were required to swear allegiance to the Constitution, the Church, in view of the anti-Catholic provisions of the act, threatened with excommunication all who took the oath. "The situation of the country," observed Justo Sierra, "was truly frightful, and nothing could return to its proper function. Consciences, fire-sides, towns, fields, cities, all were profoundly stirred. Like the great dust winds which announce the approach of storms in our country, so there was no hacienda or village or city that was not threatened by warfare, pronunciamentos, highwaymen, and the native hordes that rose with the red banner of agrarian communism. Religion and *Fueros* (exemptions) or Constitution and Reform, these were the letters from which was resolved the word 'death.' "

Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, Comonfort now sent for Juárez and informed him that he had decided upon a change of political strategy. The latter absolutely refused to budge from his position. While Comonfort was hesitating, General Zuloaga, on December 17, proclaimed the Plan of Tacubaya. This recognized Comonfort as the elected President of the nation, but called for the derogation of the Constitution of 1857 as reprobated by the sentiment of the Mexican people. A new Congress was to be called and a new Constitution was to be drawn up and submitted to the popular vote.[23] Zuloaga took possession of the capital, and on December 19, Comonfort announced his adherence to the Plan.

[23b] Cf. Ignacio Comonfort, *Politica del General Comonfort durante Su Gobierno en Méjico* (New York, 1858).

As soon as Juárez learned what had happened, he proceeded to the National Palace, where he was placed under guard, for his own "safety." The arguments of the leaders of the new movement failed to move him one inch. On January 11, 1858, he was released from detention and fled to Querétaro, where seventy of the Liberal Congressmen had assembled. This body now declared that inasmuch as Comonfort had failed in his duty to the Constitution, Juárez was now President of Mexico. Comonfort, meanwhile, changed his mind and attempted to resist Zuloaga. When this failed, he departed for the United States; and Zuloaga was declared President. Three years of civil war was now to determine the fate of the Liberal Reform.

On January 17, Juárez left Querétaro for Guanajuato, where he declared that his government had been established, with a cabinet composed of Melchor Ocampo, Guillermo Prieto, Leon Guzmán, and Manuel Ruiz. In his manifesto, he declared: "Called to this difficult post by a Constitutional precept and not by favor of the factions, I shall procure, in the short period of my administration, that the government may be the impartial protector of individual guarantees, the defender of the rights of the nation and of public liberties."

The legality of Juárez' succession to the presidency, according to the Constitution he had pledged himself to defend, has been regarded by some observers as at least doubtful, since Comonfort had not resigned and Juárez had not been sworn into the office to which he had been elected. Nevertheless, hostilities had begun, and he had accepted the responsibility confided to him by his deputies. On March 13 he set out for Guadalajara, and from there wrote to his generals: "It is seven o'clock at night and in these moments there is being decided on the field of Salamanca the great question between the people and their oppressors. It is indeed difficult to insure triumph when it depends on the success of bayonets, for war is always a hazard."

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[23] Zamacois, *loc. cit.*, tomo XIV, p. 686.

The news of the defeat of his forces under General Parrodi reached him at Guadalajara as a meeting of the cabinet officers was taking place. The same day the Fiftieth Battalion rebelled against him, with the cry "Long live the army! Down with the national guard! Down with the Constitution!" Juárez and his ministers Ocampo, Guzmán, and Ruiz were placed under detention by Captain Encarnacion Peraza; and the entire city declared itself in a state of siege. The approach of Parrodi with over 2000 soldiers, however, had a quieting effect. An armistice was agreed to, and Juárez arranged to suspend hostilities.

On the following day, Sunday, March 15, Lieutenant Cruz Ahedo, unaware of the armistice, or believing Juárez to be in danger, sent an assault column against the palace where Juárez was being held, just at the hour the people were on their way to Mass to offer their thanks for the cessation of hostilities. The resulting confusion was frightful, and the lives of Juárez and his companions were seriously endangered.

Guillermo Prieto, who described the scene and his part in saving the life of the Liberal leader, declared: "Quick as thought, I seized Sr. Juárez by the coat, put him at my shoulder, and covered him with my body . . . I opened my arms . . . and smothering the command of 'Fire!' which sounded at that moment, I cried out: 'Put up your guns! The brave do not assassinate!' " Two days later Don Benito was put at liberty.

The cold-blooded, dispassionate reaction of the Zapotecan Indian toward this act of generosity was noted with the scantiest remark in his Diary, and some years later he wrote to a friend: "With regard to Guillermo Prieto, a little before I left Chihuahua, he came to see me with the pretext that I should consent to the request of Ruiz. He told me that he liked me very much, that he was my eulogist and biographer and that, if I wished, he would accompany me, writing whatever I wished. What of it? I thanked him, pitying such weakness and taking no account of his falsehoods. In the end, this poor devil, the same as Ruiz and Negrete, are out of the combat. They have been of some service, for the government has used them. Now we shall see what they can do with their own resources."[24]

On March 20, Juárez with a force of seventy men left Guadalajara for Colima, pursued by the forces of Landa. In his Diary, he wrote: "On April 8, I left Colima for Manzanillo and slept in Coyatlan. On the 9th, I arrived at Manzanillo. On the eleventh, I embarked on the steamboat *John Stiffens* for Acapulco. The same day, I arrived and left for Panama, which I reached on the eighteenth. The nineteenth, I set out for Colon. I arrived the same day and embarked on the steamboat *Granada* for Havana, where I arrived on the twenty-third. On the twenty-fifth I left for New Orleans on the steamboat *Philadelphia,* and arrived on the 28th." Technically, according to the Constitution upon which he had based his coup d'état, he no longer had claim to the Presidency, since it was stipulated that the office of president would become vacant if the incumbent were to leave the country. But he was in no mood to worry about technicalities at this time.

Meanwhile, the United States had become interested in enlarging its spheres of influence and territory, and thus became projected into the factional struggle. In 1857, President Buchanan had instructed John Forsyth, the minister to Mexico, to negotiate with Comonfort for the cession of Lower California, Sonora, a section of Chihuahua, and perpetual right of passage across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Fifteen million dollars were authorized for the venture, but the vigorous opposition of the governor of Sonora, Pesqueiro, prevented its success. Forsyth then explained "that the purchase of commercial privileges was contemplated, and in fact desired, merely as a means to a political end — that end being to sustain Mexico (the Liberal Party) and to keep her from falling to pieces, perhaps into the hands of foreign powers, until such time as we are ready to 'Americanize' her."[25]

Reflecting on these events after the fall of Comonfort and the triumph of the Conservatives, the New York *Times* declared: "If the Liberal Party returns to power . . . all these treaties can easily be put into effect. . . . The United States may expect nothing in the way of treaties from the Church party, and Mr. Buchanan cannot fail to comprehend that it is good policy to support the Liberal Party in Mexico." This view was correct. Forsyth attempted to reopen negotiations for the purchase of several Mexican states from the Conservative government, but General Zuloaga refused to consider the proposition. The American minister then intervened on behalf of the Liberals, giving protection to Lerdo de Tejada and hiding in the American legation the silver which had been seized from the cathedral of Morelia. When the Mexican Government took cognizance of his activities, Forsyth prepared to defend himself by force. The general situation became clear when the United States broke diplomatic relations with the Conservative government and transferred its recognition to Juárez.[26]

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[24] Quoted in Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.*, p. 119.

[25] Cf. James Morton Callahan, *Mexican Policy Under Buchanan* (Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1910).

vii

On April 4, Juárez with his companions, Ocampo and Prieto, returned to Vera Cruz, where he was received with much ceremony and oratory by Gutiérrez Zamora. His wife, who had remained under straitened and difficult circumstances at Oaxaca, hastened to join him; and at Vera Cruz he established headquarters. A veritable torrent of decrees soon came to be issued by this ministry. "We are today in a solemn moment," he declared, "because upon the result of the bloody fight, which the partisans of obscurantism and of abuses have provoked this time against the most clear principles of liberty and social progress, depends all the future of the nation."[27]

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[26] "If the reactionary government had accepted the proposition of the United States," wrote Francisco Bulnes, "the American navy would have ejected Juárez from Vera Cruz. The result of the $25,000,000 would have been triumph for the reaction, and President Buchanan would have given all his material and moral support to Miramón. The reactionaries sacrificed their party interests because of their aversion to sell territory to the United States." Cf. *El Verdadero Juárez* (Mexico, 1904), p. 238; also Senate Report, 1858, p. 101.

[27] This civil strife has gone down in history as the "Three Years War," or the War of the Reform.

As the war advanced, with the Conservative Generals Miramón, Leonardo Márquez, and Zuloaga ranging the country against the Liberal forces, and the entire nation in sanguinary disorder, Juárez proceeded with his laws of the Liberal Reform. In brief, these proposed to establish as a general and invariable rule a complete independence between the affairs of the state and those of a purely ecclesiastical nature, although the very nature of their provisions indicated the direct opposite. Thus, Juárez enacted the suppression of all the regular orders of men, without any exception, secularizing the priests. The confraternities, archconfraternities, brotherhoods and, in general, all corporations or congregations of this nature were likewise to be extinguished. The novitiates in the convents of nuns were to be closed, allowing only the sisters already living in them to continue with the dowries they had brought for their sustenance and religious service. All the property administered by the secular and regular clergy as well as that of the sisterhoods in excess of dowries was to be nationalized and alienated. Henceforth, the private offerings of the faithful to their spiritual ministers were to be considered sufficient for the purposes of religion.

With these large concepts of ecclesiastical freedom, Ocampo sent a circular to the chiefs in the territory under the control of Juárez, giving directions for the treatment of the clergy. "Assure them," said the document, "that they will be well treated and even given financial assistance if they need it, in all the places occupied by the constitutional forces, if they are submissive to the precepts of the Divine Master, and give to Caesar, without violence or biased interpretations, that which is due to Caesar."

While the Juárez government was thus sanctioning its robbery of ecclesiastical properties and suppressing the religious orders with a partial, if pious, allusion to the precepts of the Divine Master, Juárez declared null the treaty of Mont-Almonte which had been drawn up with the government of Isabella II by General Juan N. Almonte, minister of President Zuloaga in France. This treaty had ratified the agreement made by Santa Anna in 1853 promising to pay Spain for past debts and to indemnify for the assassination of Spaniards at San Vicente and San Dimas.

On the other hand, Juárez secured the enactment of the celebrated McLane-Ocampo Treaty, by which he agreed to grant to the United States in perpetuity the right to pass freely across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, which Forsyth had already sought in vain from the Conservative government, and other concessions which practically placed Mexico in a state of national servitude. When the Conservatives later sought the intervention of the European powers to strengthen their position and restore order to the distraught country, they were roundly condemned and delivered to history as black traitors to their country, by the selfsame Liberals who were willing to hand over the independence of Mexico to the United States for a cash consideration and personal protection.[28]

Juárez was in desperation, in dire financial straits, tremendously unpopular with the large mass of the Mexican people, at this time, and prepared to make any concession rather than see the triumph of his enemies and the destruction of his program of Liberal Reforms. The "Protocol containing certain conditions and stipulations agreed upon by Messrs. Ocampo and Lerdo de Tejada on the one part and Mr. Churchill on the other, as the most proper to form the basis of future negotiations between the constitutional government of Mexico and that of the United States," was written in the best traditions of the Pact of New Orleans.

In the first place it procured the cession of Lower California to the United States, then conceded rights of way across Mexican territory from El Paso to Guaymas, from some point on the Rio Grande to Mazatlán, perpetual right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and grants of alternate sections to companies designated by the United States, to be protected by military outposts of either nation. In the treaty proper, the right of intervention was granted reciprocally, "whenever the security of citizens of either republic is endangered within the territory of the other, and the legitimate and acknowledged government thereof may be unable from any cause to enforce such stipulations or to provide for such safety and security."[29]

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[28] Cf. Zamacois, *loc. cit.*, tomo XV, pp. 332 sq.

[29] Cf. Bulnes, *loc. cit.*, p. 76.

Commenting on the McLane-Ocampo Treaty, Don Francisco Bulnes accurately described the agreement as "an interventionist pact, for continuous intervention, from the moment the United States was authorized to take over the perpetual conservation of peace in Mexico." Robert M. McLane, the American minister plenipotentiary who negotiated the treaty, declared: "When it is ratified, I can easily dictate terms to the Miramón government, obtain redress and pacify the country. If it is rejected, anarchy will be the order of the day, and American influence will cease here."

Fortunately for Mexican Independence, the treaty was not ratified by the United States Senate. The secession of South Carolina from the Union removed most of the senators who favored it as an expansion of slave territory; and the later negotiations of the Confederacy with the Mexican Liberal Party were blocked by French intervention.

The American Government, however, was now determined to prevent a victory by the Conservatives. On January 2, 1859, General Miguel Miramón was chosen by the electoral *junta* of the Conservatives to succeed Zuloaga as President. To complete the dispersion of the Juárez forces, he decided to blockade Vera Cruz; and for this purpose, he acquired several war vessels in Havana. On February 27, 1859, the flotilla left Havana, and, on March 6, arrived at the anchorage of Antón Lizardo. On passing San Juan de Ulúa, his ships refused to show their flag to the fortress and were fired upon. Juárez and his minister of war, General Partearroyo, then appealed to J. R. Jarvis, chief of the American fleet stationed near Vera Cruz. These ships, they declared, were "piratical expeditions, and therefore should be considered as such by national boats and by friendly nations."

As a result, the three American warships, *Saratoga, Wave,* and *Indianola* made their way to Antón Lizardo at midnight and came upon the three Mexican vessels, which sensed the action and proceeded to withdraw. The American ships discharged their cannon at the retreating vessels, when the latter failed to surrender; and in the exchange which followed, the Mexican men-of-war were disabled. Their cargo was revealed to Juárez and then removed to New Orleans by the Americans under charge of piracy. Whatever may have been the immediate material damage to the Conservative cause by this totally unjustified interference, its moral effect was decisive. The growth of popular belief that the United States was now prepared to give military aid to Juárez' faction brought every type of adventurer and bandit to his cause, with rape and plunder of the country which hardly permits description. Fanaticism reached its height in the unspeakable indignities and deaths inflicted upon the clergy.

On November 1, the Liberal General Zaragoza defeated Márquez at Zaplotanejo.[30] Two days later González Ortega seized Guadalajara from the Conservatives. On the twenty-third of the same month, Miramón, risking everything on the battle of Calpulalpan, was defeated; and Ortega entered Mexico City in the Liberal triumph of December 25. What the Liberal victories meant may be gauged from the address of González Ortega to his troops, when on the point of marching on the capital. "In Mexico," he cried, "there are rich sybarites and immense treasures in the churches. All this wealth belongs to you, and I will distribute it amongst you with the same rectitude with which I distributed the jewels of the parish church of Zacatecas and the cathedral of Durango. My friends, forward, forward! We will march on the capital. The Reform will open the way, and much as it may vex the reactionaries, there where beauty exhibits its trappings and luxury, there will be civil marriages, and we will celebrate the unions at the feet of the statue of Venus."[31]

It is hardly to be supposed that Juárez was in full accord with this spirit. Nevertheless, he admitted that he was driven to men of this kind for support and therefore obliged to wink at their demands. "I regret, as you do," he wrote to Epitacio Huerta, on March 2, 1860, "the excesses committed by some of the guerrillas who support us; but it is necessary to tolerate them in hate of the reactionaries, because otherwise they would abandon us.

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[30] General Leonard Márquez has been branded the "Tiger of Tacubaya" by the Liberal press for carrying out the execution on April 11, 1859, of Liberal officials, including two medical students. Zamacois gives a more moderate view of this general, *loc. cit.*, tomo XV, pp. 203 sq.

[31] *Diario de Avisos,* August 16, 22, 1860, cf. R. Planchet, *loc. cit.*, p. 142.

I believe that you, the same as I, have bargained that when accounts are rendered, those who have aided us effectively will not be molested or punished; because although some of our partisans look with disgust at Rojas, Carvajal, González Ortega, and Pueblito, I have made them understand that their conduct is in accordance with my instructions and for the purpose of destroying all the resources of the enemy."

In an open coach, dressed in his black frock coat, Juárez entered the city of Mexico in triumph, by the road of the Villa de Guadalupe, on January 1, 1861. In his hands he carried the manuscript of ideas to be incorporated into his speeches and program: "To every one, according to his capacity and to each capacity according to his works and education. Thus there will be no privileged classes or unjust preferences. Socialism is the natural tendency to improve conditions or to make for the free development of the physical and moral faculties. This tendency will be the greater as despotism and oppression increase. It will disappear, or, rather, its forces to destroy the existing order will disappear, when despotism and oppression have disappeared in the governments."[32] The same month, his government was formally recognized by the United States, followed by Prussia, Great Britain, and France.

With the re-election of Juárez, came the final separation from two of his intimate friends, González Ortega and Melchor Ocampo. The departure of the former meant the loss of a most important military force. When Ocampo retired to his hacienda of Pomoco, Juárez was deprived of the man who had directed practically all the business of state and formulated the laws which he had signed at Vera Cruz while he was ascending the ranks of Masonic dignities.

Now in control at the capital, Juárez proceeded to carry out the Reform as he had promised, but upon a basis which led to considerable misgivings as to his disinterestedness. "It is one thing to legislate and another to apply the laws," he declared. . . . "For my friends, justice and favor; and for my enemies justice only, if it is possible to grant them that." He first organized his cabinet with Liberal members, and decreed the banishment of the Papal Nuncio Clementi, Don Francisco Pacheco, the Spanish Embassador to Miramón, the ministers of Guatemala and Ecuador, and the archbishop of Mexico.

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[32] Cf. Pérez Martínez, *loc. cit.*, pp. 141, 142.

Disgusted with these tactics, his entire cabinet resigned, and he reorganized it with more radical elements, including Prieto and Ignacio Ramírez. On February 2, he decreed the secularization of the hospitals and other benevolent institutions which had been administered by the Church, together with all endowments and incomes that had belonged to them. He then forbade the Viaticum to be taken publicly to the sick. On February 13, his order was carried out to suppress all but nine of the twenty-two convents in the capital. These properties were then auctioned off to favorites at ridiculous prices. In the Federal District alone, 197 estates belonging to institutions of public instruction, and 217 pieces of property owned by asylums, hospitals, and other charitable foundations were disposed of to speculators who paid for them in valueless paper. Thus did Mexican Liberalism strike a lethal blow at the public beneficences of the Catholic Church and lay the foundation for a long tradition of political confiscations to enlarge private fortunes.

As if this were not enough to lay the Church low, the government, although still professing a complete separation of State and Church, now proceeded to introduce Protestantism into the country and to turn over Catholic churches and properties for Protestant worship. "While secretary of the treasury," wrote Matías Romero, "I strongly favored the implantation of a Protestant community, to restrain the abuses of the clergy . . . I had to send for Protestants and bring them here, because only a few foreigners professed any religion other than the Catholic . . . I then favored a Protestant community presided over by a Mr. Riley, who wished to establish a National Mexican Church in competition with the Roman Catholic. . . . With the cordial cooperation of President Juárez, who shared my sentiments and was perhaps more radical than I in these matters, I sold them the church of San Francisco, one of the most beautiful in Mexico, located in the best neighborhood and equal to which another could not have been built without great expense."[33]

National exasperation with this type of unpatriotic and confiscatory bigotry, was bound to be the result. Mexico was still overwhelmingly Catholic. The Conservatives, moreover, recalling the prosperity of the nation under a Centralist regime, in contrast with the chaotic condition in which it had now been plunged, believed that a federal republic could succeed only in hastening the total ruin of the country and its servitude to the United States.

Guerrilla bands began to reappear, particularly in the central states, with the cry *"Religion y Fueros."* General Féliz Zuloaga again laid claim to the Presidency and on May 6, 1861, was recognized as such by General Márquez. In the campaigns which followed, Ocampo was captured and executed. The death of Gutiérrez Zamora, and of Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, in March, had already started a train of reverses. To regain public confidence, Juárez dissolved the ministry and created a new one. On July 17, he decreed the suspension of all public debts, even those contracted with foreign powers, for two years. It was clear that his regime, never popular, was now tottering on the precipice of tragedy; while the Conservative forces were daily regathering strength. Thereupon the creditor nations, England, Spain, and France, entered their alliance of intervention.

What followed belongs more properly to the study on Maximilian. Nevertheless, in perspective, the establishment of the Second Empire was but an interlude in Mexican history — an interlude curiously interwoven with the plans of Europe and the destinies of the United States — and the somber little Zapotecan was fated to win again and re-establish the Liberal order in the evolutionary ferment of his country.

It is interesting to note that whereas the Mexican Liberal Party arose with the ambitions of the Southern slave states of the American Union to extend their territory and power against the day of conflict with the North, it was actually to the Northern states that the Liberals owed their support during and after the Civil War. The European intervention which conspired to place Maximilian on the throne represented also a potential alliance with the Confederacy, and this the North was determined to prevent at all costs. Thus the Liberal groups in Mexico found at least a moral support consecutively from opposite elements in the United States, while the Conservatives in both instances were regarded as the enemies of progress and union in the New World.

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[33] Regis Planchet, *La Intervencion Protestante en Mexico y Sudamerica,* quoted in Cuevas, *loc. cit.,* tomo V, p. 394.

As Toribio Esquivel Obregón remarked, "The triumph of the South would have made possible an equilibrium of forces, probably the obtaining of some kind of sanction for international law in America, and at the same time it was a vital matter to Mexico to weaken the enemy, to eliminate that constant factor of domestic perturbation. Just as the United States had weakened Mexico to make themselves stronger, so should Mexico have done, had it the instincts of a nation. This was perceived by the European or Conservative Party . . . Canning's project reawakened in the European mind. A strong monarchy in Mexico, now more than ever, might take advantage of the civil war in the United States and provide possible assistance to the South. For this undertaking Napoleon III was willing to furnish the soldiers and resources of France."[34]

President Lincoln was not unaware of these complications; but he carefully abstained from intervention and limited his policy to the maintenance of relations with Juárez while withholding them from Maximilian. That Juárez was again willing to win his way by submitting Mexico to the domination of the United States is evident in the fact that he commissioned Matías Romero to secure an American army to bolster up his claims and forces.[35] Secretary of State William H. Seward recognized that such a move would break the neutrality he had professed and would simply "indicate a desire," as Romero reported, "to substitute the French in Mexico."

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[34] Cf. Toribio Esquivel Obregón, *Mexico y los Estados Unidos ante el Derecho Internacional.*

[35] Cf. Justo Sierra, *Juárez,* pp. 375 sq.

"Mr. Seward also endeavored to convince me," he added, "that to Mexico itself it is not expedient that the United States render material aid, but that it should solicit only the moral support, which it has received to date. He said he was sure that if an army of the United States were to enter Mexico, it would never return; that it was easy to drive the French from our country, but that it would be impossible to drive out the Yankees; that every million pesos the government of the United States might loan us today would cost us afterward the loss of a state, and that each rifle they might give us under these circumstances would have to be paid for with an acre of mineral ground. The foregoing has definitely confirmed me in the opinion I had formed, namely, that Mr. Seward will always oppose granting us any kind of material assistance from his government."

Both Lincoln and Seward realized the lengths to which the Liberals of Mexico were willing to go in order to keep the Conservatives from power, and Seward, in words strongly contrasting with earlier policies declared: "The President . . . is fully satisfied that the safety, welfare, and happiness of Mexico would be more effectually promoted by its complete integrity and independence than by dismemberment, with transfer or diminution of its sovereignty, even though thereby a portion or whole of the country or its sovereignty should be transferred to the United States." These statements of the policy of the United States relative to the overtures of Juárez and the Mexican Liberals are particularly significant in view of the fact that the latter have never ceased to accuse the Conservatives and the Church groups of betraying Mexico to the European powers in placing Maximilian on the throne.

From the beginning of the conflict, Juárez realized what he was up against, and on December 18, 1861 he declared: "Mexicans: The news of the coming war being prepared in Europe against us has begun, unfortunately, to be realized. Spanish forces have invaded our territory. Our national dignity is offended, and perhaps our independence is in danger. In such grievous circumstances, the government of the republic believes it is fulfilling one of its principal duties in placing before you the cardinal thought that should be the basis of its policy in the present situation. . . . The government has been and is disposed to satisfy all just claims, as far as the resources of the nation permit, which are pressed by the powers today invading it. . . . If these right intentions are despised, if they intend to humiliate Mexico, dismember its territory, intervene in its administration and interior politics, or perhaps to extinguish its nationality, I appeal to your patriotism and I call upon you to put aside the hates and enmities which the diversity of our opinions have aroused and, sacrificing your resources and your blood, to unite yourselves around the government in defense of the greatest and most sacred cause for men and the people, in defense of our country." What he had forgotten was that his own inconsiderate action was largely responsible for the division of Mexicans and the unfortunate plight in which it now found itself.

When his troops in the North were hard pressed, he tried to secure a thirty million peso loan from the house of Corlies in New York. For this he offered a mortgage on the states of Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosí. When this failed to materialize, he sold a large section of Lower California to Jacob P. Leese for $100,000. Of this amount, $30,000 was sent to his family, $16,000 to the Mexican legation in Washington, and $4,000 to the Mexican consulate in New York. The balance of $50,000 was never accounted for. Observers comment on the fact that at this time Juárez owned real estate in the Portal de Mercaderos in Mexico City, valued at $90,000, which should have provided an ample income for himself and his family. Upon his return to Mexico City, at the end of the conflict, he paid himself in full, together with traveling expenses based on the mileage he had traveled while a refugee. Bulnes points out that only his cabinet and a few close friends received the same compensation.[36]

Meanwhile, his own situation and that of the Liberal forces grew more and more desperate. From Mexico City, he fled to San Luis Potosí, passing through the city of Dolores Hidalgo, where he referred to his enemies as "that faction of traitors and cowards, a thousand times vanquished in the eternal struggles;

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[36] *El Mensajero,* July 15, 1871, cf. Planchet, *La Cuestion Religiosa,* pp. 221–223.

cruel fanatics who, far from danger, decree proscription and death for the most loyal patriots." Comonfort, with whom necessity had obliged him to make peace and whom he had named minister of war, was assassinated. His trusted general Vidaurri went over to the Conservatives, and while the Conservative generals Leonardo Márquez, Castagny, Mejía, Miramón, and the French leader Bazaine were occupying the principal cities, he beheld a movement within his own ranks to displace him as President in favor of General González Ortega.[37] From San Luis Potosí, he retreated in his coach through the deserts of the North to Chihuahua, and finally to El Paso, where he secured facilities to communicate with Sonora, Tamaulipas, Acapulco, and Vera Cruz by way of California and New York.

Safely installed in Texas he was able to reunite his elements and avail himself of the aid provided by the United States. General Philip H. Sheridan was now ordered to abandon military supplies along the banks of the Rio Grande, where they might be seized by the Liberal troops.[38] Colonel Sedgwick attacked the border town of Matamoros and seized González Ortega, whom he turned over to the vengeance of Juárez.

In his darkest moments Juárez maintained his impassive exterior and stubbornly refused to make any compromise. To Maximilian's letter of invitation to conference in the capital he replied disdainfully, rejecting the former's guarantees of safe conduct. "If in the exercise of my public functions," he said, "I should accept such intervention, public faith, the word, and the honor of an agent of Napoleon, of a man supported by these Francophiles of the Mexican Nation, and of a man who today represents the cause of one of the parties which signed the treaty of La Soledad, would not be sufficient guarantee. . . . It is certain that contemporary history registers the name of great traitors who have violated their oaths and promises, who have failed their own party, their traditions and all that there is sacred for an honored man. In these treasons, the traitor has been guided by a sordid ambition of power and a vile desire of satisfying his own passions and even his own vices. But the man actually charged with the Presidency of the Republic, risen from the obscure masses of the people, will die — if in the judgment of Providence he is doomed to die — fulfilling his oath, corresponding to the hopes of the nation over which he presides, and satisfying the inspirations of his conscience."

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[37] Juárez' term of office as President expired in December, 1865. According to Constitutional procedure, Ortega, as president of the Supreme Court, was eligible for this office but was out of Mexico allegedly in the interests of the Imperialists. Juárez therefore proclaimed his own continuance.

[38] P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* (New York, 1888), II, pp. 227, 228.

Then came the turn of the tide. Dissatisfaction with Maximilian's policies of compromise and dalliance had weakened the Conservatives. Napoleon and the other interested European powers began to lose confidence in the cause they had supported; and the stand of the United States became stronger, culminating in two notes from President Johnson to Napoleon, demanding the withdrawal of the French army from its invasion of "a republican government profoundly sympathetic to the United States and elected by the nation." The establishment of a monarchy, he declared, "would be considered as a threat to our own republican institutions."

The reaction of Juárez was quite in accord with his mordant humor. "This insistence of the American Government, or rather of the government of the United States to the North," he wrote to Santacilia in February, 1866, "will give the wolf of the Tuileries something to think about and oblige him to retire his forces from Mexico, saying like the fox of the fable, that they are green, because, as you say well, Napoleon is not the man to undertake a war with this government. The wolves do not bite themselves. They respect each other."

The intervention and representations of the United States again turned the tide, and with the withdrawal of the French troops, the Liberal forces took on new life. From El Paso, Juárez returned to Chihuahua and thence to Durango, and from there to Zacatecas, Jérez, and Fresnillo. Then came the siege of Maximilian's army at Querétaro, the betrayal of the city by Miguel López, and the capture of Maximilian with his generals.

The American minister, upon official instructions from his government, informed Juárez of his hope that Maximilian would be treated as a prisoner of war in accordance with the customs of civilized nations, and the Conservative generals, Miramón and Mejía, were offered their lives. Their refusal to accept this unless it was extended also to their monarch spelled their doom. The three were placed before the firing squad on June 19, 1867.

This bloody business obviously did not sit well on the conscience of Juárez, for he felt himself constrained to issue a "Manifesto in Justification of the National Penalties at Querétaro." "The Mexican people," he declared, "falls on its knees before God, who has deigned to crown our arms with triumph . . . Maximilian of Hapsburg knew our country only by geography. To this foreigner we owe neither blessings or evils. History has told us that the representative of his ancestor Charles V burned my progenitor Cuauhtémoc, considering his patriotism a crime. . . ."[39]

viii

On December 8, 1867, the Mexican Congress reopened its sessions, and Juárez presented his candidacy for re-election against Lerdo de Tejada and Porfirio Díaz. Don Benito had tasted triumph. He was unwilling to relinquish power; and he won, with Lerdo de Tejada in the post of Vice-President. The conditions of the election, nevertheless, were far from satisfactory. Díaz, who had risen from the campaigns of Oaxaca to become the most distinguished and ambitious of the generals, maintained that Juárez had used unfair pressure in the campaign and that he, not Juárez, had received the majority of votes. The solid front of the Liberal Party was broken, and Juárez found himself obliged to put down by force uprisings in Yucatán, Sinoloa, Perote, Puebla, Aguascalientes, and Zacatecas.

After four years of power, he was again happy to accede to the wishes of his partisans, and, despite the representations of Lerdo de Tejada, who recognized the dispositions of the *porfiristas,* he again presented his successful candidacy. The followers of Díaz launched a poorly prepared demonstration, on October 1, 1871, and seized the prison of Belen and of the Citadel; but again Juárez put down the movement with prompt, if bloody, action.

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[39] 4ª ed. (Guatemala, 1901).

Nevertheless, his best days were now over. Hardly had peace returned after the uprisings of 1868–70, when his faithful wife, whose life for his sake had indeed been a *via crucis,* expired. He himself had begun to show unmistakable signs of age; and although he continued to place a blind confidence in his prestige and the support of the people, he failed to realize that a generation of younger men was coming up, impatient of the power of his machine and eager for a greater share of leadership and its spoils. The principle of indefinite re-election of the federal executive, which he had sanctioned in his own person, had already given rise to all the appearances of a dictatorship, backed up by force and violence. Favoritism, corruption, and inefficiency were likewise charged against him, so that when Díaz launched his Plan of Noria, prohibiting presidential re-election and proposing other sweeping reforms in the Constitution, the dissolution of his regime was in sight.

It was impossible to restrain the new movement. Bloody repression in Oaxaca and Zacatecas brought a breathing spell, and Don Porfirio Díaz escaped to the United States. But it was only a short time before he returned to unite the elements of war. General Márquez appeared in Chihuahua under the banner of "no re-election"; and, in Chihuahua, also, Donato Guerro raised the battle cry of revolt against Juárez. His position was indeed precarious and embarrassing, for he himself had one time affirmed the selfsame principle which Díaz was now proclaiming, and which Díaz himself and his successors in turn were to proclaim and then violate by continuing themselves in office through re-election and manipulation, until assassination or exile should strike them down.

The principles of democracy were still far from being realized.[40] Juárez had broken the power of the Church, seized its temples, confiscated its properties, closed its schools, suppressed its religious orders and put an end to their activities in hospital and orphanage. As the spearhead of Masonic Liberalism in which a generation of men of widely divergent motives were involved, he had simply turned back the clock of the cultural advantages deeply rooted in the traditions and character of the Mexican people. His economic reforms had not in the least benefited the masses of the people, but rather removed the protection which the Church had afforded them and given rise to a new aristocracy of wealth "dripping with the fat of sacrilege." Far from introducing the principle of internal peace by constructive cooperation between lay and clerical elements, he had elevated to the status of constitutional law a conflict of officialdom with that Christian faith upon which the tribes of Mexico had been knit together into a nation. Invoking Liberalism against itself, he had perpetuated a crime that has meant endless conflict in the Mexican conscience.

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[40] Cf. Alberto Maria Carreño, *Fué Juárez Democrata?* (Mexico, 1939).

No man of military gifts, but opposed in principle to the power of the army, he was nevertheless fated to rest his success upon military action and to see both friend and foe give their blood for him or for the cause he represented. Ocampo, Degollado, Comonfort . . . Maximilian, Miramón, Mejía . . . these were shades that must have flitted before his inner mind during the paroxysms of angina pectoris that brought him to his end, on July 18, 1872.

The praise and the blame that have been laid upon his tomb are both to a considerable extent justified. No one can doubt the elementary sincerity of the man, his passion for democratic legalism as he conceived it, his desire of creating opportunity for the natives of his country even at the cost of extinguishing the last vestiges of an invading race that had put his "ancestor," Cuauhtémoc, to death. It cannot be doubted that, as an outstanding representative of Indian blood, he is widely venerated by the masses. But if one's final estimate of these judgments is to be impartial and objective, it must examine rather the premises of social life and progress upon which they are based. Juárez, the Indian shepherd boy and the devout apprentice seminarian, was actually shaped in the schools of French and Masonic Liberalism that flourished contemporaneously throughout Europe. It was his achievement merely to have brought to fulfillment those ideas of national secularism and positivistic progress that triumphed over Iturbide and the Spanish-Catholic tradition.

CHAPTER XIII

Maximilian

A FATAL COMPROMISE

i

Which elements in Mexico called Maximilian to the throne? "All the proprietors and workingmen," according to F. de la Barreyrie, "all who by means of commerce, industry, and the liberal professions worked for the welfare of the country without neglecting their own private interests — the most sane part of the population, the only part which has the right to be called the people and to be respected as such."[1] To these, writes Francisco Arrangoiz, "let us add all that section of society which had some appreciation of its history and glorious traditions as well as the Indians who hoped that the Empire would restore to them their ancient and paternal legislation, which not a few Spaniards who knew nothing of their own country or of Spanish administration in its ancient colonies, had called *barbarous*. This party and these men are those who raised Maximilian to the throne, for he promised that which they sought above all: the reparation of the sanctuary, the conservation of the Catholic principle, and with it the establishment of the civil power on a most firm basis. It is impossible to doubt that the restoration of 1863 was a work of Catholic aspirations as was the proclamation of independence in 1821."

From 1858 attempts were made by Spain, France, and England to form a plan with the United States to stop the civil wars in Mexico. It was hoped that an agreement could be reached among the belligerents of the country, that the Conservatives might be reconciled with the Liberals, Freemasonry with Catholicism, and the Independents of 1810 with those of 1821. A fusion of these elements, however, was impossible. Moreover, the United States definitely committed itself to a maintenance of the Juárez regime and was prepared to intervene, if necessary, against powers hostile to the Liberals. Meanwhile, Mexico remained torn by the most complete anarchy.

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[1] *Revelaciones Sobre la Intervencion Francesa en Méjico,* quoted in Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz, *Méjico Desde 1808 Hasta 1867* (Madrid, 1871), tomo I, introd. pp. iv, v.

Enormously complicating the purely political problems were the Laws of the Reform which Juárez launched from Vera Cruz, on July 12 and 13, 1859, nationalizing the properties of the Church and inaugurating a "liberty of cults" which revealed its purpose by forbidding the Catholic clergy to appear in the streets with their religious garb. Religious persons, priests, and nuns, were thrown out into the streets, and in the frenzy of antireligious fanaticism that called itself the Liberal spirit, churches, convents, schools, and charitable institutions were denuded on official orders or connivance of their sacred vessels and ornaments of artistic value.

Popular reaction in a country of overwhelmingly Catholic sentiment may well be imagined. In his dispatch to his government, May 27, 1861, Sir Charles Wyke, minister plenipotentiary of Great Britain, has left a vivid picture of the situation. "The destruction of the churches and convents throughout the country," he declared, "has wounded the religious sentiments of a fanatical population, and the monks who have been dispersed go about fanning the fire of discontent in the people, which is fed also by the women, who are all in favor of the Church. Those who understand the country well watch this movement with anxiety, declaring that, if it is not suffocated soon, it will induce the fall of the government and see renewed the horrors of civil war. Meanwhile, the Congress, instead of giving force to the government to end the horrible disorder, which reigns in all the length and breadth of this land, is concerning itself with disputes over various theories of the nominal government and of ultra-Liberal principles, while the respectable part of the population remains exposed without defense to the attacks of robbers and assassins who swarm in the highways and in the streets of the capital. The constitutional government is unable to maintain its authority in the various states of the federation, which, as a matter of fact, have made themselves perfectly independent, so that the same causes which divided the Confederation of Central America, and which are at work here, will probably produce the same result."[2]

In view of the impossibility of protecting the lives and properties of British subjects or of making collections on the foreign debt, Wyke suggested that the customhouses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic and Acapulco or San Blas on the Pacific be seized and forceful deductions be made on all articles. This gloomy picture was repeated by M. de Saligny, the French representative to his government. On July 17, 1861, the Mexican Congress issued a decree suspending for two years all payments including those on the foreign debt; and the same day, Wyke and De Saligny, working in agreement, broke off their relations with the Mexican Government. The Spanish Government hastened to inform Juárez that, unless a satisfactory arrangement regarding the debts were drawn up soon, it would, in common with England and France, send warships to the Mexican coast to demand satisfaction.

On September 22, Corwin, the Minister of the United States to Juárez, informed the latter that his government had authorized him to draw up a treaty binding the United States to pay the interest on the foreign debts of Mexico for a period of two years, given a corresponding mortgage on Mexican territory. Then the Mexican Congress decided to repeal its decree so far as foreign debts and agreements were concerned. But these gestures were unsatisfactory to the interested parties. With the approval of their respective sovereigns, Wyke and De Saligny left the capital and returned to Europe.

To what extent the demands of the European powers were justified or Mexico was able to make settlement is difficult to say. The federal system of government, the almost constant succession of revolutions, and the encroachment of the United States had combined to render the establishment of a regular and uniform system of national finance impossible. Many of the claims were undoubtedly of legal origin and just. Others were certainly exaggerated or unfounded. Many were the product of outrageous usury. Now the government found itself faced with the claims of 600,000 pesos which General Márquez had seized at Guadalajara in 1859, during the Three Years' War, as well as those of 15,000,000 pesos contracted by the Conservative President Miramón from the Swiss financier Jecker.

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[2] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo II, p. 393.

To recover from the government of Juárez, England and France planned a naval demonstration along the coasts of Mexico with the demand that the customhouses be placed in the hands of their agents to make direct collections from import duties. If this failed, the next step was to be a bombardment of Tampico and Vera Cruz. As this idea developed in conjunction with Spain, however, it came to include the purpose of an educational mission to teach Mexico to observe its international obligations and, without the element of conquest, to assist the Mexicans in securing an able government for themselves. The disturbed state of affairs in the United States at this time did not permit the American Government to offer more than a weak protest.

ii

The representatives of England, France, and Spain met in London, and on October 31, 1861, signed an agreement of common action. It was determined that a combined force should be sent to the Mexican coast. None of the three nations was to seek its own particular advantage, nor was any influence to be exerted on the interior affairs of Mexico which would interfere with the right of the Mexican Nation to select and constitute freely the form of its government. A commission was to be named, composed of one representative of each of the three powers, to decide questions arising from the distribution of monies collected from Mexico; and the United States, as also having claims against the Mexican Republic, was invited to join the convention.

Mr. Seward, answering the invitation to the United States, stated that President Lincoln did not wish to place in doubt the right of the aggrieved powers and that his government also had complaints against Mexico. Nevertheless, the traditional policy recommended by Washington and confirmed by happy experience advised against alliances with foreign nations. Moreover, since Mexico was a neighbor of the United States, with a similar form of government, the United States wished to profess sentiments of friendship toward that Republic, manifesting a great interest in its security, well-being, and prosperity, and had no desire of using coercive means to satisfy its claims at a time when Mexico was weakened by internal dissentions and "threatened by a foreign war."

Disappointed with this rebuff but quite certain that the United States was unable to put any obstacle in their way, the three powers named their representatives, and prepared their joint expedition. On December 10, 1861, the Spanish squadrons arrived at the anchoring ground of Antón Lizardo, off Vera Cruz, followed in early January by the French and the English.

Two days later the first conference of the plenipotentiaries was called, and a proclamation was issued. After lightly touching on the matter of indemnities, the document proceeded to loftier conceptions. "Mexicans," it declared, "listen to the voice of the allies, the anchor of salvation for yourselves in the midst of the storm which surrounds you. Confide completely in their good faith. Do not fear the uneasy and bad intentioned spirits. Your firm and determined attitude will know how to confound them, while we assist impartially at the grand spectacle of your regeneration, guaranteed by order and liberty."

Nothing of special significance occurred in the conferences until the matter of the financial claims was presented. The first which the French brought up was that of Jecker, which Juárez had refused to recognize.[3] Jecker was a banker established in Mexico City, a native of Switzerland and known as a citizen of that country until his claims were suddenly espoused by France. In 1859 he advanced the government a loan of 750,000 pesos and, receiving bonds from the Miramón Treasury for 15,000,000 pesos, found himself unable to pay the balance. In spite of this, backed by the Duc de Morny, a bastard brother of Napoleon, to whom he promised one third of the bonds, he pressed for the full amount of the contracted loan. The English representatives expressed their immediate opposition to the claim, as incapable of recognition by this or any other government of Mexico.

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[3] Cf. E. Lefèvre, *Le Mexique et L'Intervention Européenñe* (Mexico, 1862), pp. 106 sq.; also Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, pp. 20 sq.

After an exchange of notes, amid continued squabbles of the allies, it was finally agreed to call a meeting with agents of the Mexican Government at the village of Soledad. As a result of the discussions, the Juárez regime expressed its thanks for the offer of assistance which had been extended, but, in the confidence that this was unnecessary, suggested an immediate consideration of the financial claims, while the allied troops withdrew to garrisons in Córdoba, Orizaba, and Tehuacán.

The arrival at Vera Cruz of the French General Lorencez in March, followed by additional French troops, together with an expressed enthusiasm in the newspapers of France for the establishment of a monarchical government in Mexico, served to upset whatever confidence there had been in these agreements. This alarm was increased when General Antonio Taboada, deserting the Republicans, presented himself to the French officials with the information that the moderate elements of the country as well as the army were ready to accept an intervention which would not attack the independence of the nation. Lorencez received Taboada sympathetically and ordered him to join General Almonte, who had now returned to Mexico with plans for the establishment of a monarchy. Other conspirators against the Juárez government were likewise received by the French and given military protection.

The Spanish and British representatives by this time began to suspect that Napoleon had ulterior designs, out of consonance with the Treaty of London and the preliminaries of Soledad; and having come to a much more moderate and favorable view of Juárez' authority, they decided that the only alternative for them was to withdraw with their troops and leave the entire matter where it was in the beginning.

Juárez, who had warned Mexicans against lending any aid, direct or indirect, to the allies, now issued a decree declaring them to be traitors if they remained in any place occupied by the French, and subject to execution if they gave any assistance whatsoever to the latter. All Mexican men between the ages of twenty-five and sixty were called to arms, and governors were authorized to levy guerrilla warriors with public funds.

To Juárez' declaration that Mexico would "defend up to the last drop of Mexican blood the two great conquests achieved by the country in the present century — Independence and Reform," Almonte replied by calling for confidence in the cooperation of the French Emperor in the establishment within a short time "of a government which conforms with our character, our necessities, and our religious beliefs."

On April 19, General Taboada with the troops he had recruited "pronounced" at Córdoba, disowning Juárez as President of the Republic and recognizing General Almonte as supreme chief of the movement to work in conjunction with the European forces in the country, and to convoke a national assembly for the formation of a suitable government with the idea of restoring peace and order to the nation. This plan was shortly accepted, not only by Almonte, but also by the French, and seconded by the cities of Orizaba, Vera Cruz, Alvarado, and other points.

Officials were appointed; and the combined forces under Generals Almonte and Lorencez began their march toward Puebla.

From the beginning, however, a fatal disharmony manifested itself in the contempt of the French generals for the strategy and military counsels of the Mexican Conservative chieftains. The latter had advised a direct march upon the capital, which could have been taken easily. Lorencez decided upon Puebla. Then, instead of listening to Almonte and others, he resolved to attack Puebla according to the French rules of war. As a result, his forces were repulsed with great losses in the battle of May 5 and were obliged to retire to Orizaba.

In consolation for this defeat, Generals Márquez and Vicario now pledged themselves to Almonte's standard at the same time as Tomas Mejía and a host of Conservatives, who sincerely believed that the intervention would put an end to anarchy and aid in establishing a strong, independent government.

iii

In addition to the legitimate hopes of high-minded Conservatives, there were other elements involved, as in practically all cases of intervention, which were bound to complicate the situation and which finally led to the discredit and collapse of the whole movement. As early as 1858, Napoleon III had conferred with England on the possibility of establishing a monarchy in Mexico to consolidate the government and put a stop to further expansion of the United States.

Innumerable letters from Mexicans of some consequence, as well as from distressed foreigners, confirmed his belief. The Mexicans who had gone to Europe, practically all Conservatives like José Manuel Hidalgo, Almonte, and Gutiérrez de Estrada, hastened to take advantage of the European financial claims against Mexico and urge intervention for a change of government from the republicanism which appeared to have failed. Considerable influence was exercised in this direction also by the Duc de Morny, because of his own stake in the Jecker claims.

Napoleon had also conceived the idea of securing for France the province of Sonora. Silver mines were indicated in this region, and its port of Guaymas gave advantageous entrance to the Pacific. Napoleon realized that to make himself master of Sonora, a bombardment of the Mexican ports, as proposed by his English and Spanish allies, would not be enough. A strong government created by France and dependent upon French support would be necessary.

To have selected a prince from one of the three nations pressing claims would have been obviously unwise. At this point, the name of Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Hapsburg was presented as the logical choice, particularly since the Plan of Iguala, proclaimed by Iturbide, had already invited to the throne an archduke of the house of Austria. Maximilian had acquired a certain popularity in Europe and, in the words of José Manuel Hidalgo, who took a leading part in proposing his candidacy, everything indicated that he was the man "most suited for the regeneration of a country torn for forty years by a bloody anarchy."

Gutiérrez de Estrada, who had long been working for a monarchy in Mexico, was selected to present the preliminary offer to Maximilian. The latter was at that time residing in his palace at Miramar, on the coast of Trieste. Maximilian accepted the offer as soon as it was presented, on September 18, 1861. He insisted, however, that he should be called by a vote of the majority of the Mexicans.[4] The approval of his brother and father-in-law, and guarantee of aid from the army and navy of France until his throne should be definitely established were also postulated.

The truth is that Maximilian stood in a difficult position with his own family in Austria because of his ambitions and Liberal principles. Emperor Francis Joseph was quite willing to part with his younger brother, and replied that "the enterprise was magnificent, and even though it should not succeed, would always be honorable."

The second son of His Imperial Apostolic Majesty Francis Charles and of the Archduchess Sophia, Maximilian was born in the Schönbrunn Palace, Vienna, on July 6, 1832. In preparation for a naval career, his classical studies were early supplemented with a practical knowledge of the sea. At the age of eighteen he began a series of cruises that were to include the countries of the Mediterranean and Adriatic.

In 1856, the indefatigable traveler, now a Commander of the navy, went to northern Germany, by way of Belgium and Holland. On this trip he also visited France and was entertained for fifteen days at Saint Cloud by the Emperor Louis Napoleon. The next year saw him on his way down the Rhine, then into Lombardy and Central Italy, later to England, and again, significantly, to Belgium. The climax of this stage of his career came on July 2, 1857, when his representative, the Imperial Ambassador to Belgium, asked and obtained for him the hand of the Princess Maria Carlota Amalia, daughter of the Belgian King Leopold I.

At the time of her marriage, Carlota was sixteen years old.

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[4] Cf. Letter to Gutiérrez de Estrada, December 8, 1861, in Genaro Garcia y Carlos Pereyra, *Documentos Inéditos,* tomo I, *Correspondencia secreta de los principales intervencionistas Mexicanos* (Mexico, 1905), p. 115.

Describing Carlota in 1861, while advocating Maximilian for the throne of Mexico, Gutiérrez de Estrada wrote with characteristic enthusiasm: "If, in the physical order, Providence has endowed her with the most exquisite graces, morally it has adorned her with that inestimable beauty which only virtue can give. A complete simplicity united to natural majesty, a perfect education, vast and solid, joined with all the gifts of an elevated soul, an inexhaustible charity – such were the qualities which all admired in the young bride."[5]

When the young couple entered Milan on September 16, 1857, they were given a wild ovation. Shortly afterward, they went to Sicily, and from there to southern Spain, the Canary Islands, and Madeira. Leaving his bride at Madeira for the winter, the restless Maximilian set off, this time for Brazil on something of a scientific expedition.

It is difficult to assign any special significance to this early and extended absence of the Archduke from his recent bride. Nevertheless, in spite of the mutual affection which the royal couple exhibited before the world, a peculiar undercurrent of estrangement seems to have characterized their private relations. José Luis Blasio, Maximilian's private secretary in Mexico, was later to observe that they never slept together and that, on his excursions through the country, his master invariably carried a traveling cot, which he had set up for himself in a chamber adjoining that of his wife. It is not improbable that something happened early in their matrimonial career which indicated an infidelity on the part of the attractive and dreamy young prince, wounding Carlota's pride; and, although Maximilian maintained a perfect external decorum as Emperor of Mexico, confidential observers were not entirely satisfied that he lived in complete chastity.

Inasmuch as he had no children of his own, Maximilian eventually decided to provide for royal succession by adopting the two grandsons of the Emperor Agustín Iturbide. In September, 1865, he conferred the title of Princess of Mexico and a liberal allowance upon the only surviving daughter of Iturbide and placed in her care the five-year-old son of Don Angel de Iturbide, Don Agustín, whom he proposed to make heir to the throne. The other grandson, Don Salvador was sent to Europe to be educated. Don Agustín, whose father had married an American and died several years before, remained in the United States after the fall of the Empire, and died in Washington, D. C., in 1925. The other boy remained in Europe and married into a wealthy Polish family.

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[5] José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, *Fernando Maximiliano, Noticias Biográficas* (Paris, 1861).

Returning from Brazil to his command of the Austrian Navy, Maximilian showed himself a capable administrator. He separated his department from that of the army, placed it under a distinct ministry, increased its general efficiency, and rebuilt the city of Pola.

In appreciation for these services, the Emperor Francis Joseph named him political and military governor of Lombardy and Venice while retaining him in command of the navy. In spite of the political unrest of the times, Maximilian succeeded in winning the affection of the Italians of his territory and in discharging his official duties, for the period of two years, with notable satisfaction. Various reforms and public works of sanitation were carried out under his direction, including the laying out of the plaza between the Teatro della Scala and the Palacio Mariano in Milan and the restoration of the famous Basilica of San Ambrosio. His interest in building was further demonstrated in Vienna, where he provided funds for the erection of the Votive Church.

It was, therefore, with some reason that Lord Malmesbury, English minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote, on January 12, 1859: "The government of His Majesty recognizes with true satisfaction the liberal and conciliatory spirit which has presided at the government of the Lombardy-Venice Kingdom, while it was entrusted to the Archduke Maximilian."[6]

A man of benevolent appearance, well proportioned, Maximilian gave every indication of his nobility and excellent breeding. His long blond beard, parted in the middle, the lower drooping lip characteristic of the Hapsburgs, the large forehead, and lively blue eyes immediately drew attention to a magnetic personality which even his political enemies were quick to acknowledge. In her *Maximilian in Mexico,* Sara Yorke Stevenson, who lived through the events of 1864–67, remarks: "Naturally affable and kindly, his memory for faces and names was remarkable. . . . He was tall, slight, and handsome, although the whole expression of his face denoted weakness and indecision. He looked, and was, a gentleman. His dignity was without hauteur. His manner was attractive; he had the faculty of making one feel at ease, and he possessed far more personal magnetism than Carlota. Hers was a strong, intelligent face, the lines of which were somewhat hard at times, and her determined expression impressed one with the feeling that she was the better of the two to cope intelligently with the difficulties of practical life. . . . She, however, was reserved, somewhat lacking in tact and adaptability; and a certain haughtiness of manner, a dignity too conscious of itself, at first repelled any who were disposed to feel kindly towards her."

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[6] Cf. Gutiérrez de Estrada, *loc. cit.*, pp. 21–27.

An inquisitive student, who had imbibed the Liberal attitudes of the age far more than his Mexican advocates realized, Maximilian spoke six languages with facility, and wrote several books dealing with his impressions of travel as well as aphorisms, naval studies, and two volumes of poetry. From the general record, he might well have been judged one of the most promising men of the time.

iv

As soon as the affirmative reply of Maximilian was received, Napoleon communicated with Lord Palmerston, in the hope that England would also be in accord. Napoleon wished to avoid an appearance of his having officially sponsored Maximilian or given him any guarantees up to this date; but the candidacy of the latter was known to the allies, even before the Pact of London was signed.

After receiving premature faculties from Maximilian at Miramar, to confer military and civil titles, General Juan N. Almonte arrived in Mexico, February, 1862, and began under

French protection to lay the groundwork of the monarchy. When the Spanish and English plenipotentiaries protested against Almonte's open declarations and decided to withdraw their forces, the Mexican Conservatives found themselves dependent upon French support exclusively. Napoleon threw off the mask and assumed the initiative he had planned from the beginning.

With fatal and characteristic duplicity, the French Emperor now transferred his game to the Mexican Conservatives. In a letter written after the defeat of the French at Puebla, May 5, he praised General Lorencez for having protected Almonte and all who sought safety under the French banner. More than this, however, he did not desire.

Nevertheless, Lorencez was shortly displaced in command by General Forey, to whom Napoleon wrote with amazing frankness in revelation of his real aims. "Without fail," he said, "someone will ask us why we are going to expend men and money to establish a regular government in Mexico. In the present state of world civilization, the prosperity of America is not indifferent to that of Europe, since it supplies our factories and gives life to our commerce. We are interested that the Republic of the United States be powerful and prosperous, but we do not desire that it command the whole Gulf of Mexico and from there proceed to dominate the Antilles and South America or that it become the only dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If Mexico retains its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a durable government is organized there with the aid of France, we shall have recovered for the Latin race its power and prestige on the other side of the Ocean and guaranteed the security of our colonies in the Antilles as well as those of Spain; and this influence, creating enormous outlets for our commerce, will obtain the materials indispensable for our industry. Mexico thus regenerated will always be favorable to us, not only through gratitude, but also because its interests will be in agreement with ours, and it will find a basis of support for its good relations with the European powers."[7]

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[7] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, pp. 88, 89.

From this point of view, the French invasion was to put a stop to the further advance of the United States into Latin America and particularly into Mexico, half of whose territory it had already annexed. So far as the Mexicans themselves were concerned, nobody appeared to doubt that the only way to save the country was through foreign intervention. The only difference was in which way to turn. The ultra-Liberals, of the Juárez camp, wished the United States to protect Mexico, in conformity with the ambitions of the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, these were the men who fraternized with the Americans in the era of the invasion of the United States, expressing the desire that Mexico might be annexed to the United States, and who signed the McLane-Ocampo Treaty in Vera Cruz, willing to sell out their nation to the United States for a miserable loan, rather than see a triumph of the Mexican Conservative Party. Napoleon, on the other hand, was guilty of unpardonable diplomatic levity, not to say of bungling Machiavellianism, in publishing this challenge to the United States after the European alliance had invited the American Government to cooperate in its claims.

By this time, he decided that Almonte had exceeded his powers in assuming the title of supreme chief and in constituting a provisional government in Mexico. One of the first acts of General Forey, therefore, after his arrival in the country, late in September, 1862, was to dissolve the ministry which Almonte had formed as being "without the participation of the nation and in no way receiving the approval of the French intervention." Almonte graciously bowed himself out and called upon the Mexican people for renewed confidence and unity after his place was taken by the commandants whom Forey appointed to the Political Directorate.

In January, the French Generals Bazaine and Douay arrived on the uplands, where they were joined by Mexican forces and by General Forey; and preparations were made for the second attack on Puebla. For sixty-two days the city held out before surrender. The Republican Congress closed its sessions in Mexico City and fled northward to San Luis Potosí. No sooner had Juárez left the capital than the populace declared itself in favor of the intervention; and on June 12, the Franco-Mexican army entered the city, as Hidalgo declared, "in the midst of a rain of flowers, crowns, banners, triumphal arches, victorious palms, inscriptions, and salvos; more than 100,000 persons thronged the bell towers, roofs, arches of the churches, balconies, and doors of the houses, and filled the streets and squares of the city, wildly cheering the victory of the allies." In the absence of the Archbishop, the liberating generals and officials were received by the canons of the cathedral, who intoned the *Te Deum* amid the cries of *Viva el Emperador! Viva la Emperatriz!*"

The decrees which General Forey shortly afterward issued in accordance with the instructions of Napoleon were to produce a reaction of profound distrust. Church properties alienated and sold in accordance with the hated laws of the Reform were to be confirmed to their new owners. Liberty of cults, he affirmed, would be acceptable to the government, bringing back visions of the forceful implantation of Protestantism inaugurated by Juárez, a policy which had caused the most bitter resentment in this traditionally Catholic country.

More reassuring was the inauguration of the provisional regime. Thirty-five persons were named by the Minister of France, to select the personnel of government. Two hundred and fifty Mexicans were appointed to a legislative body known as the Assembly of Notables. Generals Almonte and Salas and Archbishop Labastida of Mexico were appointed to the executive board, with Don Ignacio Pavon and the bishop of Tulancingo as substitutes, the latter to act for Labastida, who was still in Europe.

The Assembly of Notables was composed exclusively of Conservatives from all classes of society. That Republicans were not named to this Assembly is comprehensible in view of the impossibility of a fusion of these elements without throwing the whole movement back into the conflict and confusion it hoped to remedy. Under the Presidency of Don Teodosio Lares, a commission was named to discuss the form of permanent government the nation would adopt. Two days later this commission turned in its report.[8]

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[8] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, pp. 125–130.

After denouncing the efforts made by the government of Juárez "to secure a direct protectorate of the United States which would have given death to our independence and with it to our race and our religion," this document presented four resolutions: The Mexican Nation was to adopt a moderate, hereditary monarchy as its form of government, with a Catholic prince. The Sovereign was to take the title of the Emperor of Mexico. The Imperial crown was to be offered to Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, for himself and his descendants; but in case Maximilian could not take possession of the throne, the Mexican Nation would ask Napoleon III to indicate another Catholic prince. With fervent approval, the Assembly adopted the motion that "there be sent to the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX a copy of the Act proclaiming the monarchy, asking His Holiness to vouchsafe his blessing upon the work of true regeneration which has been inaugurated today and upon the Prince which the Nation has elected as its sovereign."

One of the first acts of the executive board was to proclaim that regulation of ecclesiastical affairs would be by common agreement of the Holy See and the Supreme Executive of Mexico. The Order of Guadalupe, established by Iturbide, was restored. By an agreement of July 11, 1863, the Assembly proceeded to confer the title of Regency upon the executive board.

Obviously the religious note and general orientation expressed by the Regency and the Assembly were quite different from the instructions of Napoleon to Forey. The religious character of the national movement became further evident in the general and spontaneous ovation that greeted the archbishops of Mexico and Michoacán and the bishop of Oaxaca on their return to the country in September.

In the meantime, Queen Victoria and Lord Palmerston of England, fearing the French and Catholic ascendancy in Mexico, wrote to King Leopold of Belgium to persuade Maximilian to accept, instead, the crown of Greece. But to the Mexicans whom he had invited to his palace at Miramar, including the prelates of Mexico City, Michoacán, and Oaxaca, Maximilian showed himself an earnest student attached to Mexico and its Catholic traditions. When the delegation commissioned by the Assembly of Notables arrived, on October 2, 1863, he again replied without hesitation that he would accept the throne gladly "if the entire nation, manifesting its desire freely, ratified the vote of the capital."

The task of facilitating the national plebiscite stipulated by Maximilian was entrusted to General Bazaine, who arrived in Mexico City in October, replacing General Forey. At the same time, Bazaine was supplied with orders from Napoleon to reorganize the Mexican Army at once and in the civic order to work against every idea of a "reactionary and exclusive policy."

The conflict with "reactionary and exclusive policy" was not long in coming to a head, and, as General Forey had already indicated, was to be waged over the fundamental question of Church properties. Although the Regency had laid down the principle that this matter was to be settled by agreement of the Holy See with the Mexican Chief Executive, Bazaine peremptorily gave orders that the validity of promissory notes issued on these properties confiscated under the Juárez regime should now be acknowledged and that the courts should be empowered to admit claims against persons who refused to continue paying rents or installments on real estate seized from the Church.

In a meeting of the three Regents with General Bazaine and M. Budin, the French Commissioner of the Treasury, Archbishop Labastida strenuously opposed these demands. The recognition of sales made in accordance with the Juárez decrees, he maintained, would be equivalent to a reversion to the very Reform which Catholic Mexico wished to have repealed. In explaining his position, Archbishop Labastida declared that he had accepted a place on the Regency only after having received from both Maximilian and Napoleon assurances in line with the fundamental principle formulated by the executive board. The Pope had delivered the necessary faculties to come to a settlement of Church properties on this basis; and he could not now, in consistency with his trust, reverse these principles.

Upon this evidence of independence, Bazaine ordered Almonte and Salas, as Co-Regents, to eject the archbishop from the board and to dissolve the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, appointing another that would handle the matter of payments as Napoleon had secretly instructed.

When Maximilian heard of this state of affairs from Almonte, who was eager to clear himself, he admitted that it was best to avoid conflicts with the French authority, but gave orders to the Regency to do nothing about the affairs and properties of the Church, until he should arrive. By that time he would have come to an agreement with the Pope. Subsequently to this notice, Maximilian received contrary advice from Napoleon.

v

The Franco-Mexican troops had now penetrated as far as Morelia, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí, with the major part of the country under control. Everywhere the population received them as liberators, amid the greatest enthusiasm. It is true that the plebiscite was not taken up in territory remaining under the control of the Republicans and that, for the rest, it was organized by the Conservative authorities. Nevertheless, to all intents and purposes, it was an expression of the sentiments of the vast majority of the Mexican people. Maximilian, as a matter of fact, was accepted by popular vote, and the original ballots of the cities were forwarded to him in Europe.

For reasons not then apparent, it took considerable family pressure to bring Maximilian to sign an agreement renouncing in his name and in the name of his descendants succession to the Imperial Crown of Austria. When this was achieved, he formally accepted the throne of Mexico, on April 10, 1864. The Regency was then dissolved, and Maximilian named his Ministry and plenipotentiaries, with General Almonte as lieutenant.

The agreement made in Paris between Napoleon and Maximilian the preceding month was also signed, regulating the military and financial relations of the two countries. By the terms of the published contract, the French troops in Mexico were to be reduced, as soon as possible, to a corps of 25,000 men, including the Foreign Legion, this number to remain in Mexico until the Emperor of Mexico had organized the necessary replacements. The Foreign Legion at the service of France, composed of 8000 men, was to remain in Mexico for six years, after the other French forces had been withdrawn, and would then pass to the service and pay of the Mexican Government, which had the option of shortening its employment. The superior command of combined Mexican and French troops was always to be confided to French officers, although the latter were not to intervene in any branch of Mexican administration. This arrangement was naturally offensive to Mexican pride. Mixed commissions were to be established for the settlement of the claims which had originally prompted the intervention, and reimbursement was to be made by Mexico to France for the transport and sustenance of the French troops at stipulated terms.

To these clauses were added three secret articles of the utmost significance. First, Maximilian agreed to issue a proclamation reaffirming the principles, announced by Forey and effected through the order of Bazaine, nullifying the hopes of the Church for the return and protection of its properties. Napoleon's schemes for Sonora and plans for a national bank under French control were also implied in this article. Secondly, the French troops were to be reduced gradually, from 28,000 men in 1865 to 20,000 in 1867. Third, the Foreign Legion, even after passing to the service of Mexico, was to remain an integral part of the French army, under French officials, and continue to serve a cause of interest to France.

Early in April, Maximilian went to Rome for a short visit with the Pope, as he had promised. On the 14th of the month, the royal party left Miramar aboard the Austrian warship *Novara,* and, as Maximilian was putting the finishing touches on his rules of Court Etiquette, their Majesties arrived at Vera Cruz, at two o'clock in the afternoon of May 28, 1864. For the young Emperor of thirty-two years and his bride of twenty-three the whole affair was a glorious if unknown adventure.

Corwin, the Minister of the United States to the Republic, who had remained in Mexico City as an observer after the flight of Juárez, embarked earlier in the month, so as not to be in the country when Maximilian arrived.

vi

Apart from the fact that Almonte and a small local delegation were on hand, the welcome accorded the monarchs at Vera Cruz was so cold that Carlota wept with chagrin. The merchants of the city, principally foreigners, had profited by the political disorders of the past and supported many of the uprisings whose only purpose was to rob the country through the customhouses. Consequently, they were not particularly overjoyed at the prospect of strong government.

Maximilian limited himself to a few words of appreciation to the nation which had designated him to watch over its destinies. "We shall forget the shadows of the past," he said. "We shall bury party hatred, while the dawn of peace and deserved happiness shall be radiantly reborn over the new Empire."

As the group proceeded up through Córdoba and Orizaba, on its way to Puebla, the scene changed, and the natives of the countryside and cities thronged to express their enthusiasm and high hopes in the new order. Commentaries on this triumphal march have stated that the Indians believed Maximilian, with his blue eyes and golden beard, was no other than the expected divinity Quetzalcoatl. The Indians of this epoch, however, were not interested in Quetzalcoatl. Having suffered from the liberating measures of Juárez and been threatened with the levy of the Liberals and the loss of their communal lands (*ejidos*), they believed that the government of Maximilian would put an end to the tyranny to which they had been subjected.

Early in the morning of June 11, some 200 carriages carrying "the best in beauty, knowledge, and social position of the capital of the Empire" set out to welcome Maximilian and Carlota. The procession, accompanied by 500 horsemen then proceeded to the village of Guadalupe, for a civic and religious reception. Within the magnificent shrine of the Virgin, the monarchs took their thrones, as Archbishop Labastida and the other prelates intoned the *Domine, salvum fac Imperatorem.*

The formal entrance into the capital took place the following day. In the words of an eyewitness, the city was "a bride dressed in her most precious court dress and rich jewels, smilingly awaiting, filled with joy, the promised one, in whom she placed her happiness." The Mexican lancers under the command of Colonel Miguel López were in the vanguard. After them came the French Regiment of Chasseurs of Africa and the Hussars. On either side of the imperial coach, Generals Bazaine and Neigre were mounted on their chargers. Then followed sixty coaches of dignitaries in procession, first to the cathedral, where the *Te Deum* was intoned amid a great concourse, and thence to the Palace. During the entire ordeal, the monarchs manifested the greatest composure and affability. When General Mejía, who was appointed to read a message on behalf of the Order of Guadalupe, found himself impeded, either by the print of the discourse or by his own emotions, Maximilian stepped down and took the document into his own hands, declaring that it was hearts, not words, that were of importance.

vii

Throughout his entire reign, Maximilian kept the benevolent and courtly atmosphere of one who believed that with deft and light touches he could bring the country together and guide it to the graces of a new culture. Before all things, he wished to be known as a Humanitarian, above party strife, merely indicating the way of enlightenment, for others to follow. For this purpose, both he and the Empress journeyed through the country and sent back to Europe glowing reports of their receptions, even when a cheerful imagination was required to stretch the truth.

Combined with these humanitarian activities, it was but natural that their Majesties should serve as the nucleus of a renaissance of social activity among higher society. Under the mild indulgence of Maximilian, who affected a secret contempt for such proceedings, ambitious Mexican families were seized with a passion to discover evidences of nobility in their genealogy and become identified with the splendor of his court. Balls, levies, dinners, and weekly receptions became the order of the day, as the Emperor created and distributed medals and decorations with a lavish, if not always, prudent hand.

On April 10, 1865, the anniversary of his acceptance of the throne, Maximilian issued a decree creating the Imperial Academy of Sciences and Literature, and in October ordered the establishment of a national theater, to be placed under the direction of the celebrated poet José Zorrilla. To stimulate the drama he announced a contest and offered from his own purse two prizes of 1000 pesos for the best comedy and tragedy that would be written. He extended his patronage likewise to the fine arts, visited the Academy of San Carlos, now the National School of Fine Arts, and commissioned the Mexican artists Reboull and Norena to do portraits and busts of himself and the Empress. The architect Rodríguez was called to the palace to discuss projects for beautifying the capital; and Maximilian conceived and executed the Emperor's Highway, known today as the Paseo de la Reforma, between Chapultepec Castle and the Square of Charles IV. Extensive changes were made both at Chapultepec, where the Emperor decided to live, and at the old palace of the viceroys in the cathedral plaza, where he established his offices.

During the winter months, Maximilian had the court moved to the warmer climate of Cuernavaca, sixty miles south, where he took the old Borda palace, had the gardens cleared and the house restored. Particularly during the latter dates of his reign, this delightful spot served as an escape from the troubles of state. Not far from Cuernavaca, at Acapatzingo, he erected a house in Pompeian style for Carlota, which was given the suggestive name *El Olvido* (Forgetfulness).

Apparently, Maximilian's personal interests were more in the arts and sciences than in affairs of state. At Cuernavaca, he spent long hours in discussion with Professor Billimeck, a former monk, whom he engaged as a naturalist, while Carlota and the ladies of the court pursued butterflies in the gardens to enlarge the latter's collections. One of his greatest griefs was the wrecking of the palace, in January, 1867, by a small force of Liberal guerrillas.

These diversions did not signify that the Emperor languished in idleness. He began his day at four o'clock in the morning and busied himself in every concern of the people.

Thought was given to the needs of the poor and to general problems of a social character. The Council of Beneficence, presided over by the Empress, The House of Charity, under the care of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, and a Protective Committee of the Needy Classes were creations of the Emperor. Carlota showed herself equally solicitous, bestowing generous gifts upon various charitable enterprises and, on the occasion of her second birthday in the country, establishing a Maternity Hospital in Puebla. Maximilian personally undertook visitations of the prisons and shops, to verify complaints that had reached him, but his pains in these matters were not generally appreciated by the people, who felt that this indicated small confidence in his appointees.

A plan of public instruction was drawn up under his orders by Manuel Siliceo, Minister of Public Instruction and Cults, although this never had opportunity of materialization. Siliceo's report, however, accusing the Spaniards of having kept public education "in a lamentable backwardness, both because in that epoch the masters of New Spain could not teach more than they knew themselves and because it was part of their policy to keep the lower classes in ignorance and in the brutalizing of the native population," was attacked in the press and shown, in a celebrated lawsuit that followed, to have been untrue.[9] In 1865, Maximilian closed the university, which had been reopened after its suppression by Juárez.

Similar methods, in lofty disregard of facts and capacities, were used in issuing decrees to establish the relations between farmers and their hired help. To impress the Liberals of Europe, these laws were published in Germany and France, giving the idea that Maximilian was freeing the Indians from slavery and that he was responsible for the beneficent provisions which actually had been issued by the viceroys of colonial Mexico and by presidents of the Republic. His own distinctive contribution, in the matter of immigrant workers, was to establish nothing less than a type of slavery binding the worker to his employer for a number of years.

Considerable ado was made over various colonization schemes on a large scale, but none of these materialized. Napoleon's original plan to convert the state of Sonora into a French colony had to be abandoned, although Almonte and Salas granted mining privileges to France which were practically a cession of that state to France. A few weeks after the Treaty of Miramar, Dr. Gwin, an American emigré from the South, living in Paris, offered a project to colonize Sonora with several thousand families from the Confederate states. Plans were made also for the colonization of Negroes, Asiatics, Germans, English, and Swedes, but none of them succeeded; and the project of Gwin was finally rejected because of the energetic protest of the Minister of the United States to the French Government, on the ground that, promoted by Confederate traitors, it could serve only as a threat to the United States.

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[9] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo III, apénd. 8.

Not much more success eventuated from the pressing financial claims of the European powers, which had given origin to the intervention and made the Empire possible. The French demands were finally settled by the Mixed Commission, on September 27, 1865, at 40,000,000 francs, of which only 63 per cent was to be delivered and the rest in bonds in accordance with the Treaty of Miramar; but they ultimately received only a reduced percentage of the awards. Jecker's claims, settled separately, suffered severe reverses with the death of his protector, the Duc de Morny, who with other gamblers on the French Bourse had hoped to profit by the financing of the Mexican Empire.

One of the fundamental weaknesses of Maximilian's government was the chaos of the treasury. Negotiations to establish a national bank were carried on with various European banking houses in 1865 without success. Foreigners, lacking practical knowledge of the language or of the country, were empowered to establish new systems of national finance, without taking into account the experience of the past or consulting Mexican experts. In a desperate effort to raise funds, Maximilian had recourse to ruinous taxes on Mexican lands and industries, seizure of foreign cargoes, and finally suppression of various departments of the government. Meanwhile the agents of the French Government continued to intervene illegally in the customhouses, with corresponding losses for the Mexican coffers.

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The magnificence and emotions of Maximilian's first promise were of short duration. How far the frivolous and unrealistic views of the young Emperor were from the hopes and sympathies of the Conservatives, who had placed their confidence in him and invited him to the throne, can best be summed up in the words of his own letter to Baron de Pont, written on December 8, 1865, a year and one half after he felt that he had come to grips with the situation.

"I knew," he confided, "that the ideas of the poor expatriates and of the embarrassed Regency were fantastical. I never had illusions about them. . . . This country is better than its reputation and better precisely in the sense opposed to that of the expatriates. All that Gutiérrez and his friends have stated is false and founded in irreparable errors of more than twenty-five years of enforced absence. The country is neither ultra-Catholic nor reactionary. The influence of the clergy is almost null, that of the ancient Spanish ideas is practically done for; but, on the other hand, the country is not yet Liberal in the good sense of the word.

"The country has been disorganized by fifty years of continual changes and by the constant immorality of its governors, sometimes Liberals, sometimes Conservatives. All political questions have as a basis only money and influence, 'to hold on to or to grab.' The business of the present and of the future is to organize the country with reflection and patience, a work which does not admit either miracles or sudden changes. I am trying to avoid the only errors of my predecessor Juárez, who in the short time of his Presidency wished to undo and reform everything. . . . It is necessary first for the people to know me, and I shall be contented if on the twenty-fifth anniversary of my arrival they desire and appreciate me. . . .

"I wish greatly to come to an understanding with Juárez. But, before everything, he ought to recognize the determination of the effective majority of the nation which craves tranquillity, peace, and prosperity; and it is necessary that he decide to collaborate with his ceaseless energy and his intelligence in the difficult work which I have begun. If, as I believe, he really has in view the happiness of Mexico, he ought to understand very soon that no Mexican loves so much as I the country and its advancement and that I am working for this in all sincerity and with the best intentions. Let him come to aid me sincerely and loyally, and he will be received with open arms like all good Mexicans.

"There can be no talk of armistice, because there is no real enemy, but only groups of barbarous bandits, the natural consequence of so many years of civil war — parties like those which have caused so much damage in Italy and Hungary . . . I am ready to receive Juárez into my Council and among my friends; but for the present I have to defend that which stands above my vanity and my personal well-being, namely, the independence of a beautiful country and of 8,000,000 persons, a task worthy of a prince of my family."[10]

This contempt for the advice of the Conservatives, his airy optimism, and pose of broad-mindedness — however well intentioned — if calculated to impress the belligerent elements under Juárez, were fruitless. On the other hand, while indicating deliberate deception of the Conservatives and the abandonment of his promises, Maximilian's policy was bound to alienate the very elements who had rallied to consolidate the throne. Apparently, the Emperor thought that his only business was to establish peace and this through compromise, at a time when the warring Mexican camps could not compromise without fatality.

Tangible evidence of cross purposes appeared when Maximilian began to dismiss from service many of the most notable appointees of the Regency and to refer to the Conservatives, as the Juárists had done, as *cangrejos* or crabs. Definite proof that he was the wrong choice came with his appointment of José Fernando Ramírez as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Formerly a Republican of radical stripe, later a Moderate, Ramírez was never an advocate of the monarchy. He had refused to participate in the Assembly of Notables and to decorate his house on the day of the Emperor's arrival. His appointment was followed by others of Republican character. As chief of his Special Cabinet, Maximilian named Felix Eloin, a Belgian mining engineer, Protestant, a man of no training or practical knowledge in governmental administration, unable to speak Spanish. Eloin, who had accompanied Maximilian as a person of confidence on the recommendation of King Leopold, soon came to exercise a complete ascendancy over the Emperor.

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[10] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo IV, pp. 53–56.

Within a short time, this Special Cabinet came to be, as someone has pointed out, a kind of tower of Babel, composed of Germans, Belgians, French, Hungarians, and other nationalities, men of unknown background, without knowledge of or affection for the country, and capable under the circumstances of producing only a confused mentality in the Emperor. Yet this group, under the direction of Eloin, became so powerful that the various ministries could make no move without its approval.

To show his popular spirit, Maximilian appeared in the streets in the silver embroidered ranch uniform which had become distinctive of the Juárist guerrillas, apparently failing to realize the poor taste and offensive character of this gesture. On the anniversary of the *Grito de Dolores,* he issued a proclamation praising the insurrection of Hidalgo, denouncing "the slavery and despotism of hundreds of years." Further offense was given when he named a plenipotentiary Minister to Victor Emanuel of Turin, who was in open hostility with both the Pope and the Emperor of Austria.

With the arrival of the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Meglia, on December 7, 1864, the question of Church properties was brought up for final settlement. Maximilian at once showed his intentions by sending his councilors Schertzenlecher and Count de Bombelles to meet Meglia at the boat, taking care that the Nuncio should establish no communication with Mexicans. After the ceremonies of reception, Meglia presented the Emperor with the letter of Pope Pius IX, which laid forth in full, unmistakable terms the distress which His Holiness had experienced in the promised settlement of Church affairs.

Against the high hopes which His Holiness had placed in the energetic promises of Maximilian to revoke the laws in question and come to an equitable settlement of damages, disappointing reports had come of continued abuses in conformity with the old Liberal principles. In place of a "liberty of cults," which meant the imposition of foreign Protestantism under government patronage, the Pope asked for a return to the realistic acknowledgment that Mexico was and that it be kept exclusively Catholic in religion. Against the authorization of "false and subversive maxims," he asked that both public and private education be directed by ecclesiastical authority; and, finally, that "the chains be broken which have up to this time bound the Church under the dependence and despotism of the civil government."

In reply, the Minister of Justice presented the Nuncio with a program of nine points to constitute a Concordat for the regulation of Church affairs, diametrically opposed to those which Maximilian had originally promised the Pope and the Mexican prelates. According to this new program, the Mexican Government, while granting its special protection to the Catholic Religion as the religion of state, would tolerate all cults. The clergy were to be paid from the public treasury, the same as "the other civil services of the country," and they were to exercise their ministry without requiring any tithe or emolument from the faithful. All rents from Church properties which had been declared national during the Republic were to be ceded to the government. Maximilian and his successors on the throne were to enjoy forever over the Church in Mexico all the "rights equivalent to those conceded to the kings of Spain for their churches in America," including the appointment of bishops. The Pope was to indicate which of the religious orders suppressed by the Republic were to be re-established, but this, as well as the terms of re-establishment, could be done only in accord with the Emperor. The religious orders still existing were forbidden to receive novices until the same accord had been reached.

When the Papal Nuncio in amazement pointed out the obvious impossibility of the Church's approval of such proposals, Maximilian decided to work on his own account and, in a note of December 27, professing great surprise that the Nuncio "had not come with the instructions which he had awaited from Rome," ordered the Minister of Justice and Cults to proceed along the lines he himself had indicated, beginning with the recognition of titles of properties taken from the Church by the laws of Juárez, in order "to re-establish peace of spirit and tranquility of conscience in all the inhabitants of the Empire." The laws of the Reform were to be retained, "in conformity with the principle of a large and frank tolerance, always in view that the Religion of State is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church."

This turn of events was further illustrated by an Imperial decree ordering that all Papal dispatches be first presented to Maximilian by the Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, to obtain the necessary pass. In Mexico, as in France, the Encyclical of the Pope was given free discussion in the newspapers. Only the bishops were forbidden to make it known to the faithful and defend it against attacks. To these indignities, was added an order placing all cemeteries under the exclusive authority of the state and compelling the Church to admit non-Catholics for burial in consecrated ground.

To the protests of Catholic prelates, Ramírez replied that, since the Holy See did not wish to cooperate in Maximilian's program, the latter had determined to proceed "in the use of his own sovereign prerogative." The Emperor himself had already answered the prelates with a jovial reprimand, reminding them that they did not know "what had passed in Rome from Sovereign to Sovereign." The truth is, as confirmed by a note directed from Rome, March 9, 1865, by Cardinal Antonelli, and in a statement of the Holy See of July 8 to the plenipotentiaries of Mexico, that during the Emperor's short stay in Rome "there took place no negotiation relative to the religious affairs of Mexico, much less on the points indicated by the Emperor in his letter to the Minister Escudero," referring, namely, to the enforcement of the laws of the Reform and assumption of the privileges conceded the kings of Spain relative to ecclesiastical patronage.

The Holy Father understood that "the Emperor had no intentions of opening negotiations" on these matters, and "consequently he had to limit himself to recommend in general to His

Majesty the future of the Catholic Religion in the new Empire." If Maximilian wished to discuss a Concordat, the Holy See was perfectly willing to do so, but through the proper channels and not by Imperial dictation.

Unfortunately, the Empress Carlota, who had projected herself into most affairs of state from the beginning, played her hand in this one also and declared significantly that they were going "to wrest from Rome a Concordat that would serve as a model for the old European monarchies."

Maximilian decided to handle the problem by sending a commission of three persons to Rome, with orders first to stop in Paris and secure the approbation of Napoleon for his plan of settlement with the Church. The only explanation for the entire procedure of the Mexican sovereign seems to be that, dependent as he was in the physical order upon the French army, and eager to give a demonstration in Europe of his Liberalism, he had tied himself to the policies of Louis Napoleon.[11] The latter, inheriting little of the genius of Napoleon I, had at least determined to adopt his presumptuous and insulting attitude toward the Holy See in the hope of forcing the Church into a position of abjection and national servitude.

The Papal Nuncio left Mexico in June, 1865. As time was to prove, Maximilian failed in the elementary duty of recognizing his friends and the fundamental reasons of the Mexicans for his establishment on the throne. On every count, apparently, he misconceived his problems. While ignoring or persecuting the Conservatives and denouncing Catholic prelates for alleged disloyalty, Maximilian continued to build up a government of almost exclusively Republican and Liberal elements, rejecting others simply because they were, in his opinion or in the opinion of his close advisers, very *cangrejo.*

Further weakening Conservative leadership, the Emperor sent General Miramón abroad on an insignificant military mission, and, toward the end of 1864, although there were no relations between Mexico and Turkey, ordered General Márquez off on a mission to the Holy Places, as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Sultan. Commenting on this ridiculous appointment, Eloin wrote that "The Emperor sent him to Europe to save him from the clutches of the clergy, and Márquez was enchanted with the means." In this way, he succeeded in attracting to his side, both in the military and the civil order, men who were later to betray him.

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[11] In spite of his profession of the Catholic faith, Maximilian appears to have been initiated into several degrees of Scottish Rite Masonry in Paris. In Mexico, he declined election as Grand Master but served as honorary protector of the body and made generous contributions to its funds.

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On July 6, 1864, Maximilian offered a general pardon to all who, without crimes, had fought against the Empire, providing they would lay down their arms and retire to private life. On October 3, the following year, under the premature impression that the Republican leaders had been completely dispersed and had definitely abandoned the cause with Juárez' flight to the United States, he issued his famous decree condemning to death all persons seized with arms or convicted of belonging to unauthorized armed bands.

"Mexicans," declared the Emperor in joyful illusion, "the cause which Don Benito Juárez sustained with so much valor and constancy has succumbed, not only to the national will, but also before the law itself which this leader invoked in support of his claims. Today this cause, which degenerated into a small faction, has been abandoned by the departure of its chief from national territory. . . . From now on the conflict will be simply between honorable men of the Nation and bands of criminals and bandits. Leniency now ceases, which would profit only the despotism of gangs which burn cities, and rob and kill peaceful citizens, afflicted old people, and defenseless women."

The Republican General Vicente Riva Palacio, who had conducted warfare chivalrously, he ordered should be an exception to the decree; and as news of wholesale executions reached the ears of the Emperor, he wavered and gave further instructions to the effect that he should be consulted before any important Republican chieftain was delivered for death.

Upon his arrival in the country, he found a stanch and veteran Mexican Army; but, instead of building up this nucleus, he spent enormous sums in securing Austrian and Belgian troops, which conducted themselves badly toward the people and deserted in such numbers as to form a Foreign Legion under the Republican General Regulés. The direction of military campaigns he allowed to become the monopoly of French officers under General Bazaine, who was in almost constant disaccord, not only with the Mexican chieftains, but also with the generals of his own army. In this state of confusion, guerrillas and counterguerrillas were organized under the Imperial banner, inflicting damage on Conservative and Liberal interests alike.

Given the counterpurposes of Napoleon, who worked through General Bazaine, and the illusions of Maximilian, it was impossible for the Mexican Empire to consolidate itself and survive. Bazaine's personal pride, moreover, was wounded early in the relations of the two, when Maximilian indicated that Count Von Thun should be given charge of the reorganization of the Mexican Army, for lack "of a Mexican or French general who cares to, or who can, undertake the task." Working with an independence and insolence that clearly showed who was master, Bazaine, from the day in which he took command until the moment he disembarked for France, put every possible obstacle in the way of Maximilian's self-respect and assurance.

In public, Maximilian and Bazaine continued to manifest cordial relations, and on the occasion of the latter's marriage to a young Mexican girl, the Emperor presented the bride with the use of the palace of Buenavista for the period of Bazaine's residence in the country and a liberal dowry thereafter. Nevertheless, it was impossible for the truth to escape common knowledge. Profound dissatisfaction was felt when, in 1865, in spite of serious armed resistance against the Empire, Bazaine ordered back to France the first French troops, led by General Lorencez; and Maximilian, alarmed by the notices of Republican advances on every side declared, in a letter to a member of his cabinet on June 29, that if there was the least scandal, he would hold the Marshal responsible.

The withdrawal of French troops, in violation of the Treaty of Miramar, was not on Bazaine's initiative, but rather the result of Napoleon's policy in view of the costliness of the undertaking and the increasing demands of the United States. In November, 1865, the French representative in Washington was instructed from Paris that France was eager to withdraw its expeditionary forces from Mexico and that the United States could hasten the day "if it should adopt a friendly attitude which would contribute toward the consolidation of order." The best guarantee of this intention would be "the recognition of Emperor Maximilian by the Federal Government." Maximilian himself had believed this possible and wrote that the United States was "well disposed, that the government had received his agents with amiability."

With the defeat of the Confederacy, however, the time passed when the government of Washington felt constrained to treat the matter with amiability. On December 6, 1865, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Seward informed the French Government that its hopes were "entirely impracticable." The principal reason for discontent in the United States, he declared, was that "the French Army in invading Mexico, attacks a republican government, profoundly sympathetic to the United States and elected by the Nation, to replace it with a monarchy, which, while it exists, will be considered as a threat towards our own republican institutions."[12] The French Government, "compatible with its honor and its interests" was therefore asked to withdraw its troops and allow the Mexicans to enjoy a republican government "which they have elected themselves."

Pressed by unfavorable opinion at home as well as by the insistent demands of the United States, Napoleon dispatched Baron Saillard on January 16, 1866, to inform the Mexican Emperor that it was impossible to prolong the stay of his army in Mexico. At the same time he informed the French Chambers that "The government founded by the will of the people of Mexico has been consolidated. The rebels, conquered and dispersed, no longer have a leader. The national troops have manifested their bravery, and the country has found guarantees of order and security, which have developed its resources and increased its commerce from 21,000,000 to 77,000,000 francs with

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[12] Cf. Arrangoiz, *loc. cit.*, tomo IV, p. 51.

France alone. According to the hope which I manifested last year, our expedition is coming to its termination. I am arranging with Emperor Maximilian to fix the date of the departure of our troops, so that it can be effected without compromising French interests which we have gone to defend in that distant country."

The arrival of Saillard with news that the evacuation was to begin in the autumn and be rushed to completion dashed all hopes that the promises of the Treaty of Miramar were going to be fulfilled. In this predicament Maximilian sent General Almonte to France in April the same year to propose a secret treaty supplanting that of Miramar, and securing an extension of the French troops in Mexico for three more years. In case Napoleon refused, Almonte was to ask for the outright withdrawal of the French forces, in the audacious belief that Austria would send him the reinforcements he needed. Maximilian did not know that the government of the United States had already ordered its Minister in Vienna to protest against the sending of these forces under threat of breaking off diplomatic relations with Austria.

Almonte obtained no satisfaction in Paris beyond the assurance that Napoleon would communicate with his Minister in Mexico. Treaty or no treaty, the French troops would be withdrawn, on Bazaine's terms, and the Mexican people would have the honor of sustaining their own regime. Maximilian raged when he was informed of this decision. "Napoleon," he cried, "is making a fool of me. There exists a formal agreement between him and me, without which I never would have accepted the throne, which absolutely guaranteed me the aid of French troops until the end of 1868."

As soon as Maximilian became convinced of Napoleon's determination to withdraw his troops in advance of the time stipulated by the Treaty of Miramar, he believed it advisable to take the hint and retire from the throne. Carlota, however, who did not relish the idea of leaving a throne to return to the lower status of an archduchess, opposed this idea with all her energy and resolved to go herself, first to Paris to demand from Napoleon the fulfillment of the Treaty, and from there to Rome to procure a settlement of the religious question.

That the events of the past two years had begun to affect Carlota's mind first became evident at Puebla, the first night of her journey. On the way to Vera Cruz, she imagined that she was being held back, and had to be dissuaded from taking a horse. At the port, she refused to board the launch until the French flag it was carrying be lowered. After a Mexican flag was substituted, she was taken to her ship the *Empress Eugenie,* and sailed, July 13 — never to return.

Maximilian refused to attach any importance to these gestures, when they were reported, and, sharing the Empress' confidence in success, appointed two Frenchmen, General Osmont minister of war, and Friant as finance minister. "These measures," he announced, "which are in harmony with the mission of the Empress, show that the government proceeds in accord with its glorious allies and is exerting all the effort that the nation can demand to secure the pacification of the country." Nothing, however, could have been more poorly conceived. The Mexicans were already disgusted at seeing foreigners in all departments of government; Bazaine protested that these posts were incompatible with the duties of men already in the French Army. And it was not long before the United States began to threaten France with the rupture of relations in consequence of this act, which it regarded as a violation of the agreement to withdraw the expeditionary force from Mexico.

Carlota arrived in Paris on August 9, and two days later drove to the palace of Napoleon at Saint Cloud, where she was received by the Empress Eugenie. Pleading sickness, Napoleon begged to be excused from the interview, but Carlota insisted. There was no mincing of words in the lengthy Exposition which she presented. Maximilian's inability to meet his financial obligations was directly charged to General Bazaine. By the inaction of the latter during a year and one half, the Republicans had been allowed to seize power over half of the country and blockade the rest, so that principal ports were in Republican hands or unproductive. Acting on the policies dictated in France and paying exorbitantly for each service of the intervention, the Mexican Emperor had been deceived and abandoned on almost every score by Napoleon. A long and violent discussion resulted between Carlota and Napoleon, simply confirming the determination of the French Emperor to retreat from the whole affair.

When Carlota departed from the interview, her mind was on the verge of collapse. From that time, she became suspicious of everyone and everything connnected with Napoleon, whom she conceived as her mortal enemy.

After some vacillation, she departed for Rome, and on the morning of September 27 was received by Pope Pius IX. Following this audience the Empress retired to her apartments and refused to publish the details of her visit. Two days later, the Pope returned her visit, and was received in her salon, where an extended conversation took place.

She returned to seclusion until about six o'clock on the afternoon of September 30, when she appeared on the staircase, obviously in fever, and demanded to be driven to the Vatican. She insisted that the Vatican was the only place where she could be safe from Napoleon's assassins, that even her ministers and servants were in conspiracy against her. In spite of the Pope's kindly reassurances, she was determined to remain there, and would trust no food except that of which the Pope himself partook. Physicians were called, and it was decided, to calm her wandering mind, to prepare a chamber where she might sleep in company with two of her ladies in waiting.

The next day she was induced to return to her hotel, under the illusion that her retainers had been dismissed. Her condition remained so serious that she refused to drink any water except that which she obtained herself from the city fountain or to eat anything not prepared before her eyes. Maximilian was notified by cable of her cerebral congestion, and her brother, the Count of Flanders, arrived from Paris to conduct her to Miramar. She was later removed to the Chateau of Laeken, in Brussels. Apparently Carlota had a short lucid interval during which she became aware of her husband's final tragedy. After that she lapsed into permanent insanity, in which she died in 1926.

Everyone had believed that with news of Carlota's insanity, Maximilian would abdicate, and indeed two frigates had been sent to Vera Cruz to bring him back to Europe. Under other circumstances he might have taken this course, for he had all along made a display of his Liberalism for the benefit of Europe and secretly entertained the hope that the crown in Mexico might be a steppingstone. Upon the publication of the Family Pact by Francis Joseph, in 1864, he bitterly protested that the terms of his renunciation to the Austrian throne were null. As late as November, 1866, Maximilian received notices from Eloin, whom he had sent to Europe on a secret mission, that the people of Austria were asking for the abdication of Francis Joseph, with definite sympathies toward the Emperor of Mexico. This letter fell into the hands of the Juárist Consulate in New York. A copy of it was sent to the Emperor of Austria, who gave notice that his brother would not be permitted to enter Austrian territory if he left Mexico. Now it was too late to be concerned with such ambitions. As Maximilian wavered over the alternatives, a letter arrived from his mother, the Archduchess Sophia, urging him at all costs to remain in the country of his adoption.

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As the war progressed, in spite of the victories of the Imperialist armies, it became evident that the people regarded foreign troops with profound suspicion and distaste. Bandits and the guerrillas of Juárez continued their ceaseless activity, so that the citizens were defenseless as soon as the French soldiers were withdrawn from the policing of a district. Toward the end of June, 1866, Maximilian received notice that General Mejía had been defeated by the Republicans in the North at Matamoros. As soon as the United States became able to give fuller attention to the enforcements of its demands in Mexico, the fall of the Empire was inevitable.

According to the statement of General Philip H. Sheridan in his Memoirs, "At the close of our war there was little hope for the Republic of Mexico. Indeed, till our troops were concentrated on the Rio Grande there was none. Our appearance in such force along the border permitted the Liberal leaders, refugees from their homes, to establish rendezvous whence they could promulgate their plans in safety, while the countenance thus given the cause, when hope was well-nigh gone, incited the Mexican people to renewed resistance. Beginning again with very scant means, for they had lost about all, the Liberals saw their cause, under the influence of such significant and powerful backing, progress and steadily grow so strong that within two years Imperialism had received its death blow. I doubt very much whether such results could have been achieved without the presence of an American army on the Rio Grande, which, be it remembered, was sent there because, in General Grant's words, the French invasion of Mexico was so closely related to the rebellion (Confederacy) as to be essentially a part of it."[13]

The attitude of the United States on this occasion, however, as Secretary Seward indicated to Napoleon, was based on larger considerations than that of a Confederate victory. From the time of Poinsett, the United States was eager to maintain a dominant interest in Mexico, and from the American invasion, on through the Three Years' War and the era of the Reform, it threw the weight of its influence consistently on the side of the Liberals, apparently in the theory that Spanish, Conservative, and Catholic elements would have to be crushed in that country if an acceptable regime were to triumph.

"During the winter and spring of 1866," Sheridan declared, "we continued covertly supplying arms and ammunition to the Liberals — sending as many as 30,000 muskets from Baton Rouge arsenal alone." At the same time ammunition was dumped "at convenient places" along the border where it might be seized by the Liberals; assistance was given in the unification of Juárist bands; a show of force was given, giving the impression that American troops were about to advance against the Imperialists; negotiations were opened with Juárez; and numbers of American soldiers and officers were even allowed to take up arms in the Juárist cause. These were the elements which led to the defeat of Mejía with his "garrison of renegade Mexicans," as Sheridan referred to the Imperialist forces at Matamoros, so that "by midsummer Juárez, having organized a pretty good sized army, was in possession of the whole line of Rio Grande, and, in fact, of nearly the whole of Mexico down to San Luis Potosí."[14] These same elements then moved on to close in on Querétaro.

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[13] P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* (New York, 1888), II, pp. 227, 228.

Deserted by his French allies, left without ample Mexican forces, deprived of sufficient munitions, and faced with the armed hostility of the United States, Maximilian found himself on slippery ground indeed. The French evacuated Monterrey in the second part of July, 1866. The Republicans seized Tampico amid a barbarous assault, and various Imperialist officers including Colonel Medina and General Alatorre deserted to the Republican army. Late in October, Oaxaca City fell before the troops of Porfirio Díaz.

More than this, the Liberals with whom Maximilian surrounded himself and whom he made the masters of his policy, began to drop out of his cabinet and seek safer ground in Europe, where they would not be involved in the ruin of the Empire, and the Emperor found himself pretty much left to the counsels of his private physician, Dr. Basch, a German-Jew, and Father Augustín Fischer, a German Lutheran convert to Catholicism. The latter, who had come to Mexico after prospecting in Texas, was completely unknown except for unfavorable reports of a short period during which he acted as secretary of the bishop of Durango. He had insinuated himself into Maximilian's favor, was sent to Rome with the project of a Concordat, and now took charge of the Imperial Cabinet. Mexicans had previously endured the appointment to the Cabinet of the Abbé Domenech, a foreigner whom the Catholic hierarchy had repudiated and who had used his pen to calumniate the Mexican Church.

The disgust and disconfidence of the Conservatives, who had been rejected and insulted from the beginning of Maximilian's reign, can well be imagined. Nevertheless, it was to these that the Emperor returned, now in his hour of extreme need. On July 15, 1866, Teodosio Lares consented to act as Minister of Justice, on condition that Maximilian make a complete change of policy; and on September 4, a Conservative ministry was formed of Mexicans who patriotically accepted the appeal in the knowledge that they were exposing their lives and fortunes with little hope of salvaging the Empire.

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[14] P. H. Sheridan, *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 225.

Hardly had this group been assembled, representing for the first time the Party which had originally called Maximilian to the throne, when the Emperor withdrew into his palace and refused all interviews, on the plea of sickness. Then leaving word through Father Fischer that the ministry was to continue its business, he gave out word that he was going to leave for Orizaba. Fearing with good reason that Maximilian was contemplating an escape from the country, Lares warned him through Dr. Basch that such action would result in the resignation of the Ministry. In his agitated condition, Maximilian dictated secret orders, to be revealed in the event of his abdication, creating a Regency under Lares, with Bazaine as head of the army!

When Bazaine learned of the Ministry's threat, he accused the members of a betrayal of confidence, and warned them he would take stern measures if they persisted in their resolution! Bazaine, of course, was pursuing the same double policy as Maximilian, except that he was eager to gain time in order to complete the evacuation of his forces before the Emperor should slip away. The latter set out for Orizaba early in the morning of October 21.

At this most trying moment of his life, Maximilian appeared to be totally oblivious of his obligation to the Mexicans who had risked everything in the cause of the monarchy, and he confided in Bazaine, whom he had hitherto regarded as the archvillain of his reign. Engaged in fruitless negotiations with Republican chieftains which redounded in no way to his credit, his principal concern was the safe conduct of the Austrian and Belgian volunteers.

While Maximilian was carrying on his secret negotiations and trying to make up his mind at Orizaba, deputations arrived from Mexico City and Puebla with petitions signed by thousands of leading persons begging him not to abdicate. On November 9, Generals Márquez and Miramón arrived at Vera Cruz from Europe. The first had been sent for. Miramón was under the impression that Maximilian had already departed, and he counted on rallying the Conservatives around himself. When he realized the wavering state of the Emperor's will, he at once put aside his own personal ambitions, urged him not to abdicate, and pledged his life to the monarch.

When the Emperor was ready to submit the question of his continuance in power, he summoned his ministers and state councilors to Orizaba. Three days were spent in discussion, and on November 24, it was decided by vote that he should remain on the throne. At Puebla, General Castelnau, Napoleon's special agent, and the Minister of France made a final attempt to secure his abdication; but Maximilian made his way back to the capital, where he took residence on January 5, 1867, on the hacienda of *La Teja* between Chapultepec and the city proper. Although he did not wish an official reception, the entire populace turned out to greet him.

Still dominated by noble dreams quite at variance with practicable execution but in thorough keeping with his Liberal pose, Maximilian now issued a proclamation to the populace announcing his "intention of convoking a National Congress, on the most broad and liberal basis, in which all parties would participate, in order to determine whether the Empire should still continue in the future; and if the answer is in the affirmative, this body will aid in the formulation of laws vital to the consolidation of the public institutions of the country."

The whole idea of convoking a national Congress at a time when every thought was to be bent on military emergency, of submitting the question of sovereignty which had already been decided, of opening deliberations to all parties, when the monarchy was incompatible with a republic, and of contemplating fundamental laws after more than two years of a mania for lawmaking, seems like a preposterous dream. Maximilian has been represented by various commentators as a victim of the Conservatives. The truth is that the Conservatives were the victims of Maximilian and exhibited a remarkable patience.

In the days that followed, as preparations were made for the reorganization of the military forces, Bazaine busied himself with the final details of the French evacuation, and departed with the ringing words of Don Alejandro Arango y Escandón: "Go! It is of no consequence. You have done very little for your Sovereign, even less for the Church, and nothing, absolutely nothing, for your honor." The evacuation of the capital took place on February 5, 1867. The people displayed no reaction, but there was an unmistakable realization that this meant the end of Imperial strength. As a result, the troops were followed by a large number of Mexican and French officials, employers, and property owners who feared for their lives if the Republicans triumphed.

There was no official farewell. Knowledge of the Marshal's destruction, or sale to speculators, of munitions and supplies, completed the rupture. The doors and windows of the Palace remained closed in protest against the entire procedure, as Bazaine's forces departed from Mexico City, and Maximilian who secretly watched the disappearance of the rear guard, breathed a tragic sigh of deliverance, "At last we are free!"

Maximilian's deliverance from the French, however, was but the prelude to disaster. Loss of prestige for the French naturally reflected itself in diminished confidence in the Imperialist cause. Bazaine's troops were followed at so short a distance by small Juárist bands, that there appeared to be a common agreement between the two forces, and indeed every evidence, including the accusation of Porfirio Díaz, indicates that up to the last moment, Bazaine was ready to do business with the Republicans.

Meanwhile, the Imperialists had suffered serious reverses in other parts of the country. As early as October, 1866, the population of Guaymas was massacred by Republicans as the result of the French evacuation. In December, the important city of Guadalajara fell. On January 27, 1867, General Miramón seized Zacatecas from the Republicans, and Juárez was saved only by the speed of his carriage; but on the first of February, Miramón's forces suffered a severe defeat at San Jacinto, and a great number of Imperialist prisoners were shot by order of General Escobedo.

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Under these discouraging conditions, and against the advice of the President of the Council of State, Maximilian, although without military experience, decided to enter the field himself.

The capital was fortified for emergencies, and on February 13, early in the morning so as to keep the matter secret, the Emperor set out for the North, joined by a brigade of 1500 selected men under the command of General Márquez. In command in the "Empress" regiment was Colonel Miguel López.

At San Juan del Río, the Emperor, again in high spirits, issued his proclamation to the army. "Today," he said, "I place myself at the front and take command of our army, which hardly two months ago was begun to be recruited and formed. I have ardently desired this day for some time, but obstacles outside my will detained me. Now, free from all compromises, I can follow my sentiments alone. . . . Free from all foreign pressure, our entire action shall be exerted to maintain and raise high the honor of our glorious tri-colored banner." General Márquez was named chief of staff. The army was divided into three corps, under the orders of Generals Miramón, Márquez, and Mejía. General Méndez was to arrive with his troops to augment the second corps, and General Vidaurri was to open the campaign in the North. "Our confidence," he concluded, "is in God, who protects and will protect Mexico, and we will fight with indomitable energy under this sacred invocation: Long live Independence!"

On February 19, about noon, the troops reached the entrance of Querétaro, where Maximilian was met by Generals Miramón and Mejía. The city was delirious in its cheering, as the procession made its way to the Cathedral for the *Te Deum* and to the Casino Español, where the Emperor was toasted as Maximilian the Great.

During the attacks and counterattacks, as well as during the quieter phases of the siege, Maximilian showed himself courageous and adaptable to every exigency. The siege of Querétaro was the one glorious chapter of his unfortunate reign. In civilian clothes or charro uniform, he mingled with soldiers and civilians. He was present at all the meetings, witnessed every combat, and visited the hospitals and barracks, gaining the adoration of all, and stirred up great confidence in the triumph of the cause. When he was obliged to force a loan on the city, it was met without complaint by the citizens. To show the army's appreciation of his leadership, a commission of generals headed by Miramón presented him with the bronze medal of Military Merit, the most distinguished in its order, which Maximilian wore on his breast every day thereafter.

A fatal rift, however, began to show itself between Generals Márquez and Miramón. The rivalry of the two continued on every occasion. To Márquez' stubborn determination to resist the counsel of Miramón may be attributed the fall of Querétaro and the collapse of the Empire. In the first place, Márquez was content to regard the Republican army as "only miserable bands of malefactors, making war on their own account, ruining the cities, without recognizing any center, and, in general, without concerning themselves much over Don Benito Juárez." Although chief of staff, he allowed the Emperor to leave the capital without sufficient supplies. The Republican forces under Generals Escobedo and Corona were permitted to unite; and by March 6, the city was surrounded by 25,000 men. On March 23, the besiegers received an additional force of 10,000 men. The Imperialists had only 9000.

When it became evident that supplies were absolutely imperative if Querétaro was to hold out any longer, it was finally decided to send Márquez to the capital with full powers. There he was to dissolve the old Ministry, establish a new one with Vidaurri in charge of the treasury, gather men and money with all possible speed, and return to the aid of the beleaguered city.

Miramón, who had consistently distinguished himself in his sallies against the enemy, was appointed to attack the enemy on March 22, so as to divert their attention and allow Márquez and Vidaurri with 1200 men, to get through the lines. The strategy was eminently successful; but Márquez never returned.

From that day the situation daily grew worse, and while Maximilian, now installed in the fortlike convent of Santa Cruz, dictated new court ceremonials to keep up his spirits, food supplies and ammunition diminished alarmingly. As days passed without news from Márquez, scouts were sent out to penetrate the Republican lines, but these were invariably caught and shot, and suspended on poles over the trenches with placards reading: *The Emperor's Courier.*[15]

Whether Márquez could have succeeded in lifting the siege is, of course, problematical. After discharging the mission in Mexico City, instead of returning directly to Querétaro, he decided to go to the rescue of Puebla, then being attacked by Porfirio Díaz. The forces of Díaz fell upon a battalion of Hungarians which was guarding a money transport, and Márquez, taking advantage of the confusion, fled toward the capital, pursued by Díaz as far as Texcoco. As he went along, he destroyed the bridges behind him, and arrived at Mexico City, April 10, with the news that his army had suffered total catastrophe. The fact that the Foreign Legion managed to reach the capital the next day, in good order, has led various observers to believe that it was his intention to allow the Austrians to be cut to pieces by Díaz, and then establish himself in power. Maximilian had already entrusted Márquez with a notice of abdication in case of his capture.

Nothing remained for the defenders of Querétaro but to make a final attempt at escape. May 14 was first set as the date for departure, but this was postponed for the following night. At four o'clock in the morning of the 15th, word was suddenly brought by Colonel López' lieutenant that the La Cruz convent had been surrounded by the Liberals, and that the Emperor was in danger. Maximilian, who was still sleeping, received the news incredulously, dressed slowly, and prepared to descend the staircase to the street. As the group progressed toward the Cerro de las Campanas (Hill of the Bells), López rode up quickly, with the news that all was lost, and offered to hide the Emperor. When Maximilian refused, he rode back toward La Cruz. López was the traitor who opened the way for the Liberals into Querétaro.[16]

It was impossible to escape. A group of Liberal officers with General Corona ordered the Emperor to stop, and at the foot of the hill Maximilian delivered his sword to General Escobedo. He was then led to his quarters at La Cruz and placed under guard. The siege of Querétaro was over, after a gallant resistance of seventy-two days, and with it all hopes for the Empire.

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[15] Cf. José Luis Blasio, *Maximilian,* trans. by R. H. Murray (New Haven, 1934), p. 151.

[16] Cf. Alfonso Junco, *La Traicion de Querétaro* (Mexico, 1930).

General Vicente Riva Palacio, who conducted Maximilian to his cell, admitted that his sentence would be death. Of the generals who had served on his staff, Méndez was discovered in hiding and shot. Arellano, disguised as a servant, escaped to the capital. There still remained imprisoned Miramón and Mejía. The eventual fate of the other Imperialist officials was exile or prison. Nevertheless, Maximilian was to be accorded the formality of a trial, and was permitted the services of the distinguished lawyers, Mariano Riva Palacio, the father of Vicente, and Martínez de la Torre. In spite of obstacles placed in their way by General Márquez, the two arrived at Querétaro on June 4, and went into consultation with Jesús María Vázquez, an attorney of Querétaro.

So far as legal justice is concerned, the trial was a farce.[17] Juárez and Escobedo were determined to have the life of their captive; later appeals for clemency were in vain.

Particular efforts to save the Emperor were exercised by Princess Salm-Salm, the American wife of a Prussian adventurer who had fought loyally at the side of Maximilian and was imprisoned with him.[18] When Juárez turned a deaf ear to her pleas, she attempted to arrange for an escape, but the Emperor would not leave without Miramón and Mejía. During this time, the various foreign legations whose offices were sought in various details concerning Maximilian showed a cowardly spirit. It was not until the Emperor had been executed that the American State Department became genuinely concerned. There is no doubt but that, if the Washington Government had really wished to do so, it could have saved Maximilian's life.

The death sentence of Maximilian was the answer to Napoleon's challenge in the New World to regain the power and prestige of the Latin race. The sacrifice of Maximilian was not merely an isolated political incident required to atone for the sins of an individual, but was rather a bitter lesson intended by the United States, even more than the nervous, if confident, faction of Juárez, to teach Europe and its royal families to have no further thought of accepting thrones in Spanish America.[19]

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[17] *Causa de Fernando Maximilian de Hapsburgo* (Mexico, 1868).

[18] Cf. Prince Felix Salm-Salm, *My Diary In Mexico* (London, 1868).

If the second attempt to establish a national Mexican Empire ended disastrously, the fault was not of the Conservatives or of the clergy, but rather of the shortsighted and selfish policy of Napoleon who was determined to govern Mexico from Paris; to the dilatory and treacherous conduct of Bazaine; and to Maximilian's disloyalty to the Conservatives, until it was too late to salvage the wreckage from the internal and external enemies of the regime, who were determined to leave not a stone upon a stone.

During his imprisonment, the illness of the Emperor resulted in the changing of his quarters to the Teresita convent, where he was accompanied by Dr. Basch and a number of his suite. Almost until the end, he retained hope of release and dreamed of roving the Mediterranean and the Adriatic on his yacht with his friends.

He spent his remaining days writing letters of thanks to friends and arranging the disposition of his affairs. His body, he wished to be returned to Europe and laid next to that of Carlota whom he believed to be dead. From the Pope, he asked pardon for the pain he had caused and prayers for his soul. Calling for a priest, he confessed and made his peace with God. "That monarch," wrote his confessor, Father Hilarion Frías y Soto in commenting on his penitent, "was greater when he approached death than when he smiled majestically in his palace."

To Juárez, Maximilian penned the following lines: "Señor Don Benito Juárez: About to receive the death penalty, in consequence of having sought to attempt, through new political institutions, to put an end to the bloody civil war which has ruined this unfortunate country for many years, I shall gladly give up my life if its sacrifice can contribute to the peace and prosperity of my new fatherland. Firmly convinced that nothing solid can be founded on a land soaked with blood and agitated by violent commotions, I beg of you, in the most solemn manner and with the sincerity sacred to the moment in which I find myself, that my blood may be the last to be shed and that the same perseverance with which you have defended the cause just victorious, and which I was gratified to recognize and appreciate even during my prosperity, you may consecrate to the most noble task of reconciliation and of founding in a stable and durable manner the peace and tranquility of this unfortunate country."[20]

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[19] Cf. Benito Juárez, *El Fusalimento de Maximilian de Hapsburgo, Manifiesto Justificativo* (4ª ed. Guatemala, 1901).

The Emperor thanked his custodians and distributed his last five gold pieces to the firing squad. Dressed in black and accompanied by a priest, on the morning of June 19, he was led to the Cerro de las Campanas, where he was joined by Miramón on his right and Mejía on his left. The priest faltered under the ordeal and Maximilian offered him his smelling salts. To Miramón, he said, "General, a brave man should be respected even by sovereigns. Permit me, therefore, at the moment of death to cede to you the place of honor." Then turning to Mejía, a man of simple Indian faith, he offered a word of consolation, "General, what you have not received as a reward on earth will certainly be yours in heaven." He embraced both men and declared for all to hear, "I go to die for a just cause, the independence and liberty of Mexico. May my blood end the misfortunes of my new country! Long live Mexico!"[21]

General Márquez, in nominal command at Mexico City, attempted to deny the fatal news when it was relayed to the capital, but his last show of loyalty to the cause suddenly vanished with his own disappearance and flight to Cuba. The troops of Porfirio Díaz entered the city on June 29, and began the arrest of Imperial officials. One of the first to be shot was General Vidaurri.

Small credit was reflected on the Liberal government and Juárez in the later disposition of the Emperor's body. Juárez refused to deliver it, after embalmment, for reasons which he refused to state; and not until November 12, almost five months after the executions, was a release given to the Austrian Government. Thirteen days later the body was placed aboard the *Novara* at Vera Cruz, which also carried back to Europe the Austrian and Belgian prisoners, who had been freed on the entreaty of the Austrian admiral. On January 20 Maximilian's earthly remains were given permanent place in the crypt of the Capuchin church in Vienna, by the side of the other members of the Hapsburg dynasty.

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[20] Cf. *Recuerdos de Mi Vida, Memorias de Maximiliano* (Mexico, 1869), *introd.*, p. xxii.

[21] Victor Daran, *Le General Miguel Miramón* (Rome, 1886), Chap. VI.

When the chapel of the San Andrés Hospital in Mexico City, where the body had laid, become the scene of sentimental demonstrations on the part of remaining Imperialists, it was demolished by order of Juárez, and the government opened a street through the place.

CHAPTER XIV

Porfirio Díaz

LIBERALISM'S GOLDEN AGE

i

SHORTLY before his arrival in Mexico City to assume the Presidency for the first time, Porfirio Díaz presented himself at the head of his troops in Guadalajara, to be feted by the officials of that city and honored by the culturally elite. The description which José López-Portillo y Rojas has left of him on this occasion is worth recalling: "Of dark complexion, he appeared bronzed like a native Indian. His chin whisker and black hair were closely cropped; his mustache was short. He looked severely and almost ferociously around him. He wore a gray suit with a set of gold buttons; he did not have his vest well buttoned, and when it opened, it showed the bosom of a wrinkled and creased shirt. The attitude which he assumed during the artistic-literary presentation was far from decorous and attentive. Half reclining on the seat, he revealed, under his rather short trousers, the tubes of his boots wrinkled like an accordion. In his right hand, there appeared a tooth pick, which he kept using and twisting in his mouth. The public noticed all these details and concluded that the triumphant chieftain was a rude person of few social refinements."[1]

How different this Díaz from the patriarchal Caesar of later years. A comparison of the portraits of Porfirio at the end of his military campaigns and during the height of his long Presidential career presents the aspect of two men, one hunted by the law and the other issuing the order of arrest, rather than of the same individual. Except for the fact that the history of Mexico is full of similar paradoxes, it would be difficult to credit the same person with the issuance of the manifestos which appeared before his accession to power and the program which he actually adopted once he was safely installed in the Presidential seat and had made his political organization invulnerable.

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[1] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *Elevacion y Caida de Porfirio Díaz* (Mexico, 1921), p. 152.

What was it that drove the ambitions of this restless man across the battlefields of Mexico and into the palace of Chapultepec, where he dominated the whole scene of Mexican life for thirty-five years? "During the Revolution of Ayutla," he declared in his Plan of Noria, which gave the signal of his break with Juárez, "I left college to take up arms because of hate for despotism. In the War of the Reform, I fought for principles; and in the war against foreign invasion, I supported national independence until the government was re-established in the capital of the Republic. In the course of my political life, I have given sufficient proof of not aspiring to power or office or employment of any kind; but I have also contracted great responsibilities with the country for its liberty and independence, with my companions in arms, and with myself, not to be indifferent to public evils. . . . If time crowns our efforts, I shall return to the quiet of the domestic hearth, preferring in any case the frugal and peaceful life of the obscure laborer to the ostentations of power."[2]

There is ample evidence to show that throughout his life, Díaz was moved by a patriotic love for his country. He gave his greatest efforts to the pacification and aggrandizement of his country; and the fortune which he amassed for himself does not indicate that he was primarily interested in material gains for himself. Nevertheless, the great passion of Díaz was personal power, perhaps in the inner conviction that he was the only man capable of holding the reins and safely guiding the destinies of the country, but in any event, power which he had made supreme efforts and sacrifices to attain and which, to the destruction of practically everything built up during his regime, he was unwilling to relinquish. The story of Díaz is the story of one who, because he came into power through force, never could reconcile himself with the idea of making provision for a successor, and who, because he relished success above all things, never took the pains to count the cost.

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[2] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 87.

ii

According to the records of Oaxaca, Porfirio Díaz was baptized on October 15, 1830. Bancroft states that his father, José de la Cruz Díaz, was a descendant of Spaniards who came to Mexico shortly after the end of the Conquest.[3] During the wars of Independence, he was given the title of captain by Vicente Guerrero, but there is no proof that he was a military man or ever engaged in more than the labors of a farmer, veterinary, and innkeeper. He died in 1833 of cholera, and left his wife, Petrona Mori, to rear three children, with nothing more than a small inn for their support. A valiant Indian type, with possibly some Spanish blood in her veins, she set to the task with a will and laid the foundation of character in her two sons Porfirio and Félix.

Civil wars soon took their toll of the family's finances. The inn was sold, and Petrona moved to a small cottage, where she and the children worked at spinning and sold fruit. With such rudiments of learning as she had acquired, she also opened a little school. The income from these activities was not sufficient, and Porfirio turned his hand to other crafts, learning how to make shoes, tables, and chairs, and to work in metals. At the age of six, he started to school, and after learning his ABC's, went to the neighboring village of San Pedro Teococuilco, where he studied Latin with his cousin, the vicar of the parish. Here he met Justo Benítez, a lad of his own age who lived in the vicar's house and was to become his own intimate friend and counselor.

After this, he entered the seminary to study for the priesthood, but his poverty so discouraged him that he applied to one Don Joaquín Vasconcelos, a small shop owner, to give him employment. The latter encouraged him to continue his studies, and instead of giving him the desired position, insisted on providing him with a monthly allowance. With this and other assistance which he received from Padre Domínguez, who had baptized him, Díaz was able to carry on his work in Latin and philosophy with average success; and he began his theological studies.

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[3] Hubert H. Bancroft, *Porfirio Díaz* (San Francisco, 1887), p. 16.

There seems to have been nothing in the way of his becoming a good priest, until contact with Marcos Pérez, the lawyer and friend of Juárez, began to give a new turn to events. At this time, Porfirio was giving private lessons in Latin and philosophy to various students. Pérez, whose son was in the class, began to argue the young seminarian out of the idea of becoming a clergyman and invited him to attend a function at the Instituto de Ciencias, where he was presented to the celebrated Juárez himself. The spirited oratory and glamour of the occasion settled all his hesitation; and abandoning his plans for an ecclesiastical career, he suddenly left the seminary and enrolled in the Institute, which had become famous for its Liberal principles.

After a four-year course in law, at the age of twenty-three he became a student of Juárez, who was then professor of Civil Right. Veneration for this master and a general atmosphere of talk against tyranny and dictatorship were the determining factors of this epoch. In 1854, the Institute came into governmental disfavor and was closed by order of the Dictator Santa Anna; and Díaz found himself perilously involved in the political intrigues of the Liberals. Both Pérez and Juárez were proscribed by Santa Anna, and as a result, although he had completed his course and was working in the office of Pérez, Porfirio failed to receive his lawyer's title, and narrowly escaped being confined with Pérez in the tower of the convent of Santo Domingo.

To prevent discrepancies in the testimony of Pérez' friends, he now began to gather data on the case. At the same time, he and his brother Félix conceived a daring plan of getting into touch with Pérez. Armed with knives and ropes, the two slipped by the guards and managed to climb the tower and lower themselves alternately to the window of the prisoner.

At this time, December, 1854, Santa Anna ordered the plebiscite which was to approve his continuation in power. Two ballot books were offered the voters, one favorable to the Dictator, the other to the contrary. Porfirio determined not to commit himself; but when a partisan of Santa Anna accused him of cowardice, he called for the negative book, which had remained untouched, and went on record to the effect that the Dictator should resign in favor of Juan Álvarez, who had proclaimed the Plan of Ayutla. In fear of the consequences, he immediately fled from the city.

iii

This was the beginning of Díaz' military career. In the institute he had received some military training, and during the American invasion he served in a body of home guards which was popularly ridiculed as the "Nothing is worse." With this meager equipment, he now joined a group of rebel Indians led by a certain Herrera, with whom he shared the command. This band very soon engaged in combat with a government force; and defeat sent the young soldier flying toward the village of Coanana, where he took refuge for a month in the house of the parish priest. From there he returned cautiously to Oaxaca, and remained under cover until the flight of Santa Anna, when the Liberals seized control of the state.

As the Liberals succeeded in imposing themselves, Marcos Pérez assumed a large influence in the administration, and Don Porfirio secured appointment as subprefect of Ixtlán, a village in the uplands. Here he employed his military talents in organizing a national guard of 400 natives. When the governor gave signs of going over to the party of Santa Anna, Díaz suddenly appeared in the state capital with his troops, as an effective argument against the maneuver, and succeeded in seeing the reins of the government placed in the hands of Benito Juárez.

Upon the inauguration of the Three Years' War, toward the close of 1856, Juárez reciprocated by appointing Díaz to a captaincy, although the young hero had already assumed that title unofficially. Later campaigns brought corresponding promotions, and he was named Liberal governor and military commander of Tehuantepec. These titles signified only that he was now a political chieftain, for the forces of the Conservatives were as active as ever.

In 1858–59, Juárez fled to Vera Cruz; Díaz, out of touch with his superiors, found himself endowed with plenary powers and an extraordinary opportunity to exercise his abilities as administrator in the territory under his control. So well did he perform his multiple tasks, that the Abbé Brasseur of Bourbourg, who became acquainted with Díaz at this time, referred to him as a perfect type of Indian, worthy of Cuauhtémoc, and predicted his progressive rise to power. He succeeded in cleaning up the swamps and other breeding spots of disease, fed his army, and supported his judiciary and the local school masters.

During this period, his mother Petrona died; and, in 1861, he decided to abandon the army and go as a deputy to the National Congress. Díaz took only a passive part in the general confusion that characterized this body of Liberals. Suddenly the terrifying news of Melchor Ocampo's assassination came to stir the group out of its complacency. Then followed the fatal expeditions of Valle and Degollado against the advancing Conservatives under General Márquez. Finally, to meet the emergency, Díaz placed himself under military orders, met the forces of Márquez and delivered such a crushing blow that the Conservatives were sent flying for their lives.

For his valor on this occasion, he was elevated to brigadier general; but when he returned to Congress, he heard his victory spurned as a matter of small importance. It is possible that his contempt for parliamentary procedure dated from the experiences of this period. At any event, he again returned to arms and took part in the battles of Pachuca and Real del Monte, in which the armies of Márquez were virtually cut to pieces and obliged to await the intervention of the French.

iv

When the European invaders arrived in the uplands, Porfirio and his brother Félix were under the command of General Zaragoza. In the first skirmish, Félix was taken prisoner but managed to escape by overpowering his guard. Porfirio withstood the French attack for a night. Six days later he distinguished himself in the battle of May 5, when the French were turned back from Puebla.

He was also among the defenders of Puebla during its later siege, and upon its fall was taken prisoner. With the other

Liberal chieftains, he was doomed to exile in France, but on the eve of the march, he managed to escape with his comrade Berriozábal. After a circuitous journey, the two reached Mexico City just as Juárez was preparing his flight to Querétaro. On the spur of the moment, the latter offered to make Díaz his minister of war. Díaz refused the offer, urging that he was too young and that others were more in line of age and merit. The post was given to Berriozábal.

Díaz accepted the position as chief of a division and was assigned to accompany President Juárez. On the very first day, one of the battalions, which had been recruited hastily, rose in revolt, and Don Porfirio resorted to a disciplinary method which he had already tested and was to use repeatedly with telling effect. After arresting the insurgents, he lined them up before his troops and had them shot down.

In San Luis Potosí, on October 10, 1863, Juárez ordered Díaz to form an army in Oaxaca, and take command of the states of Oaxaca, Vera Cruz, Chiapas, Tabasco, Yucatán, and Campeche. To these were later added Puebla and Tlaxcala. The advance of the French had made impossible the formation of a central army. After a strenuous march, Díaz reached Oaxaca late in November. The governor of the state, who inclined toward the Intervention, refused to acknowledge the authority of the new general. Porfirio simply deposed him and appointed a new governor who would cooperate.

The Indian natives refused to extend him their support, inasmuch as they were happy to acknowledge the authority of Maximilian. Moreover, the higher elements of society were in favor of the monarchy. With the arrival of Bazaine and his forces, Porfirio was obliged to surrender and was sent under guard to Puebla. He refused, however, to sign any agreement not to take up arms again against the French. Benítez and others of his company submitted and were released. After several months of imprisonment, he managed to notify Benítez that he planned escape, and ordered the latter to notify Juárez to this effect.

Once free, he was provided by his friends with a horse, arms, and guides, and joined a guerrilla band in the state of Guerrero. With 200 boys whom he captured and formed into a battalion called the Wild Beasts of Oaxaca, he continued his uncertain way toward the Sierra of Puebla.

Upon the return of his brother Félix from the United States with supplies, the two brothers joined in maneuvers which gave them some small victories leading to the recapture of Oaxaca. The Mexicans whom he captured in battle, he ordered to be executed. The French and others, he praised for their valor and offered various grants and honors if they would join his cause. His victory at Oaxaca placed in his power 1000 French prisoners, whom he returned to General Bazaine, on the simple condition that they be ordered back to France at once.

This apparent leniency with foreigners did not indicate any sympathy on his part for the Imperialist cause, although there is considerable evidence to prove that both Maximilian and Bazaine, on separate accounts, wished to gain his favor. Bazaine's treacherous offers to sell Díaz his munitions, rather than leave them to Maximilian, and to deal independently with Díaz, if the latter would abandon the cause of Juárez, were both spurned. Upon the departure of Bazaine with the French troops and the defeat of Miramón's Mexican forces, Díaz was approached by Maximilian, who offered to dismiss Lares, Márquez, and other Conservative leaders, and to surrender all his forces, if he would allow the remaining foreign troops, numbering about 5000 men, to withdraw. In his reply of February 14, 1867, Díaz declared that as Chief of the army, he was not empowered to enter into other than military relations with the head of the invaders and would resist any attempt on their part to escape.

In themselves, these overtures definitely mark a recognition of Díaz' daring and astuteness, qualities which he was to employ with telling effect in his final attack on Puebla. At the gates of the city with diminished forces and subject to the cross fire of General Márquez, Díaz decided upon the desperate strategem of attacking the place immediately and, in case of victory, to turn about and encounter the forces of Márquez in open field. The ease with which the plaza was taken, after fifteen minutes of combat, strongly smelled of treachery on the part of some of its defenders; and the whole business, including the later defeat, flight, and immunity of General Márquez indicates that Porfirio's victory was not merely a triumph of military genius.

With the fall of Puebla, all the deserters from the Liberal army who were captured were court-marshaled and executed. Catholic prelates and civic officials were freed after considerable ceremony, upon their promise to appear in court if they were called for. This was the beginning of Díaz' method of using force to convert his enemies into friends.

On June 19, Maximilian was executed in Querétaro. Three days later, Porfirio entered Mexico City at the head of his army, without the slightest attempt on the part of anyone to disturb the public order or engage in pillage. "I maintained command of the place," he wrote in his autobiography, "from June 21 to July 15, when President Juárez made his entrance into the city. I licensed some forces, dismissed others, and remained with an army of 20,000 men, with which I received the President of the Republic."

The capture of Mexico City and the end of the Empire found Díaz at the height of his military glory and gave ample proof of his administrative character and honesty. As chief of the Army of the East, with authority over eight states, he had succeeded in establishing order in the territory held by his troops and in organizing his financial resources, so that he was able to pay his 20,000 men regularly and even give assistance to the convoy of Juárez and cover some arrears of the ministers. While he was still in Oaxaca, he received a large sum which Matías Romero sent him as the result of a loan of 30,000,000 pesos obtained in the United States. Besides his honest administration of these funds, his probity seems proved by the fact that he was able to negotiate with the rich Imperialists who had property in his territory. After his seizure of Mexico City, his credit was so honored that he obtained large loans, including one of 200,000 pesos from foreign merchants, which he repaid before the arrival of Juárez.

v

During the War of Intervention, while Juárez was flying from place to place in the North, Díaz had occupied a position of leading importance in the center of the country. Juárez had come to regard himself as the savior of Mexican nationalism, but Díaz believed the time had now come when others might aspire to the Presidency. National danger had passed, the French had been expelled, and there was no emergency for keeping Juárez in office indefinitely. Juárez, on the other hand, was determined to hold on to office as long as he could and to regard the Presidency as the just reward of his labors and pains.

At the end of the war, Juárez believed that inasmuch as the Republican troops had fought from the motive of patriotism, it would be sufficient to thank them for their noble services and return them to civil life. Naturally, this provoked considerable indignation among the soldiers, who were abandoned to their own resources. Don Porfirio was quick to espouse their cause, and, in the growing rift of sentiment, began to draw an increasing number of Mexicans away from the Juárez-Lerdo combination.

To render his own political action more independent, he offered his resignation from his military post and retired to Noria. This move had all the appearances of a grand gesture by one who had served his country without stint in time of war and had no desire of adding to its burdens during a difficult peace.

At Noria, a suburb of Oaxaca City, he lived with his first wife, Delfina Ortega, whom he had married in April, 1864. There he cultivated sugar cane, from 1868 to 1871, meanwhile maintaining a steady correspondence with his partisans throughout the Republic, who rapidly proceeded to build up a political party known as the Porfirists.

Toward the end of 1870, during the last year of Juárez' first Presidential term, with the country still divided and in a state of turmoil, Díaz found himself pitted against Juárez and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada in a race for the Presidency. Juárez was the strongest by reason of his official position as well as his prestige and popularity. Díaz received the least number of votes; but none of the three gained an absolute majority. The duty of electing the President, therefore, fell upon the Chamber. As a result, Juárez was reinstalled and Lerdo was made head of the Supreme Court and Vice-President, with terms of office to begin on December 1, 1871. Immediately there was an uproar from the Porfirists who maintained there had been a fraud in the national vote. When their complaint was ignored, they decided to resolve the matter by force of arms.

Díaz at first concealed his real sentiments and affected a repugnance for war. But the ground had already been too well prepared. The Press on his side had long been attacking the government of Juárez, and propaganda had been spread throughout the country. In the capital, the Directorate composed of Justo Benítez and other outstanding leaders, had carefully laid plans for the insurrection, and chieftains in the provinces awaited orders. Under the supervision of the conspirators already named, the Plan of Noria was drawn up as the program of Díaz' action, in November, before Juárez could take office. "The indefinite, forced, and violent re-election, of the Federal Executive," it stated, "has placed the national institutions in danger." Complaining of excessive centralization and of the imposition of federal force against the will of the people by the "blind caprice of personal power," the manifesto proceeded to deplore the indignities that had been heaped upon the army. Favoritism and corruption were denounced as the causes of national inefficiency, bankruptcy, and exorbitant taxation.

Then denouncing indefinite re-election, Díaz declared, "The Revolution of Ayutla, the principles of the Reform, and the conquest of independence and of the national institutions will be lost forever, if the destinies of the Republic have to remain at the mercy of an oligarchy so inept, greedy, and unpatriotic." Then the document outlined its program and guarantees. "The Constitution of 1857 and electoral liberty," it declared, "will be our banner; less government and more liberties, our program. . . . Let no citizen impose and perpetuate himself in the exercise of power. This will be the last revolution!"[4]

Undoubtedly there was considerable justification for Díaz complaints against the rule of Juárez, the circumstances of the election, and the evils of self-perpetuation in office. At the same time, it seems clear that he was moved principally by personal ambition and a desire to see his rival Juárez put out of the way and himself installed in the Presidency.

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[4] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 88.

A force of 8000 men was now placed under the leadership of generals favorable to Díaz and began to march toward the center of the country. In Oaxaca, Félix Díaz, governor of the state, joined hands with the ambitions of his brother; but the quick activity of leaders faithful to Juárez soon crushed the movement and sent both Félix and Porfirio, as well as their allies, flying from the state.

Still confident in his cause, Porfirio started toward Mexico City, in the belief that upon his approach the capital would rise as a man to depose Juárez. Events were to prove otherwise. The impetuous Félix, meanwhile, retreated to Juchitán. There he committed the fatal error of removing from the church the statue of the local patron saint and throwing it to the ground. In their grief and anger at this act of impiety, the Indians turned on him, had him thrown into jail, and, in spite of all his pleadings, put him to a cruel death with clubs and stones.

Within four months of its proclamation, the revolution of Noria was suppressed, and the generals around Porfirio were dispersed. Díaz managed to escape and began the wanderings of a hunted man. Reaching the state of Jalisco, he secured work as a groom for a colonel in the service of Juárez. In this employment, he arrived at Nayarit, in the hope of arousing the interest of Manuel Lozada, a ferocious *mestizo* bandit, in permanent rebellion and practical control of the region of Tepic.

Juárez was quick to sense the significance of Díaz' abortive movement, and lost no time in strengthening his own position behind the plausible, and indeed many ways, justifiable, front of legalism. He realized at least that the foundations of peace lay upon orderly procedure; and his message to Congress, December, 1871, had a profound influence upon the country at large. Then came his sudden death, and the accession of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada as Vice-President, with the task of calling for elections.

vi

When the news of these events reached Díaz, he was with Lozada, without any equipment that might enable him to stage an uprising; and he contented himself in the thought that with Juárez out of the way the national problem had been solved. Lerdo immediately issued a general amnesty, without specifying either Imperialists or Porfirists, thus putting both in the same class. Escaping from Lozado, Díaz arrived at Chihuahua, September, 1872. There, he presented himself before the authorities and relinquished his military titles as the price of his pardon. Thanks to his friends in the legislature, his honors were later restored to him in view of past services to the country.

When he returned to the capital, he found himself obliged to make a call of courtesy on Lerdo, who had now been installed in the Presidency by an almost unanimous vote in the secondary elections.[5] Lerdo received the delinquent graciously, confident in his own supremacy.

Díaz decided to retire to Candelaria, a ranch in the state of Vera Cruz, near the border of Oaxaca, which, like Noria, was presented to him by the local legislature. Here he turned carpenter, manufacturing furniture and boats. By 1874, he was ready to return to Congress as a deputy.

Díaz was never an orator, although at the height of his career he was able to express himself with exactness and power; but at this period, his addresses in Congress were usually terminated in a nervous effusion of tears, which contributed little to his reputation and left his audiences in a painful dilemma. Nevertheless, Lerdo had reason to fear his ancient rival, and to remove him from the national scene, offered him, through an intermediary, the post of representative in Berlin. Díaz refused the offer, according to his own account, with the reply, "Tell Don Sebastian that I have no diplomatic merits for such a post; moreover, I ought to consider his offer as a favor, and I accept favors only from my friends."

While at Candelaria, he had been in constant contact with his partisans, particularly from Oaxaca. The neighboring city of Tuxtépec became the center of his secret activities. Out of these meetings grew his second program of revolt, known as the Plan of Tuxtépec, issued January 10, 1876, in the name of an obscure Colonel J. Sarmiento, seconded by General Fidencio Hernández, who was known to be an intimate friend of Díaz.

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[5] Lerdo obtained nearly 10,000 votes and Díaz was given 600, while other candidates polled 136, an interesting commentary on the status of popular suffrage in a country of at least 8,000,000 persons. Cf. Herbert Priestley, *The Mexican Nation* (New York, 1935), p. 371.

As soon as Hernández seized Oaxaca, all the old leaders of the revolt of Noria began to organize their forces in different parts of the country. This time Díaz was able to count definitely on his popularity in Oaxaca, Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. It was this popularity rather than the Plan that brought strength to the movement.

At the suggestion of Manuel González, who was later to be rewarded with the Presidency for one term, Díaz departed for Brownsville, Texas, so as to be able to lead the movement down from the North. Meanwhile Lerdo continued to lay plans to succeed himself in the summer elections.

In view of the modifications adopted by Díaz himself at Palo Blanco, on March 21, 1876, the Plan of Tuxtépec presented a number of interesting propositions. While recognizing the Constitution of 1857 as the supreme law of the nation, it declared null the elections of state governors except those who subscribed to the Plan. Lerdo was not to be recognized as President, nor were his appointees to be confirmed. New elections for the chief offices of the nation were to be held two months after the seizure of the capital; and as an act of supreme importance, there was to be sustained the principle of *No Re-election* of the President of the Republic or of the state governors. Porfirio was to be the chief of the "regenerating" army.

The declaration which Díaz issued from Palo Blanco set forth the abuses of government which were held to justify revolt. "Political suffrage," he affirmed, "has been converted into a farce, since the President and his friends, by all reprobable means, place in public office those who are called his 'official candidates,' chasing out every independent citizen. . . . The municipal power has completely disappeared since the councils are simple dependents of the government. . . . The creation of the Senate, the work of Lerdo de Tejada and his favorites to neutralize legislative action, gives the veto to all laws. . . . The country has been delivered over to the English Company with the concession of the Vera Cruz railroad and the scandalous tariff agreements."[6]

Díaz was himself later to espouse every principle he had condemned in the government of Lerdo. It seems clear that his ruling ambition was, not to remedy alleged abuses, but to place himself in the Presidential chair, which he believed himself capable of administering better than anyone else. Whatever may have been his merits as a patriot or his later services as public administrator, it can hardly be doubted that his designs on the Presidency and his accession to power were not enough to justify his action as a revolutionary.

According to the provisions of Palo Blanco, the head of the Supreme Court was to be called to the Presidency, supplanting Lerdo, until elections could be held, but only in case that official was willing to accept the full Plan. Otherwise the power should revert to Díaz as head of the revolting army. In this way, he was able to make a gesture toward Constitutional procedure. But he made it clear that, unless the offer were accepted within twenty days after its issuance, it would be null and void. As a result of this clever move, José María Iglesias, to whom the offer was made, was actually urged into schism with Lerdo.

The first military blow was struck at Matamoros. Díaz took the city easily because of the defection of most of its defenders. From this victory the way was opened to new enlistments in his cause and to an abundance of money and supplies. Thence he moved with a well-disciplined armed force toward Monterrey.

Lerdo at once put himself to the task of suppressing the revolt. Under his orders, General Mariano Escobedo, the veteran of Querétaro, proceeded in person to face the rebels; and near Monterrey, the troops of Díaz were completely dispersed.

Fleeing from any further encounter with Escobedo, Díaz reentered the United States and made his way to New York. There, he boarded a ship for Vera Cruz, disguising himself as a Cuban doctor. At Tampico, a troop of Lerdist soldiers boarded the ship, and he found himself under suspicion. With the connivance of the captain of the ship he managed to conceal himself until the arrival at Vera Cruz. The captain gave out the story that Díaz had leaped overboard and been devoured by sharks, while Porfirio escaped in a small boat, and proceeded overland from Vera Cruz to Oaxaca. This episode took place in June and July of 1876.

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[6] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 106.

As the insurrection progressed, the action of Iglesias as head of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Vice-President injected an important third element in the ferment for the Presidency. On October 26, 1876, Iglesias issued his own declaration that the federal powers had ceased to be legitimate in consequence of the unrepresentative procedure of Congress in approving and sanctioning the re-election of Lerdo. In making this declaration, he believed that he was acting precisely in the manner of Juárez, who seized the Presidency when Comonfort wished to nullify the Constitution of 1857. He, therefore, believed it incumbent upon himself to assume the Presidency by Constitutional precept and, if necessary, by force. Secretly leaving the capital, Iglesias hastened to Guanajuato, whose governor embraced his cause and gave him important military background for his title of provisional President, until new elections could be called.

This action was enough to elevate the Díaz rebellion, which had thus far been kept on the level of a guerrilla enterprise, to a threat of prime importance against the security of Lerdo. Now the latter was faced with two countermovements widely separated. With three governments, one in Oaxaca, one in Mexico City, and one in Guanajuato, there rose a condition of national confusion.

A number of factors had contributed to undermine Lerdo's national popularity. Although a person of extraordinary intelligence, Lerdo was overconscious of his superiority and not the man to command the allegiance of Mexican chieftains. After the defeat of Manuel Lozada near Guadalajara, Lerdo had gained the ill will of the state of Jalisco and several deputies by continuing to govern the region as a federal military district. The federal system itself had given rise to further disturbances, for each state had conducted itself as an independent entity, with local armies, closed courts, and governors desirous of the Presidency or at least of a ministry.

Amid the national disorders of his regime, Lerdo, who had been educated and protected in his youth by a bishop, continued serenely to enact the explosive anti-Catholic laws of the Reform, which were incorporated by Congress, on May 29, 1874, into the Constitution; and to please his Masonic associates, he expelled the religious orders from the country, against every desire and representation of the people.[7]

The Porfirists, meanwhile, took advantage of general discontent and indignation to strengthen their own cause. They appealed to strong nationalism, aroused the Conservatives against Lerdo's sectarianism, and admitted into the fold a number of the old Imperialist generals. The attitude of Iglesias, plus a hostile campaign of the Press, was daily making Lerdo's position less secure.

General Alatorre, who had remained faithful to Lerdo, was himself approached by emissaries of Iglesias and remained for some time in a state of uncertainty as to which way to turn. He decided to remain loyal until November 30, when Lerdo's first full term would expire, and to reserve his judgment for freedom of action afterward. The Lerdist government was aware of his attitude, but having no other military leaders of equal competence, was obliged to depend on him.

General Manuel González, meanwhile, set out for the South with a considerable force and overtook General Francisco Tolentino, who had been dispatched by Lerdo to meet the rebels. As a result of parleys, Tolentino went over, lock, stock, and barrel, to the Díaz rebellion; and Alatorre found himself obliged to attack the enemy. At Tecoac, where the action took place, Díaz was on the point of being defeated, when the reinforcements of González arrived; and November 16 went down as the date of the defeat of the Lerdo government on the field of battle.

When the news of the disaster reached the capital, General Escobedo announced that the government was prepared to continue resistance. The following day, the city awoke to learn that Lerdo and his Ministry, as well as a good number of deputies, after sacking the treasury, had fled to Toluca. Díaz arrived in the capital, on November 20, four days after Lerdo's flight, and took possession of the Palace without meeting any resistance. Lerdo made his way through the state of Guerrero and sailed from a Pacific port for the United States. He took up residence in New York, where he lived for some years in seclusion and died in the care of the Sisters of Charity, one of the religious orders he had expelled from Mexico.

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[7] Cf. Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en Mexico* (El Paso, 1928), tomo V, pp. 384 sq.

There still remained the task of conciliating Iglesias. Díaz agreed to recognize the provisional Presidency of Iglesias provided the latter would consent to new general elections and name a coalition ministry in common with the chiefs of the Díaz revolution. Iglesias balked at this program but consented to meet Díaz for further discussion.

Then Díaz telegraphed him that he preferred the conference to be settled by telegraph. "From that time on," said Iglesias, "I began to realize that the affair was not proceeding in good faith; but in spite of the just suspicion which I conceived, I did not wish to manifest it and decided to accept plainly the telegraphic conference in place of the verbal discussion."[8]

This was but the beginning of humiliations for Iglesias. Díaz now decided to do business only through his intermediary Justo Benítez. It soon became clear that he was unwilling to go upon any basis except that of Tuxtépec and Palo Blanco, whereas Iglesias could not logically accept the rôle of a revolutionary which this demanded. The end finally came in a meeting of the two near Querétaro. Díaz made it apparent that he was not interested in Constitutional procedure. Inasmuch as Iglesias had refused to accept his program in its entirety, he determined to take matters completely into his own hands.

The scornful and insulting attitude which he adopted was apparently more effective than that of his rival. Iglesias, deserted by his soldiers, fled to Guadalajara, and failing to secure any substantial aid for his cause, departed for the United States. Díaz had won by intrigue, good luck, force of arms, and national confusion. To give the new regime some appearance of legality, he named General Juan N. Méndez chief executive and then had Méndez appoint him head of the army.

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[8] José María Iglesias, *La Sucesión Presidencial en 1876* (Mexico, 1892).

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Proceeding to Mexico City as the *de facto* President, Díaz immediately showed himself a keen administrator by naming a Cabinet of outstanding ability. Congressional elections were then held, although citizens who had been involved in the re-election of Lerdo were excluded. The new Congress met, April 1, 1877. One month later, Díaz was declared provisional President, to complete the term of office up to December 1, 1880. Eager to make a good impression on the populace, he refused to live in the National Palace and took instead a modest house on Santa Inés Street.

Iglesias relinquished all title to office; but Lerdo issued a manifesto from New York, protesting the usurpation of Díaz, and succeeded in stirring a number of minor revolts. The most important of these was led from Texas into Coahuila by General Escobedo, in June, 1877. The latter was captured the following year but was released on his promise not to take up arms again. On June 25, 1878, General Luis Mier y Terán, governor of Vera Cruz, sent exaggerated reports of a Lerdist conspiracy; and Díaz, apprehensive of every movement, wired orders to "kill on the spot." It is impossible to find justification for this slaughter. Nevertheless, the event made it clear that any new revolutionary attempt would be suffocated in blood.

To facilitate a partial demobilization of the army and at the same time to insure security on the public roads, one of the first acts of the new President was to establish the *rurales* or federal mounted police, in the traditional costume of the Mexican rancher. Pensions were provided for wounded soldiers who had served in his campaigns and for the dependents of those incapacitated or killed in service.

With peace thus placed upon a disciplined basis, Díaz now turned his attention to the development of roads, agriculture, mining, and foreign trade, and revised the legal codes to make them more just and effective. In the field of national finances, these measures were reflected in an increase of the public taxes from 18,000,000 pesos in 1876–1877 to 20,000,000 the following year.[9] A commission of Americans and Mexicans was created to discuss the foreign debt, with notable advantage to both countries.

His policy of extending the railroad system marked a radical change in international policy. Both Juárez and Lerdo had blocked American development in this direction and preferred to favor European contractors, with the idea of creating competition between Europe and the United States. Juárez was credited with saying, "Between Mexico and the United States — the desert." Díaz, on the contrary, was ready to grant liberal concessions to all American enterprises that sought them.

With the impulse received from foreign capital and industry, Mexico rapidly arose from the prostrate condition in which it had remained since the wars for independence to one of national order and wealth.

On May 5, 1878, the principle of *No Re-election* was raised to the status of Constitutional law, in accordance with the Plan of Tuxtépec, but in a definitely modified form, to permit re-election after an interregnum. With the door open to a return to office after the term of his successor, a new problem arose, namely that of getting a President who could be persuaded to turn back the reins of government at the appropriate time.

It is generally believed that Díaz had agreed to designate his old friend and constant adviser, Justo Benítez, as his successor in the Presidency upon the expiration of his first term. The general public realized that Mexican elections were no more than a formality, to keep up a front of democracy. Díaz, however, began to feel that Benítez was too ambitious. Without further ado, he shifted his patronage to Manuel González. This came as the stroke of disaster to Benítez and to his friends who counted upon his succession to build their own political futures. Benítez and Díaz parted forever. Others faithful to Díaz until this time took the same route and henceforth referred to him, not as *Porfirio*, but as *Perfidio*.

National elections were carried out exactly as planned, and on December 1, 1880, Díaz turned over the government to Manuel González. The latter responded with all the gratitude of a man who had been presented with a splendid gift. As a creature of Díaz, he realized that he was to pursue the Porfirian policies and preserve the executive seat for his master upon the expiration of his own four-year term. He accepted the resignation of the former Cabinet and appointed a new one, with Díaz, as Minister of Development, a position which the latter held for six months and resigned.

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[9] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 155.

In general, González gave the country a good administration, although a number of serious charges were brought against him. He was accused of conniving at widespread corruption among his friends and the officials of his government. Proposed recognition of the English debt was also regarded as a scandal by a large sector of the public.

During this time, Díaz was engaged as governor of his native state, Oaxaca. In almost every department, he showed himself a capable administrator, promoting industry and education as well as agriculture, and placing the treasury on a sound basis. He suddenly resigned and returned to Mexico City as magistrate in the Court of Justice. Now in his early fifties, he found himself widowed by the death of his first wife in childbirth.

Once more in the faster tempo of the capital, his eyes fell upon Carmen Romero Rubio, a cultured and beautiful lady, nineteen years of age, who had been educated in the United States. He decided to take the opportunity of studying English with so charming a teacher, and married the lady early in 1883. After a honeymoon in the United States, where he was heralded as a visiting celebrity, he returned with his bride, to await the outcome of the next Presidential elections.

After a well-organized balloting, Díaz was awarded the almost unanimous vote, taking possession of the Presidency for the second time, December 1, 1884. His new cabinet included Ignacio Mariscal as Minister of Foreign Affairs, with his father-in-law, Romero Rubio, formerly Lerdo's political manager, as Minister of Government.

Again in the Presidential chair, Díaz took pains to see that

González should not retain too much power or ambition. Followers of the ex-President he replaced with officers of his own choice, stirring up rivalries, having recourse to managed elections, or endowing the gentlemen with rich properties which should engage all their attention and activity. Charges of misuse of public funds were brought against González; but these were deposited in the official archives, to be held over his head lest he should make any undesirable move. Díaz was known to refer to the unhappy González, who died after serving as governor of Guanajuato, as a man who would have been a good executive except for his "tendency to assimilate." But he personally assured González that all this propaganda about his dishonesty originated in the envy of Romero Rubio.

A remarkable personal change had taken place in Díaz on his second accession to power. The experience of his first term in the Presidency, his trip to the United States, and the tactful coaching of his second wife changed the uncouth soldier into a cultured man of state. Meticulously dressed, carefully groomed, and managing himself with punctilio, the new Díaz became the center of the polite and cosmopolitan society of the capital. Even the man's complexion is said to have become considerably lighter, owing probably to his more sedentary life, while, more profoundly, he proved himself alert and constantly developing, at an age when most men begin to feel that they have passed the crest of life.

In particular, he showed a wisdom rarely exercised by Mexican statesmen, in drawing to his side capable persons of various political beliefs, thus not only exercising the virtue of civic tolerance but also availing himself of expert judgment, especially in economic matters. Major credit for the stability and financial improvement of the Díaz regime must go to José Ives Limantour, a naturalized Frenchman, whom Díaz appointed as Secretary of the Treasury in February, 1893.

The condition of the treasury had indeed provided a major source of worry for successive governments in Mexico and been one of the principal causes of discontent, anarchy, and insurrection. This state of affairs, which prevailed up to the time of Díaz, was by no means improved by his accession to power. In the fiscal year 1878–79, the national deficit exceeded 11,500,000 pesos; by 1887–88, it was over 21,000,000 pesos.

Two special causes contributed to this situation. The first was the scandalous dissipation of public funds during the administration of Manuel González. The four years of this regime, 1880–84, cost the government a loss of 45,000,000 pesos. At the same time, Díaz, moved by the desire of hastening the progress of the country or of consolidating his own political position, began to spend enormous sums particularly in the development of railroads, without any apparent thought of the financial future of the nation. In desperation, he sent for Matías Romero, then Mexican Minister in Washington, to assume the portfolio of the treasury and make a detailed report on his findings. Romero worked with energy to restore order out of chaos and returned to Washington, leaving the Ministry to Limantour, who had worked with him as subsecretary.

When Limantour took office, the situation of the treasury was so bad that suspension of the payment of the external debt seemed imperative. Limantour urged that payment be continued as long as possible, and although there still remained a deficit of 1,340,415 pesos at the end of the fiscal year 1893–94, he managed to carry through without having recourse to any special loans or levies. By 1895, he succeeded, not only in balancing the budget, but also in building up a surplus of 5,500,000 pesos.[10] From that time on, every year, with the exception of 1897–98, showed a steady improvement. Not one bank founded during his administration of the treasury failed, while paper money was everywhere valued on sight. Upon relinquishing his post in 1911, he left to the new government a treasury of over 73,000,000 pesos. The fact that the finances of Mexico plunged wildly afterward was due solely to the irresponsible forces of revolution that dissipated what he had so carefully built up and systematized.

As a result, the nation was able to weather every crisis from

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[10] Cf. José F. Godoy, *Porfirio Díaz* (Mexico, 1910, *version Castellana*), p. 229.

1893 to 1910, develop its resources under the most favorable terms, and engage in the erection of practically the only architectural witnesses of national glory and prosperity since the colonial era. To him in part was due the nationalization of the railroads, the draining of the Valley of Mexico, the development of Chapultepec Park, and the planning of such notable buildings as the Legislative Palace, the National Theater, the Post Office, and the Ministry of Communications.

If any error must be attributed to Limantour, it was his failure to realize the impatience of the Mexican people, and the ambitions of their leaders, which constantly exposed the country to revolt and factional upheaval. A firm believer in peace founded on prosperity, he was inclined to slight the army to cut down on its expenses, which had often under previous regimes absorbed as much as half of the national income. As a result, he not only incurred the displeasure of that body but reduced the national defense to such a point that when uprisings began to threaten the Díaz administration in 1910, the forces at the disposal of the federal executive were quite inadequate to meet the almost inevitable situation.

viii

To be sure, the Plan of Tuxtépec had proclaimed No Re-election but, like preceding Mexican executives, Porfirio Díaz hated the thought of having to relinquish power. Through Carlos Pacheco, his Minister of *Fomento,* who had lost a limb in the cause of No Re-election, he inserted the first wedge in his original principle, by proposing an amendment to the Constitution which would make possible the re-election of national and state executives for a single term. This amendment was approved by Congress and published, October 21, 1887. On December 20, 1890, Congress approved an amendment, declaring "the President will enter the exercise of his functions on December 1 and will continue in office for four years." Nothing was said about succession in office. Indefinite re-election was now assured.

While these sweeping changes were taking place, the evolution of Díaz' ideas in other respects was equally radical. The Plan of Palo Blanco had condemned Lerdo for accepting the

English debt of some 2,000,000 pesos, declaring it "immoral as well as unjust, since Mexico has not been indemnified for the losses caused by the Intervention." Díaz now began to realize that Mexico must first settle its obligations, if it was to secure further credit from abroad; and where González had failed, he now secured extraordinary financial powers from Congress and ordered the recognition of the debt, before the Chamber of Deputies was aware of what had happened.

By stirring up rivalries among possible competitors and buying off or suppressing other forms of opposition, Díaz continued in office from 1884 to 1892. When the time for Presidential elections of 1892 approached, he began to lay plans for a new "spontaneous" expression in his favor. This time he secured the services of Rosendo Pineda, the private secretary of Romero Rubio, and created a convention in the manner of the parties of the United States. This gathering of the Liberal Union was later extended to the organization of clubs under the protection of various governors. Then the mayors of the municipalities were called to a great celebration in Mexico City and sent home with the proper political sentiments. No other than General Mariano Escobedo was prevailed upon to nominate Díaz for re-election as the candidate of the Liberal Party. Porfirio was returned to office without the slightest opposition except that of the newspaper *La República,* whose editors were consequently imprisoned for their indiscretion.

Out of the first Convention of the Liberal Union in 1892 came the idea of forming a great national party to promote democracy. The two principal points in the program were independence of the Supreme Court, guaranteed by permanence of the justices, and freedom of the Press. These were shown to Limantour for Díaz' inspection, but they died in the Legislature inasmuch as the Dictator opposed the ideas. As a result the group relinquished its character as a political party and fell into line with the Administration.

This group came to be known as the Científicos or Scientific Party. Its name seems to have originated in the insistence of the constituents that government should no longer be merely pragmatic but should follow the dictates of political *science.*

The Científicos now assumed the character of a mercantile and business group, the favored inner circle whose government affiliations opened the door to boundless opportunities for the disposal of privileges and personal enrichment, and it was as such that the public came to know them.

All this played into the hands of Díaz, who thus was able to favor and silence the best talent of the day and at the same time to maintain the government on a high level of efficiency through the services of lawyers, commissions, and secretariats. The organization of the country in the most brilliant period of the Dictator can thus be credited almost exclusively to the work of the Científicos. To their indefatigable labors, heightened by motives of personal profit, Mexico came to present to the world the evidences of a modern and progressive nation.

At the top of the circle stood Limantour who, as Secretary of the Treasury, practically dominated the other ministries by a law which gave him control over their expenditures. In the front line stood the other great figures of the era. The majority of the fraternity were lawyers, cultured men, personal friends of one another. Backed by powerful foreign corporations, they absolutely controlled concessions in the fields of banking, mining, petroleum development, and other forms of commercial exploitation.[11]

It was impossible under the circumstances for this caste to avoid arousing a widespread and deep-seated envy, and since as their position depended upon the perpetuation of the Díaz regime, they became inseparably linked with its fortunes and doomed to share the miseries of its fall. These men represented economic and governmental Liberalism in the theory that Big Business would bring the maximum of prosperity. But, like their counterparts in other countries, they overreached themselves and lost sight of important human considerations in the gathering storm that was to bring revolution and chaos.

To secure the fourth re-election, in 1896, the support of rich and outstanding foreigners who had important investments in the country was enlisted on the side of Díaz, giving to the world and the nation the impression that capitalistic interests were linked with his wise and just administration. The government provided subsidies for the majority of the journals of the day, and the *Diario Oficial* was created as the organ of the government. Independent editors and publications were squelched or persecuted.

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[11] Cf. Carleton Beals, *Porfirio Diaz* (Philadelphia, 1922), pp. 321–331.

Following his triumphs in the capital, the Supreme Commander of the nation, who was now endowed with all the power of a monarch, made a series of journeys throughout the country, and the populace turned out to honor him with display which had not been seen since the exalted days of Santa Anna.

At this time he spoke of retiring from the Presidency in 1900, and suggested Limantour as his successor with General Bernardo Reyes of Nuevo León as a strong minister of war for national defense. Ministerial rivalry again played into his hands, and it was pointed out by Joaquín Baranda, Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, that Limantour, as only a naturalized citizen, was Constitutionally disqualified. This argument, although not consistently followed in several other cases, was enough to dissuade Díaz from his original intention, and he found himself as the only real candidate remaining, up for re-election the fifth time. His final decision seems to indicate that he never was sincere in the project or that he was happy to find a pretext for changing his mind and holding on to a power that had grown increasingly sweet. The Porfirist National Circle joined hands with the Liberal Union, and, now in his seventies, he emerged as the unanimous choice of the country, for 1900–1904.

Toward the close of 1901, the Pan-American Conference was held in Mexico City, bringing together an imposing galaxy of leaders and scholars from North and South American states. Not since the days of the viceroys had Mexico presented such a spectacle of peace and security. Railroads and telegraph lines had grown apace with the development of factories and commercial enterprises. The credit of the nation was excellent, and foreign investments had reached an unprecedented peak. Díaz was universally regarded as the savior of his country and possessed medals and decorations from practically every government in the world.

If any lingering doubts remained of Díaz' determination, they were finally dispelled when he called together the Científicos to lay the groundwork for his sixth re-election. The Second Convention of the Liberal Union was called, and only persons of absolute confidence and officials of the country were invited to serve as delegates. Francisco Bulnes, the most brilliant orator of the period, was selected to make the nomination.

In an address remarkable for its frankness and keen analysis, Bulnes admitted that a sixth re-election was antidemocratic and that the continued dependence of the nation upon Díaz' tenure of office indicated a state of alarm and almost of despair. "To say quietly to this nation," he declared: "'All the sacrifices which you have made have been to give you a little peace, a period of prosperity, a little decency while General Díaz lives for you; but your destiny is of the Biblical Jew: to wander from night to night, from chaos to chaos, from abyss to abyss, from dictatorship to dictatorship, from anarchy to anarchy, only to fall weakly, degraded and ragged, not upon bayonets, for exhausted slaves cannot fight — but into the soup wagons of every conqueror. . . . The re-election is only the oxygen-tank of your agony; your national life and your civilization will have to fall into the same grave as the human life of General Díaz!' — Frankly, gentlemen, if the matter is presented in this light, nothing can be more lugubrious than re-election."[12]

To remedy this tragic outlook, his appeal proceeded to represent the re-election of Díaz as a necessity, lest the work he achieved be lost. During this last period of office, then, Díaz was to work for the permanence of these gains, by placing the nation on the imperishable basis of law. "What is it," Bulnes asked, "that the nation looks forward to after Díaz? Men, and nothing more than men? The nation does not want men for the era after Díaz. The nation wants political parties; it wants institutions; it wants effective laws; it wants the struggle of ideas, interests, and passions. . . . The re-election should serve to permit General Díaz to complete his work, to fulfill the sacred duty of organizing our institutions, with the purpose of providing that society after him and in the future may depend upon its laws and not its men."

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[12] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 250.

The conditions placed upon Díaz were clear. His failure to meet them spelled the tragedy of his regime and the ruin of contemporary Mexico.

Following the Convention, Díaz was induced by Limantour and the Científicos to allow the restoration of the Vice-Presidency, which had lapsed since Iglesias. Vice-presidents had, in the past, been a source of endless intrigue and insecurity for the Chief Executive. If the office had to be recreated, it should be occupied by a man who could be trusted to keep his place and restrain his ambitions. The choice fell upon Ramón Corral, former governor of Sonora, a man but slightly known to the nation. The Presidential term was extended from four to six years; and, with this ample period in which to consolidate his gains, Díaz again took office.

ix

The Presidential Cabinet was composed for the most part of honorable, capable men of advanced age who had been with Díaz over a period of years. The governors of the states were selected entirely on the basis of their loyalty and friendship with the President. Many of them held power indefinitely; others alternated with members of their families. Nothing was done without consulting the President. The local legislature represented his will, as reflected through the governors, and well-managed elections made opposition or redress impossible.

So far as elections were concerned, the public, accustomed to see that opposition candidates had not the slightest chance against government favorites, refrained from the polls. Instead, the ballot boxes were stuffed with votes for the determined appointees, and Díaz was able to count upon the "passive cooperation of the country with all of his policy." He also resorted to the practice of having "elected" officials represent districts with which they had no personal connection, thus creating a network of representatives bound to himself absolutely by gratitude.

In one important respect, Díaz differed from Presidents who had preceded him. The nineteenth century was full of constitutions, pronunciamentos, and appeals to various forms of government. Díaz was astute enough to make no proclamation or abolition. To have done so would have been to provoke revolution and procure his own downfall. But he quietly suspended the Constitution of 1857 and its Reform laws in practical effect and placed political procedure under the norm of his own will.

In 1877, at the outset of his Presidential career, he called for "the most strict and severe exactitude" in the enforcement of the antireligious clauses of the Reform. As soon as peace returned to the country, he took a more moderate view of the matter. "The loudly alleged causes for the persecution of the Church," he said, "do not exist. There are no such accumulations of money or other uprisings than those of the people when they are unjustly attacked in their indelible traditions and in their very legitimate freedom of conscience. Persecution of the Church (whether or not the clergy are concerned) means war and war of such kind that the government can win only against its own people by means of the humiliating, despotic, costly, and most dangerous support of the United States. Mexico without its religion ruins itself to lose everything."[13]

This did not mean that the Church was given full liberty; the laws of the Reform were never revoked. But the years after 1880 were definitely years of Catholic reconstruction from the wreckage of the era of Juárez and Lerdo. More dioceses were erected during the time of Porfirio Díaz than under Philip II. A number of religious orders were organized for charitable and catechetical work to take the place of those which had been dissolved and despoiled by the reformers. In the commemoration of Independence in 1910, the banners of the Virgin of Guadalupe were everywhere paraded as the center of honor and veneration.[14]

When asked why, for all his spirit of compromise, he made no serious effort to remove from the Constitution the clauses disabling religion, Díaz replied that if he were to give the Church a little finger, it would want the whole arm. His method was rather to keep the institution at his mercy and show his benevolence by extending favors. When a political chieftain was reported as unfair to the local prelate, Díaz sent for him to discuss the agricultural situation, and closed the interview with a casual remark. "By the way, Colonel, the bishop in your state is a friend of mine. I hope you will treat him right."

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[13] Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 408.

[14] Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, p. 420; J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 458.

Thus, behind the façade of democracy, he was able to act the complete autocrat. While retaining the appearance of a Constitution, he was able to manage its provisions for popular sovereignty, and, at the same time, to make those compromises which it had intolerantly rejected, notably in the field of religious freedom. The Científicos who surrounded him and profited by his regime, as well as the sociologists of the era, felt that the Constitution, although a beautiful document, was altogether too advanced and democratic for a country of the character of Mexico. In many respects, it failed to reduce its ideals to a concrete definition of the functions of officials and the obligations of citizens. All this played into Díaz' hands and facilitated further the development of his personalist rule.

Under this benevolent autocracy, Mexico continued year after year to enjoy national prosperity and a sound treasury, with the constant increase of industry, commerce, and means of communication. Year after year, also, the same official personnel maintained the *status quo* of the regime; the official monopoly of the vote and control of the Press continued to perpetuate the Utopia with Díaz at its head. Beneath this external contentment and progress, however, there was in the minds of thinking men a growing realization that the whole Porfirian structure rested on a foundation of sand and that its fabric lacked the mortar to hold it together.

In spite of a program of public instruction, the state schools remained in a deplorable condition. The moral education of the students was entrusted to professors of the Positivist school of thought, teaching the so-called "religion of humanity" of Auguste Comte, introduced during the days of Juárez. Christian conceptions of God and of the soul were abolished, and in their place were substituted social and personal interest and motives.[15]

Díaz fit into the Positivist system as best he could. He gave out the impression of enforcing the anti-Catholic laws of the Reform; but when Catholic schools or foundations were threatened with closure, he allowed his wife to warn the Catholic authorities. A Thirty-Third Degree Mason, he liked to pose as a freethinker, and never went to Church except for the festival of Covadonga. Secretly, he professed belief in God and maintained friendly relations with the Archbishop. In these respects, however, he can hardly be accused of differing greatly from many other Mexican statesmen and politicians who have set out to persecute the Church.

The majority of the Científicos were avowed Positivists. Although they succeeded for the most part in building up large private fortunes, they gave comparatively little thought to social amelioration of the masses or to creation of a moral basis of human rights and duties besides that of self-interest. Once the bars of authority were let down, it was only natural that the end of the era should be anarchy and destructive rapacity among the lower classes.[16]

Perhaps the most amazing oversight in the system of Díaz was his failure to maintain a strong army. As one who had come into power by force of arms and used force to suppress early revolts, he should have been the first to recognize the need of ready defense. But Díaz came to feel secure in his own popularity; and, in accord with Limantour, he believed that economic interests would be enough to maintain peace.

Apart from the cadets educated in the Military College of Chapultepec, there was hardly any element in the army that could be called efficient. Favoritism in promotions had produced a profound disaffection among career officers, while the method of recruiting soldiers by levy succeeded in assembling the worst kind of ranks. It was the common practice of civil and police authorities to round up vagrants, thieves, and habitual drunkards for military service and remove them from the legal protection of their relatives, by procuring false registry of enlistment or shipping the men to other parts of the country. This same method was used to secure workers for the exploitation of the National Valley; hundreds of men were seized by the government and then turned over to favored corporations in mines and plantations.

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[15] Cf. Cuevas, *loc. cit.*, tomo V, pp. 375–379; Valentin Gama, *El Positivismo en México,* in *V.G.B.* (Mexico, November, 1933); Justo Sierra, *México, Su Evolución Social* (Barcelona, 1901), tomo II, pp. 148 sq.

[16] During the Díaz era, the land laws of Juárez and Lerdo were carried to their logical conclusion. Nearly all the remaining Indian communal lands were absorbed by large estates. Cf. Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace By Revolution* (New York, 1933), Chap. XII.

In his nomination speech, Francisco Bulnes had hinted at the general unrest beneath the political stagnancy and complacent prosperity of the era; and indeed it was primarily to give the government an opportunity to transfer the national order from a personalist foundation to one of constitutional laws that Díaz' period of office had been extended from four to six years. Díaz accepted the nomination, so delivered, but apparently he had not the slightest comprehension of his responsibility or intention of carrying out the injunction. The old system continued to function regularly and inexorably, without change, as before.

x

In March, 1908, there occurred an event of consequences which the old Dictator apparently did not foresee. James Creelman, an American journalist, came down from New York, secured an interview with Díaz, and had it published in *Pearson's Magazine* under the title of "Thrilling Story of President Díaz, the Greatest Man on the Continent." The article was accompanied with numerous illustrations and descriptions of a romantic character. All these were by way of adornment to the avowed declaration of Porfirio that he was determined to retire from office, predicting a peaceful future for Mexico under free institutions.

Most amazing of Díaz' declarations was that of his complete confidence in democracy. It is an error, he declared, to suppose that the future of democracy in Mexico has been endangered by the long permanence of one President. This large period of office, he maintained, had not in the least corrupted his political ideals but rather had convinced him more and more that democracy is the only just and true principle of government — although in practice it is possible only among advanced peoples.

According to his story, he had come into power at a time when Mexico was not yet ready for democratic institutions. The reason that democratic principles had not taken deeper root in Mexico, he felt, was that the people did not sufficiently concern themselves in public affairs. The rich and the sons of the rich were too exclusively interested in their private concerns, while the Indians, who constituted more than half of the population were accustomed to follow passively the orders of the government. Thus, until his time, he believed that Mexico lacked a solid middle class. On these grounds he explained his adoption of a patriarchal policy, guiding and sustaining the popular tendencies in the conviction that under an enforced peace, education, industry, and commerce would develop elements of stability and union in a people naturally intelligent, submissive, and benevolent.

He now believed that the day had arrived when Mexico was prepared to select and change its governments regularly, without danger of civil wars or damage to its credit and national progress. He would long since have relinquished power were it not for the overwhelming insistence of his friends that he remain in office. Indeed, he would have welcomed an opposition party, but apparently his enemies were too few or too weak to start one. Now, however, on the threshold of his eightieth year, he was going to step out, in order that he might assist in the guidance of his successor.

Díaz had said these things a thousand times before, but no one had taken them seriously; and citizens who had endeavored to express themselves or to form movements in opposition to his policies had promptly learned to regret it. But now the old Dictator was talking to the world, and to that extent had strengthened internal forces of change or rebellion which were straining at the leash to form this party of opposition to which he now promised his benediction. The interview with Creelman sounded his political death knell.

Even those who were genuinely concerned with keeping Díaz in office indefinitely began to realize that they were playing a losing game. The painful signs of old age were now manifesting themselves unmistakably in the President. His hearing and memory were failing; and it was evident that the Vice-President, even if Díaz chose to run again, would be of paramount importance. Rumblings of apprehension began to appear in various writings, and toward the end of 1908 the mildly challenging book of Francisco I. Madero, *La Sucesion Presidencial en 1910,* was given a wide circulation.[17]

At this time a large sector of the public began to consider favorably the possible candidacy of Bernardo Reyes, whom both Díaz and the Científicos felt they had reason to fear. A group of young men formed the Democratic Party, obviously to block re-election and in a general way to promote the cause of Reyes.

About the same time there appeared the Anti-Re-election Party, led by more radical and discontented elements, many of whom had become accustomed to spending most of their time in jail. The ideas of this group were also set forth in a Manifesto. Two fundamental principles were enunciated: *Effective Suffrage* and *No Re-election.* The first of these was "to save the Republic from the clutches of absolutism, to return the states their sovereignty, the municipalities their liberty, citizens their prerogatives, and the nation its greatness." The second principle was "to prevent in the future our governors from seizing power and establishing new dictatorships, and, more immediately, to secure a renovation in the personnel of the government, keeping in mind that those who direct the destinies of the country in the next Constitutional period should be the most fitted, worthy, and able to give satisfaction to the ardent aspirations of the Mexicans, who wish to be governed by the law and not by a man. . . ."

The Manifesto was signed by Emilio Vázquez Gómez, president, Francisco I. Madero and Toribio Esquivel Obregón, vice-presidents, Filomeno Mata, Paulino Martínez, Felix F. Palavicini, and José Vasconcelos, secretaries. These names were followed by numerous others which have become familiar in contemporary Mexico.

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[17] "The country is in danger," wrote Madero, referring to the Díaz dictatorship, "and to save it, the force of all good Mexicans is necessary" (2ª ed., 1909), p. 278.

The formal Anti-Re-election Convention was set for April 15, 1909, with Madero as its candidate for the Presidency and Vázquez Gómez for the Vice-Presidency. In spite of the efforts of the government to suppress the meeting, even with orders for the arrest of Madero, the Convention was held as scheduled, and Madero addressed the assembly that had designated him as its choice.

An interview was arranged between Díaz and Madero, after these events, in the hope that a compromise might be reached by eliminating Corral and permitting the free election of a Vice-President, with Madero as first possibility. The old autocrat dismissed Madero with sovereign disdain, and the opposition candidates proceeded to publicize their Manifesto to the nation. Díaz had already reconsidered his promises in the Creelman interview, and insisted that Ramón Corral again accept the Vice-Presidency.

Meanwhile, the movement for Reyes' candidacy continued to grow, stirring up a tempest of animosity in rival factions of the Press, until Reyes himself disclaimed any desire for the nomination. Lest personal ambition or national enthusiasm should remain to make Reyes a menace, Díaz ordered him to resign the governorship of Nuevo León and leave for Europe, ostensibly for military studies. Reyes accepted the exile without protest; but this move was such as to change the enthusiasm of his devotees into revolutionary rancor.

With his disappearance from the scene, the inevitable collapse of the Reyes clubs and the Democratic Party followed, leaving two extreme camps in the field, the Re-electionists, for the Díaz-Corral combination, and the Anti-Re-electionists, for a complete change. Two newspapers were founded in Mexico City to sustain the ideas of the Re-electionist Party, namely, *La Reelection* and *El Debate.* The second of these passed all limits in its bitter attacks upon enemies, real and imaginary, of the regime. It was finally suppressed upon the complaint of the American minister, Henry Lane Wilson, against an article on the United

States; but its death did not come until it had succeeded, quite against calculations, in stirring up a passionate opposition sentiment.

During this time the electoral campaign for Díaz-Corral was meeting with unexpected reverses in various parts of the country. At Cuernavaca and Guanajuato the orators were hooted, and at Guadalajara the political delegation was stoned. There were reprisals, of course. Students were jailed and journalists in various parts of the country were silenced. During none of these events, however, did Díaz feel anything but contempt for possible adversaries.[18]

xi

It was reserved for Madero to become the nemesis of the Díaz regime. A slight man, five feet two inches in height, with a high-pitched voice and nervous manner, Madero could never aspire to the iron will of Díaz, nor was he of more than mediocre intellectual talent. Guided by his sentiments more than by ideas, he was nevertheless clear in the political issues at stake. He was born, October 30, 1873, in Parras de la Fuente, Coahuila. He studied under the Jesuits in their college at Saltillo, later on went to the United States, where he studied at St. Mary's College, Baltimore, and from there to France, where he was a student in the Lyceum of Versailles and the school of Higher Commercial Studies. After traveling over most of Europe, he returned to the United States and entered the University of California to learn English. At the age of twenty he returned to his family and settled down at San Pedro de las Colonias, to manage his father's estates in the region of La Laguna. As a landed proprietor, he showed a humane and progressive spirit.

Madero's first entry into political life dated from 1905, when he founded a political club and newspaper at San Pedro and took an active part in organizing a convention for the governor of the state.[19] Owing to the intervention of Vice-President Corral in the campaign, the candidate designated by the convention was eliminated in favor of the government's candidate, and a number of persons who took part in the independent campaign were put into prison. As a result of the injustices of this election, Madero conceived his plans for a national renovation and common cause with the Anti-Re-election Party.

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[18] On October 16, 1909, Díaz met President William H. Taft in a celebrated interview at El Paso, Texas, heralded as a proof of his regime's stability, cf. Godoy, *loc. cit.*, pp. 201 sq.

[19] Alfonso Taracena, *Francisco I. Madero* (Mexico, 1937), p. 40.

At the beginning of the political movement in 1909, this party, small in size, was editing a paper with funds supplied by Madero and his sisters Mercedes and Angela. This journal was soon suppressed by the government. Its editor, Félix F. Palavicini, was forced into hiding, and the collaborators José Vasconcelos, Federico González Garza, and Luis Cabrera were ordered under arrest. Madero, nevertheless, continued his agitation and began a series of journeys, in December, 1909, throughout the country, accompanied by his wife and Roque Estrada.

The disbanding of the Reyes Party at this time put new life into the Anti-Re-election movement, and the Masonic lodges and the clubs which had served the Reyes cause now became centers of activity for Madero, who meanwhile began his second tour of the country. At Durango he went on record as opposed to the Anti-Catholic laws of the Reform, stating that their application was contrary "to public liberties and that the enjoyment of these liberties ought to be absolute." These views, however which were received with considerable interest by the people, had no significance in the political campaign and were totally disregarded by the revolutionists who later glorified Madero as a liberator. Improvement of facilities for public education, the amelioration of working conditions, encouragement of agriculture and mining, war on monopolies and privileges, improvement of the army, guarantees for freedom of the press, and a foreign policy of friendliness particularly with Latin-Americans, were listed in his official ten-point program, and served as the substance of his message on his third tour of the nation.

On July 3, 1910, Madero began his last campaign tour. Demonstrations of considerable importance had already been organized in his favor in Mexico City. At Saltillo, difficulty was experienced with the police, who attempted to prevent the candidate from speaking. Similar obstacles were met during the assembly at

Monterrey; and as Madero was leaving by automobile to take the night train to Ciudad Victoria, he was placed under arrest and removed to the penitentiary at San Luis Potosí.

He was charged with having directed a personal attack against Díaz at San Luis Potosí; and after the seizure of his correspondence, he was accused of preparing an armed revolt. His principal partisans were either imprisoned or forced into hiding and his campaign collapsed. Before he was released from prison, on July 20, the victory of Díaz and Corral was declared "by an immense majority of votes." Attempts to challenge the elections were in vain.

On October 5, Madero fled from San Luis to Texas, and, safely installed in San Antonio, issued a revolutionary program with an appeal to arms, under title of the Plan of San Luis Potosí. This Plan was rapidly circulated throughout Mexico and welcomed everywhere by the discontented elements of the country. It declared the recent elections null and refused to recognize the government of Díaz. The Constitution of 1857 and the principle of No-Re-election were announced as the supreme laws of the land. Restitution of the lands unjustly taken from them was promised to the Indians. Madero was given the character of provisional President, and November 20 was set as the date for the general uprising.

San Luis Potosí by this time had become a revolutionary center, with plans for insurrection on a national scale. Throughout the country there had been manifestations in favor of Madero, resulting in bloody reprisals. In the capital itself, on September 11, an armed force dispersed a demonstration, but a number of the participants reappeared before the private mansion of Díaz and, with the cry of "Death to the bad government, death to Porfirio Díaz," threw projectiles through the windows. In Puebla, on November 18, a well-known partisan of Madero, Aquíles Serdán, was shot by the police when he resisted arrest in his home, and thus became glorified as the first martyr of the revolution.

The beginning of the insurrection was far from encouraging. Various projects collapsed for lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Mexican people and the failure of leaders to carry out their promises. Madero returned to San Antonio in December, and only the threat of arrest for violating the neutrality laws sent him back into Mexican territory, on February 14. The movement by this time had assumed considerable proportions in the state of Chihuahua.

If Díaz had been able to send some 12,000 trained soldiers to the frontier, it is probable he could have ended the revolt. Unfortunately for his cause, he found himself totally unprepared. Unwilling to trust any of his generals, without efficient troops, and unable to attend to details himself, he turned the direction of the campaign over to his son Porfirio.

The weakness of his government gave encouragement to guerrilla bands in other parts of the country. In Zacatecas and Jalisco, Luis Moya harassed government garrisons. Armed groups infested Durango, Coahuila, and Vera Cruz. In Guerrero and Morelos, the rebel chieftains Almazán, Figueroa, and Emiliano Zapata had matters pretty much in their own hands. Moreover, there were few volunteers to enlist in the federal army, while the ranks of the Madero insurgents were daily increasing.

In this embarrassing position, Díaz decided to appeal to Madero by announcing that he would resign from office as soon as peace was restored to the country and he judged it opportune. Madero, who was never in thorough accord with the military factors of the movement, was ready to leap at any compromise and gave orders that the siege should be lifted from Ciudad Juárez which his troops were then storming. His two principal officers on the scene, Orozco and Francisco Villa determined otherwise, and the entire federal garrison surrendered. When Madero, against the wishes of his chieftains decided to show mercy to the federal officers, Orozco and Villa turned on him, and it was only his impassioned plea to the troops that saved his authority.

If Madero was hemmed in by his military leaders on the one hand, he now found his political purposes steadied by his diplomatic agent, Francisco Vásquez Gómez, who refused to deal with the representatives of Díaz except on the basis of equality. Madero was apparently contented with the change of Díaz' cabinet suggested by Limantour; but Vásquez Gómez insisted on nothing short of the resignation of Díaz and Corral, the expulsion of all the Científicos from both chambers of the Federal Congress, the replacement of state governors pledged to Díaz with others favorable to Madero, and payment of the debts incurred by the revolution. The fact that the representatives of the government were willing to present their credentials not only showed the weakness of Díaz but also gained for the Maderists the recognition of a belligerent status from the United States.

The first reaction of Díaz to these demands was one of complete disgust and contempt. The fall of Ciudad Juárez to the revolutionists, however, produced a most somber effect upon his regime. It was evident that he had exhausted available resources and failed. The growing impression in the United States was that his star was on the wane, while in Mexico his unpopularity increased daily.

In view of these facts, his representative, Francisco S. Carvajal, received instructions to make an agreement with the rebels, and on May 21, 1911, the document was signed in front of the customhouse of Ciudad Juárez. This provided for the resignation of both Díaz and Corral before the end of the month. The executive power was to be delivered temporarily into the hands of Francisco L. de la Barra, Díaz' Secretary of Foreign Relations, who was charged with calling general elections. Changes were to be made within each state according to the demands of public opinion.

As soon as news of the cessation of hostilities reached the people, there were no limits to popular enthusiasm. Delirious crowds surged the streets of the capital, and special guards were placed around the house of Díaz. In the provinces, petty chieftains everywhere declared themselves enthusiastic Maderists and conferred upon themselves military titles from captaincies to those of general command; and agitation was begun for the expropriation of all large estates and their distribution among soldiers and followers of the movement. All was lost. The house about him had crumbled. Power and popularity had both suddenly disappeared; but as the old man looked around him for an explanation of why these things had happened, it was with an air of injured innocence, wonderment, and sacrifice.

"The Mexican people," he declared in the letter of resignation, on May 25, "this people which has so generously heaped honors upon me, proclaimed me its leader during the international war, supported me patriotically in all the enterprises undertaken for the strengthening of industry and commerce in the Republic, to establish its credit, gain its international respect, and give it a dignified place among friendly nations — this people, señores deputies, has insurrected in large armed bands, declaring that my presence in the supreme executive power is the cause of the insurrection.

"I do not know any fact imputable to me which would motivate this social phenomenon; but granting without conceding that I can be unconsciously culpable, this possibility makes of me the person least appropriate to discuss and decide my own culpability. For this reason, respecting as I have always respected the will of the people, and in conformity with article 82 of the federal Constitution, I come before the supreme representation of the nation to resign the charge of Constitutional President with which the national vote honored me; and I do this with much more reason, inasmuch as to retain it, it would be necessary to continue shedding Mexican blood, lowering the credit of the nation, dissipating its riches, closing its sources, and exposing its politics to international conflicts.

"I hope, señores deputies, that when the passions which accompany every revolution have been calmed, a more conscientious and authentic study will stir in the national conscience a correct judgment, which will permit me to die, bearing in the bottom of my soul a just correspondence of the estimation which all my life I have consecrated and shall consecrate to my compatriots."[20]

These sentiments failed to arouse the sympathy of the Mexican people, who felt that the time of their liberation had arrived. Díaz was accompanied by General Huerta and a detachment of soldiers as far as Vera Cruz; but of his old friends, not even Limantour took notice of his departure, and as he boarded the German steamer *Ypiranga* with his family, he said good-by forever to a Mexico that had likewise closed its pages on another chapter.

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[20] José López-Portillo y Rojas, *loc. cit.*, p. 481.

The last years of Díaz were of small consequence to Mexico, torn as it was with strife and the problems of the Revolution. In Paris, where he took permanent residence, he contented himself with a daily walk and occasional comments on the past. "Whoever," he said, "achieves the prosperity and peace of Mexico, he will be a good Mexican. But the danger is in the Yankee, who is lying in ambush for us."[21]

On June 29, 1915, confined to his bed in the realization that death was near, he sent for a priest, confessed, made his final peace with the Church, and received the last sacraments. Three days later, as Carranza and Villa were battling for power in Mexico, Díaz closed his eyes forever. His remains still rest in the cemetery of Montparnasse, in Paris, with only an urn of earth from Oaxaca and an eagle carved in stone to bear witness to his origin and his glory.[22]

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[21] Martin Luis Guzmán, *Transito Sereno de Porfirio Díaz,* in *El Universal* (September 14, 1938).

[22] For a favorable and intelligent study of cultured life during the Díaz era, cf. Charles F. Lummis, *The Awakening of a Nation* (New York, 1904).

CHAPTER XV

Venustiano Carranza

PATRIARCH OF REVOLUTION

i

"NOT even by his physical aspect," wrote his eulogist Edmundo González-Blanco, "does Carranza appear to be a man of his race. His social joviality and the precision and gallantry of his manners; his solicitude for whatever signifies art, science, and civic interest; his special admiration for Washington; his great simplicity of character, which attracts, because of its revelation of a singular modesty, increasing his positive wisdom and worth and contrasting with the eagerness for notoriety and with the egotism which seems to be a congenital weakness of the genuinely Mexican ethnic type; the love for country and liberty in all its manifestations, united with the austerity of military habits, these are notes which increase his national prestige and merit for him the veneration of his followers and the respect of his political adversaries. Whatever may be the judgment passed upon the causes and effects of the Mexican Revolution, the figure of its Chief, as man and as patriot, will always remain safe from every insidious censure."[1]

After this lyrical outburst, the comments of Victoriano Salado Álvarez offer a sour contrast. "His enthusiasm for liberty," declared the latter, "his purpose of putting an end to Porfirian despotism and of destroying the dictatorship, were not apparent during the four elections manipulated at Coahuila in the dice box that Carranza handled with such consummate skill. . . . From what source did this stalwart Porfirian henchman derive his love for the people, his desire to better the laborer's condition, to foster public education, and to abolish iniquitous capital? During the twenty-five years of unconditional servilism and no rebellion, such nonsense had never occurred to him, and if there ever existed a devoted, placid individual, hostile to all revolutionary activity, Carranza was that individual."[2]

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[1] Edmundo González-Blanco, *Carranza y la Revolución de México* (Madrid, 1916), p. 68.

The truth seems to be that behind his external serenity and patriarchal appearance, heightened by his thick glasses and long white beard, Carranza was a man of fundamental virtues, intensely ambitious for the Presidency, dull and egotistical, and without comprehension of the social program he was supposed to inaugurate. Although the principles of the Revolution were formulated under his nominal leadership, in the Constitution of 1917, he proved to be another Díaz without the genius of the latter, and he perished at the hands of his lieutenants much in the same manner and, one may add, for much the same reasons, as the protomartyr of the Revolution, Madero, perished.

ii

Don Venustiano Carranza was born, on December 29, 1859, in the city of Cuatro Ciénagas, state of Coahuila, the son of María Garza, a woman of kindness and affability, and of Jesús Carranza, who had been a friend and supporter of Juárez. He made his elementary studies in the capital of the state and later went to the National Preparatory School in Mexico City. A serious ailment of the eyes obliged him to leave school, but this defect was partly remedied in a later operation by an oculist in the United States. He returned to his native city, where he married Virginia Salinas, raised a family, and settled down to farming and cattle raising.

He began his political career in 1887, progressing from the municipal presidency of Cuatro Ciénegas to deputy and senator of the national Congress, provisional and later constitutional governor of Coahuila, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Revolution, and finally President of the Republic. As municipal president of his native city, he clashed with the governor of Coahuila,

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[2] Victoriano Salado Álvarez, *"Las Cotidianas Siestas de las Venerables Barbas" y el Revolucionarismo de Carranza.*

Garza Galán, and consequently was obliged to retire temporarily to private life. In 1893, he and his brother Emilio, together with a few friends, took up arms against the re-election of this executive and succeeded in their purpose.

These evidences of leadership and independence were further corroborated when, late in 1909, he accepted the candidacy for governor of the state. The Anti-Re-electionists, including Francisco I. Madero, gave him their enthusiastic support, but the Científicos, who distrusted him as a friend of Bernardo Reyes, persuaded President Díaz to suggest his withdrawal. To the President's envoy, Carranza replied with bitter surprise: "Tell the President, Señor General, that while there is only one person to work for my candidacy, I shall not withdraw; rather I shall face all the consequences of my conduct, whatever they may be."

Up to this time, there was no evidence that Carranza was anything but a faithful partisan of the Díaz regime, linked to its fortunes through Bernardo Reyes, through whose influence he had become senator for three terms. As late as March 25, 1909, he wrote to Díaz, expressing his contempt for Madero. "I hope," he declared, "that this work will merit your esteemed approbation and at the same time will serve as a proof of my unchangeable adherence to the good progress of your government, today criticized by a person of no political importance (Madero). I reassure you of my special appreciation and unconditional adherence."[3]

After he was denied the support of Díaz in the gubernatorial race, however, he determined to encourage Reyes into insurrection against the old dictator and in the meantime to ally himself with the despised Madero. He visited the latter in jail at San Luis Potosí, in 1910; and, as soon as the revolution started, in January, 1911, he went to San Antonio, Texas, to join the Revolutionary Council. As a result, Madero appointed him chief of military operations for Coahuila, Nueva León, and Tamaulipas. At Cuidad Juárez, upon the conclusion of the insurrection, he took part in the negotiations with the Díaz government and was confirmed by Madero in the provisional governorship of

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[3] Manuel Bonilla, Jr., *Diez años de guerra* (Mazatlan, 1922), cap. III.

Coahuila. Satisfied at least in this ambition, he arrived at Saltillo, the capital of the state, on May 28, 1911, received by a large concourse of people. From then on, his political star began to rise. In the elections which followed, an almost unanimous vote confirmed him in office for the Constitutional term of 1911–13; when Madero assumed the Presidency, he was appointed also to the Ministry of War and Marine.

iii

"More Mexican than Juárez, who never was such," writes Vasconcelos of the little man under whom Carranza now served, "more Mexican than Díaz, who was such only by halves, Madero can be said to have been the first President, Mexican by blood and by program, directed completely to the benefit of the nation, without any other limits than respect for the legitimate rights of foreigners."[4] Nevertheless, Madero was not the man to endure. His native kindliness ill-fitted him for a position that required dictatorial powers; and, surrounded as he was with his family and cousins in political and administrative rôles, he was incapable of realizing his own idealism or of maintaining a personal dignity in character for national strength.

At first, successive revolts failed to unseat him. In the state of Morelos, Emilio Zapata rose against his neglect of the Plan of San Luis Potosí and subscribed to the Plan of Ayala, which demanded restoration of Indian communal properties and a division of the larger estates. While this movement was smouldering in sporadic guerrilla warfare around Cuernavaca, Bernardo Reyes returned from Paris, and leading an unsuccessful revolt was imprisoned by Gustavo Madero, the President's brother, who was now in virtual command. Then followed the uprising of Pascual Orozco in the North, in February, 1912, which General Victoriano Huerta crushed. In October, the same year, Félix Díaz, nephew of Porfirio, inaugurated revolt at Vera Cruz, but he was soon arrested. Madero commuted the death sentence decreed by court martial; and young Díaz was brought to Mexico City for a comfortable incarceration, along with Reyes.

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[4] José Vasconcelos, *Breve Historia de México* (Mexico, 1937), p. 536.

More formidable was the undercurrent of distrust from Washington. Although President Taft had been favorably disposed to the Madero regime, it now appeared that Madero proposed to take a more benevolent view of popular agrarian and labor disturbances and a less complete deference to foreign capital and American property. The American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, was connected with the Guggenheim interests, in competition with projects of the Madero family; and the American Embassy was shortly to become the focal point of conspiracy and revolt against the regime. Throughout 1912, Ambassador Wilson circulated alarming reports of ineptitude on the part of the Mexican Government and of disorders throughout the country. Actually, most of Mexico was at peace, and the government gave indications of ability to cope with its problems. Nevertheless, 100,000 American troops were drawn up on the border, thousands of American citizens fled back to the United States, the American Embassy was prepared for a siege, and arms were secretly shipped in to Zapata.

Madero was grieved and frightened by these developments, but hoped that the danger might pass with the accession of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency, when he would request the recall of Henry Lane Wilson. The latter, therefore, worked feverishly in the last few weeks of his term, as an active conspirator in the plot or "Pact of the Citadel" that was to unseat Madero.

The principals of this plot were Bernardo Reyes and Félix Díaz, who had been allowed to receive visitors in prison, together with Manuel Mondragón, another chief of the Porfirian army, whom Madero had freed from trial for the misuse of national funds. Under the eyes of the President, who refused to act on warnings which he had received, Mondragón assumed leadership of the conspiracy. Early in the morning of February 9, 1913, two regiments of Tacubaya, reinforced by the cadets of the Military Academy of Tlalpan, attacked the prisons and liberated Díaz and Reyes, who then proceeded at the head of the troops to assault the National Palace. Apparently, Gustavo Madero, who had heard of the uprising, was able to thwart its plans within the Palace itself; the guard fired upon the advancing column when it refused to stop, and Bernardo Reyes was killed in the spray of machine guns, which took toll of over two hundred innocent churchgoers in the plaza. Félix Díaz and Mondragón withdrew with their forces and took refuge in the Citadel.

To compel the surrender of the rebels, President Madero now appointed Victoriano Huerta, in the absence of his trusted General Ángeles, to head the government troops in place of General Villar, who had been wounded in the uprising. Huerta guaranteed his loyalty and publicly embraced the President as he took command. Although a capable general, as he had demonstrated in the campaign against Orozco, Huerta was a heavy drinker, given to dope, and, as events were soon to show, an unprincipled and ambitious traitor.

The so-called "ten tragic days" which followed were consumed in a farcical cannonading between the National Palace and the Citadel, over a mile apart. Although only three shots were scored, the intervening city was filled with death and destruction. When General Ángeles arrived to bombard the Citadel, Ambassador Wilson refused to allow him to place his guns in a strategic point, on the excuse that this would cause too much noise in the Embassy.

It was now decided by representatives of Huerta and Díaz, meeting secretly by night in the American Embassy, that Madero should be compelled to resign. Huerta would become Provisional President, and Félix Díaz would present his candidacy for the office in the coming elections within a few months. Wilson now proceeded to organize a large section of the diplomatic corps and a number of senators to demand the resignation of Madero. American battleships had been stationed at Vera Cruz and Tampico.

Under these circumstances, Huerta believed himself in a position to act. On February 18, inviting Gustavo Madero to lunch with him in the center of the city, so as to get him out of the way, he sent General Blanquet[5] to arrest the President and General Ángeles in the Palace. No sooner had Blanquet completed his mission, than Huerta delivered Gustavo Madero to the rebels in the Citadel, who had him tortured, mutilated, and then shot.

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[5] Said to have given the coup de grâce to Maximilian.

Huerta then ordered the bells of the cathedral to be rung, and, appearing on the balcony of the Palace in an intoxicated condition, he announced the events as though they represented the will of the people. A few hours later, Félix Díaz marched across the city, and the two embraced. That night, Ambassador Wilson assembled various personages of the diplomatic corps and of the government, announced the cabinet of Huerta, although the later had not yet been established in the Presidency, and referring to Madero as a madman, led the applause for the conspirators when they appeared, as "the saviors of Mexico." The "Pact of the Citadel" was then ratified. There remained only the business of disposing of Francisco Madero.

Under the circumstances, there was nothing for Madero and his Vice-President Pino Suárez to do but to resign their offices, since they were already virtual prisoners. Only eight members of Congress dared to refuse to accept their resignations. The Presidency then passed, by constitutional procedure, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro Lascurain. The latter was induced to name Huerta to this ministry and immediately resigned. Huerta automatically assumed the Presidency, by the same process, and was confirmed by almost unanimous vote of Congress.

Before presenting the resignations of Madero and Pino Suárez, Lascurain insisted that Huerta grant Madero a safe conduct from the country. Huerta reached under his shirt and drew out some holy medals which he wore around his neck, kissed them unctuously, and swore that no one should lay a hand on Madero; but he failed to sign the guarantees.

The prisoners never arrived at the train which was destined to carry them to Vera Cruz. On the night of February 22, 1913, they were placed in an automobile to be transferred from their confinement in the National Palace. On the way, they were ordered out of the automobile by Major Francisco Cárdenas and assassinated. Ambassador Wilson had assumed a sensitive attitude of nonintervention when members of the Madero family had begged him to intervene for Madero's life. He was now prepared to accept the official explanation that the prisoners had been killed during an attempted flight; and he strongly urged the Taft administration to recognize the Huerta government without delay.

iv

Precisely what was the attitude of Carranza during the events that led up to this tragedy is difficult to say. One thing is certain: Carranza's adherence to the revolution of Madero did not signify his personal satisfaction in the man, nor was he himself regarded with complete confidence by Madero and the Madero family. As early as May, 1911, Carranza suggested that Vázquez Gómez should be named head of the revolution in place of the vacillating Madero.

Even before the fall of Madero, his personal contempt for the ability of the unfortunate President and his resentment of the latter's distrust had brought him into a position of insubordination.[6] During the insurrection of Pascual Orozco in Chihuahua, early in 1912, he came into conflict with Madero's order to transfer to federal command his state troops, paid by the Federal Government. These forces, he maintained, were held together by personal loyalty to himself and should therefore remain under his own command. It is possible that Carranza, realizing the current opposition to Madero's regime, decided to take a firm and independent stand, no matter what happened.

On February 9, 1913, Madero informed the governors of the various states of the uprising in the capital and of the death of Bernardo Reyes. In spite of grief for the death of his old patron, Carranza at once congratulated the government on its triumph. Two days later he sent Francisco J. Múgica to Mexico City to offer Madero the troops of Coahuila and refuge in that state, if necessary.

When the telegram from Victoriano Huerta arrived, on February 18, announcing that he had assumed the executive power, Carranza's first impulse was to refuse recognition to the man who had broken every human decency to reach the Presidency. The very next day he declared to the state legislature that "inasmuch as the Senate, in conformity with the Constitution, had no power to name the First Magistrate of the nation, it could not legally authorize General Victoriano Huerta to assume the executive power, and consequently this general did not possess legitimate title as President of the Republic."

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[6] Cf. Alfonso Junco, *Carranza y los Orígenes de Su Rebelión* (Mexico, 1935), p. 23 and *passim.*

As soon as the legal formalities of Huerta's nomination were established, he changed his attitude and entered negotiations with the President. Representatives were sent to Mexico City to establish the facts and settle the old, thorny question of jurisdiction over the troops of Coahuila. "If Señor Madero and the lawyer Pino Suárez have freely and spontaneously renounced their high offices," he declared, "either by weakness or cowardice, there is no remedy: Huerta is the President of the Republic by provision of the law. . . ."[7] At the same time, he telegraphed Huerta as "President of the Republic," thus openly recognizing him as such.

Certain partisans of Carranza have represented these events as part of his stratagem to gain time against Huerta. It seems much more likely that Don Venustiano was unsettled in his own mind.

In Mexico City, his representatives negotiated amicably with President Huerta and his ministers, until the old matter which had caused such decisive soreness between Madero and Carranza again arose. Huerta agreed to pay the troops of Coahuila and to exempt them from the strict control of the Ministry of War; but he was unwilling to hand them over to the complete command of Carranza and insisted that they should be placed under the orders of the Ministry of Government. Carranza did not answer the telegram which conveyed this news.

Evidently Huerta was suspicious of the uncertain attitude and behavior of the governor of Coahuila, and in the first week of March sent him a curt telegram: "Please explain why you have taken 50,000 pesos from the banks, without informing this Government of the fact." Carranza had now decided to break with the new regime, and at once replied: "I have taken no money from banks as you refer; and if I had done so, it is not to you that I should render account."

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[7] Alfred Breceda, *Méjico Revolucionario* (Madrid, 1920), p. 170.

With this, there naturally came a volley of recriminations from the Huerta camp. Huerta himself charged that had not Bernardo Reyes, Félix Díaz, and Manuel Mondragón attempted their coup d'état and the latter two conspired with Huerta to eliminate Madero, Carranza would have revolted against Madero. According to Rodolfo Reyes, son of Bernardo and a member of the Huerta group, "Carranza, with whom so many ancient bonds united me . . . in my firm conviction was on the point of rising against Madero when our movement began."[8]

v

It is true that Huerta had reached the Presidency by base villainy, and continued, by his almost constant intoxication and thorough lack of principle, to exasperate a nation already horrified in the death of Madero and Pino Suárez. Nevertheless, representative men of the most widely divergent groups believed it advisable to cooperate with the Huerta government. The National Congress and all the states except Sonora and Coahuila had accepted the situation, for better or for worse, in the conviction that this was the only way to save the country from anarchy. From a strictly legal standpoint, Huerta was the Constitutional President.

Some commentators on this period have stated that Huerta depended in large part upon the Catholic Church, that Catholics conspired against Madero and for this reason suffered later the vengeance of Carranza. The truth is that Catholics had enjoyed more liberty under Madero than possibly during any time since the Liberal Reform. Under his mild and democratic regime, the National Catholic Party was organized and furnished many worthy representatives to the State and National Legislatures.

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[8] Rodolfo Reyes, *De mi vida* (Madrid, 1929–30), tomo II, c. 19. It is also suggested that Madero wished to stop the usual graft (allowed by Díaz to keep governors in line) of paying the army through the governors who padded the pay roll. Hence Carranza conspired with Gov. Maytorena against Madero; but before their revolution broke out, Victoriano Huerta seized power, Madero was shot, and then Carranza proclaimed himself the avenger of Madero.

This same party voted for Madero as the Presidential candidate although it proposed Francisco León de la Barra for Vice-President as against Madero's recommendation of Pino Suárez.

With the decline of Madero's national popularity and the development of conspiracies against him, various members of the Catholic Party were invited to join the opposition movement. At that time, in January, 1913, the second Congress of Catholic Workers' Circles was meeting at Zamora, under the patronage of such eminent prelates as Mora y del Río, Ruiz y Flores, and Orozco y Jiménez. To the question of what attitude Catholics might take during the crisis, the churchmen unanimously replied that rebellion against the legitimate government was illicit and that permissable criticism should be made only "with all moderation and without impairing the respect that is due to authority."[9]

It is true that Huerta attempted to identify himself as a Catholic, and during his short regime he did nothing against the Church itself. Nevertheless, the president of the Catholic Party, Gabriel Fernández Somellera, and the editor of its official publication *La Nacion,* Enrique Zepeda, were arrested by Huerta and obliged to leave the country. When Huerta dissolved the legitimate Congress, some thirty Catholic deputies were involved. Only six returned, one of whom, Perfecto Méndez Padilla, dared to challenge publicly Huerta's demand for extraordinary powers. In the general elections, the Catholic Party supported the candidacy of Federico Gamboa for President and Eugenio Rascon for Vice-President, against the Huerta-Blanquet combination, which, however, forced its own perpetuation, after eliminating Félix Díaz by sending him to Japan on a military mission.

So far as Carranza was concerned personally, there was no particular reason why the Church should have felt antagonistic toward him. As governor of Coahuila, he had maintained eminently friendly relations with everything Catholic, had favored the Christian Brothers, and had presided at academic functions of the Jesuits and of the College of San Juan.

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[9] Cf. Alfonso Junco, *Un Siglo de Méjico* (Mexico, 1937), pp. 263–265.

vi

Meanwhile, Huerta proceeded to consolidate himself in power by the same methods he had used to attain it. Abraham González, governor of Chihuahua, one of the primary organizers of the Madero forces, was taken from his palace and on the way to Mexico was thrown under the train. Senator Belisario Domínquez of Chiapas, who, at the end of the summer of 1913, decried Huerta's terrorist program and asked the Senate to depose the dictator, was kidnapped and assassinated.

To a large extent, these crimes were the result of a double threat to the Huerta regime. Although Huerta owed his office to the intervention of the American Ambassador, the administration in Washington had now changed. Henry Lane Wilson was recalled, and President Woodrow Wilson, while retaining the intensive prerogative of American intervention, decided that Huerta was not at all the man to be sustained. This hostile attitude, which was to exercise a preponderant influence, joined with the rebel movements in northern Mexico to make Huerta's overthrow but a question of time.

vii

While Carranza was dallying with the idea of accepting Huerta's guarantees then being offered his emissaries in the capital, word came from the state of Sonora that the rebels there were ready to strike. The governor, José Maytorena, who signified his intention of accepting Huerta, had been forced out by the legislature under the direction of Roberto Pesquiero and Adolfo de la Huerta. Pesquiero became provisional governor, and the young rancher, Álvaro Obregón, took over the military command. Apparently, also, this group already had evidence of American aid.

Carranza's delay served him poorly. He succeeded in extracting sums from public and private concerns to the extent of 1,540,000 pesos and opened the penitentiary so that the criminals might join his cause. His small forces, under the command of Pablo González, however, were unable to cope with the strong federal troops, and he was compelled to take flight to Sonora, where he identified himself with the Anti-Huertists.

Gradually the Anti-Huerta groups assumed the character of three columns. Obregón established his military ascendancy in Sonora and the West. Francisco Villa terrorized Chihuahua and the center. Pablo González remained as commander of the Northeast, in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas. There was no particular reason why Carranza merited the supreme leadership of these divergent groups. Lacking a leader, the general rebellion had to create someone to act as a front; Carranza's patriarchal appearance, his age, and his indications of ambition helped to single him out. On March 26, he and a number of followers issued the Plan of Guadalupe, which declared Huerta's authority spurious and announced an armed resistance; but it was the forced abdication of Maytorena in Sonora that gave him his chance. Up to this time, his title of First Chief had no other basis than his own announcement. While he began to refer to the rebellion as a "constitutionalist" movement, there was nothing to show that his own authority was based on anything but force. The Sonora legislature, presuming to speak for the nation, recognized his claimed title in April; and Carranza proceeded to set up the headquarters of his government on the American border at Nogales.

In the beginning the most sensational victories of the so-called Constitutionalists were not those of Carranza, but of Francisco (Pancho) Villa, a cattle rustler who had fought with the Madero forces at Ciudad Juárez. This man had later been imprisoned by Huerta for disobedience during the Orozco uprising, escaped to the United States, and returned on March 13, as a new Attila in the Constitutionalist conquest of Mexico. Gathering a bandit army of Indian cowboys in Chihuahua, he drove the federal troops from the rural regions, then seized Ciudad Juárez by leading his men on federal troop trains, and set up his headquarters at Chihuahua City.

The unspeakable depredations and crimes of these bolsheviks hardly harmonized with the loftier slogans of the revolution. Although Carranza and Villa managed to hold together for a year, it was inevitable that the break should come. At first, Carranza's troops were fairly moderate, but the eventual character of the movement soon began to reveal itself. At Durango, churches were profaned; and in the Carmelite convent, the nuns were raped. At Guadalajara, horses were stabled in the seminary, libraries and churches were sacked, priests and religious were subjected to every indignity, and atrocious sacrileges were committed.[10]

The glories of colonial art and culture meant nothing to these hordes, who were able to wipe out in a few years what it had taken centuries to produce. Recruited from mining camps, cattle ranches, and from the gambling and tenderloin sections of the towns, the rank and file thought only of plunder and loot. Groups of intellectuals began to cluster around both Villa and Carranza, but their Socialistic schemes simply rationalized the destruction.

In view of the sacrilegious character assumed by large sectors of the revolution of the anarchy which threatened to engulf the nation, and the alarming programs of the Socialists, it was but natural that the Church should distrust the movement. On the other hand, declared Samuel Guy Inman, "when the Mexican Revolution began, the Protestant churches embraced it almost unanimously because they perceived that the programme of the movement stood for that which these churches had been preaching for years, that the triumph of the Revolution meant the triumph of the Gospel. There were entire congregations which, led by their pastors, enlisted in the revolutionary army, the men to fight and the women at home to sustain them in the struggle. Many Protestant ministers held important offices in the Mexican Government. Soon the Mexican people perceived that the Protestants favored the Revolution and eagerly accepted their programme. The liberal element now feels a renewed respect and profound interest in the cause of evangelical Christianity. . . ."[11]

During this first phase of the conflict, President Wilson came to the conclusion that Villa was "a safe man to tie to." Secretary of State Bryan declared that he was an "idealist," and Mrs. Bryan said, "though a Roman Catholic, Villa neither smoked nor drank."[12] How completely the American Government was later disillusioned in this "safe man" is indicated by the words of Colonel House: "On March 8 (1916), Villa, in revolt against Carranza and pursuing the temporarily profitable career of bandit under the diaphanous guise of liberal patriot, crossed the frontier and murdered seventeen American citizens at Columbus, New Mexico."[13] When Villa, under the Constitutionalist banner with Carranza, was slaughtering the citizenry of Mexico, he was hailed by American leaders as a liberator of Mexico from the "diseases of Spanish culture" and was offered every assistance possible under the circumstances; but when seventeen Americans tasted his medicine, General Pershing was sent into Chihuahua with a punitive expedition of 10,000 men to punish the "bandit."

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[10] Cf. Francis Kelley, *Book of the Red and Yellow* (Chicago, 1915); Francis McCullagh, *Red Mexico* (New York, 1928).

[11] Cf. 66th Congress, 2nd Sess. Doc. no. 285, pp. 4–241.

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What would have happened in Mexico had Huerta been allowed to continue as President, no one can say. But as events proceeded, his downfall and the bolshevism into which Mexico was plunged can be definitely ascribed to the policy pursued by the American Government under President Wilson. Wilson refused to recognize Huerta; and all hope of stability for his regime was shattered when the American President withdrew the Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, in July, 1913, and required Huerta's resignation. Meanwhile, the White House accredited confidential agents to each of the insurgent Mexican chieftains, whom the President conceived as representatives of the people struggling toward liberty.

In August, John Lind was commissioned to ask Huerta to resign, with the suggestion that his consent would make possible the advance of financial assistance to Mexico from the United States. Huerta was disinclined to accept the suggestion. The Wilson-Lind inducement, he regarded as an insulting bribe.

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[12] Louis Stevens, *Here Comes Pancho Villa* (New York, 1930), p. 95. It may be noted that Villa's real name was Doroteo Arango, which he dropped to assume that of a once famous bandit of his region.

[13] Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926), I, pp. 230–231.

Huerta was re-elected on October 26, 1913; and although Congress rejected the vote as fraudulent, he was asked to remain in office during the national crisis until free elections could be held.

Using the same tactics as Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson had employed to shake the Madero administration, the government of Woodrow Wilson now warned American citizens in Mexico to flee the country. On December 2, President Wilson declared his policy to be that of "Watchful Waiting"; but behind the scenes, he continued in his inexorable determination to shake Huerta loose from the Mexican Presidency and to reshape the country in conformity with this own ideas of social regeneration. On the recommendation of John Lind, the United States began to furnish arms and munitions to Villa; a financial boycott was invoked against Huerta, and a ban was placed against the shipment of arms to the Mexican Government.

These measures, as forms of intervention quite as unwarranted and odious as those of Henry Lane Wilson had been, aroused a storm of protest both in Mexico and in the United States. Mexican Catholics were distraught over the spectacle of atrocities sanctioned by the American Government in a way that made it impossible for them to defend themselves. In an article published in the *New York Times,* December 6, 1914, Theodore Roosevelt declared: "The United States would not have had the least responsibility for what has been done to the Church, if the factions which committed these outrages had not been enabled to triumph by the United States. But since the United States took part in a civil war in Mexico, in the manner in which Wilson and Bryan obliged our government to take part, this country, through this act alone, is responsible for the horrible injustices, committed by the victorious revolutionaries against hundreds of believers of both sexes.

"In other words, at the very time the President assured us 'that in no part of this hemisphere can any government endure if it be stained in blood,' he was helping to put in power a government that was not only stained with blood but was stained with stains worse than those of blood. At the very time he announced that 'he would not continue relations with iniquity even if it were more convenient to do so,' he not only consorted with iniquity but openly supported it and put in power men whose actions were those of ferocious barbarians."

Mexican Catholics and property owners who protested against this wave of blood and pillage were denounced as conspirators with reaction and Huertism. Many sincere patriots and writers who were later exiled by the triumphant revolutionaries were forbidden asylum on American soil. Americans who protested against Wilson's intervention had the word "intervention" hurled back at them.

Further distress was caused when, on April 10, 1914, Mexican federal officers at Tampico ordered the arrest of American marines from the gunboat *Dolphin,* who had landed in a prohibited zone without permission. Admiral Mayo, in charge of the American fleet, instead of making amends, required an apology of the Mexican commander and demanded a salute of the American flag with a volley of twenty-one guns. Huerta refused to accede to the terms, and Wilson ordered General Funston to seize the port.

Ten days later there occurred the painful Vera Cruz incident. To prevent the delivery to the Huerta forces of a cargo of munitions from the German steamer *Ypiranga,* Admiral Fletcher received orders to take possession of Vera Cruz. The Americans were resisted by cadets of the Naval College, civilians, and federal forces. Bombardment from the American squadron and the landing of American reinforcements, however, succeeded in bringing the city under occupation, on April 21. One hundred and twenty-six Mexicans had been killed and 195 wounded. President Wilson declared: "We have gone to Mexico to serve Humanity. . . . We want to help the Mexican. . . . It is a glorious thing to die in a War of Service."

Bryan wrote to the consul Carothers: "The Constitutionalists are reported . . . as standing aloof from the controversy. This is a very proper attitude, and we hope they will not misunderstand the President's position or misconstrue his acts." Through the same consul, Villa sent a telegram to Wilson, declaring that he admired the North American people and its honored President. To a group of American journalists, he announced that if Wilson wanted satisfaction, he should turn to the revolutionists, who would have saluted the American flag, not once, but many times. He was also pleased to learn that the Americans were in Vera Cruz.

While Vera Cruz was still in the hands of the American marines, Carranza authorized publication of a letter in the *New York Herald,* in which he stated: "I felt a profound admiration for the American people and an unlimited personal esteem for President Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State of the United States of America. It is evident to me that both are men of great intelligence, and also possess to a high degree great political ideals and private virtues: for this reason I believe their friendship toward Mexico and the sympathy they have always demonstrated for the principles defended by the Mexican Constitutionalists, not only may be considered to be sincere, but also entirely disinterested, and the result of the identity that exists between the ideals I have the honor to represent and those of American democracy."

At the same time, he expressed his resentment against interference, and two years later, on May 22, 1916, he denounced Wilson as a protector of bandits, instigator of Mexican revolutions, and ally of Villa.

Under these conditions, Huerta broke off diplomatic connections with the United States on April 22, and declared he would wreak vengeance on those who threatened Mexican independence.

To escape from the embarrassing situation, which looked very much like a spread of hostilities, Wilson took refuge in the mediation of the ABC powers of Latin America. In the conference held at Niagara Falls, composed of representatives of the revolutionists, Huertists, and nine Hispanic American countries, the Carranza delegates refused to assume an active part. Huerta signified his willingness to resign and turn the government over to a neutral provisional successor; but this was not what Wilson wanted.

"We are encouraged," he declared to the American commissioners, "by your dispatches to believe that mediators realize the situation in all its elements as fully as we do as shown by their willingness that a representative of the Constitutionalists' cause should exercise the powers of the Provisional Presidency and that a Constitutionalist should be chosen President at the elections which would follow. . . . The elimination of Huerta by one process or another is now clearly inevitable, the only question remaining being the method, the occasion, and the circumstances of his elimination. . . . The object of our conferences now is to find a method by which the inevitable can be accomplished without further bloodshed. By the inevitable, we mean, not only the elimination of Huerta, but the completion of the revolution by the transfer of political power from Huerta to those who represent the interests and aspirations of the people, whose forces are now in the ascendancy."[14]

Both Wilson and Bryan, contrary to their promises to support the Mexican delegation in naming a neutral candidate, now insisted that Carranza should be provisional and permanent President. Under these conditions, it was clear that Huerta could expect no hope from either Latin American or North American sources. British support for Huerta was lost when Colonel House was sent to London and began negotiations granting concessions in the matter of Panama Canal tolls, for the assurance that British support of Huerta was neither definite nor final. This gave the United States a free hand in Mexican affairs and assured the triumph of the revolutionary forces. "It is hardly an exaggeration," writes Seymour, "to say that the abdication and flight of Huerta, in July, 1914, was directly related to the withdrawal of British support."[15]

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One of the principal causes of national anarchy was precisely that the rebellion against Huerta was largely political and personal in character, staged by petty ambitious chieftains in different parts of the country, with little in common. In Sonora, Álvaro Obregón seized real authority upon the forced abdication of Maytorena, and surrounded himself with such lieutenants as

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[14] Instructions of President Wilson as delivered by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to the Special Commissioners, May 24, 1914 (U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 505–506).

[15] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 202.

Plutarcho Elías Calles, Benjamin Hill, Francisco Serrano, and Salvador Alvarado. In the South, the agrarian guerrilla Zapata again called the *peones* together for *Tierra y Liberdad* — Land and Liberty. Between the Sonora group, which were to emerge as the real victor of the revolution, and that of Zapata there was precious little in common.

Zapata, born of a very humble family in Morelos, practically without culture, surpassed all the revolutionaries, with the possible exception of Villa, in violence of attack and savage impulse. A tall Indian, well formed, with black mustache and goatee, rough and lionlike in appearance, he began as a peaceful farm hand until his resentment against the injustice and cruelty of the encroaching hacienda owners drove him into a wandering life of rebellion. He was often in jail before 1910. Although he supported Madero against Díaz, he was by no means placated by Madero's regime. A warrior against agrarian feudalism, he cannot be absolved of militant criminality and banditry as encouraged by the rising middle class of his state.

Among other intellectuals who attached themselves to this chieftain was the Socialist, Díaz Soto y Gama, who extolled the guerrilla as a combination of all the great social reformers. The Plan of Ayala, written by a Cuautla schoolmaster, Otilio Montaño, demanding restoration to the Indian villages of their communal lands and postulating a further division of the large estates, became his official program early in the Presidency of Madero. According to one of the officials of his staff, Zapata summarized his aims in an address to his men at the gates of Mexico City. "Boys," he declared, "we lack resources to wage a formal war, and we have no other way than to scatter ourselves all over the state in small groups, each with a chief at its head and to impose ourselves by means of terror. We need elements of life, and we must acquire them by means of sack when they are not given to us voluntarily, or by theft, forced loans, or in whatever way they can be obtained. We must make them fear us, and we must do it by burning *haciendas* and by killing, since the essential quality of war has always been ferocity. Society may condemn us; but when it realizes our ideals, and new generations come to enjoy the benefits we are now sowing with fragments of our flesh and irrigating with torrents of our blood and with the tears of our women, history will justify us, and this same society which condemns us will heap blessing upon us. Sack, arson, and assassination are the only means of securing the well-being of our peoples, which is the purpose of our ideal."[16]

While Zapata continued his depradations, similar groups arose throughout the country, under the leadership of such men as Saturnino Cedillo in the state of San Luis Potosí. Lands, institutions, and houses were everywhere looted by armed gangs which called themselves Constitutionalists and who afterward found protection and sanction in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party and the Constitutionalist Convention. Even Carranza admitted, on April 15, 1917, that "A source of income more nominal than real, consisted in the occupation of enemy property, and this occupation of property was from the first a movement of a wholly spontaneous character on the part of the military forces occupying hostile regions."[17] In Chihuahua, where Villa was the factual head of the Constitutionalists, enormous estates as well as supplies were seized and distributed among the soldiers. General Obregón likewise maintained his army in large part by supplying agricultural supplies as well as ammunition to agrarian rebels.

With the acquisition of such power in the various camps, it was inevitable that there should be a clash of ambitions and something of a race for the national capital, at the same time as the social aims of the revolution were arising from the spoils of war. The question now became which camp to join. Intellectuals and self-seekers crowded the camps of both Carranza and Villa. Pablo González remained Carranza's favorite, but Luis Cabrera continued to serve pretty much as its intellectual guide, while Obregón, whom Carranza feared and tolerated, gained strength as the real power. Other men, like Felipe Angeles, Maytorena, and Blanco, disgusted with the pomposity of the First

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[16] Quoted in Edmundo González-Blanco, *op. cit.*

[17] Jorge Vera Estañol, *Al Margen de la Constitucion de 1917* (Los Angeles, 1920), p. 69.

Chief and with the servility of his camp, turned their loyalties to Villa. Still others, such as Vasconcelos and Antonio Villareal, attempted a middle course.

Carranza did everything in his power to retain a hold on his temperamental ally Villa, but without success. At Zacatecas, the latter wired Obregón, who was then joining forces with Pablo González, to show his good faith by retarding his march toward Mexico City. When Obregón refused, Villa opened secret negotiations with Francisco S. Carvajal, whom Huerta had left as Provisional President after his flight, on July 15, 1914.[18] On August 10, the federal garrison in the capital surrendered, and five days later Obregón entered the city in triumph. Carvajal was compelled to relinquish office to Carranza, on the demands of the American Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan.

As soon as Carranza had been installed in the National Palace, Obregón hurried back north to negotiate with Villa, who insisted that Carranza should not be a Presidential candidate, although he might hold power until the elections. Obregón then proceeded to Sonora, where he succeeded in arranging a compromise between Maytorena, the elected governor of Sonora and Plutarco Elías Calles, who had been imposed by the Carranzist faction. Alleging violations of his territory by the Constitutionalists, Maytorena had rebelled against Carranza. In a Conference at Nogales, Obregón secured Maytorena's promise to resign as governor and military commander on condition that Calles should withdraw from Sonora.

Needless to say, Carranza was not entirely pleased with the result of these conferences; and he suggested that a convention should be held in Mexico City, where he could be in command, to lay plans for the Presidential election.

In the meantime, the followers of Maytorena, believing they had been tricked, decided upon revolt, with the secret support of Villa and Felipe Ángeles, who, although commissioned to attack

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[18] Huerta's later career was dogged by American agents. After a short residence at Forest Hills, New York, he was arrested in New Mexico, on June 27, 1915, charged with stirring revolution in Mexico. Released on bond, he was again apprehended on July 3 at El Paso and placed under guard at Fort Bliss until a few days before his death.

Mayortena, assaulted instead the troops of General Benjamin Hill, whom Carranza had substituted for Calles. Obregón at once returned to Chihuahua to negotiate with Villa. Villa's first impulse was to have him arrested and order him to be shot. Later dissuaded by his more moderate advisers, he invited Obregón to dinner, with the result that the place of the proposed convention was made, not at the capital, but Aguascalientes. No sooner was Obregón on the train for Mexico City, than Villa again changed his mind and ordered the train stopped and Obregón arrested. Suspecting what was about to happen, Obregón's party seized control of the engine and escaped.

Carranza had already declared himself generalissimo of the North, as against the pretensions of Villa; and, when the latter attacked Hill, he decided to suspend traffic between Aquascalientes and Zacatecas, thus cutting off Villa's coal supply. Villa took this as the signal for open rebellion.

Carranza's personal position, however, was not strong enough to prevent the assembling of the generals at Aguascalientes in October, 1914; and he determined to remain in Mexico City. The meeting gradually took the shape of a convention, presided over by Antonio Villareal, and manifested the centrifugal, bewildered, and personalist character which had marked the Constitutionalist revolution from the beginning. Many of the leaders wished to eliminate both Villa and Carranza. Villa proposed that both he and Carranza should commit suicide. In the meantime, he packed the city with his troops and, joined by a Zapata delegation, soon gained the upper hand. General Eulalio Gutiérrez was nominated as provisional President for twenty days. Gutiérrez in turn appointed Villa his general in chief; and the Army of the North became the Army of the Convention.

Civil war now changed its front to that of a struggle between Villa and Zapata on the one hand, Carranza on the other. On November 21, 1914, Carranza was obliged to flee from the capital under the onslaught of the hordes of Emilio Zapata. In early December, Villa arrived at Xochomilco to join hands with Zapata, and the two generals entered the capital side by side.

Gutiérrez was established in the national palace as the puppet of Villa, whose bandits joined the Zapatists in pillaging and terrorizing the city during their two months of occupancy. When it was no longer possible for him to endure the brutal situation, he managed to escape from Mexico City, early in January, with a small group of his ministers, about 5000 soldiers, and 10,000,000 pesos of the public treasury. Denouncing the military coercion of the Convention, he decreed the deposition of Villa and Zapata and opened secret negotiations with Obregón. Inasmuch as he lacked any real power, however, none of these gestures was capable of changing matters or of establishing a stable government; and Gutiérrez found himself obliged to surrender to Carranza. Some of his followers were executed; others, like Vasconcelos, escaped to the United States.

Villa now named Roque González Garza to succeed Gutiérrez; but the fortunes of the new puppet-President were no happier than those of his fugitive predecessor. Shortly abandoned by his military "protector," he denounced both Villa and Zapata as brigands. Villa proceeded to invest himself with the Presidency of the Convention. The orgy had reached its lowest depths. Lacking every qualification for the office or sense of responsibility, Villa was simply the incarnation of disorder.

By this time, the Carranzist forces had regained enough force to launch an offensive; and Villa was obliged to evacuate the capital on January 19, 1915. Nine days later Obregón re-entered the city. The Zapatists succeeded in regaining its possession from March 11 to July 10, only to be driven out again; and Carranza finally returned to the seat of power.

Pursuing Villa as a "reactionary" opposed to the new ideals of the Revolution, Obregón inflicted a signal defeat on his enemy at Celaya and forced him in successive engagements back to his Northern lairs, where he resumed his early status of Chihuahua bandit. Pablo González, with reinforcements, turned against the Zapatists and, after completing the ruin of Morelos, finally secured Zapata's life by treachery — a sad denouement in view of Carranza's words, uttered on July 10, 1915: "Only the error of certain petty chieftains who sacrifice others for the benefit of reaction explains the fact that some are fighting against others. You may be sure that Zapatism will soon convert itself into an ally and supporter of the Constitutionalist government."

By the beginning of August, 1915, the Constitutionalists had consolidated themselves in the States of Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and the Federal District; and as his faction began to triumph, Carranza assumed a haughty and stubborn attitude toward President Wilson's continued friendly lectures and remonstrances. This attitude was to be strengthened by subsequent events, as Carranza later indicated to Miss Hermila Galindo, whom he had commissioned to write a book *The Doctrine of Carranza.* "Do not forget my commission," he declared, "to describe in vivid colors the tortuosities of American policy respecting our country, showing President Wilson as the director of this policy."[19]

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the Mexican chieftain could have established himself without Wilson's continued and insistent help. In August, 1915, the ABC powers, joined by Bolivia, Guatemala, and Uruguay, urged the establishment of a provisional government and the calling of elections; and the American State Department offered its assistance. Carranza repeatedly denounced this as intervention, whereas Villa, whose star was now sinking, welcomed the suggestion. Lind, commissioned by President Wilson to study the dilemma between the rival aspirants, declared that Carranza "with his personal probity, already proved, his experience in public life, and his strong will, is the only Mexican whom one can regard as giving promise of ability to solve the problem."

In October, therefore, munitions for Villa were cut off, and Carranza's government was officially recognized. On October 19, the Conference of American powers, after observing the scene, decided to recognize Carranza as the *de facto* President, most capable of establishing order; and formal diplomatic relations with the United States were reopened in December, with Henry P. Fletcher as the American and Eliseo Arredondo as the Mexican representative.

Villa retaliated by the murder of Americans in Mexico. Finally, his border raid at Columbus, New Mexico, in March, 1916, resulted in the Pershing expedition. Carranza bitterly resented this invasion of Mexican territory and, on May 22, protested against it as a violation of sovereignty. As a result of his representations to the Hispanic American countries, a commission sat in session until January 15, 1917, but without results, inasmuch as he refused to allow American troops to follow raiders across the border. The withdrawal of the ill-fated Pershing expedition was not completed until February 5, 1917, after eleven months in Mexico at a cost of $130,000,000. The only outcome of the adventure was the enragement of Mexican national feeling, the popularization of Villa, and an opportunity for Carranza to pose as the champion of Latin America against Yankee imperialism.

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[19] Salado Álvarez, *Carranza Germanofilo y los Antecedentes del arreglo con Von Eckardt.*

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At every turn in the road, Carranza, whether to bid for popular support or to sustain his own ego, saw in himself a reincarnation of the spirit of Juárez; and, whether from choice or force of circumstances, he pursued the simile even to his places of refuge. "This great force of character and of confidence in the triumph of the ideal," observes one commentator, "which so exalted Juárez, is comparable with that of Carranza, who crossed in turn the desert of Coahuila, without other supports than those of his conviction as a proud and courageous man, and, like that apostle, sustained the ambition of bringing the cause of legality to triumph."[20] Again, after the Zapatists had compelled him to evacuate the capital, after a short stay at Córdoba, he transferred his government, like Juárez, to Vera Cruz, took supreme power into his own hands, and proceeded to issue a host of reforming laws.

On December 12, 1914, he proclaimed a list of enactments, including a divorce law, liberty of municipalities, abolition of the office of Vice-President, and reduction of the Presidential term from six to four years. On January 6, 1915, he issued the famous decree for agrarian reform, and in the early months of the year, a mass of legislation which gave a radical turn to the Revolution, social in character, and far beyond the political conceptions which first prompted Carranza to break with Huerta. To a large extent, the program for social reconstruction was a bid for popular support, on the advice of such men as Luis Cabrera and Obregón. In part, it was a rationalization or legalization of what had been done to property during the passage of the armies across the country. Nevertheless, it laid the foundation for a complete change of economic policy in Mexico and paved the way for the Socialist revolution.

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[20] Antonio Rivera de la Torre, *Juárez-Carranza* (Mexico, 1918), p. 125.

In a radical sense, the agrarian reforms inaugurated by Carranza meant a complete reversal of the Liberalist policies inaugurated by Juárez and his associates and a return to the *ejidal* or communal form of ownership prevalent in the Aztec system, protected by the Spaniards, the Mexican Government, and the Church up to the time of Juárez.

According to Aztec tradition, the land was divided into four classes, that of the king, of the army, of the nobles, and of the villages. Village properties were assigned through *calpullis* or clans, cut into separate parcels of family patrimonies, and worked with all the characteristics of agrarian communism. This system, of course, prevailed only in the central plateau among the Indians of the Aztec federation and the Mayas of Yucatán. The tribes of the North and of the coastal lands lived as nomads.

By the time the Spaniards arrived, this system had undergone essential modifications, and the communal farmers had in large part come to form a slave or *peon* class attached to the soil. After the Conquest, the Spanish Crown assumed title to all seized and unclaimed lands, but, while allowing the confiscation of the lands of the Aztec nobles, insisted that those remaining to the *calpullis* should be respected. Thus there grew up side by side, during the colonial era, the *haciendas* or large estates of private individuals, as well as estates held by the Church or religious corporations, mission lands held in trust by the Church for Indians who had been taught to live in some form of community life, and the *ejidos* or village lands protected by the government.

The conception of national dominion inherited from the kings of Spain passed over to the Mexican Government after the consummation of independence. Hidalgo made inflammatory statements that the land of Mexico belonged to the Indians and should be returned to them; but the traditional conception and division of properties remained pretty much as it had been. Various projects of colonization on unused lands ended in failure. It was not until the inauguration of the Liberal Reform, under Juárez, with its broad conceptions of individual initiative and its laic principles of society that this system of agrarian tenure was ended.

By its prohibition of land ownership in the hands of corporations, the Lerdo Law, of June 25, 1856, not only struck at the power of the Church as its primary aim, but also spelled the death of the communal lands of the Indians, which it pretended to disvinculate. Denunciation of properties owned by the Church or held in trust for the Indians became the legal method of securing their alienation. The nonrented lands of the Church were put up for sale at a fraction of their value, and rented lands passed into the hands of the renters. When the Church protested against the accumulation of laws directed against it, President Juárez determined that it should receive no indemnity whatever.

In many instances, because the consciences of Catholics refused to be burdened with the fat of this sacrilege, large parcels of Church properties fell into the hands of foreigners or of Masonic politicians, who later protested against any revision of the law or necessity of restitution when Maximilian was called to the throne of Mexico. In this way were laid the beginnings of most of the enormous estates that marked the Díaz regime. Very few of the great properties of Mexico had titles antedating the Liberal Reform.

Meanwhile, the ancient communal lands of the Indians, deprived of the protection of the Church and subjected to the same law of corporations, were gobbled up, as even Lerdo himself was compelled to admit; and the Indians were reduced to the condition of peonage. The destruction of the *ejidos* was legally completed by President Juárez, in the laws of the Reform which he dictated from July 12, 1859, to February 5, 1861, and which were placed in the Constitution in 1873–74. The Indians, who had received from this legislation a personal, free title to lands, with all the nominal benefits of social independence, found themselves in free competition with their neighbors, the large proprietors. It was not long before the peasant became the victim of usury, deceit, and robbery; and his lands became forfeited or seized to form part of the adjoining *latifundia*. The only exceptions were in places where the laws were not promulgated or where the Indians effectively resisted the division of woods and grazing lands.

The era of individualism inaugurated by the Liberal Reform reached its height under President Díaz, who continued the division of *ejidos* in conformity with the laws framed by his predecessors. In many cases, the Indian villages were burned and the *ejidos* were forcibly taken by powerful interests or individuals, without process of law.

It was to remedy these abuses that Madero declared in his Manifesto of San Luis Potosí, "By a violent interpretation of the law of unused lands, many small proprietors, principally Indians, have seen themselves dispossessed, some by order of the secretary of Public Works, others by decree of the courts. Therefore, it is an elemental duty of justice to return this land to its legal proprietors. . . ." At the same time, Zapata and his mentors were clamoring for the restoration of the *ejido*. Nevertheless, little was done.

The real basis of revolutionary action was laid in the famous Agrarian Law of Carranza, issued in Vera Cruz, on January 6, 1915. According to this document, "The despoiling of lands of communal ownership or distribution, which had been granted by the colonial government as a means of insuring existence for the needy classes, has, under the pretext of complying with the law of June 25, 1856, and under regulations ordering the division and reduction to private properties of these lands among the residents of the respective villages, delivered them into the hands of a few speculators."

These alienations of communal lands were now declared null, as were also the concessions or sales of lands by federal authority to the injury of *ejidos* and other village properties; and machinery was to be set up for due restitution, with special preference to the soldiers of the revolution and their dependents.

The essential provisions of the Agrarian Law were later written into the Constitution of Querétaro, promulgated by Carranza on February 5, 1917.

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By the spring of 1916, the social revolution which had evolved from the conflict began to show its hand. A revolutionary army, composed of 500 generals and 100,000 soldiers ruled the country. The individual states were in the hands of independent generals who administered the Agrarian Reform for their own benefit. The government officials were almost everywhere simply local bandits, many of them still youths, who succeeded in imposing themselves in power. Carranza himself, who was neither general nor statesman, showed increasingly the characteristics of a pompous "stuffed shirt" in an administration whose activity was popularly understood in a new word *carrancear,* meaning "to steal." Some of his followers were men of ability and honesty; many others were ambitious, arrogant, and insatiable brigands. Even the formidable title *constitucionalista* became a symbol of grafting, as bitter wits began to pronounce it *con-su-uña-lista* (with grasping finger).

In the autumn of 1916, Carranza called for the election of a convention to change the Constitution of 1857 in line with the objectives of the revolution as decreed at Vera Cruz. Two hundred men, exclusively loyal followers of Carranza, met at Querétaro in December. His primary idea apparently was to give more power to the President; and he did succeed in reducing Congress to a four-month session each year, with extra sessions at the pleasure of the executive. Moreover, he cherished the dream of having his name, like that of Juárez, associated with a code of laws. In spite of his sponsorship of the agrarian laws of Vera Cruz, it is doubtful whether he had any conception or real desire of the social changes that were urged by the Socialist intellectuals who proceeded to dominate the convention.

The enactment of agrarian reform and revolution was the work rather of a radical group led by Francisco J. Múgica with the political backing of Álvaro Obregón and the intellectual guidance of Andrés Molina Enríquez. Lincoln Steffens, who lent his talents to the occasion, is also credited in large part with Article 27 of the Constitution, which laid the groundwork for a radically Socialist conception of property, invoking the ancient personal claim of the Spanish kings to the territorial extent of the country, but actually operating more in harmony with the principles of Henry George.[21] Thus it declared: "The property of lands . . . within the limits of national territory belongs originally to the Nation, which has had and retains the right of transmitting their ownership to private persons, constituting private property."

According to the Agrarian Law of 1915, "The communities which, in need of lands, lack *ejidos* or are unable to secure their restitution, because of the absence of titles or because of their legal alienation, shall be empowered to obtain donations of land sufficient to reconstruct them in conformity with the needs of their population, by expropriation, through the National Government, of the land indispensable for this purpose, from the property immediately surrounding the communities concerned." Elaborating on this principle, with special reference to the large estates, Article 27 declared, "The acquisition of private properties to obtain the objects expressed will be considered of public utility." At the same time, this article announced: "In the nation is vested the direct ownership of petroleum and all solid, liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons." Thus, at one stroke, was changed the entire policy of Díaz, who sought to develop the nation by encouraging large private enterprise and the influx of foreign capital. Whether the American Government was aware of the full significance of what was going on is doubtful.

Of equal importance were the provisions of Article 123, which established the norms of justice for labor. This enunciated the eight-hour day, affirmed the laborer's right to a living wage and a bonus on profits, the right to a decent home, on which a rent not to exceed one half of the value of the property might be collected, and also the employer's obligation to build, equip, and administer hospitals, schools, and the like. The laborers' right to strike was guaranteed, whereas employers were to be allowed to suspend operations only in case of overproduction. The justification of strikes was placed in the hands of Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration. Discharge of a worker without adequate cause was to be indemnified by an amount equal to three months' wages, and funds were to be created for accident and disability.

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[21] Cf. *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (New York, 1931).

This advanced legislation represented the fulfillment of pledges made to organized labor. During the war with Villa, Obregón had formed a personal alliance with the labor leader Luis Morones, had established branches of the I.W.W. throughout the territory held by Carranza, and enlisted six battalions of "Red" workers. This combination was later to become one of the leading agencies in the overthrow of Carranza.

At the same time, the convention witnessed a renewal of attacks upon the Church, allegedly for its support of Díaz and Huerta. "If we could," cried Deputy González Galindo, "we would devour the priests. I, señores deputies, who am no Jacobin sectary, who do not baptize my children, who am free from the enslaving traditions of Catholicism, will applaud from my seat all present who denounce the priests. . . . It has been agreed upon that religion went through an evolutionary program until it reached Christianity, which is supposed to be the most worthy form. Theologians say it is the most truthful. I call it a farce. I call it a string of lies and fables."[22]

The result was a reaffirmation of the anti-Catholic provisions of the Constitution of 1857, and the establishment of many new ones of Socialist character. Article 24 declared that "all men are free to profess the religious belief they prefer and to practice the ceremonies, devotions, and acts of the respective cult, in the temple or within the home, as long as those do not constitute an offence punishable by law." Nevertheless the law recognized no personality whatever in the religious groups denominated as churches, forbade churches to own property or to engage in education, outlawed all clergy of foreign birth, and placed in the hands of the state legislatures not only a constant vigilance over religious activities but also the faculties of determining the number of clergy permitted to function. Infraction by the clergy of any of these enactments was to be penalized without trial by jury.

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[22] *Diario de los Debates*, I, p. 520.

Carranza later realized the harm done by this legislation and tried to modify what he regarded as the most vicious Constitutional attacks upon the Church. In his memorandum to Congress, published December 27, 1918, he declared: "It now pertains to the Legislative Power to study an amendment to the Constitutional Article 130 in such terms that liberty of conscience, and natural, inalienable human rights may suffer no further limitation than that counseled by morality and the public interest of the country, and harmonize the principles of modern civilization with the legitimate liberties of mankind and the laws that regulate the political organism of the country."[23] In particular, he wished to delete the section limiting the number of clergy, as equivalent to the union of Church and State, and to modify paragraph 16, so as to permit clergymen to possess chattels and furniture. Alleging that the prohibition of foreign clergymen interfered with Protestant propaganda, he wished to have this section likewise deleted. His suggestions failed to meet the approval of the Legislature.

It is important to note that the Constitution of Querétaro was never submitted to the Mexican people for ratification. Instead, it was imposed by decree, on February 5, 1917. Popular resistance to the enforcement of many of its provisions was bound to create national disorders and obliged the government to maintain a large standing army. During the debates, Machorro Narváez, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention declared: "The actual Revolution is not yet popular in Mexico. The majority of the Mexican people are still against the Revolution; the better classes, the majority of the middle classes, and the old intellectual element are against the Revolution; the laboring classes of certain category, private employees, those who form the bulk of the middle classes, are against the Revolution; we are still in the minority." This was the truth.

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[23] *Diario Oficial.*

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Carranza was inaugurated as legal President of Mexico in March, 1917. Having established constitutional order in revolutionary manner and won the name of avenging Madero by the defeat of Huerta, he regarded his work as done. As a matter of fact, he had not thought much about the Constitution as such. His primary objective was the Presidency. To obtain this, he was willing to turn Mexico over to anarchy and plunder, but he did not desire that this should become a permanent condition. As rebellion against Huerta's government gained momentum through various groups, many of them conflicting, it had become the business of a nebular "constitutionalism" to unite them. "Our revolutionary banner," admitted Obregón, "says 'Constitutionalism,' but our acts affirm the contrary, 'Anti-Constitutionalism.' If because we are Constitutionalists we were to respect the Constitution, we would have been obliged to recognize Huerta, because Congress recognized him, and this the Constitution commanded us to do."[24]

It is doubtful whether Carranza took so cynical a view of Constitutionalism; nevertheless, it was difficult for him, in view of his own background and record, to regard the new Constitution as imposing the obligation of the social revolution envisioned by his radical supporters. He did reclaim national ownership of some 30,000,000 acres of lands alienated under Díaz, but little was done for the peasants. During his term, the agrarian reform was limited to the National Agrarian Commission, which distributed 250,000 acres to 48,000 families. The provisions of Articles 123 remained largely inoperative; strikes, due to the circulation of paper money and the consequent depreciation of real wages, were put down by the arrest of strikers and the closing of the Casa del Obrero Mundial, the headquarters of the I.W.W. Luis Morones was sentenced to death, but this was later commuted to imprisonment.

There was still the power of Álvaro Obregón to be reckoned with. Carranza was fearful both of the ambitions and of the radicalism of the latter, and was unwilling to relinquish political dominance for himself. Unable to succeed himself in office as Constitutional President, he decided to sponsor Ignacio Bonillas, then Mexican ambassador to Washington, as his successor; and it is probable that, had matters rested there, he could have secured a legal majority.

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[24] Quoted from *El Liberal,* October 6, 1914.

Obregón, however, although constitutionally incapacitated to run in the elections, was not satisfied to remain in the ranks.[25] Moreover, he despised Bonillas as a *científico* in revolutionary guise. The first rumblings of discontent were heard in an undertone that Carranza was seeking to perpetuate himself just as Díaz had done by imposing a puppet President. Then came a protest against the proposed action of the Federal Government to intervene in Sonora. Finally, as Carranza, with the backing of the Sonora group, had rebelled against Victoriano Huerta, so Obregón now turned on Carranza.

Sonora now proclaimed its independence of the Federal Government, and in April, 1920, Adolfo de la Huerta and Plutarco Elías Calles issued the Plan of Agua Prieta, demanding the removal of Carranza from office and the appointment of a provisional President until elections could be held. Obregón, who was the brains of the insurrection, was threatened with arrest for complicity, but escaped to the state of Guerrero.

In spite of the alleged ideals of social reform and constitutionalism, the truth is that Mexico was still governed pretty much by political ambitions. Like Madero before him, Carranza had lost political caste and was merely tolerated by the revolutionary boys who had profited by his gray hairs. The strong man emerging from Mexico's exhaustion, as could have been seen a long way off, was Obregón.

In May, 1918, the governor of Coahuila had organized a convention of labor leaders at Saltillo, to be brought under the control of Carranza; but the later had miscalculated his men. The convention resulted in a national federation of labor unions, the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), on a craft-union basis modeled after the American Federation of Labor. Luis Morones, the delegate from the Federal District became its secretary. Its activities were governed by a secret Grupo Acción, composed of eighteen members, all allies of Morones, the friend of Obregón. The next year the Grupo Acción organized the Mexican Labor Party to sponsor Obregón for President, and there was little that Carranza could do to stem the movement.

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[25] Obregón's status as President was not recognized by the White House until three years after his election.

With insurrection in full progress after the Plan of Agua Prieta, the Sonora triumvirate now proceeded down the Pacific coast, at the head of a column of Yaqui Indians, proclaiming for Obregón, gathering military chieftains as it went along, and irresistibly advancing on Mexico City. Even Pablo González, the favorite of Carranza, abandoned his former master. In May, Carranza, like Huerta, decided to take flight, with the words, "I do not know on whom I can rely."

The White House might have sustained him against the Sonora faction, but Wilson's patience had been shaken by Carranza's stubborn pose of independence. To cap the climax, Carranza had decided to vent his spleen by conspiring with German agents against the United States and completely alienated his American sponsors by backing the fantastic Plan of San Diego, which was to restore to Mexico the territories lost to the United States, in return for help to the Germans against the Allies.

In face of the inevitable, Carranza abandoned Mexico City for Vera Cruz, with a few friends and 5,000,000 pesos from the Mexican Treasury. On the point of departure, he was pledged eternal fealty by the commander of Vera Cruz, General Guadalupe Sánchez; but ere his train had proceeded halfway, the latter changed his mind and attacked the convoy in the mountains of Puebla. Carranza himself managed to escape on horseback and was guided toward Tampico by a local chieftain, Rodolfo Herrera.

At Tlaxcalantongo, a remote Indian village, while the unhappy Constitutionalist slept in a small hut, Herrera treacherously murdered him and gave out the word that Carranza had committed suicide.[26] Adolfo de la Huerta took over the Presidential office temporarily, and Obregón, with the field thus cleared, proceeded with his own election.

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[26] Villa was assassinated in the summer of 1923.

CHAPTER XVI

Plutarco Elías Calles

THE STRONG MAN

i

At the height of his career, according to his enthusiastic biographer Borquez, General Plutarco Elías Calles was "one of the greatest representatives of the Revolution, the foremost figure . . . whose name frames all the reforming philosophy of Mexico as the laurels on a coin encircle the emblem of the Republic." At the end of his regime, no man in Mexico was so thoroughly unpopular and hated as that same Calles.

The circumstances of his birth are not entirely clear. During the Presidential campaigns, Calles was challenged under Article 82, clause 1, of the Constitution which requires that to become President one must be a Mexican citizen by birth. The alleged foreign birth or descent of Calles could not be proved, but Mexicans have persisted to referring to him as *el turco* — the Turk. For public record, at least, he was born in Guaymas, on September 25, 1877, the son of Plutarco Elías and the Doña Jesús Calles, both natives of northern Sonora.

His immediate family lived in very moderate circumstances; but three uncles, Alexander, Rafael, and Francisco S. Elías, were rich men. The latter was twice governor of Sonora and later secretary of Agriculture. His half-brother, Arturo Malvido Elías became secretary of the Post Office Department and was at one time a financial agent in New York City for the Mexican Government.

As a young boy, Plutarco attended the school of one Don Benigno López y Sierra, where he distinguished himself to such an extent that the master prophesied: "Plutarco, some day you will become governor of Sonora." He later attended the State

Normal School at Hermosillo, Sonora, and after graduation taught in the Guaymas public schools and on the staff of the Escuela de la Moneda in Hermosillo. During this period, he is said to have done meritorious work, instilling an independent spirit into his pupils.

In carrying out his assignment, however, he became involved in serious difficulties with the government, in 1900, apparently from a revolutionary attitude toward property. He was known to be sympathetic with the revolutionists associated with *Regeneración,* a periodical issued in Los Angeles, California, and secretly distributed in Sonora. Moreover, he courted disfavor by his affiliation with the Club Verde, which was opposed to the political domination of the Torres-Izabal-Corral organization. While he was treasurer of the Guaymas Teachers Association, the funds entrusted to him mysteriously disappeared; and irregularities in conduct, alleged in a parents' petition to the School Board, resulted in his dismissal.

Later ventures do not seem to have been more successful. His uncle Alexander Elías had him appointed to the office of municipal treasurer; but when the state treasurer checked up the municipal accounts, an inexplicable shortage was found, and Calles, barely escaping arrest, was again let go. Arturo Malvido Elías was at this time operating the Hotel Mexico in Guaymas. Calles obtained work here as bartender and shortly afterward became its owner. When the place burned down, the insurance companies, alleging arson, refused to pay the full amount of the policies.

Another of his uncles now placed him on one of his farms. The enterprise terminated in bankruptcy, and he was given charge of a flour mill belonging to the firm of Smithers and Nordelhos. This business also failed, and Calles was again dismissed. During this period, according to Borquez, "His spirit, matured by the daily struggles and by meditation on historic events and men, began to acquire that serene firmness on which thought reposes, determining the creative power and the definite vision of the future of the Fatherland."

When Madero triumphed, in 1911, Calles presented his candidacy as deputy for Congress, but lost. In 1912, however, he was appointed chief of police in the frontier town of Agua Prieta, Sonora, a place of such little consequence that it did not merit the establishment of a municipality. Here he also opened a store, a saloon, and a gambling hall, patronized by tourists from the neighboring city of Douglas, Arizona. As a stern official and loyal adherent of the Madero regime, when a poor laborer shouted in the street "Down with Madero," Calles without further ado condemned him to be hanged by barbed wire from the railroad bridge near the town.

Severity and indifference to blood seems to have marked Calles throughout his public career. In 1912, he was seized by a detachment loyal to Victoriano Huerta and was sentenced to immediate execution. Calles fell on his knees and was spared through the intervention of Dr. Manuel Huerta. In 1918, now governor of Sonora, he was informed of a conspiracy of refugees in Douglas, Arizona. On the night of December 14, his agents crossed the border, kidnapped the leaders, and unmolested by the American authorities, carried them to Agua Prieta, where they were hanged in the public square. One of those executed was Dr. Manuel Huerta.

Calles' first military activity came in 1913, when he joined the forces of General Álvaro Obregón, who had marched to the northeastern part of the state against the insurrection of Pascual Orozco. As a result of his influence and evident powers of leadership, he was elevated to the rank of colonel and afterward was made chief of the regular forces of Sonora.

At this time, Calles had a ruddy bronzed complexion. His movements, according to Borquez, were "charged with a constant and quiet determination, showed a tireless tension. . . . Harsh and rude, he brought his heels down solidly, like the Spanish captains of old . . . and convinced me more and more that it is not easy to find chiefs who are able so naturally and spontaneously to adapt themselves to the medium in which they find themselves, particularly when they are among men of the people." At the height of his career, his complexion blanched perceptibly. His face, as it broadened, developed a heavy severity. A short clipped mustache and rather beetling brows heightened this impression. If benevolence was among his virtues, it did not shine through the outward appearance.

ii

At the beginning of 1914, Calles gave his attention to the organization and strengthening of his troops, and then returned to deal with Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, whom he regarded as a weak man and enemy of the Constitutionalist movement. Unsuccessful in this revolutionary enterprise, he and his partisans were obliged to flee toward Agua Prieta. From that time until 1915, he was engaged in the civil wars, on the side of the Constitutionalists, and as Carranza's provisional governor of Sonora opposed to Maytorena. At the end of 1915, when Villa tried to take refuge in Sonora, Calles directed the defense of Agua Prieta with success. His soldiers at this time called him *El Viejo* — "the old man" — humorously contradicting his claim of youth, and the *cabecilla*, or "little head."

With the triumph of the Constitutionalists, he returned to Hermosillo as provisional governor and military commandant of the state. This period was broken when he took charge of the bloody purge of the Yaqui Indians, in 1917, and Adolfo de la Huerta assumed the place of provisional governor. In the elections supervised by the Constitutionalists, Calles was given over 90 per cent of the votes and became installed as "Constitutional" governor. At the same time, the local Congress was filled with enthusiastic youths of revolutionary outlook, who proceeded to draft agrarian, labor, and educational laws that were to serve in many aspects as types of revolutionary ideals.

Following the pattern of the Prohibition Law in the United States, Calles' first act as governor of Sonora was to issue his famous decree Number 1, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or use of intoxicating liquor. Violation of this decree was made punishable by death before a firing squad; and the first execution was that of six *peones* for having liquor in their possession. This enactment, calculated to put an end to the liquor traffic among the lower classes, was later introduced into Tabasco by the Socialist reformer Garrido Canabal with the same murderous penalties. A more notable achievement of this epoch was Calles' foundation of "Cruz Gálvez" schools for orphans of the Revolution, named for a colonel who had lost his life during the civil war.

In September, 1919, with the establishment of the Constitutionalist government, he was appointed secretary of Industry, Commerce and Work in the cabinet of President Carranza. The following February, however, as a member of the Obregón group, which had begun to assert its national ambitions, he resigned his post as incompatible with his political activities and convictions. "My position within the Cabinet," he declared in the spirit of disillusion, "was insupportable, both because of the bitter opposition which all we partisans of General Obregón suffered and because of the fact that I was not disposed to make myself an accomplice of all the errors and all the acts of the most corrupt administration recorded in the annals of the government of Mexico. On the other hand, I have never taken pleasure in being placed in embarrassing situations; and I wish frankly to take my place in a definite way within the ranks of the political party to which I belong and to participate with my coreligionists in the dangers which fate has prepared for us."

Returning to Sonora early in 1920, he became a propagandist of the Presidential candidacy of Obregón, a candidacy which was shortly to be transformed into a military movement in the traditional manner. The central government, applying Article 27 of the Constitution, began to exercise its power of nationalizing property, with reference to the waters of the Sonora River. The protest of the local Congress was soon converted into armed resistance, and the Plan of Agua Prieta was signed, on April 23, 1920, by the Sonora politicians, who felt that Carranza had served his purpose long enough. General Calles was selected head of the forces which now designated themselves as the Liberal Constitutionalist Army against the Federal Government established by Carranza; and within a month, the Sonora troops, under the triumvirate of Calles, Obregón, and Abelardo L. Rodríguez, occupied the capital of the republic.

The body of President Carranza, who was murdered under circumstances hardly less shameful than those of Madero, was returned to Mexico City, on May 24, and buried in the cemetery of Dolores. The following day, Adolfo de la Huerta began to serve out the term of Carranza, under the Plan of Agua Prieta and the slogan "Effective Suffrage; No Re-election." General Obregón, left free by the withdrawal of Pablo González from the Presidential race and unopposed except by a weak candidate of the Catholic Party, was elected to the coveted post in September.

With Obregón, one of the cleverest politicians in modern Mexico, the Revolution entered a frankly cynical stage. Socialism and Anti-Imperialism served as slogans for world consumption, while plunder, graft, and the distribution of offices, unrivaled by the worst of the Díaz regime, became the real order of the day. In spite of his affectation of radicalism, Obregón was never a convinced Socialist. During his term of office, some 3,000,000 acres of land were distributed to over 600 villages; but there still remained 320,000,000 acres in private hands, principally a few thousand *hacienda* owners.

Obregón retained his belief in the *hacienda* system, so that there were still over 1,000,000 families or practically one third of the rural population employed on these estates. In spite of forced expropriations, often under circumstances that merited the word *agarristas*, or grabbers, for *agraristas,* or agrarians, Obregón made at least a gesture toward indemnification; and by law of January 10, 1920, he created the Public Agrarian Debt, to provide bonds as a guarantee of future payment to proprietors whose lands had been nationalized.

At the same time he threw a certain amount of support to the Agrarista Party, led by Díaz Soto y Gama, in order to keep the labor movement of Morones and the CROM from acquiring too much power. Article 123 of the Constitution had opened the way to make labor the dominant class of Mexico; and with official protection and the monopoly of unionization which Morones and the Grupo Acción effected by every conceivable means, Obregón realized that he had to play a careful game. This became all the truer, when the leaders of the CROM secured the support of the American Federation of Labor.

Another element of dangerous instability remained for Obregón to face. His government had not been recognized in Washington; and, without such recognition, it would be impossible for him to cope with any serious insurrection. The basis of agreement finally came when he agreed to shelve the principles of Article 27, which had placed American interests in jeopardy. From the beginning of his term, he had accepted the interpretation that this Article was not retroactive; but he refused to commit this to a treaty, as Washington desired. The groundwork for a solution of the problem was worked out in 1922, when Adolfo de la Huerta, then secretary of the treasury, negotiated a loan through Thomas Lamont of Wall Street, interest payments to be resumed with the aid of a tax imposed upon the oil industry.

With the American bankers thus interested in Mexican stability, the diplomats, Messrs. Warren and Payne, were now sent to Mexico. During the so-called Bucareli Conferences which followed, the nonretroactive character of Article 27 was reasserted; and a claims commission was created to establish the amount which Mexico would agree to pay for American damages during the Revolution. American business interests thus placated, recognition of Obregón's government was granted, on August 30, 1923.

Obregón could now rely upon the United States as an ally in case of trouble; need for this confidence was not long in coming. Just as Carranza had attempted to perpetuate his power by proposing Bonillas as his successor in the Presidency, so Obregón decided now to sponsor Plutarco Elías Calles, his secretary of government and leader of the Left Wing. Opposition to Calles soon consolidated in the nomination of the secretary of the treasury, Adolfo de la Huerta, who resigned his office, promptly denounced the Obregón government, and was in turn denounced by his successor, Alberto Pani, for having left the treasury in a chaotic condition.

In December, 1923, Guadalupe Sánchez of Vera Cruz and Enrique Estrada of Jalisco declared themselves for De la Huerta. These were soon joined by such veteran revolutionaries as Salvador Alvarado and Antonio Villareal, as well as by liberal groups disgusted with the lawless domination of the Grupo Acción, which had terrorized both industry and labor, with governmental connivance. As events developed, not even the personal spokesmen and associates of De la Huerta, who was himself a radical Socialist, were to be free from the thugs of Morones; but supported by strong military forces, De la Huerta appeared to have a decided advantage over the Obregón-Calles faction.

On December 30, however, it was announced that Obregón had asked Washington for arms and ammunition to crush the rebellion. The granting of this aid, the determination of the United States to make it effective, and the influence of the leaders of organized labor made it impossible for De la Huerta to secure foreign loans or even maintain the morale of his troops. Commenting on this incident of American intervention, President Coolidge declared, on April 25, 1927, "In the winter of 1923–1924 revolutionary activities broke out in Mexico, that probably could have overthrown the government of Obregón, had it not been that our government supplied him with arms and ammunition on credit and gave him the advantage of our moral support so that he might be able to sustain himself in office."[1]

After his defeat, De la Huerta and the leaders of his staff fled to the United States. General Enrique Estrada was imprisoned, and De la Huerta himself after having been brought to court, established residence in Los Angeles, California, where he resumed a musical career. Obregón executed the other rebel generals and promoted more than fifty chieftains who could be trusted to take their places.

General Angel Flores of Sinaloa now declared himself as opposition candidate and attacked the Obregón-Calles machine on the basis of agrarian reform. "Land distribution," he declared with considerable justification, "has been one of the greatest disasters of the present Mexican administration, for it has not been carried out as planned. What happened is simply that the rich man has been impoverished, and the pauper is not better off than before. Rural property has been destroyed, farmers having no credit or resources, and being unable to mortgage or sell their properties because no funds are available for upkeep and development on account of the fear of impending confiscation. Besides, the men to whom land division was entrusted are not landowners. They ignore the country's needs and have converted the problem into a political argument, when it should have been treated as a purely national issue."

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[1] Address at banquet of The Associated Press, Hotel Biltmore, New York (Published by Associated Producers of Petroleum in Mexico, 17 Battery Place, New York).

Calles, of course, had the support of the entire Obregón military forces and the endorsement of Morones. During his campaign, he frankly declared his policies to be dictatorship of the proletariat, suppression of private property, total submission of the family to the state, and the uprooting of religion. In the elections of September, 1924, Congress declared him the victor, two to one; General Flores died mysteriously of poisoning.

iii

Calles' first official act as President of Mexico was to confirm his campaign pledge to appoint Luis N. Morones as secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Labor. This alliance was to play a leading part in the Calles regime; and the support of the CROM was in a large measure responsible for the reputation of "strong man" that Calles was to acquire. Morones had strong support from the American Federation of Labor and was vice-president of the Pan American Federation of Labor, of which William Green was chairman. In addition, he received the commendation of the British labor leaders, Brown, Bromley, and Hickes, who assured him that "European workers are well aware that the greatest enemies of the Mexican people have always been clericalism and landlordism."[2]

In return for a practically official protection and subsidizing of the CROM, this body became an enforcer of national decrees and even undertook to replace the National Army gradually by battalions of labor syndicates belonging to the union. At its height, the CROM claimed a total membership of 1,300,000 members, although only 13,000 paid their dues. The Grupo Acción attempted, by intimidation and violence as well as by more pacific persuasion, to enroll all Mexican laborers, not excluding the prostitutes of the Federal District.

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[2] George Barnard, *The Mexican Reformation* (London, 1927), p. 30.

The financial returns of this general arrangement appear to have been enormous for the leaders. Both Morones and Calles acquired great wealth; and, although theoretical Socialists in the beginning, they developed a native Mexican capitalism of a character and of proportions that could but arouse national cynicism. After one year in Mexico, the ambassadress of the U.S.S.R., Madame Kolontay, declared that Calles and Morones "are false Socialists and take advantage of the labor element merely as an instrument of their ambitions." Morones' labor group, she asserted, "is a bourgeois crowd directed only by personal interests." As for Morones himself, she added, "it is not possible that he can develop Communism in any way, when he is exploiting the working classes for his own advantage and that of other groups."[3] With regard to the benefits gained by labor, the Federal Department of Labor, several years later, issued statistics including thirty-one states, contrasting the average minimum daily wage of 3.34 pesos with the real average daily wage of .708 pesos.[4]

In spite of the noisy program of agrarian reform, soiled by crimes of every category during the process of land seizure by agrarian bands, the peasants made less real gain than the industrial workers of Mexico. Before his election, Calles visited the city of Cuautla and declared that he was destined to carry on the work of Zapata. During his term, about 8,000,000 acres of land were distributed to 1500 villages; but, according to Luis L. León, secretary of Agriculture and Public Works, only one third of what is required to satisfy villages and centers of population had been expropriated. On December 31, 1926, bonds were issued for $1,220,000; and the bondholders drew lots for $79,145 in cash. This, of course, represented but a token of the values involved.

In the meantime, the peasants benefited only to a small extent. Four fifths of the funds available for agricultural development were loaned to revolutionary millionaires and wealthy landowners of political influence, while tremendous losses in production were registered in the abandonment or neglect of expropriated properties. From 1881 to 1890, about 500 Mexicans emigrated every year. In 1910, nearly 18,000 moved to the United States. When land restitution began, in 1921, over 51,000 departed. In 1923, the figure had reached almost 63,000; by 1924, it was over 87,000, and the exodus continued to grow during the regime of Calles. According to Secretary León, the total number, including those who left secretly, would be twice the official figures. During this period of distress, the leaders of the revolution and of agrarian reform, Calles, Aarón Sáenz, Carlos Riva Palacios, Luis L. León, General Pérez Treviño, remained in possession of the vast properties which they had accumulated.

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[3] *America,* May 21, 1927.

[4] Cf. *El Nacional,* Nov. 17, 1932.

Under these circumstances, Calles decided to abandon his early agrarian program; and adopting an increasingly conservative policy, he announced that the agrarian reform was a failure. By 1935, of some 27,000,000 acres divided among the Indians, less than 7,000,000 was put to use by them. Calles blamed the failure upon the moral and intellectual incapacity of those who were called upon to carry out the reform. Among other causes for his reaction must be seen also the important influence of the American Ambassador Morrow, who regarded the reform as economically unsound, urged a slowing down of the entire process, and advised that land should not be expropriated or distributed without cash payment.

A similar retrenchment of Calles' radicalism took place on the matter of oil fields affected by Article 27. Early in his regime, during the winter of 1925–26, he decided to enforce those provisions which had declared subsoil deposits to be national property, and he gave orders that the oil interests, most of which were American and English, should relinquish their titles of ownership in exchange for fifty-year leases, to date from the time when the properties were acquired. Action against oil companies which refused to make the transfer was at once regarded in Washington as a violation of the Bucareli agreements in 1923; and the exchange of diplomatic notes between the two capitals, from 1926 to early 1927, revealed very strained relations.

President Coolidge rather tardily, in view of several years' developments, observed that "It is a cardinal principle of law that private property should not be taken without fair compensation. . . . Under the Constitution of 1917 and by-laws and regulations for carrying it into effect, we feel that Mexico is threatening to disregard this great elementary principle by undertaking a retroactive application of their Constitution to property acquired long before their Constitution was adopted." Secretary Kellogg warned the Calles administration that "we stood squarely on the understanding made with President Obregón, and we expected it not to take any action that would deprive American citizens of their property rights." This implied distinction between exemptions for American properties and the subjection of Mexican properties to the full force of the law, of course, has never appealed to Mexicans, even to those who have been most opposed to the land policies of their government.

At the same time as American business interests were urging a stronger policy with Calles, the State Department at Washington was besieged with letters demanding the recall of Ambassador Sheffield, because he was alleged to be out of sympathy with the Calles regime. The United States then decided to change its approach to the problem, and, recalling Ambassador Sheffield in the autumn of 1927, appointed Dwight Morrow, a partner in the House of Morgan, to the post.

A man of genial personality, Ambassador Morrow at once set out to sell the idea of American friendship for Mexico. He cultivated a widely publicized interest in Mexican arts and crafts, invited Will Rogers and Colonel Lindbergh, who later became his son-in-law, on good-will visits to the country, and evinced a sympathy with Calles' projects in such matters as education and land reclamation. As a result, he became an intimate friend of the Mexican President and within two months after his arrival, had the satisfaction of announcing to his government that the Mexican Supreme Court had declared Calles' oil legislation unconstitutional. Foreigners who had acquired subsoil rights before 1917 and had taken positive measure of exploitation were to be confirmed in full rights of ownership.

The economic program of the proletarian revolution had been pretty well liquidated. Calles and his revolutionary oligarchy were rich and at ease. Cordial relationships had been assured with Washington; and Mexico was said to be on the road to commercial prosperity.

iv

In spite of the slogan "Effective Suffrage; No Re-election" of the Revolution and of the Constitution of 1917, General Obregón after one term out of office, now decided to run again for the Presidency. To make this legal, Calles amended the Constitution and, moreover, extended the Presidential term back to six years. This time, Generals Arnulfo Gómez and Francisco Serrano, both formerly protected by Obregón and Calles, appeared as opposition candidates on a "No Re-election" platform, promising religious toleration and attacking the government's agrarian policy.

On October 2, 1927, Serrano and a group of his friends, who had gone to Cuernavaca for the week end, were seized on the charge of plotting in Mexico City and were shot. It is estimated that during this week over 300 political assassinations took place throughout the Republic, to the dismay of the Mexican people. Gómez, who had pronounced in Vera Cruz, was driven into the mountains and within a month, was captured and shot. Obregón now remained the only candidate of a cowed people. On November 13, an attempt was made upon his own life, but he escaped, with his customary *sang froid* and show of good fellowship undisturbed. The following summer he was re-elected by official unanimous vote.

Not all, however, was well between Obregón and Calles. Political lines had already been drawn between the Obregónists and the Callists. Obregón's re-election had been opposed by the CROM which nourished the ambition of Morones for the Presidency. When, therefore, President-elect Obregón fell by the assassin hand of José de León Toral, on July 17, 1928, before he could assume office, there were rumors, substantiated by the disappointed Obregónists that other bullets besides those of the fanatical Toral were fired into the body of Obregón. The Grupo Acción was blamed for having made the most of the moment; and Calles himself was implicated in the tragedy.

In September when Congress met, Calles, not entirely unlike Brutus, summoned the state governors and generals to the capital, and in a gathering of national notables, with the enthusiastic applause of Ambassador Morrow, announced that the age of dictators was over. Mexico, he declared, would henceforth be governed by legal procedure and constitutional institutions. Congress then nominated as Provisional President the former governor of Tamaulipas, Portes Gil, who was regarded as an Obregónist acceptable to the Callist affiliation.

What this meant was the unification of the Obregón-Calles elements in a plutocracy that called itself Socialism. Calles now assumed the title *Jefe Maximo,* or High Chief, with absolutely no Constitutional justification, and proceeded to establish himself as the permanent power behind his puppet Presidents, surrounded by such able lieutenants as Morones, Aarón Sáenz, Puig Casauranc, Luis León, and Abelardo Rodríguez.

v

Of the revolutionary Socialist program espoused by Calles, only one point remained to give color to his regime, namely, his determination to extirpate the Catholic religion. In part, this was a carry-over of the irreligious bragadaccio of the revolutionary generals themselves. Referring to his own destructive campaigns, Álvaro Obregón had declared: "The division I am proud to command has crossed the Republic from one end to the other between the maledictions of the friars and the anathemas of the middle class. What greater glory for me! The malediction of the friars carries with it a glorification." This spirit was later incarnated into the Constitution of 1917 by the revolutionary clique, and served as the symbol of a crusade to cover the mistakes and corruption of the revolutionary politicians, when by the wildest stretch of the imagination the Church could not be conceived as a menace to anyone or anything.

Calles' attitude toward the Catholic Church cannot be understood except in terms of his stubborn desire to make himself absolute master of Mexico in every respect. It is doubtful whether he himself ever entertained the slightest secret attachment to the Church he relentlessly hounded. On the other hand, there is evidence to show that at least his second marriage, following the death of his first wife, was contracted in the presence of a Catholic priest and, indeed, under circumstances which violated his own laws. Some of his daughters were enrolled in a Catholic school of California; and during a serious illness, he entered a hospital conducted by a Catholic sisterhood in Los Angeles.

With reference to the Church in Mexico, however, Calles made his point of view clear in an answer to the President of Peru who, on July 29, 1926, pleaded for a more moderate attitude and the restoration of peace. "The present case," according to Calles, "concerns the clergy, which in the well known course of our history has unleashed so many and most great calamities upon the nation, and which, refractory to the evolution recently begun in Mexico, in its social and political organization, has once again attempted to retard the irresistible course of the universally accepted transformation, making public declaration of repudiation and rebellion against the Constitutional laws of the land. . . .

"The policy of my Government cannot produce a religious conflict, because it does not interfere or wish to interfere in doctrinal matters, but only seeks and demands strict obedience to that which is prescribed by laws promulgated for all individuals residing in Mexico, naturally including the members of the Catholic clergy. If God be the supreme significance of the good of individuals and nations, I do not believe that in this matter he is on the side of those who for more than a century have unleashed in Mexico domestic calamities, invasions, international intrigues and unrest of conscience. The Constitution of Mexico is not a special law, but a general and fundamental code, which I am obliged and determined to enforce, without fear of interdict or supernatural punishment."[5]

A number of events contributed to bring the religious conflict to a head, but the initial spark was set off by the determination of the Government of Mexico, contrary to the statements of its Chief Executive, to assume a definitely sectarian position and to create a Mexican National Church — the *Iglesia Católica Apostolica Mexicana* — as a means of destroying the Catholic Church.

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[5] These views were later elaborated by Portes Gil in his work published by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Conflict Between the Civil Power and the Clergy* (1935), and ably answered by Félix Navarrete in *La Lucha entre el Poder Civil y el Clero* (El Paso, 1935).

Early in May, 1925, Adalberto Tejeda, Secretary of the Interior, presented the historic Catholic Church of Corpus Christi in Mexico City to José Joaquín Pérez, an ex-captain now sponsored by the government as patriarch of its Mexican National Church. The following year Patriarch Pérez secured consecration at the hands of an Eastern Orthodox (non-Catholic) bishop residing in Chicago. The church of La Soledad was then assaulted; and at Cuautepec, the municipal authorities ejected the Catholic pastor of San Miguel's and set up their own clergy. To provide funds for the new sect, the CROM, under the leadership of Morones, laid a tax upon organized labor. These tithes never reached the unhappy patriarch, who signed a written retractation in the presence of a Catholic priest on his deathbed but was buried under the orders and at the expense of his Masonic lodge, in 1931.

In the meantime, anti-Catholic experiments were being advanced in various states. In the state of Jalisco, Governor Guadalupe Zuño decreed that only 250 priests could perform their ministry in his entire territory, embracing 1,240,000 inhabitants. In July, 1925, he closed the Institute of Science of Jalisco and placed the entire student body under arrest. When Catholics protested against this action, he replied by raiding other Catholic schools, including the diocesan seminary in Guadalajara, and arresting leading laymen of the state who dared to criticize his policy. "The case," he declared, "has never presented itself in which I have tolerated, much less ordered, that any individual be molested in the practice of his religious customs. I have always made it a special point to procure and grant all classes of guarantees for the practice of religious cults, and have punished all infractions or acts on the part of civil authorities that impugn upon such liberty."

The truth seems to be that the revolutionary generals, under the pretense of "defanaticizing" the masses for the edification of foreign observers, were attempting to goad the Catholic elements into rebellion, so that they themselves might profit by the disorders. Thus Ferreira, the commandant of Guadalajara, despoiled over 6000 square miles in northern Jalisco to promote what Zuño had called "the laws of true progress," after plundering objects and properties of value, and crowding 60,000 helpless peasants into concentration camps on charges of religious sedition.

In Tabasco, Governor Tomás Garrido Canábal, who had named one of his sons "Lucifer" and another "Lenin," organized a battalion of "Red Shirts" for the purpose of leveling every Catholic Church within his territory and making it impossible for religious services of any kind, except those of Socialistic ritual, to be conducted. At this time there were only 11 priests in the state, ministering to a population of over 223,000. On October, 1925, the dictator issued a decree forbidding unmarried clergy to officiate within his state; consequently the priests were obliged to leave.

On February 4, 1926, the aged primate of Mexico City, Archbishop José María Mora y del Río was alleged to have stated: "The doctrine of the Church never changes, because it is the Truth, divinely revealed. The protest formulated by the Mexican Episcopate against the articles of the Constitution of 1917 which restrain the liberty of religious dogma is stoutly sustained. It has not been modified, but confirmed, because it is based upon the doctrine of the Church." This was taken by the government as equivalent to inciting the Catholic population to rebellion.

Orders were immediately issued to enforce the Constitutional article which permits only clergymen of Mexican birth to function in the country. Priests were arrested and deported without being given time to collect their personal belongings; and, by March 15, the Department of the Interior announced that it had expelled 202 Catholic clergy and religious of foreign birth. Although a considerable number of Protestant workers from the United States were active in Mexico at the time, Samuel Guy Inman declared that "not a single Evangelical minister had been expelled."

The next step was a wholesale assault upon religious schools. Teachers and pupils were ejected, many were placed under arrest, and the doors of their institutions, both primary and secondary, were sealed. Where local officials failed to enforce the law rigorously, federal agents were introduced with troops to fire upon the indignant populace. Orphanages, hospitals, and churches were closed with the same methods, and even private homes were not exempted from official fury.

A particularly scandalous, although typical, scene occurred, as a result of the order of the Secretary of the Interior, February 22, 1926, to close the popular church of the Sagrada Familia (Holy Family) in Mexico City and to arrest the priests in charge. Three thousand parishioners, including many of the most respected persons in the capital, formed a cordon about the church, and when pistol shots of the police failed to disperse the gathering, the fire department was sent to direct its hose indiscriminately against the men and women. To complete the tragic spectacle, mounted police rode upon the crowd and whipped it into submission. Commenting on popular resistance to his antireligious program, Calles declared in an address to the Workers' Convention, on March 6, 1926: "The grimaces of the sacristans and the black looks of the bigots do not represent public opinion."[6]

With the decision of the government to enforce Article 130 of the Constitution, the official spokesmen of the Church, who had thus far suffered passively, were obliged to declare their resistance. This article, which demands the registration of the clergy with the municipal authorities, was enforced in many places so as to subordinate the Church completely to the whim of local politicians, authorizing them to withhold permission from priests to exercise their ministry and to turn over Catholic churches to persons of various cults and to apostates.

The first place to enforce the registration law was Morelia. Convinced that this measure was a vital blow to the freedom and independence of the Church, Archbishop Ruiz y Flores at once ordered his priests to abandon their churches. "The independence of the Church," he affirmed, "and the freedom of the ministry makes it impossible for us to solicit a license to officiate from the civil authority, because, were we to do so, we would subordinate the Church and interfere with the right of the people to the free and untrammelled practice of their religion. Therefore, it should not appear inconsistent that public worship in the churches has been suspended."[7]

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[6] Cf. *Excelsior,* March 6, 1926.

Although individually summoned, the priests of the Federal District refused to register and referred the matter to the Archbishop of Mexico City. This was rejected by the Municipal Council, which pointed out that, under Article 130, section VI, of the Constitution, the priestly office was reduced to the status of private profession and that, since the Church had no legal personality in Mexico, the State recognized no hierarchy within the clergy.

Further consideration, however, induced Archbishop Ruiz, following the example of his suffragan Bishop Fulcheri, to reverse his opinion. On June 8, 1926, he issued a declaration that the governor of the state had decreed "that the number of priests be fixed and guaranteed by means of identification cards issued by the state secretary, which we judge after mature deliberation, has removed the difficulty."

To the government of Calles, this compromise was no longer satisfactory and opened the way for an exploitation of the lack of firmness and unity which was indicated in the already harassed Church. The Secretary of the Interior notified Archbishop Ruiz that he was no longer free to act in the matter, that "the Executive ordered the closing of the churches because as property of the nation he is expressly authorized by the Constitution to do so, and because the priests had abandoned them. In consequence, the order is irrevocable, and the churches will be destined to nobler uses, in benefit of the people."[8] Shortly after this, Msgr. George Caruana, the Apostolic Delegate and an American citizen, was expelled from the Republic; and Bishop Manrique y Zarate of Huejutla was imprisoned.

Calles now decided to make a supreme effort to end Catholic life and worship in the nation. On June 14, 1926, he issued a decree as a composite, drawn in part from Constitutional indications, making practically every act of Catholic worship or expression of opinion on public affairs a criminal offense. Catholic schools and religious instruction in the schools were forbidden. Bishops' and priests' residences, seminaries, colleges, convents, and all other properties belonging to the Church or to religious associations were placed under the strict ownership of the state and disposition of civil agents. Religious vows were prohibited, and severe penalties were attached against re-entering religious orders. All religious acts of public worship were forbidden except those within the interior of church edifices, under the vigilance of civil authorities. Churches whose clergy failed to register with the government were to remain closed. The wearing of religious garments or insignia outside the churches was strictly forbidden to the clergy as well as to others. Clergy or religious periodicals daring to criticize these or other fundamental laws or governmental authorities were to be prosecuted.

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[7] Cf. *El Pais,* April 21, 1926.

[8] Cf. *Excelsior,* April 28, 1926.

It was then that the Mexican Episcopate, in desperate protest, had recourse to an action unprecedented in the four centuries of the Mexican nation, and ordered for July 31, 1926, until further notice, the suspension of public worship that required the service of priests, in all the churches of the Republic. "Since 1917," the bishops declared, "when we formulated the protest . . . up to these last months, our conduct has been that of prudent silence, because the antireligious statutes were not enforced to the point of making it impossible for the Church to survive. . . . However, the regulation promulgated by the Federal Executive for July 2 of the present year restrict to such an extent the divine rights of the Church which have been confided to our care, are in such conflict with those natural rights that affirm religious liberty as a primordial basis for civilization and prescribe the obligation of the individual and of society to worship God, are so contrary . . . to the rights guaranteed in the Mexican Constitution, that before such violation of sacred moral values, it is impossible for us on our part to compromise."[9]

A few days before the publication of this Pastoral Letter,

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[9] Pastoral Letter of June 25, 1926.

Calles announced his determination to enforce his regulations, if necessary with "extreme measures." "The Government," he declared, "will not take into consideration the attitude of Catholics, which, if it varies from the legal road, will be severely punished. No influences, either external or internal, including the Pope's lamentations, are capable of changing the Government's policy."[10] On July 31, government forces were concentrated in the larger cities "to overwhelm," according to Tejeda, "once and for all any resistance attempted by Catholic agitators in their antipatriotic efforts to obstruct the Public Press in its obligation to obey and compel obedience to the laws."

The clergy, however, urged the faithful to leave the churches peacefully and without further disturbance to rely on prayer for restoration of justice, so that there was no need for governmental alarm.

vi

On August 16, 1926, the official committee of the Mexican Catholic hierarchy addressed a petition to President Calles asking legal redress, in the name of the Catholic people of the nation. To the charge of rebellion for having suspended public worship in the churches, they replied "that a citizen should suspend the exercise of a profession, because the conditions imposed seem to him, in conscience, to be inadmissable, cannot be called rebellion, as 'no one is injured by him who makes use of his right.' " Referring to their neglect of petition up to this time, they declared that the government had not previously enforced the offending laws, "so that in practice there existed a policy of mutual toleration ample to preserve public peace without conflict and such that the Church possessed relative liberty to survive and exercise its functions."

Confronted with intolerable conditions, they now asked for an amendment of the Constitution and in the meantime a suspension of the articles in question, in order that worship, teaching, and charitable activities might be resumed with guarantees. "We solicit," they added, "the following liberties, to which we have a right as Christians, as citizens of a civilized nation, and even as men, namely, liberty of conscience, of thought, of worship, of teaching, of association, of press, all these sincerely, without restrictions that thwart the Constitutional principle. In a word, we do not desire privileges; we desire the recognition of that personality, necessary and indispensable, without which the liberties solicited would be ineffective."

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[10] Cf. *Excelsior,* July 20, 1926.

Calles rejected the petition because, as he declared, "I am the person least eligible to attend your petition or to recommend the repeal or constitutional amendments you solicit, since the Constitutional articles you impugn are in complete accord with my philosophical and political convictions." He informed the bishops that if they still desired to exhaust all legal means possible, they might try addressing their petition to the national Congress or state assemblies.

Five days later he agreed to receive a delegation of the Episcopate, consisting of Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, of Morelia, and Bishop Pascual Díaz, then of Tabasco. Pointing out that the Constitution of 1917 had never been ratified by popular vote, the delegation asked the President's consent to a popular referendum on the antireligious articles. This met with no greater success than the previous request. To Calles' counterproposal, Archbishop Ruiz pointed out that Congress consisted of one single faction as antagonistic as Calles himself to the Catholic cause. Moreover, the method of petition had been attempted in Michoacán. Over 100,000 voters of the state had signed a petition, which the local assembly ignored.

Nevertheless, but one legal recourse, as President Calles suggested, was left; and on September 7, 1926, the bishops presented their petition to Congress asking the same guarantees, for all cults, as those for freedom of worship and religious activity in the United States. At the same time nearly 2,000,000 Catholics throughout the Republic gave their signatures to the petition, at the risk of grave reprisals. With only one dissenting vote, the chamber of deputies, as Archbishop Ruiz had prophesied, refused even to consider the petition. The reason given was that Article 8 of the Constitution grants the right of petition in political matters only to Mexican citizens, and that the Mexican bishops had lost their citizenship, in virtue of Article 37, "because they have declared publicly, and boasted of it that they do not submit and will not submit to the present Constitution because of their obedience to the Roman Pontiff."

This decision placed the entire Catholic population in a surprising position, and together with the increased insolence of the Government and the terroristic assaults of its agents, succeeded in driving Catholics into revolt, as Calles apparently desired. The arrest and execution of Father Luis Batiz and three representatives of his parish at Zacatecas set off the spark; and for two years, the states, particularly of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato, became the scene of desperate guerrilla warfare, known as the Cristeros Rebellion from the cry of the Catholic rebels *Viva Cristo Rey* — "Live Christ the King."

During this entire period, the official attitude of the Mexican Hierarchy and of practically all the bishops individually, whatever their private views, was that of peace and neutrality, as counseled by Pope Pius XI, even to the point of exasperating the rank and file of the Catholic laity, who were prepared to sacrifice everything to regain their just liberties. Nevertheless, the bishops, now thoroughly disillusioned, were accused by Calles of having stirred the Catholics into rebellion, and, in May, 1927, were ordered out of the country.

Inasmuch as the bishops were incapable of exercising their normal functions in any event, their temporary removal from the scene was regarded as a boon to the initiative of the Cristeros; and with the appointment of Enrique Gorostieta, Jr., as commander in chief of the movement, in 1927, the rebels became a serious challenge to the Calles regime. In various parts of the Republic, the League for Defense of Religious Liberty organized an intensified boycott, to picket various establishments and to distribute religious pamphlets. In the mountains, guerrilla methods succeeded in scattering the government forces, and Calles became so concerned as to take a personal hand in the campaign.

Popular indignation with governmental sectarianism expressed itself violently in the attempted bombing of General Obregón, in early November, 1927, shortly after his re-election to the Presidency. In a mistaken effort to prejudice public opinion against the clergy, the Calles government immediately ordered the arrest of Father Miguel A. Pro Juárez, S.J., on charges of complicity in the plot, and without giving him an opportunity to clear himself, had him executed without trial, together with other suspects, on November 23. The crowds that followed the funeral were so vast that traffic in the capital was paralyzed. As already stated, José de León Toral, a cousin of the executed priest, pledged himself to vengeance, which resulted in the assassination of Obregón the following year. With such popular reaction, Calles' plan for the establishment of a National Church was incapable of fulfillment. The priests of Durango, for example, were given their choice of joining the schismatic body at 500 pesos a month or of arrest. About twelve apostatized; the rest were transported to Mexico City and placed in military prison.

For a time, notably after the installation of Portes Gil, it seemed as if the Cristeros might succeed in their immediate objectives. A number of federal generals, who considered themselves slighted by Calles' appointments, arose in revolt, and their leader, General José Gonzalo Escobár, pledged his collaboration to Gorostieta. This gave a formidable military character to the movement, and it is probable that the rebels might have scored a decisive victory, were it not for the aid of munitions and combat planes furnished the government by the United States. Calles now assumed personal command and assigned General Saturnino Cedillo, governor of San Luis Potosí, to organize the Central Division with agrarian troops, in April, 1929.

In the meantime, Calles decided to invoke American diplomatic pressure, and, through the services of Ambassador Morrow, the exiled bishops Ruiz y Flores and Díaz were induced to return for negotiations. This brought an immediate protest from the militant laity. "Many reasons," declared Gorostieta in a statement dictated on May 16, 1929, "exist to persuade us that it is not the Episcopate, but the National Guard (Cristeros), that should solve the problem. In the first place, the problem is not essentially a religious one. Liberty has been proscribed, and the National Guard has been constituted to defend all liberties. Its vitality must be ascribed to the fact that it represents the people in a genuine manner. . . .

"The foregoing and other considerations that we will not enumerate authorize us to demand, not to petition, that the solution of the problem be left to us, that the Mexican people who wish and are determined to be Catholic, that have demonstrated to the entire world that in defense of their religion they are generous with their blood, their money, and their dearest interests, in spite of the selfish apathy of the wealthy aristocracy and the intellectuals, be left unhampered to struggle for the recovery of their freedom.

"Let the bishops have patience; let them not despair that the day will arrive when we summon them in company with our priests to return and carry on their sacred mission in a nation of freemen. The voice of our martyred dead commands us to carry on!"

Shortly after the issuance of this manifesto, Gorostieta was killed in an ambuscade. From a number of causes, the Cristeros rebellion was doomed to suppression, and the three years' strike inaugurated by the suspension of public service was to fail in the attainment of its objectives.

vii

On June 22, 1929, President Gil announced that his interviews with the two prelates, who had come to Mexico in company with Ambassador Morrow, had terminated in a friendly settlement, and this was corroborated by Msgr. Ruiz y Flores, who was now Apostolic Delegate. The terms, known as the *Modus Vivendi,* or Manner of Existence, were hardly more than a reaffirmation of the same obnoxious articles as before, with a simple promise by the government that it would not overstep these norms. The agreement provided (1) that the government would not register clergymen except with the approval of their respective creeds, (2) that religious instruction might be given, but only inside church buildings, and (3) that the members of any church might petition the proper authorities for the amendment, repeal, or passage of any law. In view of the fact that the personal position of Portes Gil was quite as anti-Catholic as that of Calles, the bishops soon found themselves in a weaker position than before.

In an address delivered July 27, 1929, Gil declared: "We must defend our positions and avoid the errors of previous governments, principally those of forty years ago, which by adding tolerance to tolerance, and compliance to compliance, allowed our laws to fall into desuetude. We must be vigilant, each to his post. . . ." What this meant was further illustrated by a pronouncement of the secretary of war, on October 23, 1929. "In our judgment," he said, "based on historical evidence accumulated over the centuries, the Roman Catholic and Apostolic clergy, organized into a political faction, rapacious, tortuous, conservative, and reactionary, has been the sole cause of every misfortune that has afflicted Mexico, from the epoch of the Spanish Conquest to the present day."[11]

With the Cristeros now disorganized under penalties from the hierarchy, the laity in a state of confusion, and the bishops still fearfully expectant, Mexican Catholics were plunged into a condition of misery greater than before. In return for capitulation, the Cristeros had been promised amnesty. Nevertheless, assassination of the leaders and confiscation of their properties followed, all over the country. In many sections, government officials refused to allow the churches to be reopened for worship; and, particularly in Vera Cruz and Tabasco, outrages recalling the campaigns of Villa were inflicted against members of the Christian faith. Churches were turned into barracks, post offices, cinemas, and the like, or demolished.[12] Laws were enacted by the governors of the various states, on Gil's suggestion, to reduce the number of clergy to an absolutely inadequate minimum, often as few as one or two for a state, so that by 1933 the laws provided that only 197 priests could exercise their functions in the entire country.

Attempts were made to substitute Christian ceremonial with ancient Aztec symbols or Socialist rituals. In the process of changing names, even the village of Guadalupe was rechristened the "Colonia Gustavo A. Madero." Schools were instructed to adopt positive methods of irreligious education, not excluding in some cases revolting forms of sexual instruction and anti-Catholic calumny.

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[11] *Excelsior,* Oct. 23, 1929.

[12] Cf. Alberto María Carreño, *Pages of History* (Mexico, 1936), *passim.*

By the summer of 1931, the bishops found approach to the government denied them, but, while fruitlessly soliciting the good offices of the American Ambassador, Ruben Clark, still bravely condemned any act of violence on the part of Catholics. In spite of all obstacles, including an attempted bombing of the famous shrine, the fourth centenary of the Virgin of Guadalupe was celebrated in December with extraordinary zeal by the populace; but this simply stirred the government to further reprisals.

The arrival of the Papal Encyclical *Acerba Animi,* deploring the violation of the *Modus Vivendi* by the government and discouraging the repetition of efforts to organize active defense, in no way changed the situation. The millions of petitions for amendments and injunctions were ignored. Archbishop Orozco y Jiménez of Jalisco was exiled, on June 27, 1932; and on October 4, of the same year, Monsignor Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, Apostolic Delegate, was deported by Provisional President Abelardo Rodríguez, acting for *Jefe Maximo* (Supreme Chief) Calles. Portes Gil, by this time, felt free to declare that "there was absolutely no agreement of any kind with Messrs. Ruiz y Flores, archbishop of Michoacán, and Díaz, archbishop of Mexico, expressed by the speaker in the declarations which in the capacity of Constitutional President Interim he made on the religious subject."

Thus ended the incident of the *Modus Vivendi;* and with it the Catholic Church in Mexico retreated into the catacombs. During this entire time, although Catholic groups in the United States expressed their indignation, Calles continued to be supplied with arms from across the border to suppress any revolt against his regime. Meanwhile, his spokesmen abroad solicited sympathy for his policies, as the Rev. Moisés Sáenz, a Methodist minister, who declared before the Institute of Politics in the University of Chicago: "There exists no attack against religion in Mexico . . . there is no religious persecution. The measures that have been taken against religious organizations have been exaggerated in the United States."

Undoubtedly, the Calles regime received considerable moral support from abroad. At the same time as Morones' groups were assaulting the Catholic Church in Mexico, Mr. William Green of the American Federation of Labor, which had collaborated closely with the CROM and supplied such anti-Catholic agitators as Robert Habermann, declared, "Our interest in the neighboring country is merely economic and industrial. We have never collaborated or assisted anybody interested in any other question."

Calles was able to count also on the sentiments of the Commission on International Justice and Good Will of the Federal Council of Churches, which sent him greetings "on the inauguration of the second year of his Presidency of our sister republic, Mexico." "We believe," the greeting added, "that the friendship and mutual understanding of the two peoples and their intellectual relations have become perceptibly closer during the past year. We wish continued success to your administration during the coming year and happiness to the Mexican people in the fulfillment of the ideals inspired and fostered by your leadership."[13]

The United States Government took the stand that the religious question was strictly within the jurisdiction of Calles, whom it chose to regard as the "strong man" of Mexico to be sustained against opposition. As a result, the Mexican Scottish Rite Masonic body, whose agents and American connections had been particularly active during the crisis, thanked President Coolidge for his policy and cabled its appreciation as follows: "In the name of the Supreme Council of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite for this nation and of Mexican Masonry in general, we hereby send you our hearty applause and present to you our sincere recognition for your firm stand in refusing to participate in any manner in the so-called Mexican religious conflict, as President of that great Republic, regardless of the pressure brought to bear upon your Government for that purpose, because if you had given any encouragement on this question, it would have unchained perhaps a tremendous war in our country.

"It is impossible on the outside to have a real understanding of this conflict and the only way to maintain public order is to enforce the law and compel the Roman Catholic clergy to submit unconditionally to the will of the people expressed many years ago in its Constitution."[14]

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[13] *Excelsior,* Feb. 12, 1926.

viii

Final consolidation of political power in the hands of the so-called Revolutionary faction under Calles, was achieved by Calles and Portes Gil, in the formation of the PNR, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario,* or National Revolutionary Party. "The PNR," according to an official bulletin, "arose as a biological necessity in moments of affliction, of disorientation, and of doubt, when there was necessary an organism capable of ending the enormous cloud of political indecisions, as well as of representing and uniting all the revolutionary elements of the Republic, and of sustaining above every thing and over all, the postulates and conquests of the Mexican Revolution."[15] More realistically, it was the plan of the *Jefe Maximo* to create a single political group as in Italy and Russia, which would monopolize the political life of the country, under his direction. Every governmental employee was taxed for it; and all important political groups were absorbed into it, while leaders like Soto y Gama, Morones, and members of the Grupo Accion, who might be dangerous, were skillfully maneuvered out of position.

On March 1, 1929, the PNR held its first great convention at Querétaro, to decide on Gil's successor in the Presidency. The meetings were held significantly in the Teatro de los Heroes, where, twelve years before, the new Constitution had been drawn up. It was then that Escobar's revolt followed Calles' attempt to destroy the Presidential candidate, Gilberto Valenzuela. The convention itself had favored Aarón Sáenz; but Calles' suggestion of Pascual Ortiz Rubio, Mexican representative at Rio de Janeiro, naturally assumed the force of law.

An opposition candidate appeared in the person of José Vasconcelos, who toured the country as an anti-re-electionist denouncing the Calles-Morrow combination and the national system of graft. In the government supervised elections, he received 20,000 votes as against 1,000,000 for Rubio. Denouncing the vote as a fraud, he was forced into exile, with Escobar, and remained abroad until he was asked to leave the United States in the summer of 1939.

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[14] *Excelsior,* Aug. 28, 1926.

[15] *Un Año de Gestion del Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, 1935–1936* (Mexico, 1936).

Calles took up his residence at Cuernavaca, while the puppet President Ortiz Rubio, popularly known as Pascualito (Little Pascual), took orders from him over the telephone. If any lingering doubts of the value of the revolutionary agrarian experiment remained, they were dispelled by Calles' trip to Europe; returning from France, he announced in June, 1930, that the program was a failure. The revolution in labor was likewise subjected to a revision of ideas. Portes Gil directed his forces against the CROM, by playing off various labor groups among themselves; and Morones found himself left only with the personal wealth which he had acquired during the fat years.

In September, 1932, Ortiz Rubio made the fatal error of trying to remove from office some friends of Calles. He quickly resigned the Presidency and was succeeded by Abelardo Rodríguez, a wealthy banker and proprietor of gambling houses.

ix

An end, however, was in sight for this farcical shuffling of cards. The veterans of the Revolution were growing old, and now in the possession of this world's goods, had lost their zeal for reform and Left Wing experiments. Younger and more genuinely radical leaders were pushing up from obscurity and demanding the revival and extension of "collectivist" ideas, in education, in government, and in national economy.

By this time the elections of 1934 had come around, Calles found himself obliged to make some concessions, and selected for President a young soldier, Lazaro Cárdenas, who seemed to be a safe person, content to take orders. For once, Calles mistook his man and overplayed his cards.

The denouement was rapid. Calles' renewed anticlericalism swept from him any possible support that might have remained to him from the Catholics of Mexico. His long record of assault upon property owners had alienated that class irretrievably. His amassing of great personal wealth and abandonment of support for agrarian reform or for the organization of labor had infuriated the masses. And somehow, the government in Washington had lost interest in him.

Failing in all his tricks, he retired to a ranch in Sinaloa. When he returned with Morones to Mexico City, in December, 1935, he was suspected of a plot to return himself to power, and his life was actually in danger. Cárdenas decided to relieve the tension, with far more consideration than Calles had shown to others during the bloody years of his regime; in April, 1936, he was summoned by government agents and flown with Morones across the border to Texas. With him, he carried a copy of Hitler's *Mein Kampf,* explaining that his opposition to Communism was responsible for his banishment.

The politicians who had shared the fortunes of his halcyon days quickly slipped into obscurity or switched allegiance. Unwept and unsung, the once "strong man" of Mexico, well provided for his old age, took up residence at San Diego, California, to enjoy the civic tolerance and the exercise of human rights in an atmosphere of democracy which he had done his mightiest to stifle for others in Mexico.[16]

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[16] In the spring of 1941, Calles was allowed to return to Mexico City and take up private residence as a person who had lost public importance and all political power.

CHAPTER XVII

Lazaro Cárdenas

COLLECTIVIST

i

"TWENTY-ONE years of friendship between General Cárdenas and me," declared Calles, "cannot be fruitless. This friendship, each day made closer in the struggle for the principles and the postulates of the Revolution, binds us two together with firm and indestructible ties." Apparently, the *Jefe Maximo* felt that in Lazaro Cárdenas, he had a loyal follower who could be trusted to take orders and help to prolong the regime indefinitely.

Cárdenas had already expressed his views in a statement issued, on September 8, 1933. "Political-social plans," he said, "are justified in public opinion by the very fact of their triumph. It is beyond discussion that the government which emanates from a political plan, if it continues to exist after several years, can be considered as established. The historic cycle of any regime of government can prolong itself for an indefinite time, if the principles which it sustains and the governmental ethics which distinguish it satisfy the people. Señor General Calles has defined by himself his personal place within the revolutionary organism; and the confidence and affection which the people of Mexico have for his stand proves that he has taken the most proper road. The personal point of view concerning public men, in order to be just and above all beyond suspicion, ought to express itself when these men have passed into History."[1]

Cárdenas, however, was the very man destined to break Calles' power and pass him into History. The Socialist movement had gone on despite the increasing conservatism of the old revolutionary group; and just as the younger generation had unseated Díaz, so it now determined to remove Plutarco Elías Calles. His obstruction of the proletarian ideals he had once hailed and above all his repeated implications that there was in Mexico only one man capable of governing it were not generally acceptable to the younger men of the Party.

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[1] Mado Chaverr Matamoros, *El Verdadero Calles* (Mexico, 1933), p. 115.

"The fault is not mine," said Calles, explaining his retrenchment of economic policies and certain outstanding failures. "I have worked, up to weariness, to direct the life of Mexico into new paths, impressing upon the advance of the Revolution all the wealth of good faith available in the will and in the thought of a good patriot. But the human material has failed." Cárdenas did not think that the human material had failed; and it was not long before he began to give a demonstration of his own vigor.

ii

Lazaro Cárdenas y del Rio was born, in 1895, of mixed Spanish and Tarascan-Indian parentage, in the village of Jiquilpan de Juárez, state of Michoacán. His family was poor, without any particular cultural backgrounds, and the boy himself received only an elementary education. As a child, he is said to have been abnormally bashful and silent. At the age of eleven, to help support his widowed mother and seven sisters and brothers, he went to work in the local tax collector's office, served in a printer's office, and later acted as the town jailer. In the popular movement that unseated Díaz, it seems that the whole town joined the rebellion. When Madero was assassinated in 1913, young Cárdenas released his single prisoner and the two went off to join the fighting against Victoriano Huerta.

From 1915 to 1917 he fought with the troops of General Calles, who recognized not only his ability to carry out an order, but also his doglike obedience and apparent lack of personal desires or ambitions. These were qualities which Calles knew how to reward, and Cárdenas advanced rapidly to the rank of colonel. By 1920, now brigadier general, he joined with Obregón and Calles in overthrowing Carranza. It was in 1922–23 that the young officer, known as the "Sphinx" but highly respected by his associates, acted as chief of military operations in Pueblo

Viejo, northern Vera Cruz, where he received his first personal impressions of the petroleum companies. Here in the very center of the industry, he found himself approached for various favors and is said to have turned down offers of cash aggregating over 500,000 pesos. The experience definitely embittered him against foreign monopolies in the field and undoubtedly was largely responsible for his later sweeping policy of expropriation.

He returned to his native Michoacán, in 1923, to take command of its military forces, and, although not yet thirty years of age, distinguished himself as both soldier and administrator. During the rebellion of Adolfo de la Huerta, he remained faithful to the Obregón faction and was commissioned to attack the insurgents under the command of Enrique Estrada. Near Jiquilpan, he was seriously wounded but recovered quickly; and later leading an attack against the forces of De la Huerta in the state of Jalisco, he succeeded in outflanking and capturing 10,000 men. This achievement secured his promotion to general of division.

A lukewarm Catholic, Cárdenas went to church only occasionally. Nevertheless, during his convalescence after the engagement with Estrada, he offered a vow to the Virgin of the shrine of Nuestra Señora de los Lagos in Jalisco; and after his cure, six months after he was shot, he went to fulfill his promise, entering the church on his knees, candle in hand. During the Vera Cruz era, he was publicly recognized as an individual of regular life without special note. He was later married, in both civil and religious ceremony to Señorita Amalia Solórzano, of Tacámbaro, Michoacán, by whom he has had one son, Cuautémoc.

During his entire career, Cárdenas has been known as a man of abstemious habits, neither drinking nor smoking, clean of speech, modest of his own achievements. Brave, stubborn in his determinations, yet able to relax completely, he has been an inveterate reader, not particularly brilliant in comprehension, but thoroughly methodical, with an eye to details.

The appearance of the man is not what one may call impressive. The loaf-shaped head, with heavy jaw, drooping lip, and brooding face are characteristic of the Tarascan race. A close-clipped mustache shows Spanish inheritance. His slow, reserved, deliberate manner, of listening as well as of speaking, has been taken by many to indicate slowness of mind; but the events of his administration, no matter what one may think of the outcome or even of its principles, have pointed to deliberateness of purpose and unyielding adherence once a decision has been made.

From the beginning of his public career, Cárdenas showed himself intensely interested in social problems. Most of his reading has been directed along these lines, and in his practical affairs he has shown himself close to the people and the problems of the soil. In the campaign which resulted in his election as governor of Michoacán, in 1929, he broke with regular political procedure and fraternized with the little people of the villages as well as with the members of the organization. As a result of his genuine concern in the complaints and the life of peasants, his program during this period, embracing the construction of rural schools throughout the state, as well as the formation of community farms, brought him perhaps a greater popularity than any of his predecessors.

Still the faithful, unquestioning follower of Calles, he next became head of the PNR, then at the height of its political dominance of Mexico, and later entered the cabinet of President Rodríguez as minister of war and marine. In this atmosphere, there was little opportunity for him to demonstrate either depth of personal convictions or power of determination. Nevertheless, his record in Michoacán had aroused the interest of many radical elements among the younger generation who ardently hoped for a change from the repressive policies of Calles and the servilism of his general political entourage. Calles, apparently, had hoped to name General Manuel Pérez Treviño to the Presidency; but to retain hold on the organization, he was content to placate the younger elements by allowing the nomination of Cárdenas, whom he regarded a safe, if rather colorless, figure, as precandidate of the PNR, on June 1, 1933. At the same time, the so-called Six Year Plan was formulated, as a matter of record to satisfy the social radicals and provide Cárdenas with a kind of political platform to play with, The ratification of Cárdenas' nomination took place at the Querétaro Convention of the PNR, in December, 1933; and the Six Year Plan was submitted to the delegates as a matter of form, His election was inevitable; the fact that he had an authorized Plan meant nothing to the general public, which had grown cynical under Calles' tyranny. The trade-unions, now accustomed to exploitation and betrayal, saw no hope in the choice, while the Communists, the only opposition remaining, attacked him bitterly as a tool of Calles' Fascism.

None of these reactions seemed to effect the candidate himself. He at once turned to study the Six Year Plan in all seriousness and with a mulish determination began his Presidential campaign. Rail, horseback, and even foot carried him over 16,000 miles, with the same intensity as though he were faced with a formidable adversary. "Nothing could be better," he declared in his effort to reduce the Six Year Plan to concrete, practicable terms, "than the common purpose of the entire Republic as a starting point for the governmental program which must be put into practice during the Constitutional term of 1934–40. Within that time, the agrarian problem as a whole is to be solved; the organization of a workers' united front is to be encouraged, so that higher standards of living can be realized; the educational program needed by our masses is to be put into effect. In a word, there will be put into action the complete plan that General Calles has talked about. This doctrine intends to make Mexico a strong country on solid foundations, in this era in which the people of the world are locked in an economic-social struggle for improved conditions to gain genuine prosperity for all workmen and their homes."

With peculiar persistence, he emphasized also a highly nationalistic policy regarding foreign capital and enterprise. Mention was made of a national prohibition law, and women were to receive a greater share in government. With these general ideas, obscured partially by the inconsistencies of the 191-page statement of the Six Year Plan itself, he placed his practically uncontested candidacy before the Mexican people; and on July 1, 1934, after what was "probably the most one-sided, but at the same time most orderly, election in the history of Mexico," he scored 80 per cent of the total vote cast for President.[2] General Antonio Villareal, candidate of the independent Democratic Parties came in second; and Colonel Adalberto Tejeda, of the Left Wing of the Socialist Party, third. At the same time the PNR won all the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 49 of the 58 seats in the Senate. The Presidential inauguration took place, November 30, 1934, in the presence of a cheering crowd of 70,000; but everyone knew that Calles was still in the saddle.

While Calles may have intended the Six Year Plan as a political sop to those who had been disappointed by his abandonment of earlier policies, it was, in Cárdenas' hands, to be reduced to action. "The keynote of our national economy," according to the first project of the Plan, "should be the joint, harmonic union of all our productive forces, directed, by means of an enlarging organization of co-operative system, toward Socialism and the just equitable control of economic values." Then, amid a generous larding of Marxian phraseology, the more immediate objectives were outlined:

"1. The planned use of our national wealth, an adequate development of our human energies, and a rational expansion of available capital, with full use of savings and credits.

"2. The raising of the Mexican worker's salary so that he may secure a physical, intellectual, and moral renewal at the same time as his purchasing power increases; these are necessary conditions for the potential expansion of the interior markets.

"3. The creation of opportunities for work by promoting industrialization which will allow within the country an active commerce of products between the city and the rural regions, with the purpose of reducing the flight of the population from these regions and of relieving the burning problem of unemployment and constant insecurity of labor.

"4. The construction of a self-sustaining, autonomous economy directed and administered by the intelligence and labor of the Mexicans."

The program clearly indicated even more than the recapture of Mexican enterprise from foreign hands by Mexican capital and interests. It meant the "socialization" of Mexico. As late as December 22, 1936, Cárdenas declared to the American Press that "Mexico would look with gratitude on elements with capital which might want to invest money in the country, giving them every kind of guarantees within the laws, and they ought not alarm themselves since our legislation is more protective of capital than that of the United States, where taxes are greater and wages higher." Nevertheless, there was no doubt, as he began to speak increasingly of the primary rights of the "collectivity," that the capital would have to readjust itself to the limitations imposed by a state Socialism.

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[2] Charles W. Hackett, in *Current History*, August, 1934.

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In the beginning, Calles looked upon the scene with a slightly amused indulgence. Cárdenas accepted the Cabinet selected for him by the *Jefe Maximo,* including Rodolfo Calles, the latter's son, as minister of Communications. But easiness gave way to alarm, as Cárdenas seldom allowed his Cabinet the opportunity of seeing him. The technique of local organization which he had used during his campaign tours now kept him busy in the fulfillment of pledges to villages, farms, and petty leaders, for lands, roads, and schools. Such independence and dangerous initiative were not to be tolerated. Even more insulting, he dared to close a number of illegal gambling houses owned by personal friends of Calles, including the $1,500,000 Foreign Club in Mexico City and the Casino de la Selva in Cuernavaca.

To bring the President to some realization of his subordinate character, Calles once more resorted to the red herring conflict of Church and State. With the idea of maddening the Catholic populace into another rebellion which would again require a demonstration of the supremacy of Calles "the Strong Man," Garrido Canábal, the scourge of Tabasco and now minister of Agriculture, released his Red Shirt ruffians against Catholics throughout the country.

As a matter of fact, this seemed to be a language that Cárdenas might understand. As governor of Michoacán, he had treated the Church harshly, in spite of his nominal Catholicism; and he carried over most of the traditional attitudes that Mexican politicians had come to regard as part of their equipment. Thus he had stated: "In declaring for the separation of Church and State, and in demanding that our public schools shall be freed from domination by any religious sect, we are but following examples set by our sister republics, France and the United States. These ends attained, and the power of the Church broken absolutely, we can and will guarantee to every citizen the right to liberty of conscience and of religious worship. Atheism is not our aim."[3]

This was the language of Mexican Liberalism carried over into the Revolution. Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, this final barbarous onslaught against the Church did not meet Cárdenas' approval. He may have seen in it the ruthless hand of Calles and Calles' henchmen, and simply bided his time. At any event, the fury of the persecution increased in reverse proportion to the social idealism under which it was masked as well as to any conceivable danger from the now prostrate Church. In Tabasco, church edifices were razed to the ground, religious emblems were burned, and such restrictions were imposed on the clergy as made Catholic worship physically impossible, while in the same mood alcohol was outlawed and prostitution was placed under the protecting wing of the government. Between September 5 and October 6, 1935, over 130 churches were closed by Presidential decree. In Tamaulipas, a league of school teachers petitioned the Chamber of Deputies to execute all priests and confiscate their property. A committee of the PNR drew up a resolution demanding the deportation of the entire Catholic hierarchy. In states which had not forbidden religious services entirely, the number of clergy permitted and the restrictions imposed amounted to a farce. Any appeal from the law was regarded as sedition; any judge who would dare to hear a petition was promptly branded as a "reactionary" worthy of immediate dismissal.

The situation at this time became so bleak that, in spite of the vindictive stand taken in the United States against the Catholic Church by such organs as *The Christian Century*, the American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities reported in October, 1935, after a personal investigation, that "the deliberate purpose of the [Mexican] Government's policy is not merely the correction of alleged abuses, but the extirpation of all religion in the country."[4] The movement succeeded in temporarily pulverizing religion, but inasmuch as the Catholic public had been deprived of all power to assert itself, Calles' hopes of rebellion were dashed to the ground; and he felt himself obliged to try something else.

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[3] Cf. George Creel, *Mexican Red* (*Collier's*, March 16, 1935).

This time it was labor that opened the way to action. In June, 1935, the Strong Man called a number of senators to his palace at Cuernavaca and complained bitterly of Cárdenas' failure to suppress the epidemic of strikes which had broken out, practically upon his induction into office. At the same time he hinted at the unfortunate end of Ortiz Rubio as the result of an attempted split in loyalties.

So far as labor was concerned, neither the CROM nor the General Confederation of Workers and Farmers (CGOC), organized by the young intellectual Lombardo Toledano, had any real confidence in the promises of Cárdenas. A 38-day strike against the Canadian-owned Mexican Tramways Company, therefore, led the way as an assertion of defiance as well as of discontent and sounded the note of protest against both the suppression of independent labor organization and the increasing power of foreign corporations under the aegis of the Calles regime. In rapid succession, there followed large strikes against the Huasteca Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil, the San Rafael Company, organized with French-Spanish capital, the Mexican Telephone and Telegraph Company, owned by the American T. and T., extending to the American and British owned mines of the North, the banana industry of Tabasco, and even the bakers of Mexico City. The alarming feature of these demonstrations was that labor was consistently winning legal victories through the decisions of the courts, notably of the Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Board. The question in Calles' mind was whether Cárdenas was too weak to withstand the pressure of mass demonstrations or whether he was actually in league with labor's demands.

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[4] Cf. *Literary Digest,* October 26, 1935; also Charles McFarland (General Secretary Emeritus, Federal Council Churches of Christ), *Chaos in Mexico* (New York, 1935).

A crisis was reached with the strike, on May 22, of the employees of the Mexican Telephone and Telegraph Company, in which Calles owned a large block of shares. The workers demanded the right of independent organization, aside from company unions, and collective contract. They had, as a matter of fact, already succeeded in placing men of their own choice at the head of the company union; and now, in pushing for a recognition of their demands, they received the support of other labor groups, including the entire CGOC of Toledano, who threatened a general strike, if their representations were not considered.

On June 12, Calles threw down the gauntlet. Deploring maneuvers to divide the political camp into Cárdenists and Callists and the Chambers into "left wings" and "right wings," he branded the strikes as an unjust injury "to a government headed by so honest a citizen and so sincere a friend of the workers as General Cárdenas." Pointing out the inability of the companies to meet the demands of higher wages at a time when they were bankrupt or unable to pay dividends, and castigating the internecine struggles of labor leaders for supremacy, at the cost of the public, he branded the general spirit of agitation as both ingratitude and treason.[5]

The very next day, Cárdenas rose to the occasion and in one short statement effected the bloodless revolution which the people had been awaiting for years. Denying that he had in the slightest way been responsible for a division in the revolutionary party, he hurled the accusation back at those who were "deeply wounded because they did not obtain positions which they desired in the new Government." Then with a hammerlike blow, he turned to the labor question. "With respect to the labor problems which have come up in recent months," he said, "and which were embodied in strike movements, I consider that they are the result of an adjustment of the interests represented by the two factors of production. If they cause some uneasiness and even temporarily injure the country's economy, they will, when solved reasonably and in the spirit of equity and social justice, contribute in time to strengthen the economic situation, inasmuch as their correct solution brings about better conditions for the workers, obtained in accord with the economic possibilities of the capitalist sector.

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[5] Cf. J. Manuel Corro Viña, *Cárdenas Frente a Calles* (Mexico, 1935). pp. 137 sq.

"Face to face with these problems, the Federal Executive is determined to work with firm decision to fulfill the program of the Revolution as well as the laws which regulate the balance of production and to advance the execution of the Six Year Plan of the PNR, without regard for the alarm of the representatives of the capitalist factor. At the same time, however, I consider it my duty to inform both the workers and employers that, within the law, they will enjoy every guarantee and support for the exercise of their rights and that, for no consideration, will the President of the Republic permit excesses of any kind or acts which imply violations of the law or unnecessary agitations.

"Accordingly, I declare that I have complete confidence in the workers' and peasants' organizations of the country, and I trust that they will be able to act with the moderation and patriotism required by the legitimate interests which they represent."

In conclusion, Cárdenas asked for a national expression of full confidence in himself. "All men of the Revolution" were asked "to meditate deeply and sincerely upon what is the path of duty." "Everyone," he concluded, "may be certain that I will never work in a different way from that which has inspired all the acts of my life as a citizen, loyal friend, and soldier of the Revolution."[6]

The national effect was electric. Calles' bluff had been called; and there was nothing he seemed able to do about it. Labor organizations throughout the country immediately wired their support to Cárdenas. The majority wing of the Chamber of Deputies gave him a unanimous vote, and there began a wild exodus from the Calles' band wagon. Even Portes Gil abandoned his old master, to pledge allegiance to the new Strong Man and become president of the PNR in a reorganization of both the ancient and recent anti-Callists. The cabinet imposed by Calles was dismissed and a new Government was composed on a left-wing basis under Cárdenas' old friend, Francisco J. Múgica; and Saturnino Cedillo, although of conservative tendencies, was substituted for Tomás Canábal, as Minister of Agriculture.

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[6] Corro Viña, *ibid.*, pp. 143 sq.

Calles, now definitely broken, left Mexico City on June 18, 1935, for his health's sake. After a period of retirement on his ranch at Sinaloa, he proceeded to Los Angeles and later to Hawaii. When he returned to Mexico City shortly before Christmas, the same year, he found that Cárdenas had dismissed five Calles senators on charges of "sedition and rebellious activities," as well as the governors of Sonora, Sinaloa, Guanajuato, and Durango, transferred or ejected about twenty military commanders of doubtful loyalty, and exiled Canábal after smashing his power.

"We have been witnessing for the first time in many years," declared the newspaper *El Universal,* "a strong, spontaneous movement of public opinion. The perfect unanimity of the masses in their way of thinking and feeling has revealed two irrefutable conclusions: First, that the historic cycle of personal regimes in Mexico is definitely ended; second, that the Cárdenas Government now enjoys the firm support of a majority of the nation."

iv

As soon as the die had been cast, Cárdenas found that his strongest support was to come from the labor movement led by Lombardo Toledano, an intellectual who had studied the philosophies of Comte and Bergson in the University of Mexico but later swung to that of Karl Marx and professed a high admiration for the system of Soviet Russia. To a certain extent also he was pledged the collaboration of the Communists by their general secretary Hernan Laborde, who had opposed Cárdenas in the Presidential elections. "The Communist Party," said Laborde, "does not blindly accept the entire program of the Cárdenas Government. We realize, only too well, its faults and uncertainties. But, at the same time, we recognize also the necessity of supporting, with the help of a strong united front, a progressive government such as that of Cárdenas when it is threatened by Fascism."

The left-wing character of dominant labor groups became apparent in the manifesto signed by the so-called Proletarian Defense Committee in reply to Calles' statement on the strike situation. After affirming the right of labor to strike without restrictions, to collective bargaining, and social betterment, the Committee went on to declare, "Strikes will end only when a transformation of the bourgeois system under which we live has been achieved. The organized labor and peasant movement of Mexico, quite aware of the historical moment in which it lives, declares that it will oppose all transgressions of its rights, making use, if necessary, of the general, nation-wide strike as the only means of defense against the possible establishment of a Fascist regime in Mexico. In the face of this threat, the Committee declares its determination to maintain class unity."

Such language, of course, besides ignoring the fact that Fascist politics had long been running the country, was bound to stir the activities of "anticommunist" elements, such as those of the Gold Shirts under Nicolás Rodríguez. A war of propaganda and violence was the result. Toledano's house was bombed; and Rodríguez was ejected from the country. Moreover, there still remained the dissenting voice of such groups as Morones' CROM and the CGT (General Workers' Confederation).

It was through these more conservative labor unions that Calles made his final attempt to return to power. Apparently on his instructions, Morones organized a strike of the CROM in the states of Vera Cruz, Tlaxcala, and Puebla, on December 13, 1935, as a demonstration against "communist activities." A few days later the two instigators flew back to Mexico City, where they were welcomed by a delegation of the CROM.

Again, Cárdenas rose to the situation and in an address before a gigantic manifestation of the Proletarian Defense Committee with red banners waving in the Zócalo before the Presidential

Palace, while airplanes dropped anti-Calles leaflets on the crowds, he denounced the former *Jefe Maximo* as a fascist grown wealthy on the rightful substance of the people. His reassurances to independent labor organizations now definitely confirmed him as labor's choice and led the way to the consolidation of industrial unionism under Lombardo Toledano.

From February 22 to 26, 1936, the National Arena was the scene of the epochal Congress for Labor Unification. With the exception of the CGT and the remnants of the CROM, most of the 3000 labor unions of Mexico joined hands to form the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers), with a total membership of 600,000 and Toledano as general secretary by unanimous choice. Now in the saddle, the CTM with Cárdenas' approval was able to interpret subversive activity as the work of Calles and to effect his expulsion from the country, at dawn on Good Friday, April 10.

This did not mean that Cárdenas ever placed an implicit trust in Toledano or the CTM. On the contrary, like his predecessors in office, he was willing to use labor for its political support but remained wary lest it acquire too much power. Toledano was eager to assume the rôle of official protector and even patron of the President; but the latter took good care to keep him out of the government and refused to attach any official significance to his utterances. More than that, he opposed the extension of the CTM to include control of the peasants. For a while, Portes Gil worked for popularity among the peasant groups, but in the autumn of 1936 he was released from the Presidency of the PNR and retired to his private legal practice. The next summer, Saturnino Cedillo, whose idea of agricultural economy never coincided with that of Cárdenas, resigned from the Ministry of Agriculture and returned to San Luis Potosí.

This left Cárdenas a dictator with more power than even Calles possessed. Putting aside the principles of federalism which the Liberals of nineteenth-century Mexico had fought for, he cut through state lines and proceeded to build his economic reforms on a national basis. While substituting the support of the workers, the peasants, and the army for that of the capitalistic and middle classes, he was careful to balance these three elements against one another. Thus, at the same time as the CTM drove its enrollment up to the million mark and began to militarize its members, Cárdenas proceeded to organize and unite peasant leagues throughout the country on a national basis. To retain the loyalty of the army, he raised the pay of the regulars and appealed to their historic position in the social revolution of Mexico. On the other hand, he established peasant militias as a kind of people's army and liberally supplied them with weapons, ostensibly to protect themselves against the dispossessed landlords.

These three elements of the new proletariat likewise served to undermine the control of the politicians over the PNR, as Cárdenas began, early in 1938, to effect a complete reorganization of the Party. The principles of the reform were announced on December 18, 1937. Cárdenas, who had been much impressed with the Popular Front in Spain and had read extensively the literature of the Left Wing in that country, decided to admit members into the reformed organization on a corporative basis, that is, not as individuals, but as affiliated with some group. Eliminating the principle of financial and organizational support through the forced contributions of government employees, he decided to depend upon the workers, the peasants, and the army as the triple keystone of support.

The army was to function as a nonpolitical body, although the history of Mexico up to this time, and indeed of later developments within Cárdenas' own regime, proved that the army was the principal bulwark, not only of the Government but of the official political party itself. Whatever may have been Cárdenas' early thought of popular militias within the CNC or Peasants' Confederation, the specter of the CTM, assuming the proportions of an independent party equipped with munitions and ready to strike, upon the command of Toledano, must have remained in the mind of the President.

In addition to these three sectors, provision was made for a popular membership. Communists were excluded as a party, but they could enter through other organizations. All approved groups were to retain their own autonomy, but they were forbidden to engage in political activity in the electoral campaigns except through the official front of the new party.

Thus was reborn the phoenix bird of the Revolution as the PRM (Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana) or Party of the Mexican Revolution, from the ashes of Calles' PNR. All its members were to be "Marxists," and thus the conservative elements of the Republic were excluded from participation in the political voice of the country except through small bodies of protest or through the possibility of some form of spontaneous demonstration which might survive official military suppression.

"Without any reservation whatsoever," the Party accepted "the democratic form of government." On the other hand, its charter overflowed with unmistakable references to the "class struggle" and the "dialectical development" of the Mexican people. Just how much of this theory was understood by Cárdenas or represented his personal convictions is difficult to say. Cárdenas himself has constantly declared himself opposed to both Communism and Fascism, and the "Communist" and "Fascist" groups have declared themselves dissatisfied with Cárdenas. Nevertheless, he was quite content with the statement of the Party charter: "The PRM considers that one of its fundamental objectives is the preparation of the people to implant a democracy of workers and achieve a Socialist regime."

v

Solidly entrenched behind the organized masses and endeared to them by his utterances against foreign imperialism and by his practical interest in the historic underdog elements of the nation, the new dictator took a private house in the suburbs of the capital, instead of moving into Chapultepec Palace, and practically carried the government around with him on his continual tours of inspection and redress among the peasant and industrial workers of the country.

In recognition of the predominantly rural character of Mexico, his first and greatest love was the farm; and the keynote of his administration was a return or award of the land to the Indian, as heralded by reformers from the time of Hidalgo. In his reply to the note of the American Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he declared: "Confronted with the unescapable obligation of carrying out the agrarian reform — undoubtedly the most important point of the revolutionary program — my Government must expropriate all the lands that may be necessary until their complete distribution, as is ordered by the Constitution and the agrarian code of Mexico. . . . In view of the fact that the aspirations of the collectivity must prevail over individual interests, Mexico cannot refrain from carrying out the redistribution of the land although in doing so she might likewise affect foreigners."[7]

The basis of the agrarian expropriations, laid in 1915 by General Carranza and written into Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, declared that the title of lands resided in the nation so that Mexican citizens had a right to such land as was necessary for their existence. Nevertheless, the spoliation of the communal Indian properties had been so extensive under the Liberal governments from the time of Juárez, and their return so reluctant, that as late as the Presidency of Plutarco Calles, 85 per cent of the farm lands of Mexico were in the hands of less than 1 per cent of the rural population. Even under Calles, who began in bluff fashion as a great agrarian reformer, only 25,000,000 acres had been expropriated and proportioned to 942,000 peasants, by 1933; and Calles, having become enormously rich during the process, announced that the agrarian reform was a failure.

The increasingly conservative policy of Calles in this respect was a principal reason for the rift between himself and Cárdenas. As President, the latter decided to take matters in his own hands and, with special powers, to redeem personally the pledges which he had made during his campaign tours. Again, by train, automobile, horseback, and on foot, Cárdenas made his way across the length and breadth of the land, hearing the grievances of peasants, and over the protests of landlords and corporative interests, setting up *ejidos* after expropriations, this time with the idea of the complete destruction of the *hacienda*.

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[7] Cf. Department of State Publication 1288, Inter-American series 16, p. 32.

At the end of 1937, only halfway through his term of office, he had distributed more land than all previous governments. By 1939, total expropriations since 1910 amounted to over 60,000,000 acres, awarded to some 1,700,000 peasants. He declared that it was not his intention to touch so-called "small" properties, which might in some instances run into 2000 or more acres, so that about one third of the country would still remain in private hands.

To some extent, at least, Cárdenas seems to have recognized that the problem was far greater than one simply of expropriation and division. With proper adjustment, he declared, there would be ample guarantee of success in "the confidence which the Government of the Revolution has in the workers of the land: an unlimited confidence that these workers know how to stimulate their social and economic function in rural life; a faith in their productive capacity; an unbreakable conviction in the sense of responsibility of the masses; a very strong security that the Revolution has been incarnated in the individuals and collectivities — this will have to follow its ascending course up to the realization of the objectives which the Revolution itself has pointed out."

More concretely, this seems to have meant the creation, not of mere subsistence plots or even of independent communal villages for self-sustenance, but rather of cooperative farms for raising crops on a commercial scale. To provide finances for the experiment, the Bank of Ejidal Credit was established to furnish seeds and implements, and to advance funds for immediate needs, then to take the crop, market it, and pay the ejidatarians their shares of the profits.

The procedure of land distribution followed the ejidal laws, requiring a minimum of twenty ejidatarians for the formal petition of properties. This petition was presented to the Mixed Agrarian Commission, made up of one member of the federal government, one of the state government, and one elected by the peasants every two years. This board made its recommendation to the state governor for decision, although the President reserved the absolutely final voice to himself. If a favorable judgment was given, the peasants took possession of the land.

Exceptions have been made in law for lands planted with crops requiring a period of years for maturity. The flow of credit from the Bank was effected by a Society of Ejidal Credit composed of 51 per cent of the ejidatarians.

Results, as might be expected, have been spotty. The application of the norms of the law have been extremely uneven. Scandals in the Bank, sabotage by former owners, illegal assaults upon properties by bands of peasants, frauds against the Bank practiced by the peasants, and sheerly natural elements have conspired with human incompetence. There are sections in which the peasants have made the most of their new opportunities. In others, the story is written in abandoned plantations and the ruin of enterprise as well as of investment.

Under the interpretation of Cárdenas, the ejidatarians in the more advanced projects were not regarded as proprietors but as members of cooperative cells working on nationalized properties under the direction of the government bank. To demonstrate what could be done under this arrangement, the government decided to expend its best efforts in the rich farm region known as La Laguna, at the juncture of the states of Coahuila and Durango. On October 6, 1936, lands and waters were awarded by Presidential decree to all the peasants of the area who presented approved petitions "with the understanding that if within the legal radius of the expropriation there were not sufficient lands for all their wants, they could, with respect to their wants, be transferred at the cost of the Government to other zones where there are lands available to satisfy their needs."

The zone under consideration is a plain embracing about 1,500,000 acres and nine cities, of which the principal is Torreón. At the time of the expropriation, the land was owned chiefly by various branches of five families long settled in the region. Financed with the aid of American and British capital, they had placed about one third of the area under irrigation and, between the years 1927–33, had introduced a great deal of modern farm machinery, with the immediate result, coinciding with world conditions, of creating wide unemployment in a population of about 241,000 persons.

This situation resulted in a series of sporadic strikes, until the

CTM began to incorporate the various peasant and workers' leagues. Then, in August, 1936, a general strike was called, affecting 28,000 farm hands. The demands, it would appear, were nominally reasonable. Their immediate fulfillment, however, including a minimum wage of 1.75 pesos per day, payment for seven days in a six-day week, and shorter hours, plus new houses, more medical service, and schools, would have bankrupted the landlords. This gave the President the opportunity he had been looking for. On the motive of "public utility" he nationalized the properties and shortly thereafter appeared in La Laguna to direct personally the distribution of lands to the applauding thousands.

As a result of this operation, about 112,000 ejidatarians have been placed in some 370 ejidal communities, with the remainder in urban and semiurban communities. To save the experiment, which had a disastrous season in 1937, the National Bank of Ejidal Credit poured 31,000,000 pesos up to June 30 of that year, in addition to 20,000,000 pesos distributed by August among the 30,076 ejidatarians grouped in local societies of Ejidal Credit operating 255,000 acres of land throughout the country.

In certain respects, it cannot be doubted that the distributivist idea in itself has many and vast merits. The ultimate success of the plan in action has yet to be demonstrated. Frequent wrangling between the state and federal governments and political intrigue and corruption, always an important factor in government-financed projects, have seriously imperiled the whole movement, and this, indeed, under a President whose extraordinary personal honesty has been his strongest bulwark. Moreover, while the government has spent millions in enterprises like irrigation to open new lands, it has passed over large idle areas, almost regularly, to seize improved properties and turn out their owners as the enemies of society, just as they are about to make some return on their investment.

Of even greater significance has been the policy of temporizing, or more exactly, of shelving indefinitely the matter of indemnification for lands expropriated. Distinction in law was made between the restitution of lands unjustly taken in the past from the peasants and donation of lands from properties possessing a just title. For the latter, Article 27 of the Constitution states that indemnity will be based on the tax value of the land taken and adds that "the proprietor will be obliged to receive bonds of a special debt to guarantee that payment of expropriated property." This was further implemented by the law of President Calles, August 25, 1927, although the bonds issued were practically worthless. In the vast number of cases, particularly under the rapid and wholesale expropriations of President Cárdenas, most of the landlords received absolutely no indemnity or even promise of such, and it now appears that indemnity may never be awarded.

With this in mind, President Cárdenas made a direct appeal for remission of the debt, in his address on the anniversary of the Revolution, November 20, 1938. "I consider it fitting," he declared "to ask our brothers, the Mexicans, especially all those owners of lands which were taken to satisfy the imperative necessities of the weak and poorly fed peasant class, that, with the true fervor of patriotism and humanitarian sentiment, they make an examination of the condition and exploitation of the peasants upon the lands and that they grant the restitution or donation indicated in the laws, as a consequence of the armed war provoked in large part by the latifundists.

"In consideration, on the other hand, of the injustice of condemning future generations to pay the enormous debt which would have to be settled on the people, as well as of the possibilities of the nation's power to pay, it must be admitted that many years will be required for the settlement of the debt. It would be of high morality and true sympathy for the interests of the country if Mexicans would be willing to forego the indemnity which might be due them by the seizure of the lands which they have held with the force and sacrifice of those selfsame peasants. In this manner, the Nation could feel very proud of the comprehension and true patriotism of its own sons."

The peasants have received these lands, it may be noted, as an outright gift.

Pressure from the government of the United States has succeeded in extracting some payment for lands taken from American citizens. Nevertheless, in referring to the moral necessity and the international law of indemnity, the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Hay, stated the official postulate of the Cárdenas Government that "there is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory or carried out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of immediate or even of deferred compensation for expropriations of a general and impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the land." Going one step farther, he added, "Mexico has maintained that the so-called rights of man, among others the right to property, with its modalities, are not principles of international law, but that their validity is derived from municipal (i.e., civil) law."[8]

vi

That these principles sounded an ominous warning, if not a death knell, to the moral basis of the "so-called rights of man," notably to their modalities in the private ownership of capital and productive property seemed to be an obvious conclusion to many observers of the Cárdenas regime. On the other hand, whether from sheer expediency or from vacillation of principle, Cárdenas himself felt it advisable to encourage private enterprise and to stimulate the influx of foreign capital within certain limitations.

Thus he announced: "We are not in a position to undertake projects which require great capital, for the reason that we have not had the opportunity of accumulating it. Therefore, foreign capital will doubtless be welcomed by every considerate Mexican, providing, on entering Mexico, it recognizes the economic rights of the workers and does not attempt to raise itself above the law or assume privileges above those of the Mexicans themselves." Eventually, the system of colonial economy, he declared, had to disappear; in its place would come the organization of cooperatives by the workers themselves. "It is not necessary," he added, "to contemplate illegal attacks upon industries already established, which ought to enjoy constitutional guarantees, but rather to plan the direct initial exploitation of the untouched sources of wealth. Finally, I wish to affirm, advisable in the unification of the national economy, the State control of production, without the motive of profit, of certain necessary factors in agriculture and fuel, making use of our great national reserves in the coal and petroleum regions, to distribute them as a social service. Studies leading to this objective are already in progress."

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[8] State Publication 1288, *cit.*, pp. 8, 9.

Having drawn this distinction between immediate concessions to private capital and the final purpose of supplanting it by cooperatives under government control, Cárdenas proceeded with his program of expropriation and domination in the field of industry. To a large extent apparently, he depended upon the friendliness of the Roosevelt administration, expressed through the frequent applause and approval of Ambassador Daniels as the voice of the "Good Neighbor." The first step in promoting the program was the extension of official favor to strikes and to the formation of a militant working class. Native as well as foreign capital thus came under the axe.

When a street demonstration of property owners in Monterrey denouncing Communism followed a strike at the glass factory early in 1936, the President visited the city and declared that he had no intention of collectivizing industry. Nevertheless, he added, to a commission of industrialists, "the employers who are tired of the social struggle can surrender their industries to the workers or to the government." As a result of generally unsettled conditions which made business stability extremely difficult, the Mexican Chambers of Commerce expressed their alarm to the President, but without notably tangible improvement of the situation. Thus, the organization submitted, "In Monterrey you added that 'the laws ought to be interpreted in a Revolutionary spirit,' and although we do not intend to discuss here the Revolution, with which we are in accord in many of its postulates, your phrase gives rise to the commission of innumerable and serious abuses by other authorities under the extreme elasticity of the concept." According to this complaint, there were members of the Supreme Court of Justice who declared themselves Revolutionaries before judges and "interpreted" the laws regularly in the spirit of greatest prejudice against employers simply because these happened to be in the owner class.

In many cases it seems true that the government, having fostered a strike, made an investigation of the financial condition of the industry involved, and if the company was not already in bankruptcy, made conditions so difficult that the solution of government expropriation or seizure by the labor unions became inevitable. In 1937, the bankrupted railroads, owned by foreign bondholders, were nationalized and handed over to the unions for administration. On March 18 of the following year, acting on the Mexican Expropriation Law of 1936, which authorized the seizure of private property for reasons of "public and social welfare" as well as of "public necessity," President Cárdenas issued his famous decree expropriating the properties of seventeen British and American oil companies.[9]

This summary and defiant smashing of powerful international petroleum corporations was meant, above all, and taken as such by the vast majority of the Mexican people, including those who disagreed with the method, to be a proud assertion of Mexican national sovereignty; and it was in the confidence of popular backing that Cárdenas took the step. Four days after the announcement of the decree, an enormous mass meeting of some 200,000 people was held in the capital, to cheer the decision and to declare with banners and posters that "The Petroleum Expropriation Marks the Beginning of Our Independence."

The immediate cause alleged for the act was "that it is publicly known that the oil companies operating in the country were ordered, on December 18 last, to establish new labor conditions by Group Number 7 of the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, and that said companies expressed their refusal to accept the respective decree, notwithstanding the fact that the constitutionality thereof had been affirmed by decision of the Supreme Court of the Nation, and without advancing any other reason for such refusal than their alleged financial inability, which led to the application of the provisions of Section XXI of Article 123 of the Constitution of the Republic: namely, to the cancellation by the respective authority of the labor contracts which had been the subject matter of the above-mentioned decree."

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[9] Most of them were subsidiaries of the Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell.

Arguing that this fact of enforced stoppage, although by Government decree, "leads inevitably to the suspension of all activities in the petroleum industry," the Government proceeded to expropriate in order "to obviate grave domestic disturbances." The matter of indemnity was to be arranged within ten years.[10] Thus was abrogated the agreement of the Bucareli Conference of 1923, as well as the understanding reached by Dwight Morrow in 1927, that Article 27 of the Constitution was not to apply retroactively or eventuate in confiscation.

Swift and strong notes passed between the Government of Mexico and the Governments of the United States and England. As a result, Mexico after making prompt payment of an outstanding debt, was content to break its diplomatic relations with Britain. Somewhat more compromising was the administration of Roosevelt, which had all along been patting Cárdenas on the back. Nevertheless, in his note of July 21, 1938, Cordell Hull declared: "The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there may be an expressed intention to pay at some time in the future." This statement was undoubtedly prompted, not only by the traditional American policy of requiring prompt and just compensation, but also by the realization that Mexico's ability to pay was none too certain.

Having once taken its stand on the matter as one of national sovereignty, Cárdenas expressed a willingness to make compensation on a domestic basis, but his government absolutely refused to recognize the obligation as a matter of international law and therefore rejected every proposal to submit the problem to a board of international arbitration. As late as 1940, Washington, no doubt urged by the oil interests, urged this arbitration; and on every occasion the suggestion was enough to touch off social dynamite in Mexico.

Whether or not Cárdenas' grievances of long standing against the companies were justified, the fact is that the methods of seizure corresponded with his normal technique; and its purpose fit in perfectly with the announced objectives of his administration. When a general strike of the CTM, on May 28, 1937, involving 18,000 workers employed by the companies resulted in a drastic shortage of gasoline, the President ordered the union leaders to send their men back to work, in the public interest. This was done with the understanding that their demands would be submitted to the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. Acting on the report of the Mexican economist Jesús Silva Herzog, the board gave a favorable decision to the workers, on December 18. The companies asked for an injunction ten days later, alleging inability to meet the increased wages plus other stringent requirements, but finally offered a compromise payment up to 4,000,000 pesos of the official award. This proved unacceptable; and on March 1, 1938, the Supreme Court gave the companies 72 hours to comply with the original decision.

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[10] The Mexican Expropriation Law (Mexico, 1938), pp. 53–55.

Again maintaining their inability to meet the conditions, the companies found themselves now in conflict with the government and public order. This gave the President the opportunity he had been waiting for. Toledano had already declared to a general congress of the CTM, on February 22, "Comrades, it appears inevitable that the moment will come when the petroleum companies will have to be replaced by representatives of the State and the Mexican workers to maintain petroleum production. We are prepared and willing to take over the technical, economic, legal, moral, and historic responsibility that belongs to a nation of free men." Cárdenas now issued his decree: "It has therefore become unavoidable, as a logical consequence, to take final measures, to end this continual state of affairs under which the country labors, its industrial advance checked by those who hold in their hands the power to throw every obstacle in its way, employing the dynamic force of their activity, not for noble and lofty ends, but to abuse that economic strength, so far as to imperil the very life of a nation that seeks to uplift its people by means of the application of its own resources and by the free management of its own destinies. . . ."

As in the case of the agricultural expropriations, it may yet be too early to pass final judgment on the economic outcome of the petroleum experiment. Following the seizure, there still remained the question of a financial settlement between the companies, demanding $450,000,000 in the current rate of exchange and claiming rights to the source of the oil, and the Mexican Government, estimating a just payment at less than $10,000,000 and reserving the oil beds as inalienable property of the nation. The National Petroleum Administration, now called the Pemex, immediately found itself confronted with the problems of sabotage and boycott in addition to the inefficiency of its management, so that the workers, far from profiting by the new arrangement, were faced with widespread decrease of wages and unemployment. Further embarrassment came with a sharp drop in the peso and the threat of curtailment in silver purchases by the United States.

Thus, although Cárdenas took office at a moment of rising prosperity throughout the world, and Mexican foreign trade more than doubled between 1931 and 1936, with a corresponding increase in federal revenue, the financial stability of his government at the end of his term in 1940 was extremely doubtful. On the other hand, an increasing flow of American tourists in Mexico plus the continued purchase of silver by Washington served to balance a deficit already met in part by the discontinuance both of bonds on expropriated lands and of payment of interest on the debt.

Meanwhile, the government continued its spending program on excellent new roads, schools, agrarian development, and social improvements of undeniable value. Thoroughly confident in the success of the first Six Year Plan, Cárdenas declared the freedom of the people in the choice of his successor in the election scheduled for July 7, 1940. Indeed, the revolution had come to regard its achievements with such satisfaction that, as early as February 21, 1940, Lombardo Toledano, in the national council meeting of the CTM, announced a second Six Year Plan. This was to include the centralization of national economy, embracing both private and public interests under an expert technical committee to control all branches of national life, with the cooperation of the working class in a system of government bravely called "functional democracy."

If Cárdenas had done nothing else, he at least fanned the masses into a new consciousness of the Mexican nationality.

vii

Among the primary paradoxes of the Cárdenas regime, and perhaps one of the primary reasons for its success, was the unbloody and tolerant view which the President took of the enemies of his regime and of the elements which the Mexican political tradition had branded for rapid extinction. It must be remembered that Cárdenas, through his own energies as well as through circumstances and exigencies, had improved legal and practical precedent to make himself the most absolute of Mexican dictators. Nevertheless, with the exception of General Cedillo, who was killed in a brush with federal troops, early in 1939, after his clumsy defiance of Cárdenas' power, the rule of the first Six Year Plan was singularly free of fatal violence. It is true that offending and "seditious" generals were transferred from strategic positions, and several were sent into exile; but this was not the dark hand of assassination or execution by which previous executives in the Presidential chair had liquidated their enemies.

Even more, on July 1, 1935, Cárdenas granted amnesty to all who had taken part or were alleged to have taken part in Mexican rebellions, for the past twenty years, auguring better relations with the Church, many of whose leaders, including the Papal Delegate Monsignor Ruiz y Flores, were still in exile. In the same month, disgusted with the terrorism of General Canábal, who had served on his cabinet as minister of Agriculture, he suspended normal powers in the state of Tabasco and named a new state military commandant to guarantee fairer elections. When Tabascan students went from Mexico City to their state capital Villahermosa to demonstrate against Canábal's rule, they were shot down by the machine guns of Canábal's Red Shirt organization. It was then that the Federal Government intervened. Canábal was sent out of the country, and his Red Shirts were disbanded.

This did not mean that the anticlerical, or rather anti-Catholic, bitterness that had marked the Calles era was suddenly abandoned. The closure of churches and the drastic limitation of priests went on apace for the first year of Cárdenas' term of office and continued to prevail as a policy up to the close of 1937. When Archbishop Díaz of Mexico City died, May 19, 1936, the government was determined to refuse permission for burial from his own cathedral; and it was only after Ambassador Daniels had extended his friendly offices unofficially for a more humane consideration that this decency was granted.

The appointment of Archbishop Martínez, of Michoacán, to Mexico and his investment with the practical offices of the Papal Delegate, however, seemed to coincide with a gradual alleviation of the painful situation. On May 30, when a number of peasants tried to rebuild a church, they were fired upon by state troops, and four were killed. Four days later, the Federal Government issued a reprimand stating that "All authorities have express instructions to abstain from persecution of Catholics." This indicated that more toleration was to be accorded the resumption of Catholic services, so that by the beginning of 1940 all the bishops of Mexico had returned to their dioceses, with the exception of one, who resigned in favor of an administrator. The extent of this gain is clear in the fact that in 1933 only 197 priests were allowed to officiate in the entire country.

The reopening of Catholic churches for worship did not signify the amendment of any basic law of the country or a *carte blanche* for religious freedom. On the contrary, the Revolutionary program proceeded with a more careful determination to the fulfillment of Calles' announcement: "We must now enter and take possession of the consciences of the children, of the consciences of the young, because they do belong, and should belong, to the Revolution." What this meant was stated in Article 3 of the Reformed Constitution, which President Cárdenas set out to enforce: "Education which the State shall impart will be Socialist, and moreover, to exclude all religious doctrine, it shall combat fanaticism and prejudices. For this end, the school shall organize its teachings and activities in such form as will permit it to create in the youth a rational and exact concept of the universe and of social life."

Inasmuch as the teaching of religion was forbidden in the schools, all participation by the Church or the clergy was outlawed, and license was granted to private institutions only on the basis of their conformity to Socialist principles of thought, there was no doubt that the Revolution intended to advance its ideals by monopolizing national culture. Observers who believed that the term "Socialist" meant merely a universal education were soon disabused by the official spokesmen of the government, who made it clear that the theory of the program was to teach Marxist dialectical materialism to the masses, in an effort to supplant religion with "scientific" truth, to foment the class struggle, and combat all forms of imperialism.

Following the destruction of the Church's educational predominance by Juárez in 1857, the educational facilities of Mexico, both primary and secondary, went into a spiral decline. In 1919, after lay education had monopolized the field for four generations, Jorge Vera Estañol, Secretary of Public Instruction under Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta, declared that "somewhat more than four-fifths part of the population of Mexico is illiterate."[11] The reason generally assigned for the failure of the states and municipalities to solve the problem satisfactorily was lack of money. Shortly before the resignation of Díaz, a project of federal schools was announced, although Carranza refused cooperation in his state, and financial difficulties again came to the fore. Madero's administration was so crowded with political considerations that nothing was achieved. Plans for the establishment of 5000 elementary schools were laid during the early months of Huerta's administration; but these were shelved when the Constitution of 1917 abolished the Department of Public Instruction. At the same time, the intolerance of the Revolutionist chieftains forced the closing of over 2500 private primary, elementary, and secondary schools throughout the country for the reason that they were maintained or conducted by religious or the clergy.

During the ascendancy of Obregón, a constructive program was evolved by José Vasconcelos, who secured appropriations to build nearly 1000 rural schools with a program of education which included, not only the instruction of children, but also the organization of cultural missions for the social improvement of entire communities.

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[11] *Al Margen de la Constitucion de 1917* (Los Angeles, 1920), p. 37.

Although, under Calles, teachers were severely penalized for holding Catholic views, and children were compelled to prepare antireligious themes, the construction of schools, notably rural centers, and the enrollment of students made extraordinary headway. With the change of ideology from "lay" to "socialist" education, in 1934, new impetus was given to the social character of the school. According to statistics issued by the Secretariat of Public Education, there were in December, 1935, a total of more than 22,000 primary and kindergarten schools sustained by public funds throughout the country in addition to nearly 700 centers, including technical and agricultural schools of a post primary character and cultural enterprises of general purposes.

The importance of the school, in Cárdenas' program, was repeatedly stressed by the President himself, who declared in his New Year's Message, 1938, "A good share of the propaganda to be carried on falls on the teachers, who by their qualifications, their disinterested service in behalf of the masses, their experience and knowledge of the economic possibilities of their zones, undoubtedly exert an influence therein. I place my confidence in their enthusiasm to discharge this noble duty." In a speech on the foundation of this educational system, he declared, "The Socialist School, school of work, with the cooperation of the workers, the farmers, the teachers, and the National Army, which is now a revolutionary factor in the building of a new Mexico, can create a concept of personal, family, and civic ethics, which supplants superstitious dogma, in direct benefit of our people."

From the standpoint of quality, it is quite certain that the schools, both primary and secondary, declined pedagogically from those under Díaz. The only relic of academic freedom in the country was the National Autonomous University in Mexico City, and this institution had considerable difficulty in surviving the onslaughts of a totalitarian government and Socialist agitation. The Workers' University, directed by Toledano and supported with government funds, attempted to offset the bourgeois culture of this institution by imparting integral Marxism to its students; and a series of National Polytechnic Schools were created to serve a technical-social function.

On the other hand, as a result of the general educational program, illiteracy in Mexico dropped appreciably, the statistics of 1935 indicating nearly 43 per cent of school age actually in school as compared with a little over 23 per cent in 1900. The rise of government interest in popular education can be gauged by an increase in appropriations, from 4,764,984 pesos in 1900 to 11,434,719 pesos in 1907, followed by 20,186,206 pesos in 1921, and 57,755,118 pesos in 1935. The public health budget was also increased proportionately.

The scene was not, however, entirely rosy. In general, the teachers were vastly underpaid and frequently overworked, with consequent dissatisfaction. The Catholics of the country, resentful of the exclusion of religious teaching and of the substitution of antireligious pedagogy, opposed a good deal of the government's program in education. In some instances, angry groups used violence against teachers. An abortive and clumsy attempt to introduce sex education met with loud protests from the organization of Fathers of Families. Cárdenas himself became impatient of the extravagant language of the proletarian pedagogues, and in 1938 began to order a stressing of "democracy" in place of the sectarian "socialism."

Nevertheless, the determination of the government was intensified "toward the preparation of the national proletariat, for the moment in which the historic evolution of the economic system of the country permits the substitution of the actual system of private property by that of the socialization of the means and instruments of production and exchange." Late in 1939, against the protest of large sectors of the people, Congress enacted a ruling to strengthen the Marxist character of Article 3, in particular to make certain that only persons thoroughly equipped in the morality and ideology of dialectical materialism should be admitted to the teaching professions. The remains of Christian culture and belief in the teachers were still, of course, the most formidable obstacle in the way of realizing the government program integrally.

If one were to judge from the cultural symbols of the Revolution, including the paintings of Diego Rivera and Clemente Orozco, or from the flamboyant expressions of the radical spokesmen of the Cárdenas regime, or from such isolated incidents as the admission of Trotzky to Mexico and the welcoming of Left Wing elements from Spain, one might conclude that Mexico had been completely made over into a North American Soviet. The situation was far more complex than that.

At the beginning of 1939, the Communists numbered some 30,000 members under their general secretary Hernan Laborde. But serious divisions between the Stalinites and the Trotzkyites contributed to weaken their front; and after the confusion resultant on the Hitler-Stalin entente, Laborde found himself ejected from office. Cárdenas himself was never regarded as thoroughly logical by these groups any more than he has been approved or trusted by conservative sectors. Even among the loudest voices of the Revolution there was dissention and frequent suggestion of insincerity or at least of a lack of conviction and a willingness to compromise, particularly if personal gain might result. Cárdenas himself did not weep over the battles of Portes Gil and Lombardo Toledano, which have perceptibly weakened the position of both these sectors. And beneath all this welter, there still remained the quiet but powerful leavening influence of Christian culture and sentiment planted by the zeal of the early missionaries and kept alive through decades of persecution.

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In these conditions, Mexico prepared itself for the Presidential elections of July 7, 1940. In conformity with Constitutional regulations, Cárdenas declared that he would not consider his reelection. In all the history of Mexico, no Presidential campaign was opened under more favorable circumstances. In the words of the President, "There ought now to have been created in the people the consciousness of its rights and the direction of its duties. . . . The time has arrived when the different tendencies, even reactionary, of the possible groups organized under the grant of civic liberties can enjoy a full campaign and enter into the electoral fight with guarantees equal to those required for the ideals of the revolutionaries."

To a large extent, this was an actual fact. There were no political prisoners in the jails. The frontiers of the country had been thrown open to the largest mass repatriation possibly in the history of the world, over 1,500,000 Mexicans having returned to their country, principally from the United States, since 1929. At no other time had the press been allowed so much freedom of expression. Even the political minorities, which had long since learned the inadvisability of appearing at the polls, began to speak of voting, as Cárdenas promised a new law of federal elections to be drafted with this freedom in view.

While the President quietly continued his rounds through the country, hastening the division and parceling of landed estates, the candidates, fully one year ahead of the elections according to requirements of law, began their campaigns. Five candidates, all of them soldiers of the Revolution, declared their candidacies: Generals Manuel Avila Camacho, Francisco J. Múgica, Miguel Sánchez Tapia, Gildardo Magaña, and Juan Andreu Almazán.

Advance indications, notably the 1,155,675 votes of the CTM pledged by Lombardo Toledano and the 1,826,515 votes of the CNC (National Farm Confederation), soon made it clear that Avila Camacho was the officially favored candidate; and as such he was given the nomination of the PRM. Under normal circumstances, this should have been signal enough for rational opposition to fold up and for Mexico to resign itself to Cárdenas' plan of conversion into a nation of cooperative cells under a national Socialist management.

The extraordinary thing was that the opposition had come to trust Cárdenas' word and to take advantage of the freedom of elections which he had promised. With this as the background of hope, General Almazán, governor of Nuevo León announced his candidacy for President on an independent ticket and proceeded in all seriousness and with enormous success to campaign the country. Precisely what Almazán would offer was not immediately clear. A veteran of the wars of the Revolution and once an ally of Zapata, he had built up a solid popularity in Monterrey and throughout the North. Dynamic, now relatively conservative, wealthy, regarded as a good man for business, apparently prepared to restore fundamental rights to Catholics, he allowed his backers to build up his cause and then threw himself into the fervor of the campaign, drawing enormous crowds throughout the length of the land.

The issues of the campaign were expressed, from an opposition standpoint, in a memorial of the Revolutionary Committee of National Reconstruction, on July 11, 1939. "The definite and unilateral protection given by the Government," according to this statement, "to the groups which more or less frankly fight for the destruction of the Constitutional regime, proclaiming the 'implantation of the democracy of workers and the Socialist regime'; the apparent intention of the party (PRM) and of the Government to convert citizenship into a collective function, in flagrant violation of our supreme law; the desire of the party and of the Government to establish 'the organization and collective exploitation of the *ejido*, eliminating the small land-parcel system'; the official policy of the systematic nationalization of industry with the purpose of organizing it also into collective form; the inclusion of communist principles in the program of the party, which is a personal creation of the President of the Republic; the sectarian and communizing policy of the government in relation with the Red Spanish immigrants; official toleration in the face of anti-constitutional and communizing workers' militias, and finally the establishment of Marxist education throughout the Republic against the absolute desire of the immense majority of the people. . . ." these, in addition to the staggering national debt, called for a drastic accounting.

Nevertheless, calm observers doubted, and with good reason, whether Mexico could or should now turn back. Even Catholic spokesmen, who had been accused of alliance with entrenched wealth and reaction, have recognized in the Cárdenas program many salient features of reform which the Church maintained before the advent of Liberalism and which it constantly advocated until its voice was silenced in the welter of the Revolution.[12] The question rather was whether the economic reform and the education of the masses should proceed along the accepted principles of private property, indemnification, and spiritual conceptions of man, or whether it should hasten to the integral realization of Marx's dialectical materialism.

In view of safeguarding social gains as well as the national economy from disaster, an intelligent swing toward "the right" seemed the only logical alternative to possible violence with a repetition of the cruel slaughter and needless destruction that has retarded the progress of this magnificent country.

Indicative of this realization was the timely warning of Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama. "The coming to a head of the present crisis," he declared in the summer of 1939, "has been clearly proving the direction in which abstract theorizing and adventuresome planning have been leading us, as well as enterprises based simply on good intentions with no thought of realities. . . . The first thing that all demand is a political policy of consideration and stability, which leans neither heavily to the right nor dangerously to the left, but maintains a position of just moderation imperiously required by a nation jolted and cruelly scourged by the crisis."

The full significance of these words can be realized only when it is remembered that, a few years before, Soto y Gama acted as mentor to General Zapata and entered Mexico with a thundering rabble, in the conviction that to secure social justice "heads must roll."

Whether heads would roll again or whether the people of Mexico were ready to put the seal of approval upon the political, economic, and cultural principles of the Six Year Plan was shortly to become obvious. Cárdenas had made a supreme effort to swing the sickle of the Revolution and complete the harvest before his term of office should expire. He now declared that he was ready to retire and leave the verdict to the people. It was a supreme tribute to his integrity, that the people of Mexico took him at his word and proceeded to the elections that were to write his glory or his doom.[13]

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[12] Cf. Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (El Paso, 1928), V, pp. 283–308; Ramiro Camacho, *La Cuestion Agraria* (Guadalajara, Mexico, 1939), *passim;* José T. Moreno, *El Agrarismo* (Mexico, D.F., 1938), *passim;* Encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno; Archivo Social de Guadalajara,* n. 69, index 04, pp. 4–6; Mexican Bishops Pastoral, Aug. 30, 1935; Alberto María Carreño, *Pages of Mexican History* (Mexico, 1936), *passim.*

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[13] Following the election of his successor, Cárdenas retired to his estate in Pátzcuaro. In 1942, he was given military command of the western coast.

CHAPTER XVIII

Epilogue

What follows is of the nature of a sequel to the last chapter, rather than, an epilogue to the book. Curiously, however, this summary of events epitomizes in many ways the history of Mexico and looks to the future with a backward glance.

Commenting editorially on the situation resulting from the Presidential election of July 7, 1940, the important newspaper *El Universal* of Mexico City noted that, with the single exception of the election of Madero in 1910, the people had not been allowed the opportunity of freely expressing themselves at the polls for over fifty years. "We have always been obliged," this editorial stated glumly, "to defer our will before that of a despot, enlightened or not, and usually the latter."

Whether the despot in this case was Lazaro Cárdenas himself or the PRM (Mexican Revolutionary Party), the elections were marked with violence, and heads did roll. There can be no reasonable doubt that the popular vote was overwhelmingly in favor of Almazán as against Cárdenas' man, Avila Camacho. The probability that the vote was one of opposition to the government rather than of direct approval of Almazán does not alter the fact. Nevertheless, the PRM, anticipating the official count of Congress, announced on July 13 that "The people of Mexico, conscious of their historic destiny, have responded with dignity to the call of the Revolution. General Avila Camacho is the President-elect." Its figures presented Avila Camacho with 2,265,199 votes and allowed Almazán only 128,574 votes for the entire nation.

This was the signal for an interlude of abuse, detention, and exile for leaders in the opposition party, and Almazán, branded as a "reactionary" and accused of being "pro-Nazi" and of stirring rebellion, left for Baltimore. En route, he announced by radio from Cuba that "I am fulfilling my duty in repeating to my countrymen my promises which will be punctually fulfilled, namely to establish myself on December 1 as President of the Republic, respecting the almost unanimous mandate of the electors."

Again the decisive vote was cast by Washington. The claims of both candidates were taken under consideration, and Vice-President-elect Henry Wallace was dispatched to Mexico City to attend the inaugural exercises of — Avila Camacho.

Widespread indignation in Mexico might have been expected, and a number of embarrassing incidents occurred in connection with Mr. Wallace's visit. Nevertheless, the people were weary of civil wars, the army was now fairly well institutionalized, and Almazán was content to accept the hospitality of his native land again, particularly since the strong arm of Uncle Sam had settled his fate. Moreover, leading spokesmen of the Catholic Church, who had abstained from commitments during the campaign, counseled popular acceptance of Avila Camacho in the interest of peace and in the hope of justice.

If a large part of the strength of Almazán's campaign lay in his protest against the anti-Christian program of the PRM, and particularly against Article 3 of the Constitution as outlawing religion and establishing Marxism as the standard of education, Avila Camacho went to the unprecedented length of calling himself "a believer" and of appealing to all elements of "the Mexican Family" to unite in the ideal of Christian harmony.

Subsequent action indicated that these statements were more than a temporizing action to win votes. The dignity of a public function reappeared in religious ceremonies. Schools under Catholic auspices were allowed to open their doors. In the public school system, the resignation of the Secretary of Education, Sánchez Pontón, in early September, 1941, and his replacement by Octavio Véjar Vázquez, indicated the beginning of a more moderate policy.

As a result, even though Article 3 had not yet been modified, Archbishop Martínez of Mexico was able to declare: "I feel certain that freedom of conscience and religious peace, which made great progress in the Cárdenas Administration, will not only continue in the new Presidential period, but also will be consolidated and perfected. I believe this, not only because the atmosphere is favorable for such a development, but also because General Avila Camacho has clearly expressed his wish to satisfy all just aspiration of public opinion, particularly in matters related to religious freedom."[1]

Precisely where Cárdenas stood during the early months of Camacho's presidency is difficult to say. It was generally thought that Camacho was still dominated by Cárdenas, an idea strengthened by the failure of his brother Maximino Avila Camacho to take a place in the government. Rumors of various sorts became so persistent that on August 11, 1941, the President felt himself obliged to issue the following statement:

"I am informed that frequent rumors are being published concerning alleged policies in my Cabinet, attributing these to the intervention or influence of persons outside the Public Administration. Because of the unrest which such rumors can give rise to in national life, and aware of my responsibility as First Executive of the nation and of the powers and obligations which our laws clearly place upon me, I declare that in all my acts I have taken care and shall continue to take care to adjust myself to the position which the Constitution of the Republic and its laws mark out for me and that neither the members of my household nor any other person have or will have any direction over the decisions which I have made or now make in the exercise of my powers."[2]

Nevertheless, a definite turn was given when, on October 2, his brother Maximino was named by the President to the post of Secretary of Communications and Public Works. To many observers, this long anticipated step meant that the time had come for Cárdenas to resign the rôle of principal mentor, if he had acted as such, and for an era of more conservative policies to establish itself.

This trend, however, had already been exhibited in a number of ways. The President made it clear that the agrarian laws were going to be fulfilled, not by hasty seizures and irresponsible running over the land, as had occurred too frequently in the past, but by judicial process. Action was also taken to remove teachers' groups from the existing labor unions, with the obvious purpose of distracting them from political activities. Conferences were held in both Mexico City and Washington to iron out the difficulties caused by the expropriation of oil properties and to fix the exchange value of the Mexican peso. Guarantees were again offered to foreign capital.

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[1] Quoted in *America,* December 14, 1940.

[2] *El Popular,* August 12, 1941.

Of signal importance, also, must be mentioned the policy of the "Good Neighbor" with the United States, which Avila Camacho espoused from the beginning of his Presidency. Mexican observers openly stated that such was part of the price he and the PRM had to pay for the Presidency. Many Mexicans, like the semi-mystic marching Synarchists, it may be pointed out, had become openly disgusted with the idea of democracy as exemplified in Mexico these many decades. Others had become cynical of democracy as exemplified in the foreign policy of the United States toward Mexico. Many, however, like those of *Acción Nacional* believed that authentic democracy in Mexico is possible if given an honest opportunity in accordance with the social character and problems of the Mexican people.

Many Mexicans, perhaps most Mexicans, are inclined to blame everything of evil, at least partially, upon their powerful neighbor in the North and to become so exasperated with the sins of the "Yanquis" as to lose sight of the vast social problems which they themselves must face among their own, including poverty, malnutrition, disease, drunkenness, larceny, and marital looseness. Clear thinking, a fearless facing of facts, a true appraisal of historical evolution with recognition of manifest differences in social patterns, and a determination of mutual helpfulness, without condescension or a demand for the pound of flesh on either hand — all this is necessary, if the relationships of Mexico and the United States are going to be productive of genuine advance.

In the words of Avila Camacho, "the effect of these closer trade relations upon the future political relations of our peoples will depend upon the spirit of cooperation they show in placing a genuine co-ordination of interests above the mere quest of profits."[3] In this connection, it is of the utmost importance to note that the Mexican statesman Ezequiel Padilla gave the strongest possible support to the American Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in the conference at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, and that Mexico generously aligned itself to the fullest extent with the destinies of the United States by its declaration of war on the Axis powers in June of the same year.

Mexico has served as the laboratory for almost every kind of social experiment within the past two centuries, and it has fallen heir to the thousand and one confusions of Europe and America. It has been told by its critics that its traditional institutions and its national culture — dominantly Catholic and specifically Spanish — are the causes of its troubles. Reformers of various kinds, and many of the carpetbag variety, have undertaken to change things around. Its history has been written and rewritten to serve nearly every cause and to utter every solemn warning. Generals and generalizations, as someone has said, have been its worse enemies. It has hardly been able to call its house its own.

Now, perhaps, in the spirit of genuine autonomy and international cooperation, Mexico may be permitted to indulge in the luxury of guiding its own destinies, of building upon its magnificent cultural traditions, of shaping its own democracy, and of saying its own prayers.

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[3] *New York Times,* October 1, 1941.

CHAPTER XIX

Bibliography

The purpose of this bibliography is not to supply an exhaustive list of sources and authorities, but rather to provide certain indications as aids to further and critical reading on Mexico. Such reading will range from that of general interest and popular understanding to more scholarly and specialized study. Needless to say, some of the works listed are more available than others; but it is believed that, from what is here offered, the earnest student of Mexican history will be able to secure satisfactory references for his information.

Libraries. Among the leading collections of documents, books, and other materials, may be named those of the National Archives of Mexico City, the Bancroft Library of the University of California (Berkeley), the Latin-American Library of the University of Texas (Austin), the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library (Chicago), the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan-American Union (Washington, D. C.), and, of course, the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress.

Periodicals. Scholarly articles and reviews are offered by such publications as *The Hispanic American Historical Review, The Catholic Historical Review, Divulgación Histórica* (Mexico), *Foreign Affairs,* publications of the *Foreign Policy Association, Ábside* (Mexico) and *Lectura* (Mexico), *Revista Hispánica Moderna* (Buenos Aires), *The Inter-American Quarterly* (now monthly), *America, Commonweal,* and most current periodicals dealing with international affairs.

General. The most compendious and basic works in English remain those of Hubert Howe Bancroft, *The Native Races,* 5 vols. (1882); *History of Central America,* 3 vols. (1882); *History of Mexico,* 6 vols. (1883–1888); *The North Mexican States,* 2 vols. (1884–1889); *Arizona and New Mexico* (1884); and *The History of California,* 7 vols. (1884–1890). Perhaps the best available one-volume work in English is H. I. Priestley's *The Mexican Nation* (1935). *Blood-Drenched Altars* (1935) by Francis C. Kelley is specifically a work of Catholic rectifications in issues of Mexican history. *A History of Mexico* (1938) by H. B. Parkes is very readable but incorporates the whole dreary anti-Catholic, anti-Spanish bias of the doctrinaire Liberals, brought up to date. Alonso Teja Zabre's *Guide to the History of Mexico* (1935) is basic propaganda of the Mexican government. Bertram D. Wolfe's *Portrait of Mexico* (1937), illustrated by Diego Rivera, tells the story as seen by the new "reformers" of Mexico. *The Historical Evolution of Hispanic America* (2nd ed., 1940) by J. Fred Rippy may be recommended as fitting the history of Mexico into the general patterns of Central and South America. Ernest Gruening's *Mexico and Its Heritage* (1934) gives an anti-Spanish, anti-Catholic interpretation.

Of the works in Spanish, the standard, written in the Liberal tradition, are *México, Su Evolución Social,* 3 vols. (1900–1902), edited by Justo Sierra, Minister of Education under Porfirio Díaz, and *México a Través de los Siglos,* 5 vols. (1887–1889), edited by Vicente Riva Palacio. Favorable from a Catholic point of view are *Historia de Méjico,* 18 vols. (1877–1882), by Niceto Zamacois and *Historia de la Nación Mexicana* (1940) by Mariano Cuevas, S.J.; in the same tradition are two works partially completed, *Historia de México,* 2 vols. (1923–1939), by Francisco Benegas Galván, and the same title by José Bravo Ugarte, 2 vols. (1941–1942). Worthy of note also are the *Compendio de la Historia de México* (1911) by Luis Pérez Verdía, *Compendio de la Historia General de México* (1902) by Nicolás León, and the highly nationalistic *Breve Historia de México* (1937) by José Vasconcelos. An interesting study in biographies is *Hombres Ilustres Mexicanos,* 3 vols. (1873), by Eduardo L. Gallo (ed.). Consult also the valuable *Diccionario Universal* (Mexico, 1853–1856).

The history of the Catholic Church, whether in friendly or unfriendly spirit, is inseparable from the general history of Mexico. In addition, the following works are indicated. From a Catholic standpoint and easily the most important work in the field is the monumental and provocative *Historia de la Iglesia* *en México,* 5 vols. (El Paso, 1928), by Mariano Cuevas, S.J. Also by Catholic authors are *Apuntamientos de Historia Eclesiástica Mejicana* (1922) by Jesús Garciá Gutiérrez, *Acción Anticatólica en Méjico* (1939) by the same author, and the works of Regis Planchet, including *La Cuestión Religiosa en México* (1927) and *El Robo de los Bienes de la Iglesia* (1936). Specifically dealing with the era of Calles is *No God Next Door* (1935) by Michael Kenny, S.J. Pamphlet 21, *An Introduction to Mexico* (1936), issued by The Catholic Association for International Peace, is worthy of study. *La Lucha Entre el Poder Civil y el Clero* (1935) by Félix Navarrete should be taken as a corrective to the anti-Catholic essay of Emilio Portes Gil on *The Conflict Between the Civil Power and the Clergy* (1935). Similarly paired should be *El Conflicto Religioso de 1926* (1929) by Aquiles P. Moctezuma (Catholic viewpoint) and *La Iglesia y el Estado en México* (1927) by Alfonso Toro (anti-Catholic viewpoint). The Catholic viewpoint is generally reflected in the works of Alfonso Junco, for example, in his *Un Siglo de México* (1937). A non-Catholic but objective statement is to be found in the works of W. H. Calcott, *Church and State in Mexico, 1822–1857* (1931) and *Liberalism in Mexico, 1857–1929* (1931). *Church and State in Latin America* (1934) by J. Lloyd Mecham contains an important résumé of Church-State relations in Mexico. The *Comentario a las Revoluciones de México,* 2 vols. (1926), by Antonio Gibaya y Patrón elaborates a critical attack upon Freemasonry and the Liberal Party in Mexico. The Liberal and anticlerical viewpoint is generally sustained by non-Catholic historians.

Perhaps the most serviceable survey of literature is *Historia de la Literatura Mexicana* (1928) by Carlos González Peña.

Primitive Culture. Among the large number of works available, the following studies by early writers are of the greatest importance: *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo, trans. of A. P. Maudslay (1933); *Historia General de las Cosas de Nueva España* (1938) by Bernardino de Sahagún; *Relación de las Cosas de Yucatán* (1938) by Diego de Landa; *Storia Antica del Messico* (1780) by Francisco Javier Clavijero; *Historia de las Indias de Nueva España* (1867–1880) by Diego Durán; *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana* (1870) by Gerónimo de Mendieta; *Historia de los Indios de Nueva España* (1914) by Toribio de Benavente Motolinía; *Monarquía Indiana* (1613–1615) by Juan de Torquemada; and, for a survey of the Caribbean Islands, *Historia de las Indias* by Bartolomé de las Casas (José M. Vigil, ed., 1877).

Of the books written in the nineteenth century and more recently, W. H. Prescott's *The Conquest of Mexico,* frequently reprinted, remains a classic, although frequently regarded as giving an exaggerated impression of the Aztec culture. As a balance to this, reference may be made to the works of A. F. Bandelier, notably his *On the Social Organization and Mode of Government of the Ancient Mexicans* (1879). Other important and generally reliable works are *Native Races,* 5 vols. (1882), and *History of Mexico,* Vol. I (1883), by H. H. Bancroft; *Historia Antigua de la Conquista de México,* 4 vols. (1880), by Manuel Orozco y Berra; *Pre-Historic America* (1890) by Marquis de Nadaillac; *Histoire des Nations Civilisées du Mexique et de L'Amérique Centrale* (1857) by Brasseur de Bourbourg; *Fundamental Principles of Old and New World Civilizations* (1901) by Zelia Nuttall; *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (1936) by Herbert S. Spinden; *Mexico Before Cortez* (1933) by J. E. Thompson; *History of the Maya* (1931) by J. E. Thompson and Thomas Gann; *Historia de México,* I (1941); and *Apuntamientos de Historia de Méjico,* I (1939) by Jesús García Gutiérrez. *Hombres Illustres Mexicanos,* Vol. I (1873), by Eduardo L. Gallo (ed.) offers biographies of the Aztec monarchs. A ready reference to ancient art and architecture is *Monumentos Arqueológicos de México* (1933), published by the Secretariat of Public Education in Mexico.

The Spanish Conquest. For contemporary evidence, one cannot do better than go back to the *Five Letters of Hernando Cortés,* trans. of J. B. Morris (1928) and the vivid *Discovery and Conquest of Mexico* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo, trans. of A. P. Maudslay (1933). Basic reading should also include the perennial classic *The Conquest of Mexico* by William H. Prescott and *The History of Mexico,* Vol. I (1883), by H. H. Bancroft. Also available in English are *Hernán Cortés* (1941) by Salvador de Madariaga; *The Spanish Conquistadores* (1934) by F. A. Kirkpatrick; *The Spanish Conquerors* (1919) by I. B. Richman; *Cortés the Conqueror* (1926) by H. D. Sedgwick; and *Narrative of Some Things in New Spain* by "The Anonymous Conqueror," published by the Cortés Society in 1917. Numerous works may be recommended as dealing with the extension of the Conquest, such as *The North Mexican States* (1884–1889); *Arizona and New Mexico* (1884); and *The History of California* (1884–1890) by H. H. Bancroft; *The Rim of Christendom* (1936), dealing with the work of the Jesuit explorer and missionary, Father Kino, and other books by H. E. Bolton; *Cabeza de Vaca* (1933) by Morris Bishop; and *The Coronado Expedition 1540–1542* (1896) by G. P. Winship.

Of works in Spanish, there is no dearth. As contemporary with the Conquest, may be mentioned the *Historia de la Conquistas de Hernán Cortés* (1870) by Francisco López de Gómara. Of the greatest importance are the *Disertaciones sobre la Historia de la República Mexicana,* 3 vols. (1844–1849), by Lucas Alamán. Valuable also is the *Historia de la Dominación Española en México,* Vol. I (republished in 1938), by Manuel Orozco y Berra. These volumes as reflecting a mature consideration for the work of Spain may be reinforced by *Hernán Cortés* (1931) and *La Obra de España en América* (1925), both by Carlos Pereyra. As indicating anti-Spanish sympathies, may be mentioned *Carácter de la Conquista Española* (1901) by Genaro Garciá and *Historia y Tragedia de Cuauhtemoc* (1933) by Alfonso Teja Zabre. *La Conquista de Nueva Galicia* (1935) by José López-Portillo y Weber depicts the blear episode of Guzmán.

The Viceregal Era. A fair estimate of this era is presented in *Viceregal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies* (1926) by Lillian Estelle Fisher; *The Viceroy of New Spain* (1914) by Donald E. Smith; *José de Gálvez: Visitor-General of New Spain* (1916) by H. I. Priestley; and, along more general lines, *Colonial Hispanic America* (1933) by C. E. Chapman; *Colonial Hispanic America* (1936) by A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.); and *The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America* (1898) by Bernard Moses. Consult also pertinent chapters in *The His-*

torical Evolution of Hispanic America (1940) by J. Fred Rippy. *A Survey of the West Indies* (1648; reprinted in 1929) by Thomas Gage presents the hostile view of an apostate Dominican priest. Specifically recommended and pertinent are *Antonio de Mendoza* (1927) by A. S. Aiton and various biographies available in Spanish, notably *Biografía de D. Fr. Juan de Zumárraga* (reprint, 1929) by Joaquín García Icazbalceta; *El Ilmo. Señor Don Vasco de Quiroga* (1903) by Nicolás León and its precursor, *Fragmentos de la Vida y Virtudes del Ilmo. y Rmo. Sr. Dr. D. Vasco de Quiroga* (1766; reprinted in 1940), by Juan Joseph Moreno; *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz* (1931) by Ezequiel A. Chávez; *Juan Ruiz de Alarcón y Su Tiempo* (1939) by Julio Jiménez Rueda; *Fr. Domingo de Betanzos* (1924) by Alberto María Carreño; *Fray Pedro de Gante* (1934), also by Chávez; *Don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza* (1906) by Genaro García (ed.); and *Los Gobernantes de México,* Vol. I (1872), by Manuel Rivera.

Among the best general surveys in Spanish must be named *Historia de la Dominación Española en México,* Vols. 2–4 (reprinted in 1938), by Manuel Orozco y Berra and the *Disertaciones,* already mentioned, Vol. III, by Lucas Alamán, together with his *Historia de Méjico,* Vol. I (1849). For a firsthand report of the viceroys, consult *Instrucciones que los Virreyes de Nueva España Dejaron a Sus Sucesores* (1867) and *Instrucción Reservada del Conde de Revilla Gigedo* (1831). Laws and commentaries of the viceregal era are to be found in *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias* (1681); *Política Indiana* (1629 and later editions) by Juan de Solórzano; and *Manual Compendio de el Regio Patronato Indiano* (1755) by Antonio Joachín de Ribadeneyra y Barrientos. The *Historia de las Indias* (José M. Vigil, ed., 1877) by Bartolomé de las Casas provides an important contemporary account of the Spanish foundations in the Caribbean area; his *Destrucción de las Indias* (1821) cannot be regarded as other than exaggerated and unreliable. A comprehensive and scientific study of New Spain toward the close of the viceregal era is provided in the *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain* (English, French, and Spanish editions) by Alexander von Humboldt. To these works may be added *Virreyes y Virreinas* (1933) by Artemio de Valle-Arizpe and *Principios Críticos sobre el Virreinato de la Nueva España* (1884–1888) by Agustín Rivera.

Touching various aspects of viceregal society and culture, may be mentioned the illustrated *Historia Gráfica de la Nueva España* (1929) by José R. Benítez; *El Palacio Nacional de México* (1936) by Artemio de Valle-Arizpe; *México Viejo* (1900) by L. González Obregón; and *España en los Destinos de México* (1929) by José Elguero. Specifically dealing with education during this period, may be recommended *Educational Foundations of the Jesuits in Sixteenth-Century New Spain* (1938) by Jerome V. Jacobsen, S.J.; *Los Colegios Jesuitas de la Nueva España* (1941) by Delfina Esmeralda López Sarrelangue; *La Educación Pública Elemental en la Ciudad de México durante el Siglo XVIII* (1936) by Luis Chávez Orozco (ed.); and *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (1928) by Mariano Cuevas, S.J. Art and architecture are competently discussed and represented in *Mexican Architecture of the Viceregal Period* (1927); *La Patria y la Arquitectura Nacional* (1915) by Frederico Mariscal; *Las Artes Industriales en la Nueva España* (1923) by M. Romero de Terreros; and *Tres Siglos de Arquitectura Colonial* (1933), a publication of the Mexican Secretariat of Public Education. Agrarian institutions are discussed in *The Encomienda in New Spain* (1929) by L. B. Simpson and *Las Instituciones Jurídicas en la Conquista de América* (1935), *La Encomienda Indiana* (1935), and *De Encomiendas y Propriedad Territorial en Algunas Regiones de la América Española* (1940) by Silvio A. Zavala.

In addition to these works, a wealth of material is to be found in the pertinent sections of general works already mentioned, notably the *History of Mexico* (1883–1888) by H. H. Bancroft; *México a Través de los Siglos* (1887–1889) by Vicente Riva Palacio; and *Historia de Méjico* (1877–1882) by Niceto de Zamacois.

The Wars for Independence. The works just named, of Bancroft, Vols. IV and V, and of Zamacois, Vols. VI–XI, together with Vol. I of *México desde 1808 hasta 1867* (1871–1872) by Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz and pertinent sections of *Historia* *de la Iglesia en México* (1928) by Mariano Cuevas, S.J., may be taken as supplying a fairly well-rounded picture of this era. Of the greatest value in tabulating sources is the *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de la Guerra de Independencia* (1877–1882) by Juan Hernández y Dávalos. To this group should be added *Historia de Méjico* (1849–1852) by Lucas Alamán and *Cuadro Histórico de la Revolución de la América Mexicana* (1823–1832) by Carlos María de Bustamante, as well as *The Background of the Revolution for Mexican Independence* (1934) by Lillian Estelle Fisher; *Historia de México* (1923–1939) by Francisco Banegas Galván; *La Guerra de Independencia* (1910) by Francisco Bulnes; and *El Plan de la Independencia de la Nueva España en 1808* (1908) by Genaro García.

Among the more important commentaries may be named *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México* (1831–1832) by the Liberal and anticlerical Lorenzo de Zavala; *Méjico y sus Revoluciones* (1836) by the ex-priest José María Luis Mora; *Historia de la Revolución de Nueva España* (1922) by José Guerra or Fray Servando de Teresa y Mier, that strange clergyman who styled himself the Bishop of Baltimore; *Memoria para la Historia de las Revoluciones en México* (1869) by A. Zerecero; and the definitely anti-Masonic *Comentario a las Revoluciones de México* (1926) by Antonio Gibaja y Patrón. Incorporating a number of important documents is *Primer Centenario de la Constitución de 1824,* published by the Mexican Cámera de Senadores in 1924.

Recommended for its critical sketches of personalities involved is *Un Siglo de Méjico* (1934) by Alfonso Junco. Other biographical works of note are *Life and Times of Hidalgo* (1910) by Noll-McMahon; *Hidalgo Íntimo* (1910) by José María de la Fuente; *Biografías de los Héroes y Caudillos de la Independencia* (1910) by Alejandro Villaseñor y Villaseñor; *Hombres Ilustres Mexicanos,* Vol. III (1874), by Eduardo L. Gallo (ed.); *Mujeres Célebres de México* (1918) by C. Hernández; *Biografía de Morelos* (Vol. II of México a Través de los Siglos, 1887–1889) by Julio Zárate; and *Morelos, Caudillo de la Independencia Mexicana* (1934) by Alfonso Teja Zabre. Pertaining to the much controverted Iturbide are *El Libertador de México*

D. Agustín de Iturbide (1872) by José J. Pesado, *Como Era Iturbide* (1921) by Rafael Heliodoro Valle, *A Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don A. de Iturbide* (1825) by C. de Beneski, and the *Manifiesto* (trans. of Agustín de Iturbide). In this period should be included also *Notes on Mexico* (1825) by Joel R. Poinsett, plotter against Iturbide, and *La Misión de Poinsett a México* (1913) by W. R. Manning.

Era of Santa Anna. Perhaps the best of the biographies of Santa Anna is that by W. H. Calcott (1936); of note also are *Santa Anna, The Napoleon of the West* (1934) by F. C. Hanighen and *Santa Anna* (1936) by Rafael F. Muñoz. *Mi Historia Militar y Política, 1810–1874* by Santa Anna is to be found in the important *Documentos Inéditos o Muy Raros para la Historia de México,* Vol. II (1905–1911), by Genaro García and Carlos Pereyra (eds.). In the same collection is printed (Vol. III) *México durante Su Guerra con los Estados Unidos.*

For a general history of the era, consult *Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867,* Vol. I (1871–1872), by Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz; *Historia de Méjico,* Vols. XI–XIV (1877–1882), by Niceto de Zamacois; *History of Mexico,* Vol. V (1883–1888), by H. H. Bancroft; *Apuntes para la Historia del Gobierno del General Santa Anna* (1846) by Carlos María Bustamante; *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México* (1831–1832) by the enemy of Santa Anna and first vice-president of Texas, Lorenzo de Zavala; and *Memorias de Mis Tiempos, 1828–1853* (1906) by the partisan of Juárez, Guillermo Prieto. Important commentaries on the period are *El Porvenir de México* (1851) by the Conservative Luis G. Cuevas, a signer of the Treaty of Guadalupe, and *Los Grandes Mentiras de Nuestra Historia* (1904) by the Liberal Francisco Bulnes. The ideologies of the growing Liberal forces are set forth in the *Obras Sueltas* (1837) of the ex-priest José María Luis Mora and in the *Obras* (1872) of Juárez' mentor, Melchor Ocampo. *Notes on Mexico* (1824) by Joel R. Poinsett and *La Misión de Poinsett a México* (1913) by W. R. Manning should also be consulted.

The story of Texas and the war with the United States is told in *Tejas, la Primera Desmembración de la República Mexicana* (1935) by Carlos Pereyra, *Santa Anna y la Guerra de*

Texas (1936) by José C. Valadés, *The United States and Mexico, 1821–1848* (1913) by G. L. Rives, and *Life of Stephen Austin* (1925) and *Mexico and Texas* (1928) by E. C. Barker. *Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico* (1916) by W. R. Manning is important for its backgrounds.

The life of the times is depicted in the voluminous novel *De Santa Anna a la Reforma* (1902–1903) by Victoriano Salado Álvarez and, from a Protestant viewpoint, *Life in Mexico* (1843) by Madame Calderón de la Barca. *Mexico, Its Peasants and Its Priests* (1856) by Robert A. Wilson is a classic of the type of bigoted writing that has served to blacken the Spanish and Catholic tradition in Mexico. *Alamán* (1938) by José C. Valadés is a competent study of the historian and statesman who was one of the principal steadying influences of the era.

The Reform. A great many works are available dealing with Juarez, the central figure of the Reform, practically all written in the Liberal tradition. Thus may be named *Juárez, Su Obra y Su Tiempo* (1905–1906) by Justo Sierra, *Juárez, Su Interpretación Humana* (1928) by J. M. Puig Casauranc, *A Life of Juárez* (1894) by U. R. Burke, and *Juárez el Impasible* (1933) by Hector Pérez Martínez. More critical in tone are *Juárez y las Revoluciones de Ayutla y de Reforma* (1905) and *El Verdadero Juárez* (1904) by Francisco Bulnes. Among the replies to the stand of Bulnes may be listed *Juárez: Refutación . . . a Bulnes* (1904) by Genaro García and *Las Supuestas Traiciones de Juárez* (1907) by F. Iglesias Calderón. In sympathetic note also are *Vida de Benito Juárez* (1874) by Gustavo Baz, *La Reforma y Juárez* (1906) by Andrés Molina Enríquez, and *La Reforma* (1906) by Porfirio Parra.

Dealing more generally with the Reform, again with favor, are *Historia de la Revolución 1853–1855* (1856) by Anselmo de la Portilla, *Los Gobiernos de Álvarez y Comonfort* (1910) and *La Revolución de Ayutla, según el Archivo del General Doblado* (1910) by Genaro García, *La Gran Década Nacional* (1904–1906) by M. Galindo y Galindo, *Mexico in Transition* (1902) by W. Butler, and *Historia de la Administración de Lerdo de Tejada* (1888) by Vicente Riva Palacio. The Congressional debates during the writing of the Constitution of 1857 are given in

Historia del Congreso Estraordinario Constituyente en 1856 y 1857 (1857) by Francisco Zarco. The *Obras* (1872) of Melchior Ocampo also cast light on the philosophy of this movement. Attitudes of the United States during this period are reflected in *Personal Memoirs,* Vol. II (1888), of Gen. P. H. Sheridan and *Mexican Policy Under Buchanan* (Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1910) by James Borton Buchanan. The general background of events is presented in *History of Mexico,* Vols. V and VI (1883–1888), by H. H. Bancroft; *México a Través de los Siglos,* Vol. V (1887–1889), by Vicente Riva Palacio; and the anti-Catholic *From Empire to Republic* (1903) by A. H. Noll.

The Catholic attitude toward the transition is set forth in *Historia de Méjico,* Vol. XIV (1877–1882), by Niceto de Zamacois; *México desde 1808 hasta 1867,* Vol. II (1871–1872), by Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz; *Un Siglo de Méjico* (1937) by Alfonso Junco; and *Historia de la Iglesia en México* (1928) by Mariano Cuevas, S.J. *El Porvenir de México* (1851) by Luis G. Cuevas should be consulted, and the pamphlet *Fué Juárez Demócrata?* (1939) by Alberto María Carreño will offer some useful indications.

The Second Empire. Perhaps the best general account is to be found in *México desde 1808 hasta 1867,* Vols. III and IV (1871–1872), by Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz. Together with this should be taken pertinent chapters in *Un Siglo de Méjico* (1937) and *La Traición de Querétaro* (1930) by Alfonso Junco; *La Intervención y el Imperio* (1903) by Victoriano Salado Álvarez; and indications provided in the *Documentos Inéditos o Muy Raros para la Historia de México* by Genaro García and Carlos Pereyra (eds.), particularly dealing with secret correspondence of the principal interventionists and with the French intervention. Also worthy of note are *Le Mexique et L'Intervention Européenñe* (1862) by E. Lefèvre and *L'Élévation et la Chute de L'Empereur Maximilien* (1868); *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico* (trans. 1934) by Count Corti; *The Establishment of Maximilian's Empire* (1918) by John Musser; and *The Mexican Adventure* (1935) by Daniel Dawson. *El Verdadero Juárez y la Verdad sobre la Intervención y el Imperio* (1904) by

Francisco Bulnes presents a fairly reliable and impartial view of the tactics employed by both Imperialists and Republicans. The reaction of the United States is competently handled in *The Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy* (1909) by J. M. Callahan.

Dealing personally with Maximilian, may be listed *Recuerdos di Mi Vida* (1869) by Maximilian; *Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico* (trans. in 1934) by José Luis Blasio, the devoted secretary of the Emperor; *Recuerdos de México* (1870) by his personal physician, Dr. Samuel Basch; *Fernando Maximiliano, Noticias Biográficas* (1861) by José María Gutiérrez de Estrada; and the Mexican diaries (1868) of the Prince and Princess Salm-Salm. The trial of the Emperor is recounted in *Causa de Fernando Maximiliano* (1868) by M. Villanueva (ed.). The causes alleged for his execution are set forth in *El Fusalimento de Maximiliano de Hapsburgo* (4th ed., 1901) by Benito Juárez. His defense is taken up in *Maximiliano Emperador de Méjico no Fué Traidor* (1907) by José Antonio Septién y Llata. The story of his faithful aide, *Le General Miguel Miramón* (1886), is honestly told by Victor Daran. A readable but rather frivolous in tone recent biography and rehearsal is *Phantom Crown* (1939) by Bertita Harding.

The Era of Díaz. Of the biographies of Díaz written by Mexicans, the best and most objective seems to be *Elevación y Caída de Porfirio Díaz* (1921) by José López-Portillo y Rojas. *Porfirio Díaz* (1887) by H. H. Bancroft was written at the beginning of Díaz' presidential career as a political and cultural build-up. The same title (1910) by José F. Godoy is a eulogy of Díaz' material achievements, without critical analysis. *Díaz, Master of Mexico* (1911) by J. Creelman likewise gives a picture of the golden age. *El General Porfirio Díaz* (1903) by Bernardo Reyes presents the story of Díaz' military exploits. A competent critical analysis is available in *El Porfirismo* (1941) by José C. Valadés. *Porfirio Díaz* (1932) by Carleton Beals is a thorough job, but written in a hostile and cynical spirit against the society and institutions of the era. An intelligent and sympathetic picture of Mexican culture during this time is given in *The Awakening of a Nation* (1904) by Charles Lummis; the perennial

Viva México (1908) by C. M. Flandrau, although cleverly written, is a hit-and-run piece of work so far as the Church and general cultural life are concerned.

General résumés of the era to be consulted include Francisco Bulnes' *The Whole Truth About Mexico* (1916) and *El Verdadero Díaz* (1920), also the *Historia de México desde la Restauración de la República hasta la Caída de Porfirio Díaz* (1917) by Ricardo García Granados, *Los Grandes Problemas Nacionales* (1909) by Andrés Molina Enríquez, and *La Constitución y la Dictadura* (1912) by Emilio Rabasa. Reflections of a critical nature on the origins of the regime are provided in *La Sucesión Presidencial en 1876* (1892) by José María Iglesias.

The revolt from Porfirism is heralded in the comparatively mild *La Sucesión Presidential de 1910* (1908) by Francisco I. Madero. Thereafter, a stream of works is unloosed, including *El Antiguo Régimen y la Revolución* (1911) by Antonio Manero, *La Revolución y Francisco Madero* (1912) by Roque Estrada, *De Porfirio Díaz a Francisco Madero* (1912) by Luis Lara Pardo, *Diez Años de Guerra* (1922) by Manuel Bonilla, *Obras Políticas* (1921) by Blas Urrea (Luis Cabrera), *De Mi Vida* (1929–1930) by Rodolfo Reyes, *Memorias Políticas* (1933) by Francisco Vásquez Gómez, and the intense autobiography *Ulises Criollo* (1935) by José Vasconcelos.

Aspects of social problems emerging from the era are discussed in *Historia de la Revolución Social en México* (1915) by José Rodríguez del Castillo and *El Problema Rural de México* (1917), *El Problema Ferrocarrilero* (1915), and *El Aspecto Agrario de la Revolución Mexicana* (1919) by Fernando González Rao.

The Revolution. An avalanche of literature has poured out of the Revolution, much of it contributed by the generals who helped to make history and an increasing amount the gestation of government presses. Inasmuch as the Revolution has undergone radical evolutions and passed through various stages, it is possible here to indicate merely some of the higher lights. For the backgrounds, reference should be made to some of the works already mentioned under the era of Díaz; for example, *Elevación y Caída de Porfirio Díaz* (1921) by José López-Portillo y

Rojas, *The Whole Truth About Mexico* (1916) by Francisco Bulnes, *De Porfirio Díaz a Francisco Madero* (1912) by Luis Lara Pardo, and *De La Dictadura a la Anarquía* (1914) by Ramón Prida. The dark days of Madero's fall and the Huerta interlude are described in *La Decena Roja* (1913) by G. N. Espinosa, *Los Últimos Díaz del Presidente Madero* (1917) by M. Márquez Sterling, and *El Presidente Huerta* (1913) by M. Doblado. Vivid backgrounds in the rapid succession of events are given in *A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico* (1916), *Intimate Pages of Mexican History* (1920), and *Diplomatic Days* (1917) by E. L. O'Shaughnessy.

The case for Carranza is built up in *Carranza y la Revolución de México* (1916) by E. González-Blanco and *Juárez-Carranza* (1918) by Antonio Rivera de la Torre. *Carranza, Sus Amigos, Sus Enemigos* (1935) by Bernardino Mena Brito tries to give both sides a hearing. Coldly critical of the Carranza-Constitutionalist movement are *Un Siglo de Méjico* (1934) and *Carranza y los Orígenes de Su Rebelión* (1935) by Alfonso Junco, *Carranza and His Bolshevik Regime* (1920) and *Al Margen de la Constitución de 1917* (1919) by J. Vera Estañol, *Mexico Under Carranza* (1919) by Thomas E. Gibbon, and *Is Mexico Worth Saving?* (1920) by George Agnew Chamberlain. *La Caída de Carranza* (1920) by José Vasconcelos sums up the weaknesses of this regime.

The intervention of the United States, particularly under President Wilson, is discussed in *A Orillas del Hudson* (1920) and *El Intervencionismo de Mr. Wilson en México* (1915) by M. L. Guzmán, *The Mexican Revolution and the United States* (1926) by Charles W. Hackett, *John Lind of Minnesota* (1935) by G. M. Stephenson, and *The Mexican Policy of President Woodrow Wilson* (1916) by M. Calero.

The part played by the bandit Pancho Villa is described in *Here Comes Pancho Villa* (1930) by Louis Stephens; that of the agrarians is told in *Emiliano Zapata* (1934) by Baltasar Dromundo and in *Tempest Over Mexico* (1935) by Rosa King for the state of Morelos. Álvaro Obregón tells his own bloody, swashbuckling story in *Ocho Mil Kilómetros en Campaña*

(1917). This same revolutionary is lauded to the skies for obvious political reasons in *President Obregón—A World Reformer* (1923) by E. J. Dillon, author also of *Mexico on the Verge* (1921). Various viewpoints are expressed by various participants in the movements, in *Mi Contribución al Nuevo Régimen* (1936) by Alberto Pani; *Mi Actuación Revolucionaria en Yucatán* (1918) by the Socialist Salvador Alvarado; *La Revolución Mexicana* (1936) by Frederico González Garza; and the memoirs of two disillusioned revolutionists, *La Tormenta* (1936) by José Vasconcelos and *Veinte Años Después* (1938) by Blas Urrea (Luis Cabrera). Interesting side lights are also given of various phases of the Revolution in *Insurgent Mexico* (1913) by John Reed; *The Political Shame of Mexico* (1914) by E. I. Bell; *El Águila y la Serpiente* (1928; trans. 1930) by M. L. Guzmán; *México Revolucionario* (1920) by Alfredo Breceda; *Diez Años de Guerra* (1922) by Manuel Bonilla, Jr.; and *Mi Labor en Servicio de México* (1934) by T. Esquivel Obregón. An important résumé of events is given in *Historia Política de la Revolución* (1938) by Miguel Alessio Robles. Djed Bórquez in his *Calles* (1925) praises that figure with political fervor. *El Verdadero Calles* (1933) by Amado Chaverri Matamoros (ed.) is an interesting album of what leading politicians were saying at the height of the career of "the strong man."

A compendious survey of the social problems and projects of Mexico, particularly during the regimes of Obregón and Calles, is given in *Mexico and Its Heritage* (1934) by Ernest Gruening. In its cultural interpretations this book follows the anti-Spanish pattern and smacks of yellow journalism in its attacks upon the Catholic Church. Of antireligious character is *La Revolución Mexicana* (1930) by the Spanish radical Luis Araquistain. *Intervention in Mexico* (1919) by Samuel Guy Inman reflects the mind of a Protestant evangelist in Latin America. The Catholic reaction to the excesses of the Carranza-Villa-Obregón campaigns are vividly set forth in *Book of the Red and Yellow* (1915) by Francis C. Kelley; his book, *Blood-Drenched Altars* (1935), includes a critical examination of the position of the Church under Calles. A Catholic interpretation is also provided in *The Mexican Reformation* (1927) by George

Barnard. *Pages of History* (1936) by Alberto María Carreño should be consulted as the observations of an eyewitness and historian during the Calles Cárdenas persecution of the Church. Other surveys of reliable character dealing with this matter are *Chaos in Mexico* (1935) by Charles A. MacFarland, *Mexican Martyrdom* (1936) by Wilfred Parsons, S.J., and *No God Next Door* (1935) by Michael Kenny, S.J. *The Mexican Gang and Mexican Headquarters* (1928) by Fráncis McCullagh views the political motives. Consult also *Present Condition of the Church in Mexico* (1935) by William Franklin Sands.

The New Social Plan. Respecting the religious aspects of the New Social Plan, the books named in the last paragraph above may be taken as providing important indications. In addition, official and semiofficial statements of the cultural and educational program of the Six Year Plan are given in *La Escuela Socialista Mexicana* (1935) by J. Jesús de la Rosa P., *Socialización de la Cultura* (1935) by Ignacio García Téllez, *La Educación Socialista* (1935) by C. Trejo Lerdo de Tejada, *México en Pensamiento y en Acción* (1926) by Rosendo Salazar, *Mexico, a Revolution by Education* (1936) by G. I. Sánchez, and *Práctica de Educación Irreligiosa* (1934) by Germán List Arzubide. Generally sympathetic with the new social planning are *Mexico Reborn* (1939) by Verna Carleton Millan and *Renascent Mexico* (1935) by Hubert Herring and Herbert Weinstock (eds.).

For a balanced and representative statement on social problems, one may consult *Mexico* (1928) by J. Fred Rippy, José Vasconcelos, and Guy Stevens; also *Aspects of Mexican Civilization* (1926) by José Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio; and *Economic and Social Program of Mexico* (1935) by W. W. Cumberland, R. A. McGowan, Joseph Thorning, and Ramón Beteta. Graphic studies of native life, but hasty in generalization and marked with a familiar bias, are *Mexican Maze* (1931) by Carleton Beals and *Mexico, a Study of Two Americas* (1935) by Stuart Chase. The same faults vitiate Anita Brenner's *Idols Behind Altars* (1929). Although taking a rather dispeptic view of Mexico as a whole, *Another Mexico* (1939) by Grahame Greene gives a realistic picture of the social revolution in Tabasco under Canabal. A competent Catholic view of forces in contemporary Mexico is *Mexico: An Object Lesson* (1939) by Evelyn Waugh.

The general agrarian problem is dispassionately and, on the whole, fairly presented in *Peace by Revolution* (1933) by Frank Tannenbaum. The solution adopted in the Six Year Plan is advocated in *The Ejido, Mexico's Way Out* (1937), a competent study, by Eyler N. Simpson. A careful study is also presented in *Diversos Aspectos del Problema Agrario* (1931) by José S. Noriega. Catholic studies in the solution of agrarian distributivism are provided in *La Cuestión Agraria* (1939) by Ramiro Camacho and *El Agrarismo* (1938, reprinted from the periodical *Ábside*) by José T. Moreno. The case against the government's plan of expropriation is expressed in *El Suplicio del Hacendado* (1938) by Pablo Martínez del Río and *La Tragedia de Yucatán* (1941) by Gustavo Molina Font; also by R. H. K. Marett in *An Eye Witness of Mexico* (1939); and, with respect to oil properties, by Evelyn Waugh in pertinent chapters of his book just referred to.

Labor problems are presented in *Organized Labor in Mexico* (1934) by Marjorie Clark. *Modern Mexico and Its Problems* (1927) by J. W. Brown is a glorification of Luis Morones and an indictment of most things that went before. *La Libertad Sindical en México* (1926) by Vicente Lombardo Toledano and subsequent books by this leader are immersed in Marxist principles. The general proletarian trend is outlined in its larger and political aspects in *Cárdenas Frente a Calles* (1935) by J. Manuel Corro Viña, *El Sentido Social del Proceso Histórico de México* (1935) by J. M. Puig Casauranc, *Hacia la República Socialista de los Trabajadores* (1938) by Juan M. Carrasco Cuéllar, and *La Política Demográfica de México* (1935) by Gilberto Loyo. It must be remembered that the ideas expressed in these works may be quickly supplanted by others, as the political scene changes; only by constant reference to the current output of literature can one keep abreast of developments. *Veinte Años Después* (1937) by Blas Urrea (Luis Cabrera) is an example of the type of disillusion to which even the Revolutionaries are susceptible. An interesting study of United States policy is afforded in *Dwight Morrow* (1935) by Harold Nicolson.

A significant reflection of social trends is available in the *Index of Contempory Mexican Painting* (1935) by Agustín Velázquez Chávez. *Portrait of Mexico* (1937) by Bertram D. Wolfe and illustrated with paintings and frescoes of Communist Diego Rivera is also an expression of revolutionary thinking of generally iconoclastic mold.

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